Question 10
Original unofficial Palo Alto Networks NetSec-Architect scenario: An engineering network contains unmanaged instruments with no interactive user login, yet policies depend entirely on human User-ID. Which test result best demonstrates that the design meets its requirement?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Original fictional security architecture situation: An engineering network contains unmanaged instruments with no interactive user login, yet policies depend entirely on human User-ID. Governing principle: Non-user devices need asset-aware policy attributes rather than fabricated interactive identities. The most defensible design response is: Use appropriate Device-ID inventory and least-privilege application rules for identified instruments, separately from human-user access. Validation: Only the intended instrument identity can reach its telemetry collector on required application flows. Sustained assurance: Reconcile Device-ID discoveries and the permitted instrument service list each quarter
Incorrect Answers
The suggested “Payroll access is allowed for the intended directory group and rejected for the similarly named group in the other forest.” tests a different architectural concern: architect identity, device posture and least-privilege controls using user-id, hip and device-id. Here, an engineering network contains unmanaged instruments with no interactive user login, yet policies depend entirely on human User-ID. Non-user devices need asset-aware policy attributes rather than fabricated interactive identities.
The proposed design “A payroll employee can reach authorized operations but cannot upload files to unapproved SaaS functions.” addresses this related architecture topic: differentiate authorization to specific applications. The actual security gap is that an engineering network contains unmanaged instruments with no interactive user login, yet policies depend entirely on human User-ID. Non-user devices need asset-aware policy attributes rather than fabricated interactive identities.
“Traffic logs identify the intended custom service, and the generic-SSL allowance is no longer necessary.” concerns the separate design topic: differentiate authorization to specific applications. It would not fix the described weakness: an engineering network contains unmanaged instruments with no interactive user login, yet policies depend entirely on human User-ID. Non-user devices need asset-aware policy attributes rather than fabricated interactive identities.