McAfee Secure

Exam Code: NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6

Exam Name: Fortinet NSE 5 - FortiSwitch 7.6 Administrator

Certification Provider: Fortinet

Corresponding Certification: NSE5

Fortinet NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6 Questions & Answers

Study with Up-To-Date REAL Exam Questions and Answers from the ACTUAL Test

64 Questions & Answers with Testing Engine

"Fortinet NSE 5 - FortiSwitch 7.6 Administrator Exam", also known as NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6 exam, is a Fortinet certification exam.

Pass your tests with the always up-to-date NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6 Exam Engine. Your NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6 training materials keep you at the head of the pack!

Satisfaction Guaranteed

Money Back Guarantee

Testking provides hassle-free money back guarantee with our products. That is because we have 100% trust in the abilities of our professional and experience product team, and our record is a proof of that.

99.6% PASS RATE
Was: $137.49
Now: $124.99

Fortinet NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6 Practice Test 56

Question 550

At the Alderbridge regional network integrator, a previously compliant workstation fails wired 802.1X after its device certificate expires. Which explanation best accounts for the concern?

  1. A certificate-based EAP method cannot accept a client credential outside its trusted validity period
  2. An open access port cannot verify user or device identity before allowing network access
  3. A policy object that is never applied does not enforce access restrictions
  4. Overbroad ACL scope can deny unrelated applications sharing the same switch

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The strongest explanation is that a certificate-based EAP method cannot accept a client credential outside its trusted validity period. This accounts for the outcome and supports the action to renew the client certificate through the approved trust chain and verify EAP-TLS authentication.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Although an open access port cannot verify user or device identity before allowing network access, the presented symptoms do not support that as the primary cause; they indicate that a certificate-based EAP method cannot accept a client credential outside its trusted validity period. For the Alderbridge regional network integrator, the direct corrective action is to renew the client certificate through the approved trust chain and verify EAP-TLS authentication.

C:

The offered principle is: A policy object that is never applied does not enforce access restrictions. In the source material it is associated with: A policy object that is never applied does not enforce access restrictions. This case has a different controlling cause: A certificate-based EAP method cannot accept a client credential outside its trusted validity period. Its keyed mechanism is: A certificate-based EAP method cannot accept a client credential outside its trusted validity period.

D:

Overbroad ACL scope can deny unrelated applications sharing the same switch. That may occur elsewhere, but the evidence at the Alderbridge regional network integrator instead points to the fact that a certificate-based EAP method cannot accept a client credential outside its trusted validity period.

Question 551

At the Alderbridge regional network integrator, a previously compliant workstation fails wired 802.1X after its device certificate expires. Which test result best shows the requirement is met?

  1. The authorized MAC count remains functional while excess identities trigger the documented action
  2. The analyzer receives exactly the intended test flow and no unrelated tenant packets
  3. A renewed workstation joins the secure VLAN and an expired certificate remains rejected
  4. An injected MAC burst is limited while known legitimate traffic remains available

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Because a certificate-based EAP method cannot accept a client credential outside its trusted validity period, the required evidence must show that a renewed workstation joins the secure VLAN and an expired certificate remains rejected. A healthy endpoint status alone is insufficient.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The authorized MAC count remains functional while excess identities trigger the documented action. That result would test a control for this other failure: Unlimited downstream MAC learning can broaden access and consume switch forwarding resources. The question instead requires evidence for: A certificate-based EAP method cannot accept a client credential outside its trusted validity period. The direct outcome to verify is: A renewed workstation joins the secure VLAN and an expired certificate remains rejected.

B:

The offered observation is: The analyzer receives exactly the intended test flow and no unrelated tenant packets. It would support the separate mechanism: Mirroring every switch packet can overrun the monitoring destination and disclose unrelated data. In this case the decisive dependency is: A certificate-based EAP method cannot accept a client credential outside its trusted validity period. The original keyed verification is: A renewed workstation joins the secure VLAN and an expired certificate remains rejected.

D:

At the Alderbridge regional network integrator, a result about mac flooding detection would not show that the team corrected the failure where a certificate-based EAP method cannot accept a client credential outside its trusted validity period.

Question 552

At the Alderbridge regional network integrator, a previously compliant workstation fails wired 802.1X after its device certificate expires. Which ongoing control best prevents this issue from recurring?

  1. Alert on supplicant certificate expiry before it affects users
  2. Review learning limit exceptions whenever virtual hosts are added
  3. Recheck ACL API and CLI syntax with firmware changes
  4. Monitor DAI bindings and violations after DHCP topology changes

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The continuing safeguard is to alert on supplicant certificate expiry before it affects users. It helps avoid the original condition: a certificate-based EAP method cannot accept a client credential outside its trusted validity period.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Review learning limit exceptions whenever virtual hosts are added. That safeguard would help prevent recurrence of: Unlimited downstream MAC learning can broaden access and consume switch forwarding resources. The risk being reviewed here is instead: A certificate-based EAP method cannot accept a client credential outside its trusted validity period. The matching ongoing control is: Alert on supplicant certificate expiry before it affects users.

C:

Recheck ACL API and CLI syntax with firmware changes is not the primary recurring safeguard for this problem. The team should alert on supplicant certificate expiry before it affects users. For the Alderbridge regional network integrator, the direct corrective action is to renew the client certificate through the approved trust chain and verify EAP-TLS authentication.

D:

Monitor DAI bindings and violations after DHCP topology changes. That safeguard would help prevent recurrence of: DAI validation depends on appropriate legitimate IP to MAC bindings. The risk being reviewed here is instead: A certificate-based EAP method cannot accept a client credential outside its trusted validity period. The matching ongoing control is: Alert on supplicant certificate expiry before it affects users.

Question 553

At the Northbridge multisite IT support team, a legacy printer without an 802.1X supplicant cannot join its narrowly permitted printing segment. Which implementation choice best addresses the situation?

  1. Apply a supported dynamic MAC learning limit or equivalent port security policy
  2. Enable supported DHCP snooping with only genuine DHCP-server-facing ports marked trusted
  3. Use a governed supported MAB fallback with a device inventory and limited authorization
  4. Apply supported ingress storm control at a threshold that preserves legitimate multicast

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This is the direct FortiSwitch 7.6 administration remedy: use a governed supported MAB fallback with a device inventory and limited authorization. The observed risk is that a device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication; a passing acceptance check would show that an approved printer reaches only its print service while an unknown MAC is restricted.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This alternative would be suitable where unlimited downstream MAC learning can broaden access and consume switch forwarding resources. It does not by itself resolve the need to use a governed supported MAB fallback with a device inventory and limited authorization. For the Northbridge multisite IT support team, the direct corrective action is to use a governed supported MAB fallback with a device inventory and limited authorization.

B:

Enable supported DHCP snooping with only genuine DHCP-server-facing ports marked trusted addresses a different kind of problem: without snooping a client port can inject unauthorized DHCP offers into a VLAN. Here the reported weakness is that a device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication. For the Northbridge multisite IT support team, the direct corrective action is to use a governed supported MAB fallback with a device inventory and limited authorization.

D:

The offered alternative is: Apply supported ingress storm control at a threshold that preserves legitimate multicast. It addresses this separate failure mode: High-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity. In the current case, the observed mechanism is: A device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication. The keyed action, Use a governed supported MAB fallback with a device inventory and limited authorization., targets that condition more directly.

Question 554

At the Northbridge multisite IT support team, a legacy printer without an 802.1X supplicant cannot join its narrowly permitted printing segment. What risk should the team identify as the primary issue?

  1. A failed supplicant must not inherit the same permissions as an authenticated employee
  2. ACL stages affect different points of the switch packet-processing pipeline
  3. An Ethernet loop can replicate broadcast traffic repeatedly across the VLAN
  4. A device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The architectural weakness is that a device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication. It can be addressed through the controlled change to use a governed supported MAB fallback with a device inventory and limited authorization.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The offered action is: A failed supplicant must not inherit the same permissions as an authenticated employee. It is associated with this separate technical condition: A failed supplicant must not inherit the same permissions as an authenticated employee. The actual incident concerns a different dependency: A device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication. The corresponding change is: A device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication.

B:

ACL stages affect different points of the switch packet-processing pipeline. That may occur elsewhere, but the evidence at the Northbridge multisite IT support team instead points to the fact that a device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication.

C:

The offered alternative is: An Ethernet loop can replicate broadcast traffic repeatedly across the VLAN. It addresses this separate failure mode: An Ethernet loop can replicate broadcast traffic repeatedly across the VLAN. In the current case, the observed mechanism is: A device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication. The keyed action, A device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication., targets that condition more directly.

Question 555

At the Northbridge multisite IT support team, a legacy printer without an 802.1X supplicant cannot join its narrowly permitted printing segment. What is the strongest acceptance test for this change?

  1. Valid approved endpoints regain access and excess addresses still trigger protection
  2. The expected static-address entries appear without changing permitted forwarding
  3. An approved printer reaches only its print service while an unknown MAC is restricted
  4. The rogue decline is filtered and authorized clients keep valid leases

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This tests the real business behavior: an approved printer reaches only its print service while an unknown MAC is restricted. It specifically checks whether the risk that a device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication has been reduced.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Valid approved endpoints regain access and excess addresses still trigger protection. That result would test a control for this other failure: A configured port violation can disable or restrict forwarding independently of link state. The question instead requires evidence for: A device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication. The direct outcome to verify is: An approved printer reaches only its print service while an unknown MAC is restricted.

B:

At the Northbridge multisite IT support team, a result about arp monitoring without global trust would not show that the team corrected the failure where a device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication.

D:

The offered observation is: The rogue decline is filtered and authorized clients keep valid leases. It would support the separate mechanism: DHCP snooping can reject invalid host lease messages that do not match binding ownership. In this case the decisive dependency is: A device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication. The original keyed verification is: An approved printer reaches only its print service while an unknown MAC is restricted.

Question 556

At the Northbridge multisite IT support team, a legacy printer without an 802.1X supplicant cannot join its narrowly permitted printing segment. Which setting or practice should be reviewed in future?

  1. Audit policy bindings across managed switch inventory
  2. Review MAB exception records and spoofing exposure
  3. Audit isolation associations when tenants migrate
  4. Review monitored ARP data quality after switching changes

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This control works beyond the initial remediation because it requires the team to review MAB exception records and spoofing exposure.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Audit policy bindings across managed switch inventory is not the primary recurring safeguard for this problem. The team should review MAB exception records and spoofing exposure. For the Northbridge multisite IT support team, the direct corrective action is to use a governed supported MAB fallback with a device inventory and limited authorization.

C:

The suggested preventive check is: Audit isolation associations when tenants migrate. Its technical scope concerns: Ordinary VLAN membership allows peer Layer 2 communication unless a separate control blocks it. This question asks how to sustain control over: A device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication. The more targeted safeguard is: Review MAB exception records and spoofing exposure.

D:

Review monitored ARP data quality after switching changes. That safeguard would help prevent recurrence of: Passive ARP monitoring and active DAI enforcement have distinct configuration requirements. The risk being reviewed here is instead: A device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication. The matching ongoing control is: Review MAB exception records and spoofing exposure.

Question 557

At the Ashbourne campus infrastructure group, a desk switch behind one authenticated user allows unauthorized downstream devices because port-based admission covers the entire port. Which corrective action best meets the requirement?

  1. Use supported static permitted MAC rules together with stronger authentication where available
  2. Select supported MAC-based authentication where individual attached device identities must be verified
  3. Use the documented FortiSwitch prelookup ACL processing stage where supported
  4. Use supported private VLAN isolation or equivalent enforced switch security mechanism

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The primary failure mode is that port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates. The proposed action directly fixes it by requiring the team to select supported MAC-based authentication where individual attached device identities must be verified; afterward, verify that an authorized user connects while a second unapproved MAC is blocked or isolated.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The option addresses the separate situation where an unrestricted MAC-learning port does not enforce the inventory expectation. For this case, the more appropriate response is to select supported MAC-based authentication where individual attached device identities must be verified. For the Ashbourne campus infrastructure group, the direct corrective action is to select supported MAC-based authentication where individual attached device identities must be verified.

C:

Use the documented FortiSwitch prelookup ACL processing stage where supported can be useful for another FortiSwitch 7.6 administration workflow, but it leaves the immediate failure unresolved. Here the priority is to select supported MAC-based authentication where individual attached device identities must be verified. For the Ashbourne campus infrastructure group, the direct corrective action is to select supported MAC-based authentication where individual attached device identities must be verified.

D:

The offered alternative is: Use supported private VLAN isolation or equivalent enforced switch security mechanism. It addresses this separate failure mode: Ordinary VLAN membership allows peer Layer 2 communication unless a separate control blocks it. In the current case, the observed mechanism is: Port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates. The keyed action, Select supported MAC-based authentication where individual attached device identities must be verified., targets that condition more directly.

Question 558

At the Ashbourne campus infrastructure group, a desk switch behind one authenticated user allows unauthorized downstream devices because port-based admission covers the entire port. Which underlying issue most directly explains this situation?

  1. Successful authentication alone does not apply differentiated authorization when return attributes are not mapped
  2. Port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates
  3. DHCP relay solves Layer 3 broadcast reachability while snooping filters unauthorized DHCP sources
  4. FortiSwitch ACL configuration distinguishes ingress prelookup and egress stages

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The architectural weakness is that port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates. It can be addressed through the controlled change to select supported MAC-based authentication where individual attached device identities must be verified.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The offered principle is: Successful authentication alone does not apply differentiated authorization when return attributes are not mapped. In the source material it is associated with: Successful authentication alone does not apply differentiated authorization when return attributes are not mapped. This case has a different controlling cause: Port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates. Its keyed mechanism is: Port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates.

C:

The offered principle is: DHCP relay solves Layer 3 broadcast reachability while snooping filters unauthorized DHCP sources. In the source material it is associated with: DHCP relay solves Layer 3 broadcast reachability while snooping filters unauthorized DHCP sources. This case has a different controlling cause: Port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates. Its keyed mechanism is: Port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates.

D:

Although fortiSwitch ACL configuration distinguishes ingress prelookup and egress stages, the presented symptoms do not support that as the primary cause; they indicate that port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates. For the Ashbourne campus infrastructure group, the direct corrective action is to select supported MAC-based authentication where individual attached device identities must be verified.

Question 559

At the Ashbourne campus infrastructure group, a desk switch behind one authenticated user allows unauthorized downstream devices because port-based admission covers the entire port. What evidence would justify considering this concern addressed?

  1. A known user authenticates and the RADIUS server logs a permitted request
  2. Legitimate leased traffic forwards while the spoofed source is dropped
  3. The analyzer receives exactly the intended test flow and no unrelated tenant packets
  4. An authorized user connects while a second unapproved MAC is blocked or isolated

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This is the relevant acceptance result: an authorized user connects while a second unapproved MAC is blocked or isolated. It demonstrates the outcome of choosing to select supported MAC-based authentication where individual attached device identities must be verified.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A known user authenticates and the RADIUS server logs a permitted request. That result would test a control for this other failure: 802.1X authentication relies on successful exchange with its configured identity server. The question instead requires evidence for: Port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates. The direct outcome to verify is: An authorized user connects while a second unapproved MAC is blocked or isolated.

B:

The offered observation is: Legitimate leased traffic forwards while the spoofed source is dropped. It would support the separate mechanism: An unrestricted port accepts spoofed IPv4 source addresses even if DHCP issued a different lease. In this case the decisive dependency is: Port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates. The original keyed verification is: An authorized user connects while a second unapproved MAC is blocked or isolated.

C:

The analyzer receives exactly the intended test flow and no unrelated tenant packets. That result would test a control for this other failure: Mirroring every switch packet can overrun the monitoring destination and disclose unrelated data. The question instead requires evidence for: Port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates. The direct outcome to verify is: An authorized user connects while a second unapproved MAC is blocked or isolated.

Question 560

At the Ashbourne campus infrastructure group, a desk switch behind one authenticated user allows unauthorized downstream devices because port-based admission covers the entire port. How should the organization sustain the improvement?

  1. Monitor authentication success and rejection events after policy changes
  2. Audit multi-host port modes after desk topology changes
  3. Audit switch segmentation and firewall policy together after additions
  4. Review trusted port diagrams during distribution upgrades

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For the Ashbourne campus infrastructure group, this maintenance action preserves the fix: audit multi-host port modes after desk topology changes. It should be revisited as the workload evolves.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The suggested preventive check is: Monitor authentication success and rejection events after policy changes. Its technical scope concerns: An open access port cannot verify user or device identity before allowing network access. This question asks how to sustain control over: Port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates. The more targeted safeguard is: Audit multi-host port modes after desk topology changes.

C:

That routine supports vlan security plus firewall policy, but the relevant ongoing risk requires the team to audit multi-host port modes after desk topology changes. For the Ashbourne campus infrastructure group, the direct corrective action is to select supported MAC-based authentication where individual attached device identities must be verified.

D:

Review trusted port diagrams during distribution upgrades. That safeguard would help prevent recurrence of: DHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port. The risk being reviewed here is instead: Port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates. The matching ongoing control is: Audit multi-host port modes after desk topology changes.

Fortinet NSE 5 - FortiSwitch 7.6 Administrator (NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6) Practice Tests