Question 1060
Original unofficial Palo Alto Networks NetSec-Architect scenario: A BGP peering design between firewall and core routers has no route withdrawal test and keeps a blackhole route after a device failure. Which continuing assurance practice best prevents recurrence?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Original fictional security architecture situation: A BGP peering design between firewall and core routers has no route withdrawal test and keeps a blackhole route after a device failure. Governing principle: Dynamic routes depend on peer health detection and control-plane convergence, not just duplicate links. The most defensible design response is: Define supported routing health, BGP timers or session policy and verify convergence under controlled device failure. Validation: The failed next hop is withdrawn and test traffic uses the intended alternate route within the recovery target. Sustained assurance: Measure real failover time rather than assuming BGP configuration means resilience
Incorrect Answers
This alternative is linked to the architecture category: design layer 3 routing, ecmp, bgp and ospf for protected flows. The actual problem is that a BGP peering design between firewall and core routers has no route withdrawal test and keeps a blackhole route after a device failure; the controlling distinction is: dynamic routes depend on peer health detection and control-plane convergence, not just duplicate links.
The suggested “Use a site-specific installation and resilience checklist.” tests a different architectural concern: evaluate new pa-series hardware deployment and scoping trends. Here, a BGP peering design between firewall and core routers has no route withdrawal test and keeps a blackhole route after a device failure. Dynamic routes depend on peer health detection and control-plane convergence, not just duplicate links.
The proposed design “Document tested version-specific fabric configuration and limits.” addresses this related architecture topic: architect private-cloud ha with active-passive, active-active and fabric options. The actual security gap is that a BGP peering design between firewall and core routers has no route withdrawal test and keeps a blackhole route after a device failure. Dynamic routes depend on peer health detection and control-plane convergence, not just duplicate links.