McAfee Secure

Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

Cisco 300-715 Bundle $25.00
300-715 Sample 1 300-715 Sample 2 300-715 Sample 3 300-715 Sample 4 300-715 Sample 5 300-715 Sample 6 300-715 Sample 7 300-715 Sample 8 300-715 Sample 9 300-715 Sample 10

100% Cisco 300-715 Guaranteed Success With Testking Training Materials

Get Real 300-715 Exam Questions & Expert Verified Answers as Experienced on the Real Exam!

  • Questions & Answers

    300-715 Questions & Answers

    433 Questions & Answers

    The ultimate exam preparation tool, Questions & Answers mirrors the actual 300-715 exam while allowing you to hone and measure every aspect of your test-taking ability.

  • 300-715 Video Course

    300-715 Training Course

    73 Video Lectures

    300-715 Video Course is developed by Cisco Professionals to help you pass the 300-715 exam.

    Description

    This course will improve your knowledge and skills required to pass Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE) exam.

Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE) (300-715) Practice Tests

Satisfaction Guaranteed

Money Back Guarantee

Testking provides hassle-free money back guarantee with our products. That is because we have 100% trust in the abilities of our professional and experience product team, and our record is a proof of that.

99.6% PASS RATE
Total Cost: $164.98
Bundle Price: $139.98

Purchase Individually

  • Questions & Answers

    Questions & Answers

    433 Questions

    $124.99
  • 300-715 Video Course

    Training Course

    73 Video Lectures

    $39.99

Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 19

Question 180

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: An industrial printer has no supplicant and is denied by 802.1X, but security policy permits the printer only to a designated print server. Which measurable outcome proves the intended behavior?

  1. A forged address lacks access to sensitive destinations even when it can mimic the printer's MAC identity.
  2. A registered scanner receives the approved restricted access while an arbitrary new MAC is denied or quarantined.
  3. The phone and PC each have the intended separate voice and data authorization sessions without allowing unlimited piggyback clients.
  4. The approved printer reaches its print server and an unregistered MAC cannot access the protected network.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The approved printer reaches its print server and an unregistered MAC cannot access the protected network. The required remediation is: Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. It works because mAC Authentication Bypass uses the endpoint MAC identifier as an authentication basis, so access must be constrained because MACs can be impersonated.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The repeat risk here is different: Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. A directly relevant preventive control is: The approved printer reaches its print server and an unregistered MAC cannot access the protected network.

B:

Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. The repeat risk here is different: Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. A directly relevant preventive control is: The approved printer reaches its print server and an unregistered MAC cannot access the protected network.

C:

Select a supported 802.1X host mode such as multi-domain when one voice endpoint and one data endpoint must authenticate separately. The repeat risk here is different: Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. A directly relevant preventive control is: The approved printer reaches its print server and an unregistered MAC cannot access the protected network.

Question 181

A campus and branch network operator reports: An industrial printer has no supplicant and is denied by 802.1X, but security policy permits the printer only to a designated print server. Which ongoing practice is most appropriate for this failure mode?

  1. Verify MAB profiling transitions and CoA support during endpoint onboarding.
  2. Treat MAB as exception-based admission and migrate devices to stronger authentication when capable.
  3. Review MAB endpoint lists and minimize permissions for devices without 802.1X.
  4. Review ISE AD group mappings whenever directory groups are renamed or reorganized.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Review MAB endpoint lists and minimize permissions for devices without 802.1X. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: MAC Authentication Bypass uses the endpoint MAC identifier as an authentication basis, so access must be constrained because MACs can be impersonated. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The approved printer reaches its print server and an unregistered MAC cannot access the protected network.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. The needed response is: Review MAB endpoint lists and minimize permissions for devices without 802.1X.

B:

Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. The needed response is: Review MAB endpoint lists and minimize permissions for devices without 802.1X.

D:

Review ISE AD group mappings whenever directory groups are renamed or reorganized. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. The needed response is: Review MAB endpoint lists and minimize permissions for devices without 802.1X.

Question 182

An access-security change request states: A staging switch authenticates every unknown MAC through a broad catch-all MAB rule that returns the standard employee data VLAN. Which response most directly corrects the described failure?

  1. Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs.
  2. Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change.
  3. Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible.
  4. Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization handling on the WLC and verify policy-triggered reauthorization for that client.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. This is appropriate because mAB is a weaker identity signal than cryptographic EAP; permissive default rules let unrecognized devices receive unwarranted access. It should be verified by this evidence: A registered scanner receives the approved restricted access while an arbitrary new MAC is denied or quarantined.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Test SSID and network-device-group conditions in each wireless authorization policy set. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 183

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: A staging switch authenticates every unknown MAC through a broad catch-all MAB rule that returns the standard employee data VLAN. Which statement best explains why the correct response works?

  1. MAB is a weaker identity signal than cryptographic EAP; permissive default rules let unrecognized devices receive unwarranted access.
  2. MAC Authentication Bypass uses the endpoint MAC identifier as an authentication basis, so access must be constrained because MACs can be impersonated.
  3. A MAC address can be spoofed, so a matching MAB record is not cryptographic proof of the physical endpoint.
  4. Closed mode restricts ordinary data access before a valid authentication result, enforcing the port's intended admission barrier.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

MAB is a weaker identity signal than cryptographic EAP; permissive default rules let unrecognized devices receive unwarranted access. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. The acceptance result is: A registered scanner receives the approved restricted access while an arbitrary new MAC is denied or quarantined.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. In the case being tested, Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. The necessary acceptance evidence is: MAB is a weaker identity signal than cryptographic EAP; permissive default rules let unrecognized devices receive unwarranted access.

C:

Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. In the case being tested, Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. The necessary acceptance evidence is: MAB is a weaker identity signal than cryptographic EAP; permissive default rules let unrecognized devices receive unwarranted access.

D:

Apply an appropriate closed-mode wired 802.1X configuration with necessary tightly controlled exceptions. In the case being tested, Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. The necessary acceptance evidence is: MAB is a weaker identity signal than cryptographic EAP; permissive default rules let unrecognized devices receive unwarranted access.

Question 184

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: A staging switch authenticates every unknown MAC through a broad catch-all MAB rule that returns the standard employee data VLAN. Which observation would BEST verify successful remediation?

  1. The scanner's received identifier resolves to the intended internal endpoint record and authorization profile.
  2. A forged address lacks access to sensitive destinations even when it can mimic the printer's MAC identity.
  3. A managed workstation authenticates via 802.1X while the pre-registered badge reader uses MAB and receives restricted authorization.
  4. A registered scanner receives the approved restricted access while an arbitrary new MAC is denied or quarantined.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A registered scanner receives the approved restricted access while an arbitrary new MAC is denied or quarantined. The required remediation is: Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. It works because mAB is a weaker identity signal than cryptographic EAP; permissive default rules let unrecognized devices receive unwarranted access.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. The repeat risk here is different: Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. A directly relevant preventive control is: A registered scanner receives the approved restricted access while an arbitrary new MAC is denied or quarantined.

B:

Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The repeat risk here is different: Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. A directly relevant preventive control is: A registered scanner receives the approved restricted access while an arbitrary new MAC is denied or quarantined.

C:

Add an explicitly authorized MAB method and appropriate event-driven policy handling for devices that cannot perform 802.1X. The repeat risk here is different: Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. A directly relevant preventive control is: A registered scanner receives the approved restricted access while an arbitrary new MAC is denied or quarantined.

Question 185

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: A staging switch authenticates every unknown MAC through a broad catch-all MAB rule that returns the standard employee data VLAN. What should be incorporated into the change checklist?

  1. Treat MAB as exception-based admission and migrate devices to stronger authentication when capable.
  2. Test MAC formatting from each switch family before importing large device inventories.
  3. Test SSID and network-device-group conditions in each wireless authorization policy set.
  4. Audit MAB exception groups and reject unrestricted unknown-endpoint defaults.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Audit MAB exception groups and reject unrestricted unknown-endpoint defaults. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: MAB is a weaker identity signal than cryptographic EAP; permissive default rules let unrecognized devices receive unwarranted access. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A registered scanner receives the approved restricted access while an arbitrary new MAC is denied or quarantined.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. The needed response is: Audit MAB exception groups and reject unrestricted unknown-endpoint defaults.

B:

Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. The needed response is: Audit MAB exception groups and reject unrestricted unknown-endpoint defaults.

C:

Test SSID and network-device-group conditions in each wireless authorization policy set. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. The needed response is: Audit MAB exception groups and reject unrestricted unknown-endpoint defaults.

Question 186

A campus and branch network operator reports: The ISE endpoint database contains a badge scanner's address using colons, but a switch supplies the MAC in a different supported representation and lookups do not match. What is the most suitable solution within these constraints?

  1. Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change.
  2. Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile.
  3. Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling.
  4. Use multi-auth host mode where supported and require each downstream client to authenticate individually.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. This is appropriate because mAB identity lookup depends on consistent endpoint MAC representation and correct RADIUS attributes, not an ordinary employee password. It should be verified by this evidence: The scanner's received identifier resolves to the intended internal endpoint record and authorization profile.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Use multi-auth host mode where supported and require each downstream client to authenticate individually. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 187

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: The ISE endpoint database contains a badge scanner's address using colons, but a switch supplies the MAC in a different supported representation and lookups do not match. Which platform distinction is decisive in this scenario?

  1. MAB is a weaker identity signal than cryptographic EAP; permissive default rules let unrecognized devices receive unwarranted access.
  2. RADIUS session authorization can remain cached on the network access device after ISE's endpoint classification changes.
  3. MAB identity lookup depends on consistent endpoint MAC representation and correct RADIUS attributes, not an ordinary employee password.
  4. A trusted certificate may still fail identity resolution if the extracted principal field does not match the intended account mapping.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

MAB identity lookup depends on consistent endpoint MAC representation and correct RADIUS attributes, not an ordinary employee password. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. The acceptance result is: The scanner's received identifier resolves to the intended internal endpoint record and authorization profile.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. In the case being tested, Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. The necessary acceptance evidence is: MAB identity lookup depends on consistent endpoint MAC representation and correct RADIUS attributes, not an ordinary employee password.

B:

Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. In the case being tested, Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. The necessary acceptance evidence is: MAB identity lookup depends on consistent endpoint MAC representation and correct RADIUS attributes, not an ordinary employee password.

D:

Maintain per-directory schema mapping tests before identity store migrations. In the case being tested, Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. The necessary acceptance evidence is: MAB identity lookup depends on consistent endpoint MAC representation and correct RADIUS attributes, not an ordinary employee password.

Question 188

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: The ISE endpoint database contains a badge scanner's address using colons, but a switch supplies the MAC in a different supported representation and lookups do not match. Which acceptance test would directly establish the desired state?

  1. The approved printer reaches its print server and an unregistered MAC cannot access the protected network.
  2. A registered scanner receives the approved restricted access while an arbitrary new MAC is denied or quarantined.
  3. The scanner's received identifier resolves to the intended internal endpoint record and authorization profile.
  4. The PSN binds successfully with certificate validation, and an untrusted server certificate is rejected.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The scanner's received identifier resolves to the intended internal endpoint record and authorization profile. The required remediation is: Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. It works because mAB identity lookup depends on consistent endpoint MAC representation and correct RADIUS attributes, not an ordinary employee password.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. The repeat risk here is different: Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. A directly relevant preventive control is: The scanner's received identifier resolves to the intended internal endpoint record and authorization profile.

B:

Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. The repeat risk here is different: Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. A directly relevant preventive control is: The scanner's received identifier resolves to the intended internal endpoint record and authorization profile.

D:

Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions. The repeat risk here is different: Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. A directly relevant preventive control is: The scanner's received identifier resolves to the intended internal endpoint record and authorization profile.

Question 189

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: The ISE endpoint database contains a badge scanner's address using colons, but a switch supplies the MAC in a different supported representation and lookups do not match. Which governance step most directly targets the root cause?

  1. Test MAC formatting from each switch family before importing large device inventories.
  2. Verify MAB profiling transitions and CoA support during endpoint onboarding.
  3. Treat MAB as exception-based admission and migrate devices to stronger authentication when capable.
  4. Test SSID and network-device-group conditions in each wireless authorization policy set.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Test MAC formatting from each switch family before importing large device inventories. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: MAB identity lookup depends on consistent endpoint MAC representation and correct RADIUS attributes, not an ordinary employee password. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The scanner's received identifier resolves to the intended internal endpoint record and authorization profile.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The needed response is: Test MAC formatting from each switch family before importing large device inventories.

C:

Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The needed response is: Test MAC formatting from each switch family before importing large device inventories.

D:

Test SSID and network-device-group conditions in each wireless authorization policy set. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The needed response is: Test MAC formatting from each switch family before importing large device inventories.

Question 190

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: An unregistered camera gains the same role as a trusted printer by cloning its MAC, and engineers argue MAB alone proves hardware identity. Which change is justified by the observed evidence?

  1. Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs.
  2. Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change.
  3. Scope the wireless 802.1X policy to approved EAP-TLS methods and compatible client certificate trust and identity rules.
  4. Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. This is appropriate because a MAC address can be spoofed, so a matching MAB record is not cryptographic proof of the physical endpoint. It should be verified by this evidence: A forged address lacks access to sensitive destinations even when it can mimic the printer's MAC identity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Verify RADIUS source interfaces after controller failover, redundancy, or interface changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.