McAfee Secure

Exam Code: H12-821

Exam Name: HCIP-Datacom-Core Technology V1.0

Certification Provider: Huawei

Huawei H12-821 Questions & Answers

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Huawei H12-821 Practice Test 55

Question 540

At fictional Pinewell Electronics, a network engineer supporting engineering labs is reviewing IGMP and PIM multicast distribution during a lab-to-production acceptance (HCIP-H12-821-MULTICAST-135). The observed network issue is: A PIM-SM router cannot switch efficiently to a shortest-path tree because its source route points through another neighbor. Which ongoing preventive or detective control would best reduce recurrence?

  1. Compare dense and sparse behavior before expanding multicast across WAN sites.
  2. Check the querier role and aging timers during multicast incidents.
  3. Include explicit (source, group) joins in SSM acceptance tests.
  4. Measure source-tree RPF selection after unicast topology changes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The preventive or detective safeguard is: Measure source-tree RPF selection after unicast topology changes. This directly addresses the recurring fault: A PIM-SM router cannot switch efficiently to a shortest-path tree because its source route points through another neighbor. The corrective action would be: Check reverse path to the source and verify supported SPT switching behavior. Success is demonstrated when: Traffic moves to the expected shortest-path branch without invalid RPF drops.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Compare dense and sparse behavior before expanding multicast across WAN sites” addresses recurrence of another problem: A PIM dense-mode network floods large multicast volumes to branches with no interested receivers. That problem depends on: The preventive or detective safeguard is: Compare dense and sparse behavior before expanding multicast across WAN sites. The recurring risk here is: A PIM-SM router cannot switch efficiently to a shortest-path tree because its source route points through another neighbor. The more targeted safeguard is “Measure source-tree RPF selection after unicast topology changes” because the preventive or detective safeguard is: Measure source-tree RPF selection after unicast topology changes.

B:

“Check the querier role and aging timers during multicast incidents” addresses recurrence of another problem: A multicast router sees no group receivers because IGMP query messages are absent from a VLAN. That problem depends on: The preventive or detective safeguard is: Check the querier role and aging timers during multicast incidents. The recurring risk here is: A PIM-SM router cannot switch efficiently to a shortest-path tree because its source route points through another neighbor. The more targeted safeguard is “Measure source-tree RPF selection after unicast topology changes” because the preventive or detective safeguard is: Measure source-tree RPF selection after unicast topology changes.

C:

“Include explicit (source, group) joins in SSM acceptance tests” addresses recurrence of another problem: A source-specific multicast receiver attempts to use an any-source RP tree even though the deployment expects a specified source. That problem depends on: The preventive or detective safeguard is: Include explicit (source, group) joins in SSM acceptance tests. The recurring risk here is: A PIM-SM router cannot switch efficiently to a shortest-path tree because its source route points through another neighbor. The more targeted safeguard is “Measure source-tree RPF selection after unicast topology changes” because the preventive or detective safeguard is: Measure source-tree RPF selection after unicast topology changes.

Question 541

At fictional Cedar Retail, a network engineer supporting store connectivity is reviewing IS-IS level-aware topology and database synchronization during an initial deployment test (HCIP-H12-821-ISIS-136). The observed network issue is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. Which ongoing preventive or detective control would best reduce recurrence?

  1. Compare link-state databases after repeated topology changes.
  2. Validate system IDs across a network before enabling IS-IS.
  3. Check NET area fields before deploying local IS-IS peering.
  4. Test default reachability from every Level 1 access area.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The preventive or detective safeguard is: Test default reachability from every Level 1 access area. This directly addresses the recurring fault: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. The corrective action would be: Confirm the expected nearest Level 1/2 border route and associated default or leaking policy. Success is demonstrated when: The Level 1 device installs a valid route toward its local Level 1/2 router.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Compare link-state databases after repeated topology changes” addresses recurrence of another problem: An IS-IS area contains conflicting LSP versions after connectivity flaps and routers disagree about routes. That problem depends on: The preventive or detective safeguard is: Compare link-state databases after repeated topology changes. The recurring risk here is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. The more targeted safeguard is “Test default reachability from every Level 1 access area” because the preventive or detective safeguard is: Test default reachability from every Level 1 access area.

B:

“Validate system IDs across a network before enabling IS-IS” addresses recurrence of another problem: An IS-IS configuration reuses one system ID on two distinct routers and link-state advertisements become ambiguous. That problem depends on: The preventive or detective safeguard is: Validate system IDs across a network before enabling IS-IS. The recurring risk here is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. The more targeted safeguard is “Test default reachability from every Level 1 access area” because the preventive or detective safeguard is: Test default reachability from every Level 1 access area.

C:

“Check NET area fields before deploying local IS-IS peering” addresses recurrence of another problem: Two Huawei routers share a link but their IS-IS NET addresses use different area identifiers while both are configured as Level 1. That problem depends on: The preventive or detective safeguard is: Check NET area fields before deploying local IS-IS peering. The recurring risk here is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. The more targeted safeguard is “Test default reachability from every Level 1 access area” because the preventive or detective safeguard is: Test default reachability from every Level 1 access area.

Question 542

At fictional Cedar Retail, a network engineer supporting store connectivity is reviewing IS-IS level-aware topology and database synchronization during an initial deployment test (HCIP-H12-821-ISIS-136). The observed network issue is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. Which observation most directly verifies that the corrective change succeeded?

  1. The intended neighbors establish and databases synchronize without authentication errors.
  2. The Level 1 device installs a valid route toward its local Level 1/2 router.
  3. Link-state packets carry supported larger metrics and computed paths match design.
  4. An eligible Level 1 neighbor forms in the expected common area.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The best verification observation is: The Level 1 device installs a valid route toward its local Level 1/2 router. It demonstrates the corrective action: Confirm the expected nearest Level 1/2 border route and associated default or leaking policy. This fits the principle: IS-IS Level 1 routing has area-local visibility and relies on Level 2 interarea reachability. Verify on the actual Huawei platform and network release.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“The intended neighbors establish and databases synchronize without authentication errors” responds to another technical or business failure: An IS-IS adjacency repeatedly resets because neighboring devices use incompatible authentication settings. That source case depends on: The best verification observation is: The intended neighbors establish and databases synchronize without authentication errors. The present issue is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. The more direct action is “The Level 1 device installs a valid route toward its local Level 1/2 router” because the best verification observation is: The Level 1 device installs a valid route toward its local Level 1/2 router.

C:

“Link-state packets carry supported larger metrics and computed paths match design” responds to another technical or business failure: A large IS-IS deployment uses narrow metrics until a new path cost exceeds the legacy representable range. That source case depends on: The best verification observation is: Link-state packets carry supported larger metrics and computed paths match design. The present issue is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. The more direct action is “The Level 1 device installs a valid route toward its local Level 1/2 router” because the best verification observation is: The Level 1 device installs a valid route toward its local Level 1/2 router.

D:

“An eligible Level 1 neighbor forms in the expected common area” responds to another technical or business failure: Two Huawei routers share a link but their IS-IS NET addresses use different area identifiers while both are configured as Level 1. That source case depends on: The best verification observation is: An eligible Level 1 neighbor forms in the expected common area. The present issue is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. The more direct action is “The Level 1 device installs a valid route toward its local Level 1/2 router” because the best verification observation is: The Level 1 device installs a valid route toward its local Level 1/2 router.

Question 543

At fictional Cedar Retail, a network engineer supporting store connectivity is reviewing IS-IS level-aware topology and database synchronization during an initial deployment test (HCIP-H12-821-ISIS-136). The observed network issue is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. Which next engineering action best addresses the reported problem?

  1. Restrict permitted interlevel route leaking with appropriate routing policy and aggregation.
  2. Align the intended IS-IS area identifiers or establish a deliberate Level 2 relationship.
  3. Configure matching supported IS-IS Hello or LSP authentication parameters for the peering scope.
  4. Confirm the expected nearest Level 1/2 border route and associated default or leaking policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The directly responsive action is: Confirm the expected nearest Level 1/2 border route and associated default or leaking policy. The specific reported fault is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. Confirmation should show: The Level 1 device installs a valid route toward its local Level 1/2 router. The supporting technical principle is: IS-IS Level 1 routing has area-local visibility and relies on Level 2 interarea reachability.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Restrict permitted interlevel route leaking with appropriate routing policy and aggregation” responds to another technical or business failure: An engineer leaks all Level 2 routes into Level 1 and overwhelms a branch routing table. That source case depends on: IS-IS route leaking trades specific interarea visibility against scaling and policy control. The present issue is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. The more direct action is “Confirm the expected nearest Level 1/2 border route and associated default or leaking policy” because IS-IS Level 1 routing has area-local visibility and relies on Level 2 interarea reachability.

B:

“Align the intended IS-IS area identifiers or establish a deliberate Level 2 relationship” responds to another technical or business failure: Two Huawei routers share a link but their IS-IS NET addresses use different area identifiers while both are configured as Level 1. That source case depends on: IS-IS Level 1 adjacency requires compatible area membership. The present issue is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. The more direct action is “Confirm the expected nearest Level 1/2 border route and associated default or leaking policy” because IS-IS Level 1 routing has area-local visibility and relies on Level 2 interarea reachability.

C:

“Configure matching supported IS-IS Hello or LSP authentication parameters for the peering scope” responds to another technical or business failure: An IS-IS adjacency repeatedly resets because neighboring devices use incompatible authentication settings. That source case depends on: IS-IS routing integrity can require compatible authentication at the relevant PDU scope. The present issue is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. The more direct action is “Confirm the expected nearest Level 1/2 border route and associated default or leaking policy” because IS-IS Level 1 routing has area-local visibility and relies on Level 2 interarea reachability.

Question 544

At fictional Cedar Retail, a network engineer supporting store connectivity is reviewing IS-IS level-aware topology and database synchronization during an initial deployment test (HCIP-H12-821-ISIS-136). The observed network issue is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. Which routing, switching, or network principle best explains the appropriate solution?

  1. IS-IS routing integrity can require compatible authentication at the relevant PDU scope.
  2. IS-IS database consistency relies on link-state PDU sequencing and flooding acknowledgements.
  3. IS-IS identifies routing systems using unique system IDs.
  4. IS-IS Level 1 routing has area-local visibility and relies on Level 2 interarea reachability.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The governing principle is: IS-IS Level 1 routing has area-local visibility and relies on Level 2 interarea reachability. In this scenario, the appropriate action is: Confirm the expected nearest Level 1/2 border route and associated default or leaking policy. Valid evidence would show: The Level 1 device installs a valid route toward its local Level 1/2 router.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“IS-IS routing integrity can require compatible authentication at the relevant PDU scope” responds to another technical or business failure: An IS-IS adjacency repeatedly resets because neighboring devices use incompatible authentication settings. That source case depends on: IS-IS routing integrity can require compatible authentication at the relevant PDU scope. The present issue is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. The more direct action is “IS-IS Level 1 routing has area-local visibility and relies on Level 2 interarea reachability” because IS-IS Level 1 routing has area-local visibility and relies on Level 2 interarea reachability.

B:

“IS-IS database consistency relies on link-state PDU sequencing and flooding acknowledgements” responds to another technical or business failure: An IS-IS area contains conflicting LSP versions after connectivity flaps and routers disagree about routes. That source case depends on: IS-IS database consistency relies on link-state PDU sequencing and flooding acknowledgements. The present issue is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. The more direct action is “IS-IS Level 1 routing has area-local visibility and relies on Level 2 interarea reachability” because IS-IS Level 1 routing has area-local visibility and relies on Level 2 interarea reachability.

C:

“IS-IS identifies routing systems using unique system IDs” responds to another technical or business failure: An IS-IS configuration reuses one system ID on two distinct routers and link-state advertisements become ambiguous. That source case depends on: IS-IS identifies routing systems using unique system IDs. The present issue is: A Level 1-only router cannot reach an IP prefix advertised only outside its local IS-IS area. The more direct action is “IS-IS Level 1 routing has area-local visibility and relies on Level 2 interarea reachability” because IS-IS Level 1 routing has area-local visibility and relies on Level 2 interarea reachability.

Question 545

At fictional Timberline Operations, a network engineer supporting production campuses is reviewing route-policy and traffic-control behavior during a controlled failover exercise (HCIP-H12-821-POLICY-137). The observed network issue is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. Which observation most directly verifies that the corrective change succeeded?

  1. Traffic tests confirm the authorized request and response directions are treated as designed.
  2. PBR-selected test packets follow a reachable authorized next hop without black holes.
  3. Only routes carrying the approved community receive the intended export action.
  4. Voice delay remains within service objectives without starving lower-priority classes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The best verification observation is: Traffic tests confirm the authorized request and response directions are treated as designed. It demonstrates the corrective action: Analyze bidirectional stateless ACL placement and session-state enforcement differences. This fits the principle: Stateless packet filters do not intrinsically track an entire transport session. Verify on the actual Huawei platform and network release.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“PBR-selected test packets follow a reachable authorized next hop without black holes” responds to another technical or business failure: A policy-based routing rule sends traffic toward a next hop that cannot be resolved in the correct VRF. That source case depends on: The best verification observation is: PBR-selected test packets follow a reachable authorized next hop without black holes. The present issue is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. The more direct action is “Traffic tests confirm the authorized request and response directions are treated as designed” because the best verification observation is: Traffic tests confirm the authorized request and response directions are treated as designed.

C:

“Only routes carrying the approved community receive the intended export action” responds to another technical or business failure: An engineer sets a BGP route community but forgets the matching export policy and upstream advertisements are unchanged. That source case depends on: The best verification observation is: Only routes carrying the approved community receive the intended export action. The present issue is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. The more direct action is “Traffic tests confirm the authorized request and response directions are treated as designed” because the best verification observation is: Traffic tests confirm the authorized request and response directions are treated as designed.

D:

“Voice delay remains within service objectives without starving lower-priority classes” responds to another technical or business failure: A campus egress port uses weighted scheduling but latency-sensitive voice sits behind large bulk transfers. That source case depends on: The best verification observation is: Voice delay remains within service objectives without starving lower-priority classes. The present issue is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. The more direct action is “Traffic tests confirm the authorized request and response directions are treated as designed” because the best verification observation is: Traffic tests confirm the authorized request and response directions are treated as designed.

Question 546

At fictional Timberline Operations, a network engineer supporting production campuses is reviewing route-policy and traffic-control behavior during a controlled failover exercise (HCIP-H12-821-POLICY-137). The observed network issue is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. Which routing, switching, or network principle best explains the appropriate solution?

  1. Policy routing can override ordinary destination lookup but still requires valid forwarding resolution.
  2. Stateless packet filters do not intrinsically track an entire transport session.
  3. Traffic classification must identify real packets before forwarding or QoS behavior is applied.
  4. Traffic policing and traffic shaping handle excess rates differently.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The governing principle is: Stateless packet filters do not intrinsically track an entire transport session. In this scenario, the appropriate action is: Analyze bidirectional stateless ACL placement and session-state enforcement differences. Valid evidence would show: Traffic tests confirm the authorized request and response directions are treated as designed.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Policy routing can override ordinary destination lookup but still requires valid forwarding resolution” responds to another technical or business failure: A policy-based routing rule sends traffic toward a next hop that cannot be resolved in the correct VRF. That source case depends on: Policy routing can override ordinary destination lookup but still requires valid forwarding resolution. The present issue is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. The more direct action is “Stateless packet filters do not intrinsically track an entire transport session” because Stateless packet filters do not intrinsically track an entire transport session.

C:

“Traffic classification must identify real packets before forwarding or QoS behavior is applied” responds to another technical or business failure: A routing policy references a nonexistent ACL and traffic is still sent down the default path. That source case depends on: Traffic classification must identify real packets before forwarding or QoS behavior is applied. The present issue is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. The more direct action is “Stateless packet filters do not intrinsically track an entire transport session” because Stateless packet filters do not intrinsically track an entire transport session.

D:

“Traffic policing and traffic shaping handle excess rates differently” responds to another technical or business failure: A Huawei MQC behavior applies policing at an uplink but the operator expects it to buffer all excess traffic. That source case depends on: Traffic policing and traffic shaping handle excess rates differently. The present issue is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. The more direct action is “Stateless packet filters do not intrinsically track an entire transport session” because Stateless packet filters do not intrinsically track an entire transport session.

Question 547

At fictional Timberline Operations, a network engineer supporting production campuses is reviewing route-policy and traffic-control behavior during a controlled failover exercise (HCIP-H12-821-POLICY-137). The observed network issue is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. Which next engineering action best addresses the reported problem?

  1. Analyze bidirectional stateless ACL placement and session-state enforcement differences.
  2. Recalculate token-bucket parameters and choose intended conform, exceed and violate actions.
  3. Correct the prefix-filter network and mask length parameters for intended component routes.
  4. Apply a scoped redistribution route policy and permit only selected service networks.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The directly responsive action is: Analyze bidirectional stateless ACL placement and session-state enforcement differences. The specific reported fault is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. Confirmation should show: Traffic tests confirm the authorized request and response directions are treated as designed. The supporting technical principle is: Stateless packet filters do not intrinsically track an entire transport session.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Recalculate token-bucket parameters and choose intended conform, exceed and violate actions” responds to another technical or business failure: A WAN traffic policy drops packets after a bandwidth threshold because committed and excess rates were configured incorrectly. That source case depends on: Token bucket policers classify traffic using configured rate and burst parameters. The present issue is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. The more direct action is “Analyze bidirectional stateless ACL placement and session-state enforcement differences” because Stateless packet filters do not intrinsically track an entire transport session.

C:

“Correct the prefix-filter network and mask length parameters for intended component routes” responds to another technical or business failure: A prefix-list denies an entire /16 because its mask range does not include the intended /24 subnet entries. That source case depends on: IP prefix filtering depends on both address prefix and permitted length ranges. The present issue is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. The more direct action is “Analyze bidirectional stateless ACL placement and session-state enforcement differences” because Stateless packet filters do not intrinsically track an entire transport session.

D:

“Apply a scoped redistribution route policy and permit only selected service networks” responds to another technical or business failure: A site redistributes static routes into OSPF and accidentally advertises a management-only address to every area. That source case depends on: Route redistribution crosses protocol boundaries and needs controlled prefix filtering. The present issue is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. The more direct action is “Analyze bidirectional stateless ACL placement and session-state enforcement differences” because Stateless packet filters do not intrinsically track an entire transport session.

Question 548

At fictional Timberline Operations, a network engineer supporting production campuses is reviewing route-policy and traffic-control behavior during a controlled failover exercise (HCIP-H12-821-POLICY-137). The observed network issue is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. Which ongoing preventive or detective control would best reduce recurrence?

  1. Build source-destination acceptance matrices for policy-based routing.
  2. Inventory import-policy attachment to each neighbor and protocol before deployment.
  3. Test both directions and protocol states after changing edge ACLs.
  4. Audit redistributed origin tags and filter sequences at each protocol boundary.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The preventive or detective safeguard is: Test both directions and protocol states after changing edge ACLs. This directly addresses the recurring fault: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. The corrective action would be: Analyze bidirectional stateless ACL placement and session-state enforcement differences. Success is demonstrated when: Traffic tests confirm the authorized request and response directions are treated as designed.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Build source-destination acceptance matrices for policy-based routing” addresses recurrence of another problem: A traffic-engineering plan changes route selection but the test validates only traceroute from the wrong source network. That problem depends on: The preventive or detective safeguard is: Build source-destination acceptance matrices for policy-based routing. The recurring risk here is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. The more targeted safeguard is “Test both directions and protocol states after changing edge ACLs” because the preventive or detective safeguard is: Test both directions and protocol states after changing edge ACLs.

B:

“Inventory import-policy attachment to each neighbor and protocol before deployment” addresses recurrence of another problem: An import routing policy changes route preference globally when only one partner's redistributed routes should be affected. That problem depends on: The preventive or detective safeguard is: Inventory import-policy attachment to each neighbor and protocol before deployment. The recurring risk here is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. The more targeted safeguard is “Test both directions and protocol states after changing edge ACLs” because the preventive or detective safeguard is: Test both directions and protocol states after changing edge ACLs.

D:

“Audit redistributed origin tags and filter sequences at each protocol boundary” addresses recurrence of another problem: An engineer imports routes from a backup routing process without a loop-prevention tag and the same prefixes circulate between protocols. That problem depends on: The preventive or detective safeguard is: Audit redistributed origin tags and filter sequences at each protocol boundary. The recurring risk here is: An ACL only denies one direction of a TCP conversation and the security team assumes return packets are automatically blocked. The more targeted safeguard is “Test both directions and protocol states after changing edge ACLs” because the preventive or detective safeguard is: Test both directions and protocol states after changing edge ACLs.

Question 549

At fictional Lakeshore Finance, a network engineer supporting transaction systems is reviewing OSPF area design and link-state convergence during a lab-to-production acceptance (HCIP-H12-821-OSPF-138). The observed network issue is: Two OSPF devices on a point-to-point fiber cannot build an adjacency because their interface network types differ. Which observation most directly verifies that the corrective change succeeded?

  1. The new DR or BDR assignment appears only after an appropriate election-triggering event.
  2. Neighbors form a stable adjacency without an unintended DR election on the point-to-point link.
  3. Authenticated Hellos are accepted and the neighbor reaches the expected stable state.
  4. Each router sees its own router ID in received Hello neighbor lists and advances beyond Init.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The best verification observation is: Neighbors form a stable adjacency without an unintended DR election on the point-to-point link. It demonstrates the corrective action: Align compatible OSPF network types and validate hello and DR behavior for the actual media. This fits the principle: OSPF interface network type affects neighbor handling and designated router behavior. Verify on the actual Huawei platform and network release.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“The new DR or BDR assignment appears only after an appropriate election-triggering event” responds to another technical or business failure: An OSPF DR election change unexpectedly disrupts traffic because an engineer assumes elections are always preemptive. That source case depends on: The best verification observation is: The new DR or BDR assignment appears only after an appropriate election-triggering event. The present issue is: Two OSPF devices on a point-to-point fiber cannot build an adjacency because their interface network types differ. The more direct action is “Neighbors form a stable adjacency without an unintended DR election on the point-to-point link” because the best verification observation is: Neighbors form a stable adjacency without an unintended DR election on the point-to-point link.

C:

“Authenticated Hellos are accepted and the neighbor reaches the expected stable state” responds to another technical or business failure: An OSPF adjacency repeatedly fails due to mismatched authentication algorithms after a maintenance window. That source case depends on: The best verification observation is: Authenticated Hellos are accepted and the neighbor reaches the expected stable state. The present issue is: Two OSPF devices on a point-to-point fiber cannot build an adjacency because their interface network types differ. The more direct action is “Neighbors form a stable adjacency without an unintended DR election on the point-to-point link” because the best verification observation is: Neighbors form a stable adjacency without an unintended DR election on the point-to-point link.

D:

“Each router sees its own router ID in received Hello neighbor lists and advances beyond Init” responds to another technical or business failure: A transit OSPF link remains in Init because one router never sees its own router ID listed in neighbor Hellos. That source case depends on: The best verification observation is: Each router sees its own router ID in received Hello neighbor lists and advances beyond Init. The present issue is: Two OSPF devices on a point-to-point fiber cannot build an adjacency because their interface network types differ. The more direct action is “Neighbors form a stable adjacency without an unintended DR election on the point-to-point link” because the best verification observation is: Neighbors form a stable adjacency without an unintended DR election on the point-to-point link.

Question 550

At fictional Lakeshore Finance, a network engineer supporting transaction systems is reviewing OSPF area design and link-state convergence during a lab-to-production acceptance (HCIP-H12-821-OSPF-138). The observed network issue is: Two OSPF devices on a point-to-point fiber cannot build an adjacency because their interface network types differ. Which routing, switching, or network principle best explains the appropriate solution?

  1. OSPF E1 and E2 external cost calculations treat internal path costs differently.
  2. OSPF neighbor liveness requires compatible timer parameters on the shared network.
  3. OSPF interface network type affects neighbor handling and designated router behavior.
  4. Totally stubby area behavior reduces inter-area summary visibility beyond ordinary stub restrictions.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The governing principle is: OSPF interface network type affects neighbor handling and designated router behavior. In this scenario, the appropriate action is: Align compatible OSPF network types and validate hello and DR behavior for the actual media. Valid evidence would show: Neighbors form a stable adjacency without an unintended DR election on the point-to-point link.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“OSPF E1 and E2 external cost calculations treat internal path costs differently” responds to another technical or business failure: An engineer mistakes an OSPF external Type 2 metric for a path whose internal costs are always added to its advertised value. That source case depends on: OSPF E1 and E2 external cost calculations treat internal path costs differently. The present issue is: Two OSPF devices on a point-to-point fiber cannot build an adjacency because their interface network types differ. The more direct action is “OSPF interface network type affects neighbor handling and designated router behavior” because OSPF interface network type affects neighbor handling and designated router behavior.

B:

“OSPF neighbor liveness requires compatible timer parameters on the shared network” responds to another technical or business failure: Routers have the same network prefix but one side uses a different OSPF Hello interval on an Ethernet segment. That source case depends on: OSPF neighbor liveness requires compatible timer parameters on the shared network. The present issue is: Two OSPF devices on a point-to-point fiber cannot build an adjacency because their interface network types differ. The more direct action is “OSPF interface network type affects neighbor handling and designated router behavior” because OSPF interface network type affects neighbor handling and designated router behavior.

D:

“Totally stubby area behavior reduces inter-area summary visibility beyond ordinary stub restrictions” responds to another technical or business failure: An OSPF totally stubby area receives unwanted detailed inter-area routes after only one router's configuration changes. That source case depends on: Totally stubby area behavior reduces inter-area summary visibility beyond ordinary stub restrictions. The present issue is: Two OSPF devices on a point-to-point fiber cannot build an adjacency because their interface network types differ. The more direct action is “OSPF interface network type affects neighbor handling and designated router behavior” because OSPF interface network type affects neighbor handling and designated router behavior.

HCIP-Datacom-Core Technology V1.0 (H12-821) Practice Tests