McAfee Secure

Cisco 300-410 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-410

Exam Name Implementing Cisco Enterprise Advanced Routing and Services (ENARSI)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Enterprise

Cisco 300-410 Bundle $25.00
300-410 Sample 1 300-410 Sample 2 300-410 Sample 3 300-410 Sample 4 300-410 Sample 5 300-410 Sample 6 300-410 Sample 7 300-410 Sample 8 300-410 Sample 9 300-410 Sample 10

100% Cisco 300-410 Guaranteed Success With Testking Training Materials

Get Real 300-410 Exam Questions & Expert Verified Answers as Experienced on the Real Exam!

  • Questions & Answers

    300-410 Questions & Answers

    498 Questions & Answers

    The ultimate exam preparation tool, Questions & Answers mirrors the actual 300-410 exam while allowing you to hone and measure every aspect of your test-taking ability.

  • 300-410 Video Course

    300-410 Training Course

    129 Video Lectures

    300-410 Video Course is developed by Cisco Professionals to help you pass the 300-410 exam.

    Description

    This course will improve your knowledge and skills required to pass Implementing Cisco Enterprise Advanced Routing and Services (ENARSI) exam.

Implementing Cisco Enterprise Advanced Routing and Services (ENARSI) (300-410) Practice Tests

Satisfaction Guaranteed

Money Back Guarantee

Testking provides hassle-free money back guarantee with our products. That is because we have 100% trust in the abilities of our professional and experience product team, and our record is a proof of that.

99.6% PASS RATE
Total Cost: $164.98
Bundle Price: $139.98

Purchase Individually

  • Questions & Answers

    Questions & Answers

    498 Questions

    $124.99
  • 300-410 Video Course

    Training Course

    129 Video Lectures

    $39.99

Cisco 300-410 Practice Test 13

Question 120

At the Southridge banking office, an IPv4 ACL on R-SRG-EDGE1 allows two explicit applications, but an otherwise legitimate management source loses connectivity after the ACL is applied. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Apply the IPv6 ACL to the correct routed interface and incoming direction.
  2. Correct the time-range definition and the device time reference used by the ACL.
  3. Place the source-only standard ACL close to the intended destination or use an appropriate extended ACL.
  4. Add a narrowly scoped permit for the authorized source and service above the implicit deny.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The fault at the Southridge banking office has a specific cause. Packets that do not match an ACL permit statement are denied by the implicit final rule. Add a narrowly scoped permit for the authorized source and service above the implicit deny. Confirm success against this result: The authorized management flow passes while test traffic outside the approved policy remains blocked.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: The IPv6 access-classification policy is not attached to the traffic ingress path being protected. The stated evidence at the Southridge banking office instead concerns ipv4 acl implicit deny.

B:

This could help where time-based acl inactive schedule is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Southridge banking office. Packets that do not match an ACL permit statement are denied by the implicit final rule.

C:

That change targets standard acl source-only matching, not the reported ipv4 acl implicit deny fault at the Southridge banking office. Packets that do not match an ACL permit statement are denied by the implicit final rule.

Question 121

At the Westlake utility network, a standard IPv4 ACL intended to limit access to one destination is blocking the same source subnet's unrelated traffic on another network. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Apply the IPv6 ACL to the correct routed interface and incoming direction.
  2. Correct the time-range definition and the device time reference used by the ACL.
  3. Place the source-only standard ACL close to the intended destination or use an appropriate extended ACL.
  4. Use strict uRPF where the topology supports it, or explicitly document loose-mode reachability-only validation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Place the source-only standard ACL close to the intended destination or use an appropriate extended ACL. That directly addresses the documented condition at the Westlake utility network: A standard IPv4 ACL matches source addresses, so placement can affect more destinations than intended. Confirmation should show that only the designated destination is restricted while unrelated paths from the same source remain usable.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That change targets ipv6 acl interface direction, not the reported standard acl source-only matching fault at the Westlake utility network. A standard IPv4 ACL matches source addresses, so placement can affect more destinations than intended.

B:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: The time-based ACL entry is inactive at the time packets arrive despite matching source and destination criteria. The stated evidence at the Westlake utility network instead concerns standard acl source-only matching.

D:

That change targets urpf loose versus strict source check, not the reported standard acl source-only matching fault at the Westlake utility network. A standard IPv4 ACL matches source addresses, so placement can affect more destinations than intended.

Question 122

At the Pinecrest freight terminal, a standard IPv4 ACL intended to limit access to one destination is blocking the same source subnet's unrelated traffic on another network. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Place the source-only standard ACL close to the intended destination or use an appropriate extended ACL.
  2. Select a suitable source-validation mode and design that accounts for legitimate asymmetric paths.
  3. Recalculate the wildcard mask to match precisely the intended IPv4 address block.
  4. Correct the time-range definition and the device time reference used by the ACL.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Place the source-only standard ACL close to the intended destination or use an appropriate extended ACL. That directly addresses the documented condition at the Pinecrest freight terminal: A standard IPv4 ACL matches source addresses, so placement can affect more destinations than intended. Confirmation should show that only the designated destination is restricted while unrelated paths from the same source remain usable.

Incorrect Answers

B:

That change targets urpf strict in asymmetric topology, not the reported standard acl source-only matching fault at the Pinecrest freight terminal. A standard IPv4 ACL matches source addresses, so placement can affect more destinations than intended.

C:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: Wildcard bits determine which address positions are ignored, and the current value does not represent the intended network. The stated evidence at the Pinecrest freight terminal instead concerns standard acl source-only matching.

D:

This could help where time-based acl inactive schedule is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Pinecrest freight terminal. A standard IPv4 ACL matches source addresses, so placement can affect more destinations than intended.

Question 123

At the Cedarfield retail branch, R-CED-BR1 has an extended ACL with the intended source and destination criteria, but the undesired packets still pass because the ACL is applied outbound on an unrelated interface. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Correct the time-range definition and the device time reference used by the ACL.
  2. Attach the ACL in the correct direction on the interface that actually sees the traffic.
  3. Use strict uRPF where the topology supports it, or explicitly document loose-mode reachability-only validation.
  4. Add a narrowly scoped permit for the authorized source and service above the implicit deny.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Attach the ACL in the correct direction on the interface that actually sees the traffic. That directly addresses the documented condition at the Cedarfield retail branch: The ACL attachment direction or interface does not intersect the targeted packet flow. Confirmation should show that counters increment on the matching deny entry and the disallowed application flow is blocked.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: The time-based ACL entry is inactive at the time packets arrive despite matching source and destination criteria. The stated evidence at the Cedarfield retail branch instead concerns extended acl inbound/outbound orientation.

C:

That change targets urpf loose versus strict source check, not the reported extended acl inbound/outbound orientation fault at the Cedarfield retail branch. The ACL attachment direction or interface does not intersect the targeted packet flow.

D:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: Packets that do not match an ACL permit statement are denied by the implicit final rule. The stated evidence at the Cedarfield retail branch instead concerns extended acl inbound/outbound orientation.

Question 124

At the Bluewater clinical network, R-BLU-PE1 has an extended ACL with the intended source and destination criteria, but the undesired packets still pass because the ACL is applied outbound on an unrelated interface. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Add a narrowly scoped permit for the authorized source and service above the implicit deny.
  2. Attach the ACL in the correct direction on the interface that actually sees the traffic.
  3. Correct the time-range definition and the device time reference used by the ACL.
  4. Place the source-only standard ACL close to the intended destination or use an appropriate extended ACL.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The fault at the Bluewater clinical network has a specific cause. The ACL attachment direction or interface does not intersect the targeted packet flow. Attach the ACL in the correct direction on the interface that actually sees the traffic. Confirm success against this result: Counters increment on the matching deny entry and the disallowed application flow is blocked.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That change targets ipv4 acl implicit deny, not the reported extended acl inbound/outbound orientation fault at the Bluewater clinical network. The ACL attachment direction or interface does not intersect the targeted packet flow.

C:

This could help where time-based acl inactive schedule is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Bluewater clinical network. The ACL attachment direction or interface does not intersect the targeted packet flow.

D:

That change targets standard acl source-only matching, not the reported extended acl inbound/outbound orientation fault at the Bluewater clinical network. The ACL attachment direction or interface does not intersect the targeted packet flow.

Question 125

At the Harborview media campus, an ACL on R-HAR-DIST1 meant to cover 10.127.0.0/16 uses a wildcard mask that unintentionally matches only part of the permitted source range. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Apply the IPv6 ACL to the correct routed interface and incoming direction.
  2. Attach the ACL in the correct direction on the interface that actually sees the traffic.
  3. Recalculate the wildcard mask to match precisely the intended IPv4 address block.
  4. Use strict uRPF where the topology supports it, or explicitly document loose-mode reachability-only validation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The fault at the Harborview media campus has a specific cause. Wildcard bits determine which address positions are ignored, and the current value does not represent the intended network. Recalculate the wildcard mask to match precisely the intended IPv4 address block. Confirm success against this result: Addresses inside the approved range match while adjacent unauthorized ranges do not.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This could help where ipv6 acl interface direction is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Harborview media campus. Wildcard bits determine which address positions are ignored, and the current value does not represent the intended network.

B:

That change targets extended acl inbound/outbound orientation, not the reported ipv4 wildcard mask matching fault at the Harborview media campus. Wildcard bits determine which address positions are ignored, and the current value does not represent the intended network.

D:

This could help where urpf loose versus strict source check is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Harborview media campus. Wildcard bits determine which address positions are ignored, and the current value does not represent the intended network.

Question 126

At the Ironwood training campus, an ACL on R-IRN-RT1 meant to cover 10.248.0.0/16 uses a wildcard mask that unintentionally matches only part of the permitted source range. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Select a suitable source-validation mode and design that accounts for legitimate asymmetric paths.
  2. Use strict uRPF where the topology supports it, or explicitly document loose-mode reachability-only validation.
  3. Add a narrowly scoped permit for the authorized source and service above the implicit deny.
  4. Recalculate the wildcard mask to match precisely the intended IPv4 address block.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The fault at the Ironwood training campus has a specific cause. Wildcard bits determine which address positions are ignored, and the current value does not represent the intended network. Recalculate the wildcard mask to match precisely the intended IPv4 address block. Confirm success against this result: Addresses inside the approved range match while adjacent unauthorized ranges do not.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: Strict uRPF rejects packets whose incoming interface is not the router's reverse best path toward the source. The stated evidence at the Ironwood training campus instead concerns ipv4 wildcard mask matching.

B:

This could help where urpf loose versus strict source check is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Ironwood training campus. Wildcard bits determine which address positions are ignored, and the current value does not represent the intended network.

C:

That change targets ipv4 acl implicit deny, not the reported ipv4 wildcard mask matching fault at the Ironwood training campus. Wildcard bits determine which address positions are ignored, and the current value does not represent the intended network.

Question 127

At the Hillcrest research lab, a time-range ACL should permit contractor access during the approved maintenance window, but legitimate traffic remains denied despite a matching IP rule. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Apply the IPv6 ACL to the correct routed interface and incoming direction.
  2. Correct the time-range definition and the device time reference used by the ACL.
  3. Select a suitable source-validation mode and design that accounts for legitimate asymmetric paths.
  4. Place the source-only standard ACL close to the intended destination or use an appropriate extended ACL.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The fault at the Hillcrest research lab has a specific cause. The time-based ACL entry is inactive at the time packets arrive despite matching source and destination criteria. Correct the time-range definition and the device time reference used by the ACL. Confirm success against this result: The permit takes effect only during the intended window according to a synchronized clock.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That change targets ipv6 acl interface direction, not the reported time-based acl inactive schedule fault at the Hillcrest research lab. The time-based ACL entry is inactive at the time packets arrive despite matching source and destination criteria.

C:

This could help where urpf strict in asymmetric topology is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Hillcrest research lab. The time-based ACL entry is inactive at the time packets arrive despite matching source and destination criteria.

D:

That change targets standard acl source-only matching, not the reported time-based acl inactive schedule fault at the Hillcrest research lab. The time-based ACL entry is inactive at the time packets arrive despite matching source and destination criteria.

Question 128

At the Northport logistics site, a time-range ACL should permit contractor access during the approved maintenance window, but legitimate traffic remains denied despite a matching IP rule. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Select a suitable source-validation mode and design that accounts for legitimate asymmetric paths.
  2. Correct the time-range definition and the device time reference used by the ACL.
  3. Use strict uRPF where the topology supports it, or explicitly document loose-mode reachability-only validation.
  4. Place the source-only standard ACL close to the intended destination or use an appropriate extended ACL.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

At the Northport logistics site, the evidence points to a concrete mechanism rather than a generic outage. The time-based ACL entry is inactive at the time packets arrive despite matching source and destination criteria. Correct the time-range definition and the device time reference used by the ACL. Confirm it by checking that the permit takes effect only during the intended window according to a synchronized clock.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This could help where urpf strict in asymmetric topology is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Northport logistics site. The time-based ACL entry is inactive at the time packets arrive despite matching source and destination criteria.

C:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: Loose uRPF checks that a source route exists, not that the packet came on the best reverse-path interface. The stated evidence at the Northport logistics site instead concerns time-based acl inactive schedule.

D:

This could help where standard acl source-only matching is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Northport logistics site. The time-based ACL entry is inactive at the time packets arrive despite matching source and destination criteria.

Question 129

At the Elmfield engineering office, an IPv6 traffic filter is configured to block unsolicited management connections but traffic still reaches R-ELM-EDGE1 over the IPv6-facing ingress link. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Place the source-only standard ACL close to the intended destination or use an appropriate extended ACL.
  2. Attach the ACL in the correct direction on the interface that actually sees the traffic.
  3. Apply the IPv6 ACL to the correct routed interface and incoming direction.
  4. Recalculate the wildcard mask to match precisely the intended IPv4 address block.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

At the Elmfield engineering office, the evidence points to a concrete mechanism rather than a generic outage. The IPv6 access-classification policy is not attached to the traffic ingress path being protected. Apply the IPv6 ACL to the correct routed interface and incoming direction. Confirm it by checking that authorized IPv6 management sources reach the device and disallowed attempts increment deny counters.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: A standard IPv4 ACL matches source addresses, so placement can affect more destinations than intended. The stated evidence at the Elmfield engineering office instead concerns ipv6 acl interface direction.

B:

This could help where extended acl inbound/outbound orientation is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Elmfield engineering office. The IPv6 access-classification policy is not attached to the traffic ingress path being protected.

D:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: Wildcard bits determine which address positions are ignored, and the current value does not represent the intended network. The stated evidence at the Elmfield engineering office instead concerns ipv6 acl interface direction.

Question 130

At the Granite manufacturing plant, an IPv6 traffic filter is configured to block unsolicited management connections but traffic still reaches R-GRA-PE1 over the IPv6-facing ingress link. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Apply the IPv6 ACL to the correct routed interface and incoming direction.
  2. Add a narrowly scoped permit for the authorized source and service above the implicit deny.
  3. Recalculate the wildcard mask to match precisely the intended IPv4 address block.
  4. Correct the time-range definition and the device time reference used by the ACL.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

At the Granite manufacturing plant, the evidence points to a concrete mechanism rather than a generic outage. The IPv6 access-classification policy is not attached to the traffic ingress path being protected. Apply the IPv6 ACL to the correct routed interface and incoming direction. Confirm it by checking that authorized IPv6 management sources reach the device and disallowed attempts increment deny counters.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: Packets that do not match an ACL permit statement are denied by the implicit final rule. The stated evidence at the Granite manufacturing plant instead concerns ipv6 acl interface direction.

C:

This could help where ipv4 wildcard mask matching is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Granite manufacturing plant. The IPv6 access-classification policy is not attached to the traffic ingress path being protected.

D:

That change targets time-based acl inactive schedule, not the reported ipv6 acl interface direction fault at the Granite manufacturing plant. The IPv6 access-classification policy is not attached to the traffic ingress path being protected.