Question 430
At fictional Ironbridge Utilities, a network engineer supporting branch services is reviewing route-policy and traffic-control behavior during a supervised route change (HCIP-H12-821-POLICY-108). The observed network issue is: An administrator applies an ACL to an ingress interface in the wrong direction and a blocked flow still reaches servers. Which routing, switching, or network principle best explains the appropriate solution?
Explanation
Correct Answer
The governing principle is: ACL enforcement is sensitive to attachment location and traffic direction. In this scenario, the appropriate action is: Attach the intended traffic filter at the correct direction and interface scope. Valid evidence would show: Denied test flows increment the expected counters and permitted traffic still passes.
Incorrect Answers
“Policy routing can override ordinary destination lookup but still requires valid forwarding resolution” responds to another technical or business failure: A policy-based routing rule sends traffic toward a next hop that cannot be resolved in the correct VRF. That source case depends on: Policy routing can override ordinary destination lookup but still requires valid forwarding resolution. The present issue is: An administrator applies an ACL to an ingress interface in the wrong direction and a blocked flow still reaches servers. The more direct action is “ACL enforcement is sensitive to attachment location and traffic direction” because ACL enforcement is sensitive to attachment location and traffic direction.
“Stateless packet filters do not intrinsically track an entire transport session” responds to another technical or business failure: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. That source case depends on: Stateless packet filters do not intrinsically track an entire transport session. The present issue is: An administrator applies an ACL to an ingress interface in the wrong direction and a blocked flow still reaches servers. The more direct action is “ACL enforcement is sensitive to attachment location and traffic direction” because ACL enforcement is sensitive to attachment location and traffic direction.
“Route attribute creation alone does not guarantee propagation across a BGP session” responds to another technical or business failure: An outbound route-policy appends a community but the upstream device removes communities when send behavior is disabled. That source case depends on: Route attribute creation alone does not guarantee propagation across a BGP session. The present issue is: An administrator applies an ACL to an ingress interface in the wrong direction and a blocked flow still reaches servers. The more direct action is “ACL enforcement is sensitive to attachment location and traffic direction” because ACL enforcement is sensitive to attachment location and traffic direction.