Question 770
Original unofficial Palo Alto Networks NetSec-Architect scenario: A factory routes sensor-to-controller traffic entirely inside the local switch but places its only IoT inspection point at the internet edge. Which test result best demonstrates that the design meets its requirement?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Original fictional security architecture situation: A factory routes sensor-to-controller traffic entirely inside the local switch but places its only IoT inspection point at the internet edge. Governing principle: An external perimeter sensor cannot see east-west frames that never cross it. The most defensible design response is: Position an appropriate passive telemetry sensor or mirrored flow at the internal OT visibility point. Validation: Representative PLC traffic appears in the asset discovery view without forcing a disruptive traffic hairpin. Sustained assurance: Maintain a network-flow visibility map after switch and VLAN changes
Incorrect Answers
The proposed design “The observed test traffic is classified without exceeding the clinical equipment latency requirement.” addresses this related architecture topic: differentiate iot sensor placement and passive traffic visibility. The actual security gap is that a factory routes sensor-to-controller traffic entirely inside the local switch but places its only IoT inspection point at the internet edge. An external perimeter sensor cannot see east-west frames that never cross it.
“A controlled local service request becomes visible without changing the live application route.” concerns the separate design topic: design device visibility through ngfw, metadata collectors and sd-wan. It would not fix the described weakness: a factory routes sensor-to-controller traffic entirely inside the local switch but places its only IoT inspection point at the internet edge. An external perimeter sensor cannot see east-west frames that never cross it.
This alternative is linked to the architecture category: architect iot and ot device security visibility, risk and enforcement. The actual problem is that a factory routes sensor-to-controller traffic entirely inside the local switch but places its only IoT inspection point at the internet edge; the controlling distinction is: an external perimeter sensor cannot see east-west frames that never cross it.