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Exam Code: 300-420

Exam Name Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Enterprise

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Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD) (300-420) Practice Tests

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Cisco 300-420 Practice Test 55

Question 540

A preventive architecture review covers this situation: A critical factory is single-homed to one WAN provider, yet its SLA requires survival of a local access-fiber cut. Which preventive design control MOST DIRECTLY addresses this specific risk?

  1. Include chassis, power and provider-path diversity in WAN high-availability reviews.
  2. Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent.
  3. Rehearse production-size failover load and monitor backup usage limits.
  4. Test both traffic directions and firewall session replication with realistic WAN failures.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent. This control targets the underlying design risk. Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The follow-up acceptance check remains: The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The repeat risk here is different: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. A directly relevant preventive control is: Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent.

C:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. The repeat risk here is different: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. A directly relevant preventive control is: Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent.

D:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The repeat risk here is different: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. A directly relevant preventive control is: Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent.

Question 541

A new campus or WAN review presents this constraint: During a predeployment review for a regional healthcare WAN, the team discovers this design gap: a critical factory is single-homed to one WAN provider, yet its SLA requires survival of a local access-fiber cut. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which action MOST DIRECTLY meets the stated design requirement?

  1. Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity.
  2. Validate directional path symmetry needs and application statefulness before enabling multipath traffic.
  3. Design multicast support across the selected SD-WAN fabric and validate replication or rendezvous requirements.
  4. Add a diverse second access circuit and suitable edge failover to eliminate the single access-link fault domain.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Add a diverse second access circuit and suitable edge failover to eliminate the single access-link fault domain. This action addresses the stated design problem. Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. A practical confirmation is: The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled. The regional healthcare WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The needed response is: Add a diverse second access circuit and suitable edge failover to eliminate the single access-link fault domain.

B:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The needed response is: Add a diverse second access circuit and suitable edge failover to eliminate the single access-link fault domain.

C:

Unicast overlay reachability does not guarantee multicast replication, membership or underlay support. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The needed response is: Add a diverse second access circuit and suitable edge failover to eliminate the single access-link fault domain.

Question 542

For this Cisco ENSLD design case: During a predeployment review for a regional healthcare WAN, the team discovers this design gap: a critical factory is single-homed to one WAN provider, yet its SLA requires survival of a local access-fiber cut. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which technical principle BEST explains the design decision?

  1. Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access.
  2. Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain.
  3. Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable.
  4. Secure SD-WAN onboarding depends on authenticated controllers and connectivity to the orchestration services.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The correct engineering response is: Add a diverse second access circuit and suitable edge failover to eliminate the single access-link fault domain. The observable check is: The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled. The regional healthcare WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Secure SD-WAN onboarding depends on authenticated controllers and connectivity to the orchestration services. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 543

During acceptance testing for this network design: During a predeployment review for a regional healthcare WAN, the team discovers this design gap: a critical factory is single-homed to one WAN provider, yet its SLA requires survival of a local access-fiber cut. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which acceptance observation BEST establishes the intended result?

  1. Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops.
  2. The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled. The regional healthcare WAN acceptance record also captures this result.
  3. During an induced primary failure, voice delay and critical application loss remain within policy thresholds.
  4. Loss of either edge router leaves an alternate WAN path functional within the agreed outage budget.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled. The regional healthcare WAN acceptance record also captures this result. Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. In the case being tested, Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled. The regional healthcare WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

C:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. In the case being tested, Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled. The regional healthcare WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

D:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. In the case being tested, Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled. The regional healthcare WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

Question 544

Operations wants to avoid recurrence of this design flaw: During a predeployment review for a regional healthcare WAN, the team discovers this design gap: a critical factory is single-homed to one WAN provider, yet its SLA requires survival of a local access-fiber cut. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which preventive design control MOST DIRECTLY addresses this specific risk?

  1. Rehearse production-size failover load and monitor backup usage limits.
  2. Test both traffic directions and firewall session replication with realistic WAN failures.
  3. Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent. Apply the same control to the regional healthcare WAN rollout checklist.
  4. Include chassis, power and provider-path diversity in WAN high-availability reviews.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent. Apply the same control to the regional healthcare WAN rollout checklist. This control targets the underlying design risk. Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The follow-up acceptance check remains: The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled. The regional healthcare WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. The repeat risk here is different: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. A directly relevant preventive control is: Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent. Apply the same control to the regional healthcare WAN rollout checklist.

B:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The repeat risk here is different: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. A directly relevant preventive control is: Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent. Apply the same control to the regional healthcare WAN rollout checklist.

D:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The repeat risk here is different: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. A directly relevant preventive control is: Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent. Apply the same control to the regional healthcare WAN rollout checklist.

Question 545

A Cisco enterprise designer reviews the following scenario: Two ISP circuits terminate on one edge router and the design claims hardware-resilient WAN connectivity. Which action MOST DIRECTLY meets the stated design requirement?

  1. Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity.
  2. Validate directional path symmetry needs and application statefulness before enabling multipath traffic.
  3. Set critical application priorities and capacity controls specifically for the lower-bandwidth backup transport.
  4. Evaluate Group Encrypted Transport VPN where platform support and shared WAN routing permit its use.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity. This action addresses the stated design problem. Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. A practical confirmation is: Loss of either edge router leaves an alternate WAN path functional within the agreed outage budget.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The needed response is: Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity.

C:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The needed response is: Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity.

D:

GETVPN can encrypt group traffic on a trusted routed core without requiring pairwise tunnel overlays between every site. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The needed response is: Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity.

Question 546

The network architecture board discusses the following: Two ISP circuits terminate on one edge router and the design claims hardware-resilient WAN connectivity. Which technical principle BEST explains the design decision?

  1. Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access.
  2. Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain.
  3. Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable.
  4. DWDM multiplexes distinct optical wavelengths onto one fiber pair to increase transport capacity.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The correct engineering response is: Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity. The observable check is: Loss of either edge router leaves an alternate WAN path functional within the agreed outage budget.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: DWDM multiplexes distinct optical wavelengths onto one fiber pair to increase transport capacity. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 547

The infrastructure team must validate this situation: Two ISP circuits terminate on one edge router and the design claims hardware-resilient WAN connectivity. Which acceptance observation BEST establishes the intended result?

  1. During an induced primary failure, voice delay and critical application loss remain within policy thresholds.
  2. Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops.
  3. Loss of either edge router leaves an alternate WAN path functional within the agreed outage budget.
  4. A packet capture on an untrusted transport path shows only protected payload where encryption is mandated.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Loss of either edge router leaves an alternate WAN path functional within the agreed outage budget. Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. In the case being tested, Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Loss of either edge router leaves an alternate WAN path functional within the agreed outage budget.

B:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. In the case being tested, Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Loss of either edge router leaves an alternate WAN path functional within the agreed outage budget.

D:

Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. In the case being tested, Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Loss of either edge router leaves an alternate WAN path functional within the agreed outage budget.

Question 548

A post-incident design review discusses the following: Two ISP circuits terminate on one edge router and the design claims hardware-resilient WAN connectivity. Which preventive design control MOST DIRECTLY addresses this specific risk?

  1. Test both traffic directions and firewall session replication with realistic WAN failures.
  2. Rehearse production-size failover load and monitor backup usage limits.
  3. Check demarcation handoff, VLAN tags and carrier SLA testing at activation.
  4. Include chassis, power and provider-path diversity in WAN high-availability reviews.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Include chassis, power and provider-path diversity in WAN high-availability reviews. This control targets the underlying design risk. Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The follow-up acceptance check remains: Loss of either edge router leaves an alternate WAN path functional within the agreed outage budget.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The repeat risk here is different: Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. A directly relevant preventive control is: Include chassis, power and provider-path diversity in WAN high-availability reviews.

B:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. The repeat risk here is different: Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. A directly relevant preventive control is: Include chassis, power and provider-path diversity in WAN high-availability reviews.

C:

Metro Ethernet can present an Ethernet service to customer edges without requiring a private optical system. The repeat risk here is different: Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. A directly relevant preventive control is: Include chassis, power and provider-path diversity in WAN high-availability reviews.

Question 549

During a network design workshop, the team finds this issue: During a predeployment review for a financial firm WAN, the team discovers this design gap: two ISP circuits terminate on one edge router and the design claims hardware-resilient WAN connectivity. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which action MOST DIRECTLY meets the stated design requirement?

  1. Set critical application priorities and capacity controls specifically for the lower-bandwidth backup transport.
  2. Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity.
  3. Add a diverse second access circuit and suitable edge failover to eliminate the single access-link fault domain.
  4. Add encryption if confidentiality is required rather than assuming a Layer 2 pseudowire is intrinsically encrypted.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity. This action addresses the stated design problem. Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. A practical confirmation is: Loss of either edge router leaves an alternate WAN path functional within the agreed outage budget. The financial firm WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The needed response is: Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity.

C:

Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The needed response is: Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity.

D:

Layer 2 VPN isolation is distinct from end-to-end payload encryption and depends on carrier trust boundaries. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The needed response is: Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity.

Question 550

In a technical design review: During a predeployment review for a financial firm WAN, the team discovers this design gap: two ISP circuits terminate on one edge router and the design claims hardware-resilient WAN connectivity. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which technical principle BEST explains the design decision?

  1. Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access.
  2. Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable.
  3. Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain.
  4. Metro Ethernet can present an Ethernet service to customer edges without requiring a private optical system.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The correct engineering response is: Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity. The observable check is: Loss of either edge router leaves an alternate WAN path functional within the agreed outage budget. The financial firm WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Metro Ethernet can present an Ethernet service to customer edges without requiring a private optical system. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.