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Exam Code: 300-420

Exam Name Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Enterprise

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Cisco 300-420 Practice Test 54

Question 530

The network architecture board discusses the following: A design proposal assumes a carrier Layer 2 VPN automatically provides cryptographic confidentiality to all transported data. Which technical principle BEST explains the design decision?

  1. DMVPN uses hub-assisted next-hop resolution to support dynamic spoke connectivity over multipoint GRE, commonly secured with IPsec.
  2. Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries.
  3. IPsec secures eligible IP packets using negotiated security associations; GRE alone does not encrypt them.
  4. Cellular WAN connectivity provides a separate access medium but has latency, availability and usage constraints.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The correct engineering response is: Add encryption if confidentiality is required rather than assuming a Layer 2 pseudowire is intrinsically encrypted. The observable check is: A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: DMVPN uses hub-assisted next-hop resolution to support dynamic spoke connectivity over multipoint GRE, commonly secured with IPsec. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: IPsec secures eligible IP packets using negotiated security associations; GRE alone does not encrypt them. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Cellular WAN connectivity provides a separate access medium but has latency, availability and usage constraints. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 531

The infrastructure team must validate this situation: A design proposal assumes a carrier Layer 2 VPN automatically provides cryptographic confidentiality to all transported data. Which acceptance observation BEST establishes the intended result?

  1. Authorized spokes resolve each other’s tunnel address and exchange traffic through the expected protected path.
  2. End-to-end multicast packets traverse the overlay and reach only authorized receiving networks.
  3. A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated.
  4. Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated. Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries.

Incorrect Answers

A:

DMVPN uses hub-assisted next-hop resolution to support dynamic spoke connectivity over multipoint GRE, commonly secured with IPsec. In the case being tested, Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated.

B:

GRE can encapsulate multicast or nonnative payloads over a unicast IP underlay but supplies no encryption by itself. In the case being tested, Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated.

D:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. In the case being tested, Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated.

Question 532

A post-incident design review discusses the following: A design proposal assumes a carrier Layer 2 VPN automatically provides cryptographic confidentiality to all transported data. Which preventive design control MOST DIRECTLY addresses this specific risk?

  1. Rotate credentials and test rekeying and cipher policy before production expiry.
  2. Test NHRP registrations, route recursion and IPsec state under hub or ISP failure.
  3. Test cellular failover, authentication, signal quality and billing controls regularly.
  4. Document transport trust levels separately from encryption policy and verify carrier claims.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Document transport trust levels separately from encryption policy and verify carrier claims. This control targets the underlying design risk. Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The follow-up acceptance check remains: A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated.

Incorrect Answers

A:

IPsec secures eligible IP packets using negotiated security associations; GRE alone does not encrypt them. The repeat risk here is different: Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. A directly relevant preventive control is: Document transport trust levels separately from encryption policy and verify carrier claims.

B:

DMVPN uses hub-assisted next-hop resolution to support dynamic spoke connectivity over multipoint GRE, commonly secured with IPsec. The repeat risk here is different: Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. A directly relevant preventive control is: Document transport trust levels separately from encryption policy and verify carrier claims.

C:

Cellular WAN connectivity provides a separate access medium but has latency, availability and usage constraints. The repeat risk here is different: Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. A directly relevant preventive control is: Document transport trust levels separately from encryption policy and verify carrier claims.

Question 533

During a network design workshop, the team finds this issue: During a predeployment review for a manufacturing group WAN, the team discovers this design gap: a design proposal assumes a carrier Layer 2 VPN automatically provides cryptographic confidentiality to all transported data. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which action MOST DIRECTLY meets the stated design requirement?

  1. Evaluate DMVPN with NHRP registration and a supported multipoint GRE/IPsec design.
  2. Add encryption if confidentiality is required rather than assuming a Layer 2 pseudowire is intrinsically encrypted.
  3. Evaluate Group Encrypted Transport VPN where platform support and shared WAN routing permit its use.
  4. Set critical application priorities and capacity controls specifically for the lower-bandwidth backup transport.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Add encryption if confidentiality is required rather than assuming a Layer 2 pseudowire is intrinsically encrypted. This action addresses the stated design problem. Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. A practical confirmation is: A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated. The manufacturing group WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

DMVPN uses hub-assisted next-hop resolution to support dynamic spoke connectivity over multipoint GRE, commonly secured with IPsec. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The needed response is: Add encryption if confidentiality is required rather than assuming a Layer 2 pseudowire is intrinsically encrypted.

C:

GETVPN can encrypt group traffic on a trusted routed core without requiring pairwise tunnel overlays between every site. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The needed response is: Add encryption if confidentiality is required rather than assuming a Layer 2 pseudowire is intrinsically encrypted.

D:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The needed response is: Add encryption if confidentiality is required rather than assuming a Layer 2 pseudowire is intrinsically encrypted.

Question 534

In a technical design review: During a predeployment review for a manufacturing group WAN, the team discovers this design gap: a design proposal assumes a carrier Layer 2 VPN automatically provides cryptographic confidentiality to all transported data. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which technical principle BEST explains the design decision?

  1. DMVPN uses hub-assisted next-hop resolution to support dynamic spoke connectivity over multipoint GRE, commonly secured with IPsec.
  2. GRE can encapsulate multicast or nonnative payloads over a unicast IP underlay but supplies no encryption by itself.
  3. Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries.
  4. The SD-WAN overlay control plane distributes reachability or policy, not the application payload itself.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The correct engineering response is: Add encryption if confidentiality is required rather than assuming a Layer 2 pseudowire is intrinsically encrypted. The observable check is: A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated. The manufacturing group WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: DMVPN uses hub-assisted next-hop resolution to support dynamic spoke connectivity over multipoint GRE, commonly secured with IPsec. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: GRE can encapsulate multicast or nonnative payloads over a unicast IP underlay but supplies no encryption by itself. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: the SD-WAN overlay control plane distributes reachability or policy, not the application payload itself. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 535

An engineering reviewer needs objective proof for the following: During a predeployment review for a manufacturing group WAN, the team discovers this design gap: a design proposal assumes a carrier Layer 2 VPN automatically provides cryptographic confidentiality to all transported data. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which acceptance observation BEST establishes the intended result?

  1. End-to-end multicast packets traverse the overlay and reach only authorized receiving networks.
  2. Authorized group members exchange encrypted traffic over normal private WAN routes and rekey successfully.
  3. Authorized spokes resolve each other’s tunnel address and exchange traffic through the expected protected path.
  4. A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated. The manufacturing group WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated. The manufacturing group WAN acceptance record also captures this result. Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries.

Incorrect Answers

A:

GRE can encapsulate multicast or nonnative payloads over a unicast IP underlay but supplies no encryption by itself. In the case being tested, Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated. The manufacturing group WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

B:

GETVPN can encrypt group traffic on a trusted routed core without requiring pairwise tunnel overlays between every site. In the case being tested, Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated. The manufacturing group WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

C:

DMVPN uses hub-assisted next-hop resolution to support dynamic spoke connectivity over multipoint GRE, commonly secured with IPsec. In the case being tested, Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated. The manufacturing group WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

Question 536

The change advisory board sees a repeat risk in this case: During a predeployment review for a manufacturing group WAN, the team discovers this design gap: a design proposal assumes a carrier Layer 2 VPN automatically provides cryptographic confidentiality to all transported data. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which preventive design control MOST DIRECTLY addresses this specific risk?

  1. Document transport trust levels separately from encryption policy and verify carrier claims. Apply the same control to the manufacturing group WAN rollout checklist.
  2. Test NHRP registrations, route recursion and IPsec state under hub or ISP failure.
  3. Protect group-key distribution and test key-server redundancy and rekey intervals.
  4. Account for tunnel MTU, routing and encryption requirements during design reviews.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Document transport trust levels separately from encryption policy and verify carrier claims. Apply the same control to the manufacturing group WAN rollout checklist. This control targets the underlying design risk. Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The follow-up acceptance check remains: A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated. The manufacturing group WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

B:

DMVPN uses hub-assisted next-hop resolution to support dynamic spoke connectivity over multipoint GRE, commonly secured with IPsec. The repeat risk here is different: Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. A directly relevant preventive control is: Document transport trust levels separately from encryption policy and verify carrier claims. Apply the same control to the manufacturing group WAN rollout checklist.

C:

GETVPN can encrypt group traffic on a trusted routed core without requiring pairwise tunnel overlays between every site. The repeat risk here is different: Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. A directly relevant preventive control is: Document transport trust levels separately from encryption policy and verify carrier claims. Apply the same control to the manufacturing group WAN rollout checklist.

D:

GRE can encapsulate multicast or nonnative payloads over a unicast IP underlay but supplies no encryption by itself. The repeat risk here is different: Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. A directly relevant preventive control is: Document transport trust levels separately from encryption policy and verify carrier claims. Apply the same control to the manufacturing group WAN rollout checklist.

Question 537

A design team must resolve this enterprise network problem: A critical factory is single-homed to one WAN provider, yet its SLA requires survival of a local access-fiber cut. Which action MOST DIRECTLY meets the stated design requirement?

  1. Set critical application priorities and capacity controls specifically for the lower-bandwidth backup transport.
  2. Validate directional path symmetry needs and application statefulness before enabling multipath traffic.
  3. Add a diverse second access circuit and suitable edge failover to eliminate the single access-link fault domain.
  4. Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Add a diverse second access circuit and suitable edge failover to eliminate the single access-link fault domain. This action addresses the stated design problem. Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. A practical confirmation is: The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The needed response is: Add a diverse second access circuit and suitable edge failover to eliminate the single access-link fault domain.

B:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The needed response is: Add a diverse second access circuit and suitable edge failover to eliminate the single access-link fault domain.

D:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The needed response is: Add a diverse second access circuit and suitable edge failover to eliminate the single access-link fault domain.

Question 538

The design record describes this issue: A critical factory is single-homed to one WAN provider, yet its SLA requires survival of a local access-fiber cut. Which technical principle BEST explains the design decision?

  1. Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable.
  2. Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS.
  3. Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain.
  4. Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The correct engineering response is: Add a diverse second access circuit and suitable edge failover to eliminate the single access-link fault domain. The observable check is: The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 539

After designing a change for the following scenario: A critical factory is single-homed to one WAN provider, yet its SLA requires survival of a local access-fiber cut. Which acceptance observation BEST establishes the intended result?

  1. The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled.
  2. During an induced primary failure, voice delay and critical application loss remain within policy thresholds.
  3. Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops.
  4. Loss of either edge router leaves an alternate WAN path functional within the agreed outage budget.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled. Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. In the case being tested, Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled.

C:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. In the case being tested, Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled.

D:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. In the case being tested, Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled.

Question 540

A preventive architecture review covers this situation: A critical factory is single-homed to one WAN provider, yet its SLA requires survival of a local access-fiber cut. Which preventive design control MOST DIRECTLY addresses this specific risk?

  1. Include chassis, power and provider-path diversity in WAN high-availability reviews.
  2. Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent.
  3. Rehearse production-size failover load and monitor backup usage limits.
  4. Test both traffic directions and firewall session replication with realistic WAN failures.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent. This control targets the underlying design risk. Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The follow-up acceptance check remains: The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The repeat risk here is different: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. A directly relevant preventive control is: Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent.

C:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. The repeat risk here is different: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. A directly relevant preventive control is: Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent.

D:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The repeat risk here is different: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. A directly relevant preventive control is: Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent.