McAfee Secure

Exam Code: NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6

Exam Name: Fortinet NSE 5 - FortiSwitch 7.6 Administrator

Certification Provider: Fortinet

Corresponding Certification: NSE5

Fortinet NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6 Questions & Answers

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Fortinet NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6 Practice Test 64

Question 630

At the Northbridge managed-network provider, a malicious endpoint sends DHCP decline messages about leases held by other access ports. Which underlying issue most directly explains this situation?

  1. High-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity
  2. DHCP snooping can reject invalid host lease messages that do not match binding ownership
  3. 802.1X authentication relies on successful exchange with its configured identity server
  4. Overbroad ACL scope can deny unrelated applications sharing the same switch

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The architectural weakness is that dHCP snooping can reject invalid host lease messages that do not match binding ownership. It can be addressed through the controlled change to apply DHCP snooping validation on the proper untrusted port boundary.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The offered principle is: High-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity. In the source material it is associated with: High-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity. This case has a different controlling cause: DHCP snooping can reject invalid host lease messages that do not match binding ownership. Its keyed mechanism is: DHCP snooping can reject invalid host lease messages that do not match binding ownership.

C:

The offered principle is: 802.1X authentication relies on successful exchange with its configured identity server. In the source material it is associated with: 802.1X authentication relies on successful exchange with its configured identity server. This case has a different controlling cause: DHCP snooping can reject invalid host lease messages that do not match binding ownership. Its keyed mechanism is: DHCP snooping can reject invalid host lease messages that do not match binding ownership.

D:

Although overbroad ACL scope can deny unrelated applications sharing the same switch, the presented symptoms do not support that as the primary cause; they indicate that dHCP snooping can reject invalid host lease messages that do not match binding ownership. For the Northbridge managed-network provider, the direct corrective action is to apply DHCP snooping validation on the proper untrusted port boundary.

Question 631

At the Northbridge managed-network provider, a malicious endpoint sends DHCP decline messages about leases held by other access ports. What evidence would justify considering this concern addressed?

  1. The rogue decline is filtered and authorized clients keep valid leases
  2. The approved static endpoint forwards and an unauthorized source remains blocked
  3. The supported number of devices authenticates and excess sessions follow a documented restriction
  4. A controlled packet is matched at the intended stage without changing unrelated forwarding

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This tests the real business behavior: the rogue decline is filtered and authorized clients keep valid leases. It specifically checks whether the risk that dHCP snooping can reject invalid host lease messages that do not match binding ownership has been reduced.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The offered observation is: The approved static endpoint forwards and an unauthorized source remains blocked. It would support the separate mechanism: DHCP-based dynamic source bindings do not exist for devices with manually assigned addresses. In this case the decisive dependency is: DHCP snooping can reject invalid host lease messages that do not match binding ownership. The original keyed verification is: The rogue decline is filtered and authorized clients keep valid leases.

C:

The supported number of devices authenticates and excess sessions follow a documented restriction. That result would test a control for this other failure: Authentication session capacity is finite and may be exceeded by fanout through a single port. The question instead requires evidence for: DHCP snooping can reject invalid host lease messages that do not match binding ownership. The direct outcome to verify is: The rogue decline is filtered and authorized clients keep valid leases.

D:

The offered observation is: A controlled packet is matched at the intended stage without changing unrelated forwarding. It would support the separate mechanism: ACL stages affect different points of the switch packet-processing pipeline. In this case the decisive dependency is: DHCP snooping can reject invalid host lease messages that do not match binding ownership. The original keyed verification is: The rogue decline is filtered and authorized clients keep valid leases.

Question 632

At the Northbridge managed-network provider, a malicious endpoint sends DHCP decline messages about leases held by other access ports. How should the organization sustain the improvement?

  1. Check feature-matrix conflicts before changing VLAN translation
  2. Remove temporary selective mirroring after investigation
  3. Review fallback VLAN rules whenever user groups change
  4. Inspect DHCP anomaly statistics during repeated address disruptions

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The needed prevention is to inspect DHCP anomaly statistics during repeated address disruptions. It directly sustains the original change to apply DHCP snooping validation on the proper untrusted port boundary.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The suggested preventive check is: Check feature-matrix conflicts before changing VLAN translation. Its technical scope concerns: Feature interactions can make a planned access-port source guard unsupported. This question asks how to sustain control over: DHCP snooping can reject invalid host lease messages that do not match binding ownership. The more targeted safeguard is: Inspect DHCP anomaly statistics during repeated address disruptions.

B:

Remove temporary selective mirroring after investigation. That safeguard would help prevent recurrence of: Mirroring every switch packet can overrun the monitoring destination and disclose unrelated data. The risk being reviewed here is instead: DHCP snooping can reject invalid host lease messages that do not match binding ownership. The matching ongoing control is: Inspect DHCP anomaly statistics during repeated address disruptions.

C:

That routine supports authentication-failure vlan, but the relevant ongoing risk requires the team to inspect DHCP anomaly statistics during repeated address disruptions. For the Northbridge managed-network provider, the direct corrective action is to apply DHCP snooping validation on the proper untrusted port boundary.

Question 633

At the Ashbourne branch IT department, a workstation changes ports after a lease renewal but the anti-spoofing database still associates its old physical interface. Which approach best resolves the described issue?

  1. Inspect and refresh the correct DHCP snooping bindings and client port associations
  2. Enable supported dynamic ARP inspection with correct trusted boundaries
  3. Fix RADIUS addressing reachability and shared trust before changing the wired port policy
  4. Apply supported 802.1X port authentication backed by the approved RADIUS identity service

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The reported facts support this change rather than a general platform replacement. The team should inspect and refresh the correct DHCP snooping bindings and client port associations because stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard. A suitable test confirms that the moved device forwards under the correct renewed binding and spoofed entries fail.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The offered action is: Enable supported dynamic ARP inspection with correct trusted boundaries. It is associated with this separate technical condition: Unvalidated ARP claims let a malicious host impersonate another IP-to-MAC relationship. The actual incident concerns a different dependency: Stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard. The corresponding change is: Inspect and refresh the correct DHCP snooping bindings and client port associations.

C:

This alternative would be suitable where 802.1X authentication relies on successful exchange with its configured identity server. It does not by itself resolve the need to inspect and refresh the correct DHCP snooping bindings and client port associations. For the Ashbourne branch IT department, the direct corrective action is to inspect and refresh the correct DHCP snooping bindings and client port associations.

D:

Apply supported 802.1X port authentication backed by the approved RADIUS identity service addresses a different kind of problem: an open access port cannot verify user or device identity before allowing network access. Here the reported weakness is that stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard. For the Ashbourne branch IT department, the direct corrective action is to inspect and refresh the correct DHCP snooping bindings and client port associations.

Question 634

At the Ashbourne branch IT department, a workstation changes ports after a lease renewal but the anti-spoofing database still associates its old physical interface. Which explanation best accounts for the concern?

  1. High-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity
  2. Stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard
  3. Successful authentication alone does not apply differentiated authorization when return attributes are not mapped
  4. Authentication service outages require deliberate restricted failure handling rather than implicit trust

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The problem stems from the fact that stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard. A correct solution would inspect and refresh the correct DHCP snooping bindings and client port associations and check that the moved device forwards under the correct renewed binding and spoofed entries fail.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The offered principle is: High-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity. In the source material it is associated with: High-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity. This case has a different controlling cause: Stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard. Its keyed mechanism is: Stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard.

C:

The offered principle is: Successful authentication alone does not apply differentiated authorization when return attributes are not mapped. In the source material it is associated with: Successful authentication alone does not apply differentiated authorization when return attributes are not mapped. This case has a different controlling cause: Stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard. Its keyed mechanism is: Stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard.

D:

Authentication service outages require deliberate restricted failure handling rather than implicit trust. That may occur elsewhere, but the evidence at the Ashbourne branch IT department instead points to the fact that stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard.

Question 635

At the Ashbourne branch IT department, a workstation changes ports after a lease renewal but the anti-spoofing database still associates its old physical interface. Which test result best shows the requirement is met?

  1. The moved device forwards under the correct renewed binding and spoofed entries fail
  2. An injected MAC burst is limited while known legitimate traffic remains available
  3. The registered instrument connects while an unregistered device is denied
  4. Tenant appliances reach their shared gateway without exchanging direct frames

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

At the Ashbourne branch IT department, evidence that the moved device forwards under the correct renewed binding and spoofed entries fail directly validates the correction, instead of testing a neighboring service.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The offered observation is: An injected MAC burst is limited while known legitimate traffic remains available. It would support the separate mechanism: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. In this case the decisive dependency is: Stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard. The original keyed verification is: The moved device forwards under the correct renewed binding and spoofed entries fail.

C:

The registered instrument connects while an unregistered device is denied. That result would test a control for this other failure: An unrestricted MAC-learning port does not enforce the inventory expectation. The question instead requires evidence for: Stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard. The direct outcome to verify is: The moved device forwards under the correct renewed binding and spoofed entries fail.

D:

At the Ashbourne branch IT department, a result about private vlan restricted hosts would not show that the team corrected the failure where stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard.

Question 636

At the Ashbourne branch IT department, a workstation changes ports after a lease renewal but the anti-spoofing database still associates its old physical interface. Which ongoing control best prevents this issue from recurring?

  1. Monitor binding refresh and mobility events during desk moves
  2. Monitor binding age and client mobility when enabling source guard
  3. Audit switch segmentation and firewall policy together after additions
  4. Alert on supplicant certificate expiry before it affects users

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The continuing safeguard is to monitor binding refresh and mobility events during desk moves. It helps avoid the original condition: stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Monitor binding age and client mobility when enabling source guard. That safeguard would help prevent recurrence of: An unrestricted port accepts spoofed IPv4 source addresses even if DHCP issued a different lease. The risk being reviewed here is instead: Stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard. The matching ongoing control is: Monitor binding refresh and mobility events during desk moves.

C:

Audit switch segmentation and firewall policy together after additions is not the primary recurring safeguard for this problem. The team should monitor binding refresh and mobility events during desk moves. For the Ashbourne branch IT department, the direct corrective action is to inspect and refresh the correct DHCP snooping bindings and client port associations.

D:

Alert on supplicant certificate expiry before it affects users. That safeguard would help prevent recurrence of: A certificate-based EAP method cannot accept a client credential outside its trusted validity period. The risk being reviewed here is instead: Stale IP-to-MAC-to-port associations can reject legitimate clients under DAI or source guard. The matching ongoing control is: Monitor binding refresh and mobility events during desk moves.

Question 637

At the Quayside data network services firm, a misbehaving IoT camera overwhelms an access VLAN with unsolicited multicast frames. Which implementation choice best addresses the situation?

  1. Add the approved static IP and MAC source guard binding for that controller
  2. Reorder or narrow ACL rules so the specific security decision is evaluated correctly
  3. Apply a supported dynamic MAC learning limit or equivalent port security policy
  4. Apply supported ingress storm control at a threshold that preserves legitimate multicast

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The primary failure mode is that high-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity. The proposed action directly fixes it by requiring the team to apply supported ingress storm control at a threshold that preserves legitimate multicast; afterward, verify that the offending stream is limited while intended subscriber traffic continues.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This alternative would be suitable where dHCP-based dynamic source bindings do not exist for devices with manually assigned addresses. It does not by itself resolve the need to apply supported ingress storm control at a threshold that preserves legitimate multicast. For the Quayside data network services firm, the direct corrective action is to apply supported ingress storm control at a threshold that preserves legitimate multicast.

B:

Reorder or narrow ACL rules so the specific security decision is evaluated correctly addresses a different kind of problem: aCL evaluation precedence can allow a general rule to bypass a later specific restriction. Here the reported weakness is that high-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity. For the Quayside data network services firm, the direct corrective action is to apply supported ingress storm control at a threshold that preserves legitimate multicast.

C:

The option addresses the separate situation where unlimited downstream MAC learning can broaden access and consume switch forwarding resources. For this case, the more appropriate response is to apply supported ingress storm control at a threshold that preserves legitimate multicast. For the Quayside data network services firm, the direct corrective action is to apply supported ingress storm control at a threshold that preserves legitimate multicast.

Question 638

At the Quayside data network services firm, a misbehaving IoT camera overwhelms an access VLAN with unsolicited multicast frames. What risk should the team identify as the primary issue?

  1. Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure
  2. Port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates
  3. High-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity
  4. Authentication session capacity is finite and may be exceeded by fanout through a single port

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The evidence indicates that high-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity. The appropriate response is to apply supported ingress storm control at a threshold that preserves legitimate multicast and demonstrate that the offending stream is limited while intended subscriber traffic continues.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The offered action is: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. It is associated with this separate technical condition: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. The actual incident concerns a different dependency: High-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity. The corresponding change is: High-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity.

B:

Port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates. That may occur elsewhere, but the evidence at the Quayside data network services firm instead points to the fact that high-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity.

D:

Authentication session capacity is finite and may be exceeded by fanout through a single port. That is not the mechanism that accounts for the stated failure at the Quayside data network services firm.

Question 639

At the Quayside data network services firm, a misbehaving IoT camera overwhelms an access VLAN with unsolicited multicast frames. What is the strongest acceptance test for this change?

  1. Authorized clients resolve their gateway and poisoned ARP packets are denied
  2. An authorized user connects while a second unapproved MAC is blocked or isolated
  3. A valid corporate supplicant obtains its approved role and the unknown laptop is denied
  4. The offending stream is limited while intended subscriber traffic continues

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The intended correction is to apply supported ingress storm control at a threshold that preserves legitimate multicast. The decisive verification is that the offending stream is limited while intended subscriber traffic continues, rather than only confirming configuration was saved.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Authorized clients resolve their gateway and poisoned ARP packets are denied. That result would test a control for this other failure: DAI validation depends on appropriate legitimate IP to MAC bindings. The question instead requires evidence for: High-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity. The direct outcome to verify is: The offending stream is limited while intended subscriber traffic continues.

B:

At the Quayside data network services firm, a result about 802.1x port versus mac mode would not show that the team corrected the failure where high-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity.

C:

A valid corporate supplicant obtains its approved role and the unknown laptop is denied. That result would test a control for this other failure: An open access port cannot verify user or device identity before allowing network access. The question instead requires evidence for: High-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity. The direct outcome to verify is: The offending stream is limited while intended subscriber traffic continues.

Question 640

At the Quayside data network services firm, a misbehaving IoT camera overwhelms an access VLAN with unsolicited multicast frames. Which setting or practice should be reviewed in future?

  1. Review trusted port diagrams during distribution upgrades
  2. Review storm thresholds and receiver counts when video usage changes
  3. Revalidate ACL VLAN selectors after segmentation changes
  4. Review MAB exception records and spoofing exposure

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

This control works beyond the initial remediation because it requires the team to review storm thresholds and receiver counts when video usage changes.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Review trusted port diagrams during distribution upgrades is not the primary recurring safeguard for this problem. The team should review storm thresholds and receiver counts when video usage changes. For the Quayside data network services firm, the direct corrective action is to apply supported ingress storm control at a threshold that preserves legitimate multicast.

C:

The suggested preventive check is: Revalidate ACL VLAN selectors after segmentation changes. Its technical scope concerns: Overbroad ACL scope can deny unrelated applications sharing the same switch. This question asks how to sustain control over: High-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity. The more targeted safeguard is: Review storm thresholds and receiver counts when video usage changes.

D:

Review MAB exception records and spoofing exposure. That safeguard would help prevent recurrence of: A device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication. The risk being reviewed here is instead: High-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity. The matching ongoing control is: Review storm thresholds and receiver counts when video usage changes.

Fortinet NSE 5 - FortiSwitch 7.6 Administrator (NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6) Practice Tests