Question 660
Following the issue — A team enables storage encryption but allows legacy shared-key access despite an identity-only access policy. — the team takes this action: Disable shared key authorization when supported and migrate clients to Microsoft Entra tokens. Which continuing safeguard BEST prevents the same control weakness from returning?
Explanation
Correct Answer
The recurring safeguard is: Audit storage access authentication modes alongside encryption posture. This mitigates the control weakness because: Encryption at rest does not replace strong access control for storage data. Keep the intervention, Disable shared key authorization when supported and migrate clients to Microsoft Entra tokens., in the approved deployment, monitoring and change governance process.
Incorrect Answers
This safeguard is for the dependency described by: Ephemeral containers still create runtime and image exposure independent of short deployment lifetime. The continuing risk here is determined by: Encryption at rest does not replace strong access control for storage data. The targeted safeguard is “Audit storage access authentication modes alongside encryption posture”.
“Test container egress behavior during each application namespace deployment” addresses a different recurring failure: Kubernetes workload egress can create risk even when the API server is not publicly exposed. For the condition in this question, maintain “Audit storage access authentication modes alongside encryption posture” because encryption at rest does not replace strong access control for storage data.
That review protects the control associated with: Server HTTPS encryption and client certificate authentication establish different trust properties. It does not directly prevent the stated recurrence, which concerns: Encryption at rest does not replace strong access control for storage data. The appropriate guardrail is “Audit storage access authentication modes alongside encryption posture”.