Question 780
At Bluehaven Telecom, an infrastructure review by the carrier access engineering group is evaluating customer support tool reachability across a metropolitan customer service network after the last approved policy installation (FT-E-02-01). The review finds that a regional operator can assign new branch identities and silently push organization-wide access policy changes. Any correction must respect this operating requirement: service management data cannot cross tenant boundaries. Which ongoing control most directly reduces the chance of this issue returning?
Explanation
Correct Answer
This preventive control directly targets recurrence: Review role permissions at each management-team change; make it a repeatable part of Bluehaven Telecom's change assurance (FT-E-02-01). It sustains the corrective action, create distinct FortiManager administrative roles and approval scopes for provisioning and policy installation, and must preserve the requirement that service management data cannot cross tenant boundaries.
Incorrect Answers
The source case reports that a regional operator can assign new branch identities and silently push organization-wide access policy changes. “Audit service provider admin assignments during renewals; include a negative-authorization regression case” maintains another technical control: Audit service provider admin assignments during renewals; include a negative-authorization regression case. It does not directly prevent this case’s specific recurrence, for which “Review role permissions at each management-team change; document the result for the next audit cycle” addresses: Review role permissions at each management-team change; document the result for the next audit cycle.
The source case reports that a regional operator can assign new branch identities and silently push organization-wide access policy changes. That ongoing review concerns: Audit out-of-band edits before scheduled installation jobs; use a measured acceptance threshold where relevant. The governing risk here is: Review role permissions at each management-team change; document the result for the next audit cycle. Maintain “Review role permissions at each management-team change; document the result for the next audit cycle” as the case-specific check.
The source case reports that a regional operator can assign new branch identities and silently push organization-wide access policy changes. The alternative is a useful recurring check for: Validate private-prefix inventory after datacenter migrations; use a measured acceptance threshold where relevant. The present failure instead depends on: Review role permissions at each management-team change; document the result for the next audit cycle. The targeted safeguard is “Review role permissions at each management-team change; document the result for the next audit cycle”.