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Cisco 300-420 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-420

Exam Name Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Enterprise

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Cisco 300-420 Practice Test 36

Question 350

For this Cisco ENSLD design case: During a predeployment review for a new headquarters building, the team discovers this design gap: an employee connects a rogue device that replies with DHCP offers before the legitimate server. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which technical principle BEST explains the design decision?

  1. DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages.
  2. Per-port support does not guarantee the chassis can supply simultaneous power across all endpoints.
  3. A VACL can filter traffic within a VLAN independent of ordinary routed interface ACL enforcement.
  4. RSTP enables faster convergence than legacy 802.1D in supported topologies when port roles are correctly configured.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The correct engineering response is: Enable DHCP snooping and trust only the approved server-facing paths. The observable check is: Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped. The new headquarters building acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

B:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Per-port support does not guarantee the chassis can supply simultaneous power across all endpoints. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: a VACL can filter traffic within a VLAN independent of ordinary routed interface ACL enforcement. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: RSTP enables faster convergence than legacy 802.1D in supported topologies when port roles are correctly configured. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 351

During acceptance testing for this network design: During a predeployment review for a new headquarters building, the team discovers this design gap: an employee connects a rogue device that replies with DHCP offers before the legitimate server. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which acceptance observation BEST establishes the intended result?

  1. The expected MST instances carry the assigned VLAN groups and topology-change rates remain controlled.
  2. Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped. The new headquarters building acceptance record also captures this result.
  3. The suspected port is held loop-inconsistent under the test condition instead of creating a forwarding loop.
  4. Authorized wake packets reach sleeping clients on the intended VLAN and unapproved broadcast exposure stays blocked.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped. The new headquarters building acceptance record also captures this result. DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages.

Incorrect Answers

A:

MST can map multiple VLANs to a smaller set of spanning-tree instances while Layer 2 domain size still matters. In the case being tested, DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped. The new headquarters building acceptance record also captures this result.

C:

Loop Guard helps protect against unidirectional BPDU loss causing unexpected spanning-tree forwarding. In the case being tested, DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped. The new headquarters building acceptance record also captures this result.

D:

Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. In the case being tested, DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped. The new headquarters building acceptance record also captures this result.

Question 352

Operations wants to avoid recurrence of this design flaw: During a predeployment review for a new headquarters building, the team discovers this design gap: an employee connects a rogue device that replies with DHCP offers before the legitimate server. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which preventive design control MOST DIRECTLY addresses this specific risk?

  1. Pair spanning-tree protections with fiber health monitoring and UDLD where supported.
  2. Audit optical connections and align UDLD mode on critical peer links.
  3. Review trusted port assignments and rate limits as topology changes. Apply the same control to the new headquarters building rollout checklist.
  4. Track PoE class and endpoint growth in access-switch capacity plans.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Review trusted port assignments and rate limits as topology changes. Apply the same control to the new headquarters building rollout checklist. This control targets the underlying design risk. DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. The follow-up acceptance check remains: Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped. The new headquarters building acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Loop Guard helps protect against unidirectional BPDU loss causing unexpected spanning-tree forwarding. The repeat risk here is different: DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. A directly relevant preventive control is: Review trusted port assignments and rate limits as topology changes. Apply the same control to the new headquarters building rollout checklist.

B:

UDLD can detect certain unidirectional Layer 2 link conditions that simple physical carrier status misses. The repeat risk here is different: DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. A directly relevant preventive control is: Review trusted port assignments and rate limits as topology changes. Apply the same control to the new headquarters building rollout checklist.

D:

Per-port support does not guarantee the chassis can supply simultaneous power across all endpoints. The repeat risk here is different: DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. A directly relevant preventive control is: Review trusted port assignments and rate limits as topology changes. Apply the same control to the new headquarters building rollout checklist.

Question 353

A Cisco enterprise designer reviews the following scenario: A compromised endpoint attempts ARP spoofing on the staff VLAN after DHCP snooping is enabled. Which action MOST DIRECTLY meets the stated design requirement?

  1. Apply Dynamic ARP Inspection where supported using valid DHCP snooping bindings or other authorized ARP entries.
  2. Use Root Guard on the port where superior BPDUs must not be accepted.
  3. Use Loop Guard where appropriate to stop an expected non-designated port from transitioning to forwarding on lost BPDUs.
  4. Use an appropriate rapid spanning-tree design with correct edge-port roles and designated forwarding paths.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Apply Dynamic ARP Inspection where supported using valid DHCP snooping bindings or other authorized ARP entries. This action addresses the stated design problem. DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. A practical confirmation is: Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Root Guard prevents a designated switch port from accepting a downstream superior-root claim. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The needed response is: Apply Dynamic ARP Inspection where supported using valid DHCP snooping bindings or other authorized ARP entries.

C:

Loop Guard helps protect against unidirectional BPDU loss causing unexpected spanning-tree forwarding. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The needed response is: Apply Dynamic ARP Inspection where supported using valid DHCP snooping bindings or other authorized ARP entries.

D:

RSTP enables faster convergence than legacy 802.1D in supported topologies when port roles are correctly configured. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The needed response is: Apply Dynamic ARP Inspection where supported using valid DHCP snooping bindings or other authorized ARP entries.

Question 354

The network architecture board discusses the following: A compromised endpoint attempts ARP spoofing on the staff VLAN after DHCP snooping is enabled. Which technical principle BEST explains the design decision?

  1. Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design.
  2. DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain.
  3. A VACL can filter traffic within a VLAN independent of ordinary routed interface ACL enforcement.
  4. Loop Guard helps protect against unidirectional BPDU loss causing unexpected spanning-tree forwarding.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The correct engineering response is: Apply Dynamic ARP Inspection where supported using valid DHCP snooping bindings or other authorized ARP entries. The observable check is: Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve.

Incorrect Answers

A:

DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: a VACL can filter traffic within a VLAN independent of ordinary routed interface ACL enforcement. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Loop Guard helps protect against unidirectional BPDU loss causing unexpected spanning-tree forwarding. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 355

The infrastructure team must validate this situation: A compromised endpoint attempts ARP spoofing on the staff VLAN after DHCP snooping is enabled. Which acceptance observation BEST establishes the intended result?

  1. Authorized wake packets reach sleeping clients on the intended VLAN and unapproved broadcast exposure stays blocked.
  2. The expected MST instances carry the assigned VLAN groups and topology-change rates remain controlled.
  3. Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve.
  4. The prohibited within-VLAN frame flow is blocked and unrelated permitted VLAN traffic remains functional.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve. DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. In the case being tested, DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve.

B:

MST can map multiple VLANs to a smaller set of spanning-tree instances while Layer 2 domain size still matters. In the case being tested, DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve.

D:

A VACL can filter traffic within a VLAN independent of ordinary routed interface ACL enforcement. In the case being tested, DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve.

Question 356

A post-incident design review discusses the following: A compromised endpoint attempts ARP spoofing on the staff VLAN after DHCP snooping is enabled. Which preventive design control MOST DIRECTLY addresses this specific risk?

  1. Audit optical connections and align UDLD mode on critical peer links.
  2. Document intended spanning-tree root placement and root-guard boundary ports.
  3. Verify edge-port and point-to-point link settings in switch templates.
  4. Maintain binding consistency for statically addressed devices and trusted uplinks.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Maintain binding consistency for statically addressed devices and trusted uplinks. This control targets the underlying design risk. DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The follow-up acceptance check remains: Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve.

Incorrect Answers

A:

UDLD can detect certain unidirectional Layer 2 link conditions that simple physical carrier status misses. The repeat risk here is different: DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. A directly relevant preventive control is: Maintain binding consistency for statically addressed devices and trusted uplinks.

B:

Root Guard prevents a designated switch port from accepting a downstream superior-root claim. The repeat risk here is different: DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. A directly relevant preventive control is: Maintain binding consistency for statically addressed devices and trusted uplinks.

C:

RSTP enables faster convergence than legacy 802.1D in supported topologies when port roles are correctly configured. The repeat risk here is different: DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. A directly relevant preventive control is: Maintain binding consistency for statically addressed devices and trusted uplinks.

Question 357

During a network design workshop, the team finds this issue: During a predeployment review for a public-sector campus, the team discovers this design gap: a compromised endpoint attempts ARP spoofing on the staff VLAN after DHCP snooping is enabled. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which action MOST DIRECTLY meets the stated design requirement?

  1. Evaluate a VLAN access map for the specific Layer 2 filtering requirement with platform support.
  2. Apply Dynamic ARP Inspection where supported using valid DHCP snooping bindings or other authorized ARP entries.
  3. Provide an approved routed WoL delivery method rather than assuming a Layer 2 broadcast crosses routers automatically.
  4. Calculate aggregate PoE demand including startup spikes and choose switches with adequate supported power budgets.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Apply Dynamic ARP Inspection where supported using valid DHCP snooping bindings or other authorized ARP entries. This action addresses the stated design problem. DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. A practical confirmation is: Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve. The public-sector campus acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A VACL can filter traffic within a VLAN independent of ordinary routed interface ACL enforcement. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The needed response is: Apply Dynamic ARP Inspection where supported using valid DHCP snooping bindings or other authorized ARP entries.

C:

Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The needed response is: Apply Dynamic ARP Inspection where supported using valid DHCP snooping bindings or other authorized ARP entries.

D:

Per-port support does not guarantee the chassis can supply simultaneous power across all endpoints. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The needed response is: Apply Dynamic ARP Inspection where supported using valid DHCP snooping bindings or other authorized ARP entries.

Question 358

In a technical design review: During a predeployment review for a public-sector campus, the team discovers this design gap: a compromised endpoint attempts ARP spoofing on the staff VLAN after DHCP snooping is enabled. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which technical principle BEST explains the design decision?

  1. Root Guard prevents a designated switch port from accepting a downstream superior-root claim.
  2. LACP requires peer participation and compatible member parameters before an aggregated bundle can form reliably.
  3. DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain.
  4. Loop Guard helps protect against unidirectional BPDU loss causing unexpected spanning-tree forwarding.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The correct engineering response is: Apply Dynamic ARP Inspection where supported using valid DHCP snooping bindings or other authorized ARP entries. The observable check is: Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve. The public-sector campus acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Root Guard prevents a designated switch port from accepting a downstream superior-root claim. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: LACP requires peer participation and compatible member parameters before an aggregated bundle can form reliably. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Loop Guard helps protect against unidirectional BPDU loss causing unexpected spanning-tree forwarding. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 359

An engineering reviewer needs objective proof for the following: During a predeployment review for a public-sector campus, the team discovers this design gap: a compromised endpoint attempts ARP spoofing on the staff VLAN after DHCP snooping is enabled. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which acceptance observation BEST establishes the intended result?

  1. Clients receive leases only from approved DHCP servers and rogue offers are dropped.
  2. Authorized wake packets reach sleeping clients on the intended VLAN and unapproved broadcast exposure stays blocked.
  3. The expected MST instances carry the assigned VLAN groups and topology-change rates remain controlled.
  4. Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve. The public-sector campus acceptance record also captures this result.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve. The public-sector campus acceptance record also captures this result. DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain.

Incorrect Answers

A:

DHCP snooping separates trusted DHCP sources from untrusted access ports and can block rogue server messages. In the case being tested, DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve. The public-sector campus acceptance record also captures this result.

B:

Ordinary local broadcast frames do not propagate across a Layer 3 boundary without an explicit WoL relay design. In the case being tested, DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve. The public-sector campus acceptance record also captures this result.

C:

MST can map multiple VLANs to a smaller set of spanning-tree instances while Layer 2 domain size still matters. In the case being tested, DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve. The public-sector campus acceptance record also captures this result.

Question 360

The change advisory board sees a repeat risk in this case: During a predeployment review for a public-sector campus, the team discovers this design gap: a compromised endpoint attempts ARP spoofing on the staff VLAN after DHCP snooping is enabled. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which preventive design control MOST DIRECTLY addresses this specific risk?

  1. Maintain binding consistency for statically addressed devices and trusted uplinks. Apply the same control to the public-sector campus rollout checklist.
  2. Verify edge-port and point-to-point link settings in switch templates.
  3. Audit optical connections and align UDLD mode on critical peer links.
  4. Document intended spanning-tree root placement and root-guard boundary ports.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Maintain binding consistency for statically addressed devices and trusted uplinks. Apply the same control to the public-sector campus rollout checklist. This control targets the underlying design risk. DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. The follow-up acceptance check remains: Forged ARP replies fail validation while legitimate endpoint ARP continues to resolve. The public-sector campus acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

B:

RSTP enables faster convergence than legacy 802.1D in supported topologies when port roles are correctly configured. The repeat risk here is different: DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. A directly relevant preventive control is: Maintain binding consistency for statically addressed devices and trusted uplinks. Apply the same control to the public-sector campus rollout checklist.

C:

UDLD can detect certain unidirectional Layer 2 link conditions that simple physical carrier status misses. The repeat risk here is different: DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. A directly relevant preventive control is: Maintain binding consistency for statically addressed devices and trusted uplinks. Apply the same control to the public-sector campus rollout checklist.

D:

Root Guard prevents a designated switch port from accepting a downstream superior-root claim. The repeat risk here is different: DAI checks ARP packet bindings to reduce ARP spoofing within the Layer 2 broadcast domain. A directly relevant preventive control is: Maintain binding consistency for statically addressed devices and trusted uplinks. Apply the same control to the public-sector campus rollout checklist.