Question 40
At Lakefield Media, a subscription operations team is improving subscriber queries after a documented configuration change (SF-A28-02). The administrator observes that one shared bot mixes employee operational runbooks with public refund answers. Any fix must ensure that customer preferences remain private to authorized users. Which continuing control best prevents this issue from recurring?
Explanation
Correct Answer
The preventive control directly addresses repeat failures: Test information leakage between audience-specific agents; require the check in the next release review at Lakefield Media (SF-A28-02). It complements the corrective action, separate customer service and internal employee use cases with appropriate agent boundaries, and protects the explicit condition that customer preferences remain private to authorized users.
Incorrect Answers
This safeguard, “Test external-customer record scope and handoffs; review it before expanding channel availability”, reduces a different source-defined risk: Customers need assistance with cases and troubleshooting through a public support site. The correction must ensure that shipment changes remain attributable and reversible. That risk depends on: Service agents target service interactions and channel-specific customer needs. The recurring problem here is one shared bot mixes employee operational runbooks with public refund answers. The correction must ensure that customer preferences remain private to authorized users. The originally selected control “Test information leakage between audience-specific agents; review it with audit evidence from regression testing” is more specific because different agent audiences imply different trust, authorization and context boundaries.
This safeguard, “Review channel exposure whenever an agent's purpose changes; review it and confirm the control remains effective after release”, reduces a different source-defined risk: An internal procurement helper is configured as a public service agent with customer-facing entry points. The correction must ensure that citizen information stays limited to the relevant case. That risk depends on: Agent type selection should follow user audience and operational purpose. The recurring problem here is one shared bot mixes employee operational runbooks with public refund answers. The correction must ensure that customer preferences remain private to authorized users. The originally selected control “Test information leakage between audience-specific agents; review it with audit evidence from regression testing” is more specific because different agent audiences imply different trust, authorization and context boundaries.
This safeguard, “Test forged identifiers and user switching; review it as part of periodic access and quality reviews”, reduces a different source-defined risk: An agent confuses a user-provided email address with the authenticated contact ID. The correction must ensure that financial identifiers are masked outside authorized roles. That risk depends on: Trusted linked identity is not interchangeable with unverified conversational text. The recurring problem here is one shared bot mixes employee operational runbooks with public refund answers. The correction must ensure that customer preferences remain private to authorized users. The originally selected control “Test information leakage between audience-specific agents; review it with audit evidence from regression testing” is more specific because different agent audiences imply different trust, authorization and context boundaries.