Question 800
Original Fortinet NSE5_SSE_AD-7.6 educational scenario: A regulated company needs to prevent credit-card identifiers from being uploaded through allowed collaboration apps, but its policy only performs URL filtering. Which ongoing control best prevents the same issue from recurring?
Explanation
Correct Answer
In this situation, a regulated company needs to prevent credit-card identifiers from being uploaded through allowed collaboration apps, but its policy only performs URL filtering. The relevant technical mechanism is: Destination categorization cannot substitute for content-aware sensitive-data inspection. The most direct diagnostic or implementation action is: Configure and apply a supported DLP profile with carefully tested data patterns to the relevant traffic path. A useful verification is: Synthetic payment identifiers trigger the intended data-loss action while benign uploads remain permitted. An ongoing safeguard is: Review DLP patterns with legal and data owners after classification changes. This is the INTENDED choice for the most useful ongoing preventive control. The issuer documents define the topic and product background, not the truth of this item-level intended key.
Incorrect Answers
This routine guards against another mechanism: A content scanner cannot make claims about data it cannot decode or observe. The recurring exposure in the current case is: Destination categorization cannot substitute for content-aware sensitive-data inspection. The matching preventive check is “Review DLP patterns with legal and data owners after classification changes”.
That safeguard is relevant to: Deep inspection requires appropriate endpoint trust in the signing authority used for substitute certificates. The current failure instead follows from: Destination categorization cannot substitute for content-aware sensitive-data inspection. Its prevention measure is “Review DLP patterns with legal and data owners after classification changes”.
This routine guards against another mechanism: Having a client agent installed does not prove required device security posture. The recurring exposure in the current case is: Destination categorization cannot substitute for content-aware sensitive-data inspection. The matching preventive check is “Review DLP patterns with legal and data owners after classification changes”.