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Exam Code: 300-420

Exam Name Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Enterprise

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Cisco 300-420 Practice Test 57

Question 560

Operations wants to avoid recurrence of this design flaw: During a predeployment review for a multimodal logistics WAN, the team discovers this design gap: a primary high-bandwidth WAN link fails and an undersized LTE backup becomes saturated, disrupting voice. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which preventive design control MOST DIRECTLY addresses this specific risk?

  1. Test both traffic directions and firewall session replication with realistic WAN failures.
  2. Include chassis, power and provider-path diversity in WAN high-availability reviews.
  3. Rehearse production-size failover load and monitor backup usage limits. Apply the same control to the multimodal logistics WAN rollout checklist.
  4. Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Rehearse production-size failover load and monitor backup usage limits. Apply the same control to the multimodal logistics WAN rollout checklist. This control targets the underlying design risk. Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. The follow-up acceptance check remains: During an induced primary failure, voice delay and critical application loss remain within policy thresholds. The multimodal logistics WAN acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The repeat risk here is different: Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. A directly relevant preventive control is: Rehearse production-size failover load and monitor backup usage limits. Apply the same control to the multimodal logistics WAN rollout checklist.

B:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The repeat risk here is different: Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. A directly relevant preventive control is: Rehearse production-size failover load and monitor backup usage limits. Apply the same control to the multimodal logistics WAN rollout checklist.

D:

Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The repeat risk here is different: Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. A directly relevant preventive control is: Rehearse production-size failover load and monitor backup usage limits. Apply the same control to the multimodal logistics WAN rollout checklist.

Question 561

A Cisco enterprise designer reviews the following scenario: A WAN redesign proposes active-active sharing over asymmetric providers, ignoring return-path and firewall-state constraints. Which action MOST DIRECTLY meets the stated design requirement?

  1. Validate directional path symmetry needs and application statefulness before enabling multipath traffic.
  2. Add a diverse second access circuit and suitable edge failover to eliminate the single access-link fault domain.
  3. Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity.
  4. Consider a DWDM transport design with appropriate optical engineering rather than treating each wavelength as a new IP routing protocol.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Validate directional path symmetry needs and application statefulness before enabling multipath traffic. This action addresses the stated design problem. Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. A practical confirmation is: Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The needed response is: Validate directional path symmetry needs and application statefulness before enabling multipath traffic.

C:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The needed response is: Validate directional path symmetry needs and application statefulness before enabling multipath traffic.

D:

DWDM multiplexes distinct optical wavelengths onto one fiber pair to increase transport capacity. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The needed response is: Validate directional path symmetry needs and application statefulness before enabling multipath traffic.

Question 562

The network architecture board discusses the following: A WAN redesign proposes active-active sharing over asymmetric providers, ignoring return-path and firewall-state constraints. Which technical principle BEST explains the design decision?

  1. Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain.
  2. Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable.
  3. Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS.
  4. GRE can encapsulate multicast or nonnative payloads over a unicast IP underlay but supplies no encryption by itself.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The correct engineering response is: Validate directional path symmetry needs and application statefulness before enabling multipath traffic. The observable check is: Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: GRE can encapsulate multicast or nonnative payloads over a unicast IP underlay but supplies no encryption by itself. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 563

The infrastructure team must validate this situation: A WAN redesign proposes active-active sharing over asymmetric providers, ignoring return-path and firewall-state constraints. Which acceptance observation BEST establishes the intended result?

  1. During an induced primary failure, voice delay and critical application loss remain within policy thresholds.
  2. Loss of either edge router leaves an alternate WAN path functional within the agreed outage budget.
  3. Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops.
  4. Routes remain in the intended VPN and all authorized branches exchange routed traffic.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops. Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. In the case being tested, Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops.

B:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. In the case being tested, Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops.

D:

A carrier MPLS L3VPN separates customer routing via provider VRFs and distributes eligible customer prefixes. In the case being tested, Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops.

Question 564

A post-incident design review discusses the following: A WAN redesign proposes active-active sharing over asymmetric providers, ignoring return-path and firewall-state constraints. Which preventive design control MOST DIRECTLY addresses this specific risk?

  1. Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent.
  2. Rehearse production-size failover load and monitor backup usage limits.
  3. Exercise controller and transit provider failures independently in the lab.
  4. Test both traffic directions and firewall session replication with realistic WAN failures.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Test both traffic directions and firewall session replication with realistic WAN failures. This control targets the underlying design risk. Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The follow-up acceptance check remains: Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The repeat risk here is different: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. A directly relevant preventive control is: Test both traffic directions and firewall session replication with realistic WAN failures.

B:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. The repeat risk here is different: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. A directly relevant preventive control is: Test both traffic directions and firewall session replication with realistic WAN failures.

C:

Resilient SD-WAN depends on control-plane connectivity and viable data-plane paths across failure domains. The repeat risk here is different: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. A directly relevant preventive control is: Test both traffic directions and firewall session replication with realistic WAN failures.

Question 565

During a network design workshop, the team finds this issue: During a predeployment review for a coastal branch network, the team discovers this design gap: a WAN redesign proposes active-active sharing over asymmetric providers, ignoring return-path and firewall-state constraints. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which action MOST DIRECTLY meets the stated design requirement?

  1. Add a diverse second access circuit and suitable edge failover to eliminate the single access-link fault domain.
  2. Validate directional path symmetry needs and application statefulness before enabling multipath traffic.
  3. Use separate redundant edge devices and verify upstream termination diversity.
  4. Build redundant controller-reachability paths and test overlay recovery under provider isolation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Validate directional path symmetry needs and application statefulness before enabling multipath traffic. This action addresses the stated design problem. Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. A practical confirmation is: Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops. The coastal branch network acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The needed response is: Validate directional path symmetry needs and application statefulness before enabling multipath traffic.

C:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The needed response is: Validate directional path symmetry needs and application statefulness before enabling multipath traffic.

D:

Resilient SD-WAN depends on control-plane connectivity and viable data-plane paths across failure domains. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The needed response is: Validate directional path symmetry needs and application statefulness before enabling multipath traffic.

Question 566

In a technical design review: During a predeployment review for a coastal branch network, the team discovers this design gap: a WAN redesign proposes active-active sharing over asymmetric providers, ignoring return-path and firewall-state constraints. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which technical principle BEST explains the design decision?

  1. Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access.
  2. Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain.
  3. Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable.
  4. SD-WAN path choice does not replace queuing and traffic treatment at physical congestion points.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The correct engineering response is: Validate directional path symmetry needs and application statefulness before enabling multipath traffic. The observable check is: Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops. The coastal branch network acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: SD-WAN path choice does not replace queuing and traffic treatment at physical congestion points. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 567

An engineering reviewer needs objective proof for the following: During a predeployment review for a coastal branch network, the team discovers this design gap: a WAN redesign proposes active-active sharing over asymmetric providers, ignoring return-path and firewall-state constraints. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which acceptance observation BEST establishes the intended result?

  1. During an induced primary failure, voice delay and critical application loss remain within policy thresholds.
  2. Loss of either edge router leaves an alternate WAN path functional within the agreed outage budget.
  3. The factory continues its critical transaction workload after the primary access span is disabled.
  4. Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops. The coastal branch network acceptance record also captures this result.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops. The coastal branch network acceptance record also captures this result. Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. In the case being tested, Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops. The coastal branch network acceptance record also captures this result.

B:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. In the case being tested, Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops. The coastal branch network acceptance record also captures this result.

C:

Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. In the case being tested, Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops. The coastal branch network acceptance record also captures this result.

Question 568

The change advisory board sees a repeat risk in this case: During a predeployment review for a coastal branch network, the team discovers this design gap: a WAN redesign proposes active-active sharing over asymmetric providers, ignoring return-path and firewall-state constraints. An approval gate requires both a measurable acceptance check and a durable prevention control. Which preventive design control MOST DIRECTLY addresses this specific risk?

  1. Test both traffic directions and firewall session replication with realistic WAN failures. Apply the same control to the coastal branch network rollout checklist.
  2. Include chassis, power and provider-path diversity in WAN high-availability reviews.
  3. Rehearse production-size failover load and monitor backup usage limits.
  4. Audit actual last-mile diversity rather than counting two circuits sharing a duct as independent.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Test both traffic directions and firewall session replication with realistic WAN failures. Apply the same control to the coastal branch network rollout checklist. This control targets the underlying design risk. Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. The follow-up acceptance check remains: Approved applications survive active-active operation and failover without state-related drops. The coastal branch network acceptance record also captures this result.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Two external circuits on one router still share a single customer edge hardware failure domain. The repeat risk here is different: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. A directly relevant preventive control is: Test both traffic directions and firewall session replication with realistic WAN failures. Apply the same control to the coastal branch network rollout checklist.

C:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. The repeat risk here is different: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. A directly relevant preventive control is: Test both traffic directions and firewall session replication with realistic WAN failures. Apply the same control to the coastal branch network rollout checklist.

D:

Single-homing leaves a single path failure that routing protocols cannot repair without alternate physical access. The repeat risk here is different: Stateful security and asymmetric routing can disrupt sessions even when both paths are individually reachable. A directly relevant preventive control is: Test both traffic directions and firewall session replication with realistic WAN failures. Apply the same control to the coastal branch network rollout checklist.

Question 569

A design team must resolve this enterprise network problem: An engineer describes the SD-WAN management GUI as the component that forwards user packets between branches. Which action MOST DIRECTLY meets the stated design requirement?

  1. Use OMP for overlay route and policy information while leaving end-user forwarding to the WAN-edge data plane.
  2. Ensure the approved orchestrator/controller discovery and certificate trust path is available during bootstrap.
  3. Distinguish management functions from WAN edge data-plane forwarding in the architecture.
  4. Set critical application priorities and capacity controls specifically for the lower-bandwidth backup transport.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Distinguish management functions from WAN edge data-plane forwarding in the architecture. This action addresses the stated design problem. SD-WAN management centralizes configuration and visibility, while WAN edges forward application packets. A practical confirmation is: Configuration changes reach the correct edges but production packets are observed through WAN-edge tunnels rather than the management UI.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The SD-WAN overlay control plane distributes reachability or policy, not the application payload itself. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: SD-WAN management centralizes configuration and visibility, while WAN edges forward application packets. The needed response is: Distinguish management functions from WAN edge data-plane forwarding in the architecture.

B:

Secure SD-WAN onboarding depends on authenticated controllers and connectivity to the orchestration services. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: SD-WAN management centralizes configuration and visibility, while WAN edges forward application packets. The needed response is: Distinguish management functions from WAN edge data-plane forwarding in the architecture.

D:

Failover changes available capacity; a backup path that is up may still violate application SLA without admission or QoS. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: SD-WAN management centralizes configuration and visibility, while WAN edges forward application packets. The needed response is: Distinguish management functions from WAN edge data-plane forwarding in the architecture.

Question 570

The design record describes this issue: An engineer describes the SD-WAN management GUI as the component that forwards user packets between branches. Which technical principle BEST explains the design decision?

  1. Secure SD-WAN onboarding depends on authenticated controllers and connectivity to the orchestration services.
  2. The SD-WAN overlay control plane distributes reachability or policy, not the application payload itself.
  3. SLA-based policy selects eligible paths using active performance measurements rather than only static next-hop reachability.
  4. SD-WAN management centralizes configuration and visibility, while WAN edges forward application packets.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

SD-WAN management centralizes configuration and visibility, while WAN edges forward application packets. The correct engineering response is: Distinguish management functions from WAN edge data-plane forwarding in the architecture. The observable check is: Configuration changes reach the correct edges but production packets are observed through WAN-edge tunnels rather than the management UI.

Incorrect Answers

A:

SD-WAN management centralizes configuration and visibility, while WAN edges forward application packets. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Secure SD-WAN onboarding depends on authenticated controllers and connectivity to the orchestration services. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

SD-WAN management centralizes configuration and visibility, while WAN edges forward application packets. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: the SD-WAN overlay control plane distributes reachability or policy, not the application payload itself. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

SD-WAN management centralizes configuration and visibility, while WAN edges forward application packets. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: SLA-based policy selects eligible paths using active performance measurements rather than only static next-hop reachability. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.