McAfee Secure

Exam Code: NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6

Exam Name: Fortinet NSE 5 - FortiSwitch 7.6 Administrator

Certification Provider: Fortinet

Corresponding Certification: NSE5

Fortinet NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6 Questions & Answers

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"Fortinet NSE 5 - FortiSwitch 7.6 Administrator Exam", also known as NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6 exam, is a Fortinet certification exam.

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Fortinet NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6 Practice Test 66

Question 650

At the Eastbrook campus infrastructure group, a technician disables DHCP snooping in response to failed inter-VLAN DHCP relay although the legitimate server path is blocked. What risk should the team identify as the primary issue?

  1. DHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port
  2. FortiSwitch ACL configuration distinguishes ingress prelookup and egress stages
  3. DHCP relay solves Layer 3 broadcast reachability while snooping filters unauthorized DHCP sources
  4. An open access port cannot verify user or device identity before allowing network access

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The evidence indicates that dHCP relay solves Layer 3 broadcast reachability while snooping filters unauthorized DHCP sources. The appropriate response is to troubleshoot server reachability relay and snooping trust independently before disabling security and demonstrate that the approved client receives a lease and rogue DHCP offers stay blocked.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The offered action is: DHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port. It is associated with this separate technical condition: DHCP snooping can discard authorized server replies arriving through an untrusted port. The actual incident concerns a different dependency: DHCP relay solves Layer 3 broadcast reachability while snooping filters unauthorized DHCP sources. The corresponding change is: DHCP relay solves Layer 3 broadcast reachability while snooping filters unauthorized DHCP sources.

B:

FortiSwitch ACL configuration distinguishes ingress prelookup and egress stages. That may occur elsewhere, but the evidence at the Eastbrook campus infrastructure group instead points to the fact that dHCP relay solves Layer 3 broadcast reachability while snooping filters unauthorized DHCP sources.

D:

An open access port cannot verify user or device identity before allowing network access. That is not the mechanism that accounts for the stated failure at the Eastbrook campus infrastructure group.

Question 651

At the Eastbrook campus infrastructure group, a technician disables DHCP snooping in response to failed inter-VLAN DHCP relay although the legitimate server path is blocked. What is the strongest acceptance test for this change?

  1. The rogue decline is filtered and authorized clients keep valid leases
  2. The approved client receives a lease and rogue DHCP offers stay blocked
  3. A traffic-generator test enforces the cap without disrupting authorized routine flows
  4. A valid corporate supplicant obtains its approved role and the unknown laptop is denied

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The team can confirm the fix by showing that the approved client receives a lease and rogue DHCP offers stay blocked. This aligns with the corrective design to troubleshoot server reachability relay and snooping trust independently before disabling security.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The rogue decline is filtered and authorized clients keep valid leases. That result would test a control for this other failure: DHCP snooping can reject invalid host lease messages that do not match binding ownership. The question instead requires evidence for: DHCP relay solves Layer 3 broadcast reachability while snooping filters unauthorized DHCP sources. The direct outcome to verify is: The approved client receives a lease and rogue DHCP offers stay blocked.

C:

A traffic-generator test enforces the cap without disrupting authorized routine flows. That result would test a control for this other failure: Allowing a protocol does not limit how much bandwidth or switch resources it may consume. The question instead requires evidence for: DHCP relay solves Layer 3 broadcast reachability while snooping filters unauthorized DHCP sources. The direct outcome to verify is: The approved client receives a lease and rogue DHCP offers stay blocked.

D:

The offered observation is: A valid corporate supplicant obtains its approved role and the unknown laptop is denied. It would support the separate mechanism: An open access port cannot verify user or device identity before allowing network access. In this case the decisive dependency is: DHCP relay solves Layer 3 broadcast reachability while snooping filters unauthorized DHCP sources. The original keyed verification is: The approved client receives a lease and rogue DHCP offers stay blocked.

Question 652

At the Eastbrook campus infrastructure group, a technician disables DHCP snooping in response to failed inter-VLAN DHCP relay although the legitimate server path is blocked. Which setting or practice should be reviewed in future?

  1. Retest relay and snooping together after L3 changes
  2. Audit ARP inspection statistics when switching configurations change
  3. Audit scheduled ACL changes around daylight-saving transitions
  4. Review MAC session counts before deploying virtual access nodes

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

After implementation, the team should retest relay and snooping together after L3 changes as the appropriate recurring safeguard against the identified issue.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Audit ARP inspection statistics when switching configurations change. That safeguard would help prevent recurrence of: Unvalidated ARP claims let a malicious host impersonate another IP-to-MAC relationship. The risk being reviewed here is instead: DHCP relay solves Layer 3 broadcast reachability while snooping filters unauthorized DHCP sources. The matching ongoing control is: Retest relay and snooping together after L3 changes.

C:

The suggested preventive check is: Audit scheduled ACL changes around daylight-saving transitions. Its technical scope concerns: A schedule mismatch can disable or enable filtering outside its intended window. This question asks how to sustain control over: DHCP relay solves Layer 3 broadcast reachability while snooping filters unauthorized DHCP sources. The more targeted safeguard is: Retest relay and snooping together after L3 changes.

D:

Review MAC session counts before deploying virtual access nodes. That safeguard would help prevent recurrence of: Authentication session capacity is finite and may be exceeded by fanout through a single port. The risk being reviewed here is instead: DHCP relay solves Layer 3 broadcast reachability while snooping filters unauthorized DHCP sources. The matching ongoing control is: Retest relay and snooping together after L3 changes.

Question 653

At the Tarnbridge network security team, a guest device spoofs large numbers of MAC sources until learning resources are strained. Which corrective action best meets the requirement?

  1. Apply supported ingress storm control at a threshold that preserves legitimate multicast
  2. Use the FortiSwitchOS 7.6 supported ACL stage syntax and validate policy placement
  3. Combine supported MAC learning limits and traffic monitoring at the untrusted access edge
  4. Reorder or narrow ACL rules so the specific security decision is evaluated correctly

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The reported facts support this change rather than a general platform replacement. The team should combine supported MAC learning limits and traffic monitoring at the untrusted access edge because excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. A suitable test confirms that an injected MAC burst is limited while known legitimate traffic remains available.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The option addresses the separate situation where high-rate unwanted multicast can consume shared switch forwarding capacity. For this case, the more appropriate response is to combine supported MAC learning limits and traffic monitoring at the untrusted access edge. For the Tarnbridge network security team, the direct corrective action is to combine supported MAC learning limits and traffic monitoring at the untrusted access edge.

B:

The offered action is: Use the FortiSwitchOS 7.6 supported ACL stage syntax and validate policy placement. It is associated with this separate technical condition: FortiSwitch ACL configuration distinguishes ingress prelookup and egress stages. The actual incident concerns a different dependency: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. The corresponding change is: Combine supported MAC learning limits and traffic monitoring at the untrusted access edge.

D:

The offered alternative is: Reorder or narrow ACL rules so the specific security decision is evaluated correctly. It addresses this separate failure mode: ACL evaluation precedence can allow a general rule to bypass a later specific restriction. In the current case, the observed mechanism is: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. The keyed action, Combine supported MAC learning limits and traffic monitoring at the untrusted access edge., targets that condition more directly.

Question 654

At the Tarnbridge network security team, a guest device spoofs large numbers of MAC sources until learning resources are strained. Which underlying issue most directly explains this situation?

  1. Unvalidated ARP claims let a malicious host impersonate another IP-to-MAC relationship
  2. Unlimited downstream MAC learning can broaden access and consume switch forwarding resources
  3. Authentication service outages require deliberate restricted failure handling rather than implicit trust
  4. Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The problem stems from the fact that excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. A correct solution would combine supported MAC learning limits and traffic monitoring at the untrusted access edge and check that an injected MAC burst is limited while known legitimate traffic remains available.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The offered principle is: Unvalidated ARP claims let a malicious host impersonate another IP-to-MAC relationship. In the source material it is associated with: Unvalidated ARP claims let a malicious host impersonate another IP-to-MAC relationship. This case has a different controlling cause: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. Its keyed mechanism is: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure.

B:

Unlimited downstream MAC learning can broaden access and consume switch forwarding resources. That is not the mechanism that accounts for the stated failure at the Tarnbridge network security team.

C:

The offered principle is: Authentication service outages require deliberate restricted failure handling rather than implicit trust. In the source material it is associated with: Authentication service outages require deliberate restricted failure handling rather than implicit trust. This case has a different controlling cause: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. Its keyed mechanism is: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure.

Question 655

At the Tarnbridge network security team, a guest device spoofs large numbers of MAC sources until learning resources are strained. What evidence would justify considering this concern addressed?

  1. The approved client receives a lease and rogue DHCP offers stay blocked
  2. An approved printer reaches only its print service while an unknown MAC is restricted
  3. The registered instrument connects while an unregistered device is denied
  4. An injected MAC burst is limited while known legitimate traffic remains available

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This is the relevant acceptance result: an injected MAC burst is limited while known legitimate traffic remains available. It demonstrates the outcome of choosing to combine supported MAC learning limits and traffic monitoring at the untrusted access edge.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The approved client receives a lease and rogue DHCP offers stay blocked. That result would test a control for this other failure: DHCP relay solves Layer 3 broadcast reachability while snooping filters unauthorized DHCP sources. The question instead requires evidence for: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. The direct outcome to verify is: An injected MAC burst is limited while known legitimate traffic remains available.

B:

The offered observation is: An approved printer reaches only its print service while an unknown MAC is restricted. It would support the separate mechanism: A device without an EAP supplicant cannot complete normal interactive 802.1X authentication. In this case the decisive dependency is: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. The original keyed verification is: An injected MAC burst is limited while known legitimate traffic remains available.

C:

The registered instrument connects while an unregistered device is denied. That result would test a control for this other failure: An unrestricted MAC-learning port does not enforce the inventory expectation. The question instead requires evidence for: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. The direct outcome to verify is: An injected MAC burst is limited while known legitimate traffic remains available.

Question 656

At the Tarnbridge network security team, a guest device spoofs large numbers of MAC sources until learning resources are strained. How should the organization sustain the improvement?

  1. Alert on abnormal broadcast rates and edge topology changes
  2. Trend MAC counts and violations on guest access ports
  3. Review flooded-frame limits during new contractor deployments
  4. Retest guest onboarding after identity infrastructure changes

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For the Tarnbridge network security team, this maintenance action preserves the fix: trend MAC counts and violations on guest access ports. It should be revisited as the workload evolves.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The suggested preventive check is: Alert on abnormal broadcast rates and edge topology changes. Its technical scope concerns: An Ethernet loop can replicate broadcast traffic repeatedly across the VLAN. This question asks how to sustain control over: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. The more targeted safeguard is: Trend MAC counts and violations on guest access ports.

C:

That routine supports vlan flood limitation, but the relevant ongoing risk requires the team to trend MAC counts and violations on guest access ports. For the Tarnbridge network security team, the direct corrective action is to combine supported MAC learning limits and traffic monitoring at the untrusted access edge.

D:

Retest guest onboarding after identity infrastructure changes. That safeguard would help prevent recurrence of: Unauthenticated devices should not inherit corporate routing or service permissions. The risk being reviewed here is instead: Excessive unique source MAC addresses can force unknown-unicast forwarding and table pressure. The matching ongoing control is: Trend MAC counts and violations on guest access ports.

Question 657

At the Fairhaven managed-network provider, a publicly accessible port advertises detailed switch identity and management information unnecessarily. Which approach best resolves the described issue?

  1. Use supported storm control plus loop prevention to contain the offending edge links
  2. Reorder or narrow ACL rules so the specific security decision is evaluated correctly
  3. Restrict LLDP advertisements or exposed TLVs on untrusted ports while preserving infrastructure discovery
  4. Attach the authorized port security profile to the intended FortiSwitch interfaces

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This solution addresses the stated limitation: unrestricted discovery data can reveal network topology and device details to unknown endpoints. Implementing it means the team should restrict LLDP advertisements or exposed TLVs on untrusted ports while preserving infrastructure discovery, then verify that the public endpoint receives no restricted management TLVs and trusted uplinks still discover peers.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use supported storm control plus loop prevention to contain the offending edge links can be useful for another FortiSwitch 7.6 administration workflow, but it leaves the immediate failure unresolved. Here the priority is to restrict LLDP advertisements or exposed TLVs on untrusted ports while preserving infrastructure discovery. For the Fairhaven managed-network provider, the direct corrective action is to restrict LLDP advertisements or exposed TLVs on untrusted ports while preserving infrastructure discovery.

B:

The offered action is: Reorder or narrow ACL rules so the specific security decision is evaluated correctly. It is associated with this separate technical condition: ACL evaluation precedence can allow a general rule to bypass a later specific restriction. The actual incident concerns a different dependency: Unrestricted discovery data can reveal network topology and device details to unknown endpoints. The corresponding change is: Restrict LLDP advertisements or exposed TLVs on untrusted ports while preserving infrastructure discovery.

D:

Attach the authorized port security profile to the intended FortiSwitch interfaces addresses a different kind of problem: a policy object that is never applied does not enforce access restrictions. Here the reported weakness is that unrestricted discovery data can reveal network topology and device details to unknown endpoints. For the Fairhaven managed-network provider, the direct corrective action is to restrict LLDP advertisements or exposed TLVs on untrusted ports while preserving infrastructure discovery.

Question 658

At the Fairhaven managed-network provider, a publicly accessible port advertises detailed switch identity and management information unnecessarily. Which explanation best accounts for the concern?

  1. An unrestricted port accepts spoofed IPv4 source addresses even if DHCP issued a different lease
  2. ACL stages affect different points of the switch packet-processing pipeline
  3. Allowing a protocol does not limit how much bandwidth or switch resources it may consume
  4. Unrestricted discovery data can reveal network topology and device details to unknown endpoints

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This identifies the root issue: unrestricted discovery data can reveal network topology and device details to unknown endpoints. At the Fairhaven managed-network provider, the team should therefore restrict LLDP advertisements or exposed TLVs on untrusted ports while preserving infrastructure discovery.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The offered principle is: An unrestricted port accepts spoofed IPv4 source addresses even if DHCP issued a different lease. In the source material it is associated with: An unrestricted port accepts spoofed IPv4 source addresses even if DHCP issued a different lease. This case has a different controlling cause: Unrestricted discovery data can reveal network topology and device details to unknown endpoints. Its keyed mechanism is: Unrestricted discovery data can reveal network topology and device details to unknown endpoints.

B:

Although aCL stages affect different points of the switch packet-processing pipeline, the presented symptoms do not support that as the primary cause; they indicate that unrestricted discovery data can reveal network topology and device details to unknown endpoints. For the Fairhaven managed-network provider, the direct corrective action is to restrict LLDP advertisements or exposed TLVs on untrusted ports while preserving infrastructure discovery.

C:

The offered principle is: Allowing a protocol does not limit how much bandwidth or switch resources it may consume. In the source material it is associated with: Allowing a protocol does not limit how much bandwidth or switch resources it may consume. This case has a different controlling cause: Unrestricted discovery data can reveal network topology and device details to unknown endpoints. Its keyed mechanism is: Unrestricted discovery data can reveal network topology and device details to unknown endpoints.

Question 659

At the Fairhaven managed-network provider, a publicly accessible port advertises detailed switch identity and management information unnecessarily. Which test result best shows the requirement is met?

  1. Legitimate leased traffic forwards while the spoofed source is dropped
  2. A valid corporate supplicant obtains its approved role and the unknown laptop is denied
  3. A controlled packet is matched at the intended stage without changing unrelated forwarding
  4. The public endpoint receives no restricted management TLVs and trusted uplinks still discover peers

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The team can confirm the fix by showing that the public endpoint receives no restricted management TLVs and trusted uplinks still discover peers. This aligns with the corrective design to restrict LLDP advertisements or exposed TLVs on untrusted ports while preserving infrastructure discovery.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Legitimate leased traffic forwards while the spoofed source is dropped. That result would test a control for this other failure: An unrestricted port accepts spoofed IPv4 source addresses even if DHCP issued a different lease. The question instead requires evidence for: Unrestricted discovery data can reveal network topology and device details to unknown endpoints. The direct outcome to verify is: The public endpoint receives no restricted management TLVs and trusted uplinks still discover peers.

B:

The offered observation is: A valid corporate supplicant obtains its approved role and the unknown laptop is denied. It would support the separate mechanism: An open access port cannot verify user or device identity before allowing network access. In this case the decisive dependency is: Unrestricted discovery data can reveal network topology and device details to unknown endpoints. The original keyed verification is: The public endpoint receives no restricted management TLVs and trusted uplinks still discover peers.

C:

A controlled packet is matched at the intended stage without changing unrelated forwarding. That result would test a control for this other failure: ACL stages affect different points of the switch packet-processing pipeline. The question instead requires evidence for: Unrestricted discovery data can reveal network topology and device details to unknown endpoints. The direct outcome to verify is: The public endpoint receives no restricted management TLVs and trusted uplinks still discover peers.

Question 660

At the Fairhaven managed-network provider, a publicly accessible port advertises detailed switch identity and management information unnecessarily. Which ongoing control best prevents this issue from recurring?

  1. Monitor binding refresh and mobility events during desk moves
  2. Audit multi-host port modes after desk topology changes
  3. Recheck ACL API and CLI syntax with firmware changes
  4. Review LLDP policy on ports repurposed for public access

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This control works beyond the initial remediation because it requires the team to review LLDP policy on ports repurposed for public access.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That routine supports arp source binding stale, but the relevant ongoing risk requires the team to review LLDP policy on ports repurposed for public access. For the Fairhaven managed-network provider, the direct corrective action is to restrict LLDP advertisements or exposed TLVs on untrusted ports while preserving infrastructure discovery.

B:

Audit multi-host port modes after desk topology changes. That safeguard would help prevent recurrence of: Port-level authorization can allow multiple devices once the port itself authenticates. The risk being reviewed here is instead: Unrestricted discovery data can reveal network topology and device details to unknown endpoints. The matching ongoing control is: Review LLDP policy on ports repurposed for public access.

C:

Recheck ACL API and CLI syntax with firmware changes is not the primary recurring safeguard for this problem. The team should review LLDP policy on ports repurposed for public access. For the Fairhaven managed-network provider, the direct corrective action is to restrict LLDP advertisements or exposed TLVs on untrusted ports while preserving infrastructure discovery.

Fortinet NSE 5 - FortiSwitch 7.6 Administrator (NSE5_FSW_AD-7.6) Practice Tests