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Exam Code: 300-420

Exam Name Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Enterprise

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Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD) (300-420) Practice Tests

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Cisco 300-420 Practice Test 35

Question 340

A post-incident design review discusses the following: A remote campus must wake powered-down PCs using Wake-on-LAN packets delivered from another IP subnet. Which preventive design control MOST DIRECTLY addresses this specific risk?

  1. Pair spanning-tree protections with fiber health monitoring and UDLD where supported.
  2. Review trusted port assignments and rate limits as topology changes.
  3. Audit optical connections and align UDLD mode on critical peer links.
  4. Document secure WoL relay permissions and disable unrestricted directed broadcasts.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Document secure WoL relay permissions and disable unrestricted directed broadcasts. This control targets the underlying design risk. Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. The follow-up acceptance check remains: Authorized wake packets reach sleeping clients on the intended VLAN and unapproved broadcast exposure stays blocked.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Loop Guard helps protect against unidirectional BPDU loss causing unexpected spanning-tree forwarding. The repeat risk here is different: Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. A directly relevant preventive control is: Document secure WoL relay permissions and disable unrestricted directed broadcasts.

B:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The repeat risk here is different: Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. A directly relevant preventive control is: Document secure WoL relay permissions and disable unrestricted directed broadcasts.

C:

UDLD can detect certain unidirectional Layer 2 link conditions that simple physical carrier status misses. The repeat risk here is different: Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. A directly relevant preventive control is: Document secure WoL relay permissions and disable unrestricted directed broadcasts.

Question 341

During a network design workshop, the team finds this issue: During a predeployment review for a mixed-use industrial campus, the team discovers this design gap: a remote campus must wake powered-down PCs using Wake-on-LAN packets delivered from another IP subnet. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which action MOST DIRECTLY meets the stated design requirement?

  1. Use an appropriate rapid spanning-tree design with correct edge-port roles and designated forwarding paths.
  2. Provide an approved routed WoL delivery method rather than assuming a Layer 2 broadcast crosses routers automatically.
  3. Enable DHCP snooping and trust only the approved server-facing paths.
  4. Evaluate MST regions and appropriately scoped Layer 2 domains to improve spanning-tree scalability.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Provide an approved routed WoL delivery method rather than assuming a Layer 2 broadcast crosses routers automatically. This action addresses the stated design problem. Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. A practical confirmation is: Authorized wake packets reach sleeping clients on the intended VLAN and unapproved broadcast exposure stays blocked. The mixed-use industrial campus acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

RSTP enables faster convergence than legacy 802.1D in supported topologies when port roles are correctly configured. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. The needed response is: Provide an approved routed WoL delivery method rather than assuming a Layer 2 broadcast crosses routers automatically.

C:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. The needed response is: Provide an approved routed WoL delivery method rather than assuming a Layer 2 broadcast crosses routers automatically.

D:

MST can map multiple VLANs to a smaller set of spanning-tree instances while Layer 2 domain size still matters. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. The needed response is: Provide an approved routed WoL delivery method rather than assuming a Layer 2 broadcast crosses routers automatically.

Question 342

In a technical design review: During a predeployment review for a mixed-use industrial campus, the team discovers this design gap: a remote campus must wake powered-down PCs using Wake-on-LAN packets delivered from another IP subnet. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which technical principle BEST explains the design decision?

  1. RSTP enables faster convergence than legacy 802.1D in supported topologies when port roles are correctly configured.
  2. BPDU Guard protects an edge port from participating in an unintended bridge topology when BPDUs appear.
  3. Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design.
  4. DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. The correct engineering response is: Provide an approved routed WoL delivery method rather than assuming a Layer 2 broadcast crosses routers automatically. The observable check is: Authorized wake packets reach sleeping clients on the intended VLAN and unapproved broadcast exposure stays blocked. The mixed-use industrial campus acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: RSTP enables faster convergence than legacy 802.1D in supported topologies when port roles are correctly configured. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: BPDU Guard protects an edge port from participating in an unintended bridge topology when BPDUs appear. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 343

An engineering reviewer needs objective proof for the following: During a predeployment review for a mixed-use industrial campus, the team discovers this design gap: a remote campus must wake powered-down PCs using Wake-on-LAN packets delivered from another IP subnet. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which acceptance observation BEST establishes the intended result?

  1. Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped.
  2. A simulated unidirectional failure raises a UDLD event and the protection action matches the approved mode.
  3. The prohibited within-VLAN frame flow is blocked and unrelated permitted VLAN traffic remains functional.
  4. Authorized wake packets reach sleeping clients on the intended VLAN and unapproved broadcast exposure stays blocked. The mixed-use industrial campus acceptance record also captures this result.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Authorized wake packets reach sleeping clients on the intended VLAN and unapproved broadcast exposure stays blocked. The mixed-use industrial campus acceptance record also captures this result. Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design.

Incorrect Answers

A:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. In the case being tested, Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Authorized wake packets reach sleeping clients on the intended VLAN and unapproved broadcast exposure stays blocked. The mixed-use industrial campus acceptance record also captures this result.

B:

UDLD can detect certain unidirectional Layer 2 link conditions that simple physical carrier status misses. In the case being tested, Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Authorized wake packets reach sleeping clients on the intended VLAN and unapproved broadcast exposure stays blocked. The mixed-use industrial campus acceptance record also captures this result.

C:

A VACL can filter traffic within a VLAN independent of ordinary routed interface ACL enforcement. In the case being tested, Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Authorized wake packets reach sleeping clients on the intended VLAN and unapproved broadcast exposure stays blocked. The mixed-use industrial campus acceptance record also captures this result.

Question 344

The change advisory board sees a repeat risk in this case: During a predeployment review for a mixed-use industrial campus, the team discovers this design gap: a remote campus must wake powered-down PCs using Wake-on-LAN packets delivered from another IP subnet. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which preventive design control MOST DIRECTLY addresses this specific risk?

  1. Document secure WoL relay permissions and disable unrestricted directed broadcasts. Apply the same control to the mixed-use industrial campus rollout checklist.
  2. Treat only verified host-facing interfaces as BPDU Guard edge ports.
  3. Use explicit per-VLAN security tests before deploying VACL changes widely.
  4. Standardize EtherChannel negotiation modes and link speed settings on both ends.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Document secure WoL relay permissions and disable unrestricted directed broadcasts. Apply the same control to the mixed-use industrial campus rollout checklist. This control targets the underlying design risk. Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. The follow-up acceptance check remains: Authorized wake packets reach sleeping clients on the intended VLAN and unapproved broadcast exposure stays blocked. The mixed-use industrial campus acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

B:

BPDU Guard protects an edge port from participating in an unintended bridge topology when BPDUs appear. The repeat risk here is different: Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. A directly relevant preventive control is: Document secure WoL relay permissions and disable unrestricted directed broadcasts. Apply the same control to the mixed-use industrial campus rollout checklist.

C:

A VACL can filter traffic within a VLAN independent of ordinary routed interface ACL enforcement. The repeat risk here is different: Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. A directly relevant preventive control is: Document secure WoL relay permissions and disable unrestricted directed broadcasts. Apply the same control to the mixed-use industrial campus rollout checklist.

D:

LACP requires peer participation and compatible member parameters before an aggregated bundle can form reliably. The repeat risk here is different: Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. A directly relevant preventive control is: Document secure WoL relay permissions and disable unrestricted directed broadcasts. Apply the same control to the mixed-use industrial campus rollout checklist.

Question 345

A design team must resolve this enterprise network problem: An employee connects a rogue device that replies with DHCP offers before the legitimate server. Which action MOST DIRECTLY meets the stated design requirement?

  1. Apply Dynamic ARP Inspection where supported using valid DHCP snooping bindings or other authorized ARP entries.
  2. Use an appropriate rapid spanning-tree design with correct edge-port roles and designated forwarding paths.
  3. Enable DHCP snooping and trust only the approved server-facing paths.
  4. Calculate aggregate PoE demand including startup spikes and choose switches with adequate supported power budgets.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Enable DHCP snooping and trust only the approved server-facing paths. This action addresses the stated design problem. DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. A practical confirmation is: Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped.

Incorrect Answers

A:

DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The needed response is: Enable DHCP snooping and trust only the approved server-facing paths.

B:

RSTP enables faster convergence than legacy 802.1D in supported topologies when port roles are correctly configured. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The needed response is: Enable DHCP snooping and trust only the approved server-facing paths.

D:

Per-port support does not guarantee the chassis can supply simultaneous power across all endpoints. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The needed response is: Enable DHCP snooping and trust only the approved server-facing paths.

Question 346

The design record describes this issue: An employee connects a rogue device that replies with DHCP offers before the legitimate server. Which technical principle BEST explains the design decision?

  1. BPDU Guard protects an edge port from participating in an unintended bridge topology when BPDUs appear.
  2. RSTP enables faster convergence than legacy 802.1D in supported topologies when port roles are correctly configured.
  3. A VACL can filter traffic within a VLAN independent of ordinary routed interface ACL enforcement.
  4. DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The correct engineering response is: Enable DHCP snooping and trust only the approved server-facing paths. The observable check is: Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped.

Incorrect Answers

A:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: BPDU Guard protects an edge port from participating in an unintended bridge topology when BPDUs appear. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: RSTP enables faster convergence than legacy 802.1D in supported topologies when port roles are correctly configured. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: a VACL can filter traffic within a VLAN independent of ordinary routed interface ACL enforcement. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 347

After designing a change for the following scenario: An employee connects a rogue device that replies with DHCP offers before the legitimate server. Which acceptance observation BEST establishes the intended result?

  1. Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped.
  2. A test BPDU on the access port triggers the expected protective state while legitimate uplinks stay operational.
  3. A planned uplink failure recovers within the agreed convergence objective without loops.
  4. A simulated unidirectional failure raises a UDLD event and the protection action matches the approved mode.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped. DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages.

Incorrect Answers

B:

BPDU Guard protects an edge port from participating in an unintended bridge topology when BPDUs appear. In the case being tested, DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped.

C:

RSTP enables faster convergence than legacy 802.1D in supported topologies when port roles are correctly configured. In the case being tested, DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped.

D:

UDLD can detect certain unidirectional Layer 2 link conditions that simple physical carrier status misses. In the case being tested, DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped.

Question 348

A preventive architecture review covers this situation: An employee connects a rogue device that replies with DHCP offers before the legitimate server. Which preventive design control MOST DIRECTLY addresses this specific risk?

  1. Audit MST region name, revision and VLAN mappings whenever adding switches.
  2. Review trusted port assignments and rate limits as topology changes.
  3. Use explicit per-VLAN security tests before deploying VACL changes widely.
  4. Audit optical connections and align UDLD mode on critical peer links.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Review trusted port assignments and rate limits as topology changes. This control targets the underlying design risk. DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The follow-up acceptance check remains: Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped.

Incorrect Answers

A:

MST can map multiple VLANs to a smaller set of spanning-tree instances while Layer 2 domain size still matters. The repeat risk here is different: DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. A directly relevant preventive control is: Review trusted port assignments and rate limits as topology changes.

C:

A VACL can filter traffic within a VLAN independent of ordinary routed interface ACL enforcement. The repeat risk here is different: DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. A directly relevant preventive control is: Review trusted port assignments and rate limits as topology changes.

D:

UDLD can detect certain unidirectional Layer 2 link conditions that simple physical carrier status misses. The repeat risk here is different: DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. A directly relevant preventive control is: Review trusted port assignments and rate limits as topology changes.

Question 349

A new campus or WAN review presents this constraint: During a predeployment review for a new headquarters building, the team discovers this design gap: an employee connects a rogue device that replies with DHCP offers before the legitimate server. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which action MOST DIRECTLY meets the stated design requirement?

  1. Provide an approved routed WoL delivery method rather than assuming a Layer 2 broadcast crosses routers automatically.
  2. Apply Dynamic ARP Inspection where supported using valid DHCP snooping bindings or other authorized ARP entries.
  3. Calculate aggregate PoE demand including startup spikes and choose switches with adequate supported power budgets.
  4. Enable DHCP snooping and trust only the approved server-facing paths.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Enable DHCP snooping and trust only the approved server-facing paths. This action addresses the stated design problem. DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. A practical confirmation is: Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped. The new headquarters building acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The needed response is: Enable DHCP snooping and trust only the approved server-facing paths.

B:

DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The needed response is: Enable DHCP snooping and trust only the approved server-facing paths.

C:

Per-port support does not guarantee the chassis can supply simultaneous power across all endpoints. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The needed response is: Enable DHCP snooping and trust only the approved server-facing paths.

Question 350

For this Cisco ENSLD design case: During a predeployment review for a new headquarters building, the team discovers this design gap: an employee connects a rogue device that replies with DHCP offers before the legitimate server. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which technical principle BEST explains the design decision?

  1. DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages.
  2. Per-port support does not guarantee the chassis can supply simultaneous power across all endpoints.
  3. A VACL can filter traffic within a VLAN independent of ordinary routed interface ACL enforcement.
  4. RSTP enables faster convergence than legacy 802.1D in supported topologies when port roles are correctly configured.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The correct engineering response is: Enable DHCP snooping and trust only the approved server-facing paths. The observable check is: Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped. The new headquarters building acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

B:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Per-port support does not guarantee the chassis can supply simultaneous power across all endpoints. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: a VACL can filter traffic within a VLAN independent of ordinary routed interface ACL enforcement. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: RSTP enables faster convergence than legacy 802.1D in supported topologies when port roles are correctly configured. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.