Microsoft MB-820 Bundle

“The feature runs without file-system or server-administration privileges in the online target” supports the separate task “assess deployment-specific restrictions and select cloud-compatible APIs when SaaS must be supported”, not the reported problem: a company expects one tenant's app to automatically share customer table records with another independent tenant. This case instead calls for “An isolated-tenant test shows no unintended cross-tenant records and approved integration transfers only permitted data”.

“The extension deploys successfully to an online sandbox without a server-local .NET assembly” concerns the separate step “replace the server-specific .NET dependency with supported AL or external service integration appropriate to cloud execution”. The reported issue is that a company expects one tenant's app to automatically share customer table records with another independent tenant, so the direct response is to an isolated-tenant test shows no unintended cross-tenant records and approved integration transfers only permitted data.

The proposed “The release plan distinguishes Microsoft-managed platform updates from customer-managed extension releases” tests a different control: assign extension code ownership and compatibility testing to the publisher while Microsoft maintains the online platform. The reported condition is that a company expects one tenant's app to automatically share customer table records with another independent tenant; the more direct action is to an isolated-tenant test shows no unintended cross-tenant records and approved integration transfers only permitted data.

“Client presentation and application execution have distinct responsibilities” concerns the separate step “document how the browser client, service tier, AL extensions and managed data platform participate in operations”. The reported issue is that a company expects one tenant's app to automatically share customer table records with another independent tenant, so the direct response is to design explicit authorized integration rather than assuming Business Central tenant databases share company data.

“The System Application and Base Application serve different architectural responsibilities” concerns the alternative task “use the System Application APIs for reusable system capabilities and extend the Base Application for business processes”, but the stated failure is that a company expects one tenant's app to automatically share customer table records with another independent tenant. The required measure is to design explicit authorized integration rather than assuming Business Central tenant databases share company data.

The proposed “SaaS servicing does not transfer responsibility for third-party app quality” tests a different control: assign extension code ownership and compatibility testing to the publisher while Microsoft maintains the online platform. The reported condition is that a company expects one tenant's app to automatically share customer table records with another independent tenant; the more direct action is to design explicit authorized integration rather than assuming Business Central tenant databases share company data.

“Verify authentication and data ownership before adding any Microsoft 365 integration” concerns the alternative task “select supported Business Central capabilities and explicit service integrations for Microsoft 365 workflows”, but the stated failure is that a company expects one tenant's app to automatically share customer table records with another independent tenant. The required measure is to include cross-tenant negative tests for connected apps.

The proposed “Review customization requests for unsupported base-object replacement” tests a different control: design a separate AL extension that adds the required fields and logic through supported extensibility points. The reported condition is that a company expects one tenant's app to automatically share customer table records with another independent tenant; the more direct action is to include cross-tenant negative tests for connected apps.

“Run online target and analyzer checks before accepting a technical design” supports the separate task “replace the server-specific .NET dependency with supported AL or external service integration appropriate to cloud execution”, not the reported problem: a company expects one tenant's app to automatically share customer table records with another independent tenant. This case instead calls for “Include cross-tenant negative tests for connected apps”.

The proposed “Review dependency direction when introducing shared utility code” tests a different control: use an appropriate System Application API or a distinct reusable extension module. The reported condition is that a support engineer changes a published API contract within an extension without considering installed consumer apps; the more direct action is to compare exported API surfaces at every version promotion.

“Require owner approval for destructive extension cleanup” supports the separate task “document supported uninstall and delete-data behavior, preserve data as required and use deliberate cleanup procedures”, not the reported problem: a support engineer changes a published API contract within an extension without considering installed consumer apps. This case instead calls for “Compare exported API surfaces at every version promotion”.

“Check ID conflicts against declared installed dependencies” concerns the alternative task “allocate supported object ID ranges and check unique app identity and object conflicts”, but the stated failure is that a support engineer changes a published API contract within an extension without considering installed consumer apps. The required measure is to compare exported API surfaces at every version promotion.

“Declare the exact dependency identifier and compatible version constraints in the manifest” supports the separate task “declare the exact dependency identifier and compatible version constraints in the manifest”, not the reported problem: a support engineer changes a published API contract within an extension without considering installed consumer apps. This case instead calls for “version public interfaces compatibly and review downstream dependency contracts before a breaking change”.

“Allocate supported object ID ranges and check unique app identity and object conflicts” concerns the separate step “allocate supported object ID ranges and check unique app identity and object conflicts”. The reported issue is that a support engineer changes a published API contract within an extension without considering installed consumer apps, so the direct response is to version public interfaces compatibly and review downstream dependency contracts before a breaking change.

“Use documented extension points and define integration precedence, supported events and compatibility tests” concerns the alternative task “use documented extension points and define integration precedence, supported events and compatibility tests”, but the stated failure is that a support engineer changes a published API contract within an extension without considering installed consumer apps. The required measure is to version public interfaces compatibly and review downstream dependency contracts before a breaking change.

“The helper can be reused across unrelated business extensions with an explicit dependency” concerns the separate step “use an appropriate System Application API or a distinct reusable extension module”. The reported issue is that a support engineer changes a published API contract within an extension without considering installed consumer apps, so the direct response is to a compatibility test shows old consumers still work or fail with a documented upgrade path.

“The combined installation completes without duplicate object ID errors” concerns the alternative task “allocate supported object ID ranges and check unique app identity and object conflicts”, but the stated failure is that a support engineer changes a published API contract within an extension without considering installed consumer apps. The required measure is to a compatibility test shows old consumers still work or fail with a documented upgrade path.

“Shared workflows run with both apps installed and no conflicting state transitions” supports the separate task “use documented extension points and define integration precedence, supported events and compatibility tests”, not the reported problem: a support engineer changes a published API contract within an extension without considering installed consumer apps. This case instead calls for “A compatibility test shows old consumers still work or fail with a documented upgrade path”.

The proposed “Compiler success alone is not marketplace certification” tests a different control: run the appropriate AppSourceCop and code analysis gates against the target runtime. The reported condition is that a support engineer changes a published API contract within an extension without considering installed consumer apps; the more direct action is to version public interfaces compatibly and review downstream dependency contracts before a breaking change.

“Distribution scope and validation obligations depend on app type” supports the separate task “select a per-tenant deployment for tenant-specific use and an AppSource publishing workflow for marketplace distribution”, not the reported problem: a support engineer changes a published API contract within an extension without considering installed consumer apps. This case instead calls for “version public interfaces compatibly and review downstream dependency contracts before a breaking change”.

“Marketplace apps are packaged extensions rather than private forks of Microsoft source” concerns the separate step “implement published tables, page extensions and event subscribers rather than distributing a modified base application”. The reported issue is that a support engineer changes a published API contract within an extension without considering installed consumer apps, so the direct response is to version public interfaces compatibly and review downstream dependency contracts before a breaking change.

The proposed “API contract design should enforce data minimization” tests a different control: expose only the minimal approved fields and apply entitlement and permission rules. The reported condition is that a SaaS integration makes destructive data changes through an OData endpoint with no caller authorization review; the more direct action is to expose only approved actions and enforce permissions and validation at the service boundary.

“Business operations often require action endpoints, not raw field mutation” supports the separate task “implement or expose an appropriate supported bound/unbound action that invokes validated posting logic”, not the reported problem: a SaaS integration makes destructive data changes through an OData endpoint with no caller authorization review. This case instead calls for “expose only approved actions and enforce permissions and validation at the service boundary”.

“API versioning protects downstream integration dependencies” concerns the alternative task “preserve compatible contracts or introduce a deliberate versioned API and migration path”, but the stated failure is that a SaaS integration makes destructive data changes through an OData endpoint with no caller authorization review. The required measure is to expose only approved actions and enforce permissions and validation at the service boundary.

“The partner can retrieve and update authorized records through the declared API contract” supports the separate task “create an appropriately configured API page with stable entity name, entity set, publisher and version properties”, not the reported problem: a SaaS integration makes destructive data changes through an OData endpoint with no caller authorization review. This case instead calls for “Unauthorized requests are denied even when callers know the endpoint URL”.

“The API payload omits protected fields for unauthorized consumers” concerns the separate step “expose only the minimal approved fields and apply entitlement and permission rules”. The reported issue is that a SaaS integration makes destructive data changes through an OData endpoint with no caller authorization review, so the direct response is to unauthorized requests are denied even when callers know the endpoint URL.

“The caller gets the intended action outcome without bypassing document posting rules” concerns the alternative task “implement or expose an appropriate supported bound/unbound action that invokes validated posting logic”, but the stated failure is that a SaaS integration makes destructive data changes through an OData endpoint with no caller authorization review. The required measure is to unauthorized requests are denied even when callers know the endpoint URL.

“Publish a compatible new API contract or supported API page design rather than assuming API page extension is available” concerns the separate step “publish a compatible new API contract or supported API page design rather than assuming API page extension is available”. The reported issue is that a SaaS integration makes destructive data changes through an OData endpoint with no caller authorization review, so the direct response is to expose only approved actions and enforce permissions and validation at the service boundary.

The proposed “Expose only the minimal approved fields and apply entitlement and permission rules” tests a different control: expose only the minimal approved fields and apply entitlement and permission rules. The reported condition is that a SaaS integration makes destructive data changes through an OData endpoint with no caller authorization review; the more direct action is to expose only approved actions and enforce permissions and validation at the service boundary.

“Create an appropriately configured API page with stable entity name, entity set, publisher and version properties” supports the separate task “create an appropriately configured API page with stable entity name, entity set, publisher and version properties”, not the reported problem: a SaaS integration makes destructive data changes through an OData endpoint with no caller authorization review. This case instead calls for “expose only approved actions and enforce permissions and validation at the service boundary”.

“Audit API field lists and permission behavior after schema changes” concerns the alternative task “expose only the minimal approved fields and apply entitlement and permission rules”, but the stated failure is that a SaaS integration makes destructive data changes through an OData endpoint with no caller authorization review. The required measure is to run negative authorization tests against API endpoints.

The proposed “Diff published schemas before deployment” tests a different control: preserve compatible contracts or introduce a deliberate versioned API and migration path. The reported condition is that a SaaS integration makes destructive data changes through an OData endpoint with no caller authorization review; the more direct action is to run negative authorization tests against API endpoints.

“Test data freshness and consistency assumptions before enabling read scale-out” supports the separate task “evaluate supported read scale-out patterns for appropriate read workloads without compromising consistency needs”, not the reported problem: a SaaS integration makes destructive data changes through an OData endpoint with no caller authorization review. This case instead calls for “Run negative authorization tests against API endpoints”.