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Cisco 300-410 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-410

Exam Name Implementing Cisco Enterprise Advanced Routing and Services (ENARSI)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Enterprise

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Cisco 300-410 Practice Test 14

Question 130

At the Granite manufacturing plant, an IPv6 traffic filter is configured to block unsolicited management connections but traffic still reaches R-GRA-PE1 over the IPv6-facing ingress link. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Apply the IPv6 ACL to the correct routed interface and incoming direction.
  2. Add a narrowly scoped permit for the authorized source and service above the implicit deny.
  3. Recalculate the wildcard mask to match precisely the intended IPv4 address block.
  4. Correct the time-range definition and the device time reference used by the ACL.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

At the Granite manufacturing plant, the evidence points to a concrete mechanism rather than a generic outage. The IPv6 access-classification policy is not attached to the traffic ingress path being protected. Apply the IPv6 ACL to the correct routed interface and incoming direction. Confirm it by checking that authorized IPv6 management sources reach the device and disallowed attempts increment deny counters.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: Packets that do not match an ACL permit statement are denied by the implicit final rule. The stated evidence at the Granite manufacturing plant instead concerns ipv6 acl interface direction.

C:

This could help where ipv4 wildcard mask matching is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Granite manufacturing plant. The IPv6 access-classification policy is not attached to the traffic ingress path being protected.

D:

That change targets time-based acl inactive schedule, not the reported ipv6 acl interface direction fault at the Granite manufacturing plant. The IPv6 access-classification policy is not attached to the traffic ingress path being protected.

Question 131

At the Aspen agricultural office, valid return traffic arrives over a secondary WAN circuit and is dropped by strict uRPF because the best route to its source points to the primary circuit. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Select a suitable source-validation mode and design that accounts for legitimate asymmetric paths.
  2. Correct the time-range definition and the device time reference used by the ACL.
  3. Place the source-only standard ACL close to the intended destination or use an appropriate extended ACL.
  4. Attach the ACL in the correct direction on the interface that actually sees the traffic.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Select a suitable source-validation mode and design that accounts for legitimate asymmetric paths. That directly addresses the documented condition at the Aspen agricultural office: Strict uRPF rejects packets whose incoming interface is not the router's reverse best path toward the source. Confirmation should show that legitimate asymmetric traffic passes under the approved anti-spoofing design while forged sources remain filtered.

Incorrect Answers

B:

That change targets time-based acl inactive schedule, not the reported urpf strict in asymmetric topology fault at the Aspen agricultural office. Strict uRPF rejects packets whose incoming interface is not the router's reverse best path toward the source.

C:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: A standard IPv4 ACL matches source addresses, so placement can affect more destinations than intended. The stated evidence at the Aspen agricultural office instead concerns urpf strict in asymmetric topology.

D:

This could help where extended acl inbound/outbound orientation is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Aspen agricultural office. Strict uRPF rejects packets whose incoming interface is not the router's reverse best path toward the source.

Question 132

At the Oakbridge insurance office, valid return traffic arrives over a secondary WAN circuit and is dropped by strict uRPF because the best route to its source points to the primary circuit. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Use strict uRPF where the topology supports it, or explicitly document loose-mode reachability-only validation.
  2. Place the source-only standard ACL close to the intended destination or use an appropriate extended ACL.
  3. Attach the ACL in the correct direction on the interface that actually sees the traffic.
  4. Select a suitable source-validation mode and design that accounts for legitimate asymmetric paths.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The fault at the Oakbridge insurance office has a specific cause. Strict uRPF rejects packets whose incoming interface is not the router's reverse best path toward the source. Select a suitable source-validation mode and design that accounts for legitimate asymmetric paths. Confirm success against this result: Legitimate asymmetric traffic passes under the approved anti-spoofing design while forged sources remain filtered.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: Loose uRPF checks that a source route exists, not that the packet came on the best reverse-path interface. The stated evidence at the Oakbridge insurance office instead concerns urpf strict in asymmetric topology.

B:

This could help where standard acl source-only matching is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Oakbridge insurance office. Strict uRPF rejects packets whose incoming interface is not the router's reverse best path toward the source.

C:

That change targets extended acl inbound/outbound orientation, not the reported urpf strict in asymmetric topology fault at the Oakbridge insurance office. Strict uRPF rejects packets whose incoming interface is not the router's reverse best path toward the source.

Question 133

At the Redwood medical campus, administrators enable loose uRPF expecting to require every received packet to arrive on the best reverse-path interface. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Apply the IPv6 ACL to the correct routed interface and incoming direction.
  2. Place the source-only standard ACL close to the intended destination or use an appropriate extended ACL.
  3. Use strict uRPF where the topology supports it, or explicitly document loose-mode reachability-only validation.
  4. Select a suitable source-validation mode and design that accounts for legitimate asymmetric paths.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Use strict uRPF where the topology supports it, or explicitly document loose-mode reachability-only validation. That directly addresses the documented condition at the Redwood medical campus: Loose uRPF checks that a source route exists, not that the packet came on the best reverse-path interface. Confirmation should show that tests distinguish unreachable spoofed sources from reachable sources arriving over alternate paths.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That change targets ipv6 acl interface direction, not the reported urpf loose versus strict source check fault at the Redwood medical campus. Loose uRPF checks that a source route exists, not that the packet came on the best reverse-path interface.

B:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: A standard IPv4 ACL matches source addresses, so placement can affect more destinations than intended. The stated evidence at the Redwood medical campus instead concerns urpf loose versus strict source check.

D:

That change targets urpf strict in asymmetric topology, not the reported urpf loose versus strict source check fault at the Redwood medical campus. Loose uRPF checks that a source route exists, not that the packet came on the best reverse-path interface.

Question 134

At the Cedarbrook hospital, administrators enable loose uRPF expecting to require every received packet to arrive on the best reverse-path interface. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Recalculate the wildcard mask to match precisely the intended IPv4 address block.
  2. Place the source-only standard ACL close to the intended destination or use an appropriate extended ACL.
  3. Select a suitable source-validation mode and design that accounts for legitimate asymmetric paths.
  4. Use strict uRPF where the topology supports it, or explicitly document loose-mode reachability-only validation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Use strict uRPF where the topology supports it, or explicitly document loose-mode reachability-only validation. That directly addresses the documented condition at the Cedarbrook hospital: Loose uRPF checks that a source route exists, not that the packet came on the best reverse-path interface. Confirmation should show that tests distinguish unreachable spoofed sources from reachable sources arriving over alternate paths.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This could help where ipv4 wildcard mask matching is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Cedarbrook hospital. Loose uRPF checks that a source route exists, not that the packet came on the best reverse-path interface.

B:

That change targets standard acl source-only matching, not the reported urpf loose versus strict source check fault at the Cedarbrook hospital. Loose uRPF checks that a source route exists, not that the packet came on the best reverse-path interface.

C:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: Strict uRPF rejects packets whose incoming interface is not the router's reverse best path toward the source. The stated evidence at the Cedarbrook hospital instead concerns urpf loose versus strict source check.

Question 135

At the Bayview university campus, BGP TCP sessions flap during traffic bursts, while interface drops stay low; R-BAY-DIST1 shows CoPP drops in the class carrying BGP control traffic. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Use supported IPv6 ND inspection or snooping with trusted binding information on the access segment.
  2. Adjust the CoPP classification and authorized BGP control traffic rate according to measured demand and attack protection needs.
  3. Enable and verify AAA command accounting with a reachable, trusted logging/accounting destination.
  4. Correct the control-plane class match to identify OSPF protocol 89 and keep its intended policy limits.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Adjust the CoPP classification and authorized BGP control traffic rate according to measured demand and attack protection needs. That directly addresses the documented condition at the Bayview university campus: A restrictive control-plane policing class is discarding legitimate BGP packets. Confirmation should show that BGP sessions remain stable under normal load and the CoPP counters no longer show legitimate BGP loss.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: Forged neighbor advertisement information can poison IPv6 neighbor mappings on the LAN. The stated evidence at the Bayview university campus instead concerns copp control-plane bgp drops.

C:

That change targets aaa accounting gaps, not the reported copp control-plane bgp drops fault at the Bayview university campus. A restrictive control-plane policing class is discarding legitimate BGP packets.

D:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: The control-plane classifier does not match OSPF packets as expected. The stated evidence at the Bayview university campus instead concerns copp control-plane bgp drops.

Question 136

At the Clearwater library district, BGP TCP sessions flap during traffic bursts, while interface drops stay low; R-CLW-EDGE1 shows CoPP drops in the class carrying BGP control traffic. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Tune the SSH-management CoPP class for the legitimate approved workload without removing protective rate limits.
  2. Adjust the CoPP classification and authorized BGP control traffic rate according to measured demand and attack protection needs.
  3. Use supported IPv6 ND inspection or snooping with trusted binding information on the access segment.
  4. Correct the control-plane class match to identify OSPF protocol 89 and keep its intended policy limits.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The fault at the Clearwater library district has a specific cause. A restrictive control-plane policing class is discarding legitimate BGP packets. Adjust the CoPP classification and authorized BGP control traffic rate according to measured demand and attack protection needs. Confirm success against this result: BGP sessions remain stable under normal load and the CoPP counters no longer show legitimate BGP loss.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That change targets copp management ssh rate-limiting, not the reported copp control-plane bgp drops fault at the Clearwater library district. A restrictive control-plane policing class is discarding legitimate BGP packets.

C:

This could help where ipv6 neighbor discovery inspection is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Clearwater library district. A restrictive control-plane policing class is discarding legitimate BGP packets.

D:

That change targets copp protocol classification error, not the reported copp control-plane bgp drops fault at the Clearwater library district. A restrictive control-plane policing class is discarding legitimate BGP packets.

Question 137

At the Highland government office, R-HIG-RT1 needs to protect OSPF control packets, but the CoPP class map matches the wrong IP protocol number and fails to account for legitimate OSPF packets. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Apply DHCPv6 Guard on untrusted access ports, permitting only approved DHCPv6 server or relay sources.
  2. Correct the control-plane class match to identify OSPF protocol 89 and keep its intended policy limits.
  3. Enable and verify AAA command accounting with a reachable, trusted logging/accounting destination.
  4. Use supported IPv6 ND inspection or snooping with trusted binding information on the access segment.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

At the Highland government office, the evidence points to a concrete mechanism rather than a generic outage. The control-plane classifier does not match OSPF packets as expected. Correct the control-plane class match to identify OSPF protocol 89 and keep its intended policy limits. Confirm it by checking that coPP counters rise in the OSPF class during protocol activity without undesired adjacency loss.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This could help where ipv6 dhcpv6 guard is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Highland government office. The control-plane classifier does not match OSPF packets as expected.

C:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: Authentication and authorization are active, but command-level accounting records are not being collected. The stated evidence at the Highland government office instead concerns copp protocol classification error.

D:

This could help where ipv6 neighbor discovery inspection is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Highland government office. The control-plane classifier does not match OSPF packets as expected.

Question 138

At the Foothill municipal site, R-FOO-DIST1 needs to protect OSPF control packets, but the CoPP class map matches the wrong IP protocol number and fails to account for legitimate OSPF packets. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Correct the control-plane class match to identify OSPF protocol 89 and keep its intended policy limits.
  2. Apply IPv6 Source Guard with valid address binding data on the relevant untrusted access port.
  3. Apply DHCPv6 Guard on untrusted access ports, permitting only approved DHCPv6 server or relay sources.
  4. Use supported IPv6 ND inspection or snooping with trusted binding information on the access segment.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The fault at the Foothill municipal site has a specific cause. The control-plane classifier does not match OSPF packets as expected. Correct the control-plane class match to identify OSPF protocol 89 and keep its intended policy limits. Confirm success against this result: CoPP counters rise in the OSPF class during protocol activity without undesired adjacency loss.

Incorrect Answers

B:

This could help where ipv6 source guard and bindings is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Foothill municipal site. The control-plane classifier does not match OSPF packets as expected.

C:

That change targets ipv6 dhcpv6 guard, not the reported copp protocol classification error fault at the Foothill municipal site. The control-plane classifier does not match OSPF packets as expected.

D:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: Forged neighbor advertisement information can poison IPv6 neighbor mappings on the LAN. The stated evidence at the Foothill municipal site instead concerns copp protocol classification error.

Question 139

At the Silverstream data center, authorized SSH sessions to R-SIL-PE1 fail intermittently during routine automation runs, and the CoPP management class shows sustained packet drops. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Apply IPv6 Source Guard with valid address binding data on the relevant untrusted access port.
  2. Correct the control-plane class match to identify OSPF protocol 89 and keep its intended policy limits.
  3. Tune the SSH-management CoPP class for the legitimate approved workload without removing protective rate limits.
  4. Use supported IPv6 ND inspection or snooping with trusted binding information on the access segment.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Tune the SSH-management CoPP class for the legitimate approved workload without removing protective rate limits. That directly addresses the documented condition at the Silverstream data center: A too-small management control-plane policer drops permitted SSH traffic during ordinary operations. Confirmation should show that automated SSH sessions complete at the required rate while abusive traffic still triggers protection.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That change targets ipv6 source guard and bindings, not the reported copp management ssh rate-limiting fault at the Silverstream data center. A too-small management control-plane policer drops permitted SSH traffic during ordinary operations.

B:

This is appropriate for a different routing or network-control issue: The control-plane classifier does not match OSPF packets as expected. The stated evidence at the Silverstream data center instead concerns copp management ssh rate-limiting.

D:

That change targets ipv6 neighbor discovery inspection, not the reported copp management ssh rate-limiting fault at the Silverstream data center. A too-small management control-plane policer drops permitted SSH traffic during ordinary operations.

Question 140

At the Brookstone distribution branch, authorized SSH sessions to R-BRK-EDGE1 fail intermittently during routine automation runs, and the CoPP management class shows sustained packet drops. Which operational change most directly addresses the fault described?

  1. Apply DHCPv6 Guard on untrusted access ports, permitting only approved DHCPv6 server or relay sources.
  2. Enable and verify AAA command accounting with a reachable, trusted logging/accounting destination.
  3. Tune the SSH-management CoPP class for the legitimate approved workload without removing protective rate limits.
  4. Enable IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard on untrusted ports with trusted router uplinks correctly identified.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The fault at the Brookstone distribution branch has a specific cause. A too-small management control-plane policer drops permitted SSH traffic during ordinary operations. Tune the SSH-management CoPP class for the legitimate approved workload without removing protective rate limits. Confirm success against this result: Automated SSH sessions complete at the required rate while abusive traffic still triggers protection.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This could help where ipv6 dhcpv6 guard is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Brookstone distribution branch. A too-small management control-plane policer drops permitted SSH traffic during ordinary operations.

B:

That change targets aaa accounting gaps, not the reported copp management ssh rate-limiting fault at the Brookstone distribution branch. A too-small management control-plane policer drops permitted SSH traffic during ordinary operations.

D:

This could help where ipv6 rogue router advertisement is the issue, but not for the evidence reported at the Brookstone distribution branch. A too-small management control-plane policer drops permitted SSH traffic during ordinary operations.