McAfee Secure

Exam Code: NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6

Exam Name: Fortinet NSE 5 - FortiSwitch 7.6 Administrator

Certification Provider: Fortinet

Corresponding Certification: NSE5

Fortinet NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6 Questions & Answers

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"Fortinet NSE 5 - FortiSwitch 7.6 Administrator Exam", also known as NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6 exam, is a Fortinet certification exam.

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Fortinet NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6 Practice Test 61

Question 600

At the Ivystone network modernization program, a dense virtual desktop host presents far more device MAC identities than supported sessions on one access port. Which ongoing control best prevents this issue from recurring?

  1. Alert on supplicant certificate expiry before it affects users
  2. Review MAC session counts before deploying virtual access nodes
  3. Monitor binding age and client mobility when enabling source guard
  4. Review ACL precedence in change approvals

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The needed prevention is to review MAC session counts before deploying virtual access nodes. It directly sustains the original change to check FortiSwitch model and per-port MAC authentication session limits before selecting a multi-host design.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That routine supports eap tls certificate expiry, but the relevant ongoing risk requires the team to review MAC session counts before deploying virtual access nodes. For the Ivystone network modernization program, the direct corrective action is to check FortiSwitch model and per-port MAC authentication session limits before selecting a multi-host design.

C:

Monitor binding age and client mobility when enabling source guard is not the primary recurring safeguard for this problem. The team should review MAC session counts before deploying virtual access nodes. For the Ivystone network modernization program, the direct corrective action is to check FortiSwitch model and per-port MAC authentication session limits before selecting a multi-host design.

D:

Review ACL precedence in change approvals. That safeguard would help prevent recurrence of: ACL evaluation precedence can allow a general rule to bypass a later specific restriction. The risk being reviewed here is instead: Authentication session capacity is finite and may be exceeded by fanout through a single port. The matching ongoing control is: Review MAC session counts before deploying virtual access nodes.

Question 601

At the Valeford managed-network provider, an untrusted user connects a small DHCP server that begins offering incorrect gateways to office clients. Which implementation choice best addresses the situation?

  1. Restrict LLDP advertisements or exposed TLVs on untrusted ports while preserving infrastructure discovery
  2. Check FortiSwitch model and per-port MAC authentication session limits before selecting a multi-host design
  3. Apply a supported ingress ACL filtering the unauthorized source and destination combination
  4. Enable supported DHCP snooping with only genuine DHCP-server-facing ports marked trusted

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The primary failure mode is that without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN. The proposed action directly fixes it by requiring the team to enable supported DHCP snooping with only genuine DHCP-server-facing ports marked trusted; afterward, verify that clients receive the approved scope and rogue offers are filtered.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This alternative would be suitable where unrestricted discovery data can reveal network topology and device details to unknown endpoints. It does not by itself resolve the need to enable supported DHCP snooping with only genuine DHCP-server-facing ports marked trusted. For the Valeford managed-network provider, the direct corrective action is to enable supported DHCP snooping with only genuine DHCP-server-facing ports marked trusted.

B:

Check FortiSwitch model and per-port MAC authentication session limits before selecting a multi-host design addresses a different kind of problem: authentication session capacity is finite and may be exceeded by fanout through a single port. Here the reported weakness is that without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN. For the Valeford managed-network provider, the direct corrective action is to enable supported DHCP snooping with only genuine DHCP-server-facing ports marked trusted.

C:

The option addresses the separate situation where an unrestricted ingress path forwards matching frames before intended access controls apply. For this case, the more appropriate response is to enable supported DHCP snooping with only genuine DHCP-server-facing ports marked trusted. For the Valeford managed-network provider, the direct corrective action is to enable supported DHCP snooping with only genuine DHCP-server-facing ports marked trusted.

Question 602

At the Valeford managed-network provider, an untrusted user connects a small DHCP server that begins offering incorrect gateways to office clients. What risk should the team identify as the primary issue?

  1. Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure
  2. Unlimited downstream MAC learning can broaden access and consume switch forwarding resources
  3. A syntactically correct ACL has no effect if deployed outside the packet path
  4. Without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The architectural weakness is that without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN. It can be addressed through the controlled change to enable supported DHCP snooping with only genuine DHCP-server-facing ports marked trusted.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The offered action is: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. It is associated with this separate technical condition: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. The actual incident concerns a different dependency: Without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN. The corresponding change is: Without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN.

B:

Unlimited downstream MAC learning can broaden access and consume switch forwarding resources. That may occur elsewhere, but the evidence at the Valeford managed-network provider instead points to the fact that without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN.

C:

The offered alternative is: A syntactically correct ACL has no effect if deployed outside the packet path. It addresses this separate failure mode: A syntactically correct ACL has no effect if deployed outside the packet path. In the current case, the observed mechanism is: Without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN. The keyed action, Without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN., targets that condition more directly.

Question 603

At the Valeford managed-network provider, an untrusted user connects a small DHCP server that begins offering incorrect gateways to office clients. What is the strongest acceptance test for this change?

  1. A controlled loop trigger is contained without affecting the rest of the network
  2. The authorized MAC count remains functional while excess identities trigger the documented action
  3. A measured burst is contained while approved discovery traffic remains functional
  4. Clients receive the approved scope and rogue offers are filtered

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The intended correction is to enable supported DHCP snooping with only genuine DHCP-server-facing ports marked trusted. The decisive verification is that clients receive the approved scope and rogue offers are filtered, rather than only confirming configuration was saved.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A controlled loop trigger is contained without affecting the rest of the network. That result would test a control for this other failure: An Ethernet loop can replicate broadcast traffic repeatedly across the VLAN. The question instead requires evidence for: Without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN. The direct outcome to verify is: Clients receive the approved scope and rogue offers are filtered.

B:

At the Valeford managed-network provider, a result about dynamic mac learning limit would not show that the team corrected the failure where without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN.

C:

A measured burst is contained while approved discovery traffic remains functional. That result would test a control for this other failure: Uncontrolled flooded frames can spread to other subscribers within the same VLAN. The question instead requires evidence for: Without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN. The direct outcome to verify is: Clients receive the approved scope and rogue offers are filtered.

Question 604

At the Valeford managed-network provider, an untrusted user connects a small DHCP server that begins offering incorrect gateways to office clients. Which setting or practice should be reviewed in future?

  1. Alert on abnormal broadcast rates and edge topology changes
  2. Audit DHCP-snooping trusted interfaces after uplink moves
  3. Recheck ACL API and CLI syntax with firmware changes
  4. Monitor authentication success and rejection events after policy changes

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This control works beyond the initial remediation because it requires the team to audit DHCP-snooping trusted interfaces after uplink moves.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Alert on abnormal broadcast rates and edge topology changes is not the primary recurring safeguard for this problem. The team should audit DHCP-snooping trusted interfaces after uplink moves. For the Valeford managed-network provider, the direct corrective action is to enable supported DHCP snooping with only genuine DHCP-server-facing ports marked trusted.

C:

The suggested preventive check is: Recheck ACL API and CLI syntax with firmware changes. Its technical scope concerns: FortiSwitch ACL configuration distinguishes ingress prelookup and egress stages. This question asks how to sustain control over: Without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN. The more targeted safeguard is: Audit DHCP-snooping trusted interfaces after uplink moves.

D:

Monitor authentication success and rejection events after policy changes. That safeguard would help prevent recurrence of: An open access port cannot verify user or device identity before allowing network access. The risk being reviewed here is instead: Without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN. The matching ongoing control is: Audit DHCP-snooping trusted interfaces after uplink moves.

Question 605

At the Lakehaven branch IT department, corporate clients cannot obtain addresses after the legitimate DHCP trunk was mistakenly marked untrusted. Which corrective action best meets the requirement?

  1. Correct the DHCP snooping trust setting on the designated server-facing uplink
  2. Use the supported monitored ARP learning feature on the correct trusted port and VLAN
  3. Reorder or narrow ACL rules so the specific security decision is evaluated correctly
  4. Use supported VLAN storm control or filtering on the risky access path

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This is the direct FortiSwitch 7.6 administration remedy: correct the DHCP snooping trust setting on the designated server-facing uplink. The observed risk is that dHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port; a passing acceptance check would show that a client receives a valid lease while a rogue access-port server remains blocked.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The offered action is: Use the supported monitored ARP learning feature on the correct trusted port and VLAN. It is associated with this separate technical condition: Passive ARP monitoring and active DAI enforcement have distinct configuration requirements. The actual incident concerns a different dependency: DHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port. The corresponding change is: Correct the DHCP snooping trust setting on the designated server-facing uplink.

C:

Reorder or narrow ACL rules so the specific security decision is evaluated correctly can be useful for another FortiSwitch 7.6 administration workflow, but it leaves the immediate failure unresolved. Here the priority is to correct the DHCP snooping trust setting on the designated server-facing uplink. For the Lakehaven branch IT department, the direct corrective action is to correct the DHCP snooping trust setting on the designated server-facing uplink.

D:

The offered alternative is: Use supported VLAN storm control or filtering on the risky access path. It addresses this separate failure mode: Uncontrolled flooded frames can spread to other subscribers within the same VLAN. In the current case, the observed mechanism is: DHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port. The keyed action, Correct the DHCP snooping trust setting on the designated server-facing uplink., targets that condition more directly.

Question 606

At the Lakehaven branch IT department, corporate clients cannot obtain addresses after the legitimate DHCP trunk was mistakenly marked untrusted. Which underlying issue most directly explains this situation?

  1. DHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port
  2. Without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN
  3. Successful authentication alone does not apply differentiated authorization when return attributes are not mapped
  4. A device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The evidence indicates that dHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port. The appropriate response is to correct the DHCP snooping trust setting on the designated server-facing uplink and demonstrate that a client receives a valid lease while a rogue access-port server remains blocked.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN. That is not the mechanism that accounts for the stated failure at the Lakehaven branch IT department.

C:

The offered principle is: Successful authentication alone does not apply differentiated authorization when return attributes are not mapped. In the source material it is associated with: Successful authentication alone does not apply differentiated authorization when return attributes are not mapped. This case has a different controlling cause: DHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port. Its keyed mechanism is: DHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port.

D:

Although a device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication, the presented symptoms do not support that as the primary cause; they indicate that dHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port. For the Lakehaven branch IT department, the direct corrective action is to correct the DHCP snooping trust setting on the designated server-facing uplink.

Question 607

At the Lakehaven branch IT department, corporate clients cannot obtain addresses after the legitimate DHCP trunk was mistakenly marked untrusted. What evidence would justify considering this concern addressed?

  1. Clients receive the approved scope and rogue offers are filtered
  2. A client receives a valid lease while a rogue access-port server remains blocked
  3. An authorized user connects while a second unapproved MAC is blocked or isolated
  4. A controlled time-based test matches documented permit and deny windows

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The intended correction is to correct the DHCP snooping trust setting on the designated server-facing uplink. The decisive verification is that a client receives a valid lease while a rogue access-port server remains blocked, rather than only confirming configuration was saved.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Clients receive the approved scope and rogue offers are filtered. That result would test a control for this other failure: Without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN. The question instead requires evidence for: DHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port. The direct outcome to verify is: A client receives a valid lease while a rogue access-port server remains blocked.

C:

An authorized user connects while a second unapproved MAC is blocked or isolated. That result would test a control for this other failure: Port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates. The question instead requires evidence for: DHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port. The direct outcome to verify is: A client receives a valid lease while a rogue access-port server remains blocked.

D:

The offered observation is: A controlled time-based test matches documented permit and deny windows. It would support the separate mechanism: A schedule mismatch can disable or enable filtering outside its intended window. In this case the decisive dependency is: DHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port. The original keyed verification is: A client receives a valid lease while a rogue access-port server remains blocked.

Question 608

At the Lakehaven branch IT department, corporate clients cannot obtain addresses after the legitimate DHCP trunk was mistakenly marked untrusted. How should the organization sustain the improvement?

  1. Monitor binding refresh and mobility events during desk moves
  2. Review trusted port diagrams during distribution upgrades
  3. Review policer thresholds against normal endpoint behavior
  4. Review egress ACL direction and order during policy changes

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For the Lakehaven branch IT department, this maintenance action preserves the fix: review trusted port diagrams during distribution upgrades. It should be revisited as the workload evolves.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The suggested preventive check is: Monitor binding refresh and mobility events during desk moves. Its technical scope concerns: Stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard. This question asks how to sustain control over: DHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port. The more targeted safeguard is: Review trusted port diagrams during distribution upgrades.

C:

That routine supports acl policer selected traffic, but the relevant ongoing risk requires the team to review trusted port diagrams during distribution upgrades. For the Lakehaven branch IT department, the direct corrective action is to correct the DHCP snooping trust setting on the designated server-facing uplink.

D:

Review egress ACL direction and order during policy changes. That safeguard would help prevent recurrence of: An ingress-only filter may not cover the intended egress direction of a prohibited flow. The risk being reviewed here is instead: DHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port. The matching ongoing control is: Review trusted port diagrams during distribution upgrades.

Question 609

At the Westwick data network services firm, a campus enables dynamic ARP inspection without establishing the required DHCP snooping binding database. Which approach best resolves the described issue?

  1. Enable supported dynamic ARP inspection with correct trusted boundaries
  2. Establish supported DHCP snooping and then enable DAI on the intended VLANs
  3. Check FortiSwitch model and per-port MAC authentication session limits before selecting a multi-host design
  4. Use a governed supported MAB fallback with a device inventory and limited authorization

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For the Westwick data network services firm, the appropriate correction is to establish supported DHCP snooping and then enable DAI on the intended VLANs. The decisive reason is that dAI validation depends on appropriate legitimate IP to MAC bindings; acceptance evidence is that authorized clients resolve their gateway and poisoned ARP packets are denied.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Enable supported dynamic ARP inspection with correct trusted boundaries can be useful for another FortiSwitch 7.6 administration workflow, but it leaves the immediate failure unresolved. Here the priority is to establish supported DHCP snooping and then enable DAI on the intended VLANs. For the Westwick data network services firm, the direct corrective action is to establish supported DHCP snooping and then enable DAI on the intended VLANs.

C:

This alternative would be suitable where authentication session capacity is finite and may be exceeded by fanout through a single port. It does not by itself resolve the need to establish supported DHCP snooping and then enable DAI on the intended VLANs. For the Westwick data network services firm, the direct corrective action is to establish supported DHCP snooping and then enable DAI on the intended VLANs.

D:

Use a governed supported MAB fallback with a device inventory and limited authorization addresses a different kind of problem: a device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication. Here the reported weakness is that dAI validation depends on appropriate legitimate IP to MAC bindings. For the Westwick data network services firm, the direct corrective action is to establish supported DHCP snooping and then enable DAI on the intended VLANs.

Question 610

At the Westwick data network services firm, a campus enables dynamic ARP inspection without establishing the required DHCP snooping binding database. Which explanation best accounts for the concern?

  1. Unvalidated ARP claims let a malicious host impersonate another IP-to-MAC relationship
  2. Uncontrolled flooded frames can spread to other subscribers within the same VLAN
  3. ACL evaluation precedence can allow a general rule to bypass a later specific restriction
  4. DAI validation depends on appropriate legitimate IP to MAC bindings

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This identifies the root issue: dAI validation depends on appropriate legitimate IP to MAC bindings. At the Westwick data network services firm, the team should therefore establish supported DHCP snooping and then enable DAI on the intended VLANs.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The offered principle is: Unvalidated ARP claims let a malicious host impersonate another IP-to-MAC relationship. In the source material it is associated with: Unvalidated ARP claims let a malicious host impersonate another IP-to-MAC relationship. This case has a different controlling cause: DAI validation depends on appropriate legitimate IP to MAC bindings. Its keyed mechanism is: DAI validation depends on appropriate legitimate IP to MAC bindings.

B:

Although uncontrolled flooded frames can spread to other subscribers within the same VLAN, the presented symptoms do not support that as the primary cause; they indicate that dAI validation depends on appropriate legitimate IP to MAC bindings. For the Westwick data network services firm, the direct corrective action is to establish supported DHCP snooping and then enable DAI on the intended VLANs.

C:

The offered principle is: ACL evaluation precedence can allow a general rule to bypass a later specific restriction. In the source material it is associated with: ACL evaluation precedence can allow a general rule to bypass a later specific restriction. This case has a different controlling cause: DAI validation depends on appropriate legitimate IP to MAC bindings. Its keyed mechanism is: DAI validation depends on appropriate legitimate IP to MAC bindings.

Fortinet NSE 5 - FortiSwitch 7.6 Administrator (NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6) Practice Tests