Question 580
Original unofficial Palo Alto Networks NetSec-Architect scenario: A branch has dual security gateways but both depend on one shared power feed; the site availability claim ignores that dependency. Which continuing assurance practice best prevents recurrence?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Original fictional security architecture situation: A branch has dual security gateways but both depend on one shared power feed; the site availability claim ignores that dependency. Governing principle: Availability claims depend on independence of the actual failure domains. The most defensible design response is: Assess branch HA across WAN, power, devices, routing and security service connections rather than device count alone. Validation: A controlled device failure passes but the plan explicitly addresses the shared power dependency with mitigation. Sustained assurance: Conduct a failure-mode review before signing branch HA acceptance
Incorrect Answers
“Maintain a monitoring plan for userless branch applications.” concerns the separate design topic: design branch sase and sd-wan architectures, availability and experience monitoring. It would not fix the described weakness: a branch has dual security gateways but both depend on one shared power feed; the site availability claim ignores that dependency. Availability claims depend on independence of the actual failure domains.
The suggested “Audit DNS path visibility after ISP or proxy changes.” tests a different architectural concern: evaluate prisma sd-wan identity, device and threat services. Here, a branch has dual security gateways but both depend on one shared power feed; the site availability claim ignores that dependency. Availability claims depend on independence of the actual failure domains.
The proposed design “Review IoT per-device application allowlists after firmware updates.” addresses this related architecture topic: evaluate prisma sd-wan identity, device and threat services. The actual security gap is that a branch has dual security gateways but both depend on one shared power feed; the site availability claim ignores that dependency. Availability claims depend on independence of the actual failure domains.