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Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 20

Question 190

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: An unregistered camera gains the same role as a trusted printer by cloning its MAC, and engineers argue MAB alone proves hardware identity. Which change is justified by the observed evidence?

  1. Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs.
  2. Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change.
  3. Scope the wireless 802.1X policy to approved EAP-TLS methods and compatible client certificate trust and identity rules.
  4. Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. This is appropriate because a MAC address can be spoofed, so a matching MAB record is not cryptographic proof of the physical endpoint. It should be verified by this evidence: A forged address lacks access to sensitive destinations even when it can mimic the printer's MAC identity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Verify RADIUS source interfaces after controller failover, redundancy, or interface changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 191

An enterprise access-control incident describes: An unregistered camera gains the same role as a trusted printer by cloning its MAC, and engineers argue MAB alone proves hardware identity. What mechanism governs this authentication or management outcome?

  1. MAC Authentication Bypass uses the endpoint MAC identifier as an authentication basis, so access must be constrained because MACs can be impersonated.
  2. A MAC address can be spoofed, so a matching MAB record is not cryptographic proof of the physical endpoint.
  3. MAB is a weaker identity signal than cryptographic EAP; permissive default rules let unrecognized devices receive unwarranted access.
  4. An existing 802.1X session does not automatically renegotiate its authorization until a supported reauthentication or CoA path occurs.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A MAC address can be spoofed, so a matching MAB record is not cryptographic proof of the physical endpoint. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The acceptance result is: A forged address lacks access to sensitive destinations even when it can mimic the printer's MAC identity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. In the case being tested, Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A MAC address can be spoofed, so a matching MAB record is not cryptographic proof of the physical endpoint.

C:

Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. In the case being tested, Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A MAC address can be spoofed, so a matching MAB record is not cryptographic proof of the physical endpoint.

D:

Test SSID and network-device-group conditions in each wireless authorization policy set. In the case being tested, Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A MAC address can be spoofed, so a matching MAB record is not cryptographic proof of the physical endpoint.

Question 192

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: An unregistered camera gains the same role as a trusted printer by cloning its MAC, and engineers argue MAB alone proves hardware identity. What is the strongest evidence that this requirement is met?

  1. The same endpoint moves to the authorized IoT policy on reauthorization without changing neighboring port sessions.
  2. The approved printer reaches its print server and an unregistered MAC cannot access the protected network.
  3. A forged address lacks access to sensitive destinations even when it can mimic the printer's MAC identity.
  4. The correct server subnet or host is mapped to the intended tag and a nearby unlisted host does not inherit it.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A forged address lacks access to sensitive destinations even when it can mimic the printer's MAC identity. The required remediation is: Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. It works because a MAC address can be spoofed, so a matching MAB record is not cryptographic proof of the physical endpoint.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The repeat risk here is different: Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. A directly relevant preventive control is: A forged address lacks access to sensitive destinations even when it can mimic the printer's MAC identity.

B:

Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. The repeat risk here is different: Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. A directly relevant preventive control is: A forged address lacks access to sensitive destinations even when it can mimic the printer's MAC identity.

D:

Create a controlled static IP-to-SGT mapping for the approved server and distribute it through the supported method. The repeat risk here is different: Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. A directly relevant preventive control is: A forged address lacks access to sensitive destinations even when it can mimic the printer's MAC identity.

Question 193

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: An unregistered camera gains the same role as a trusted printer by cloning its MAC, and engineers argue MAB alone proves hardware identity. Which recurring operational control would reduce this risk?

  1. Review MAB endpoint lists and minimize permissions for devices without 802.1X.
  2. Treat MAB as exception-based admission and migrate devices to stronger authentication when capable.
  3. Audit MAB exception groups and reject unrestricted unknown-endpoint defaults.
  4. Alert on ISE node time drift and authoritative NTP reachability.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Treat MAB as exception-based admission and migrate devices to stronger authentication when capable. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: A MAC address can be spoofed, so a matching MAB record is not cryptographic proof of the physical endpoint. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A forged address lacks access to sensitive destinations even when it can mimic the printer's MAC identity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The needed response is: Treat MAB as exception-based admission and migrate devices to stronger authentication when capable.

C:

Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The needed response is: Treat MAB as exception-based admission and migrate devices to stronger authentication when capable.

D:

Alert on ISE node time drift and authoritative NTP reachability. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The needed response is: Treat MAB as exception-based admission and migrate devices to stronger authentication when capable.

Question 194

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: A newly profiled building sensor should move from temporary MAB isolation to its approved IoT group, but it stays in the staging authorization result for hours. Which administrative action BEST addresses this specific situation?

  1. Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs.
  2. Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile.
  3. Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change.
  4. Update the ISE LDAP identity source search base and matching user object attributes to reflect the directory hierarchy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. This is appropriate because rADIUS session authorization can remain cached on the network access device after ISE's endpoint classification changes. It should be verified by this evidence: The same endpoint moves to the authorized IoT policy on reauthorization without changing neighboring port sessions.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Review ISE AD group mappings whenever directory groups are renamed or reorganized. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 195

An access-security change request states: A newly profiled building sensor should move from temporary MAB isolation to its approved IoT group, but it stays in the staging authorization result for hours. Which architectural fact determines the appropriate fix?

  1. MAB is a weaker identity signal than cryptographic EAP; permissive default rules let unrecognized devices receive unwarranted access.
  2. RADIUS session authorization can remain cached on the network access device after ISE's endpoint classification changes.
  3. MAC Authentication Bypass uses the endpoint MAC identifier as an authentication basis, so access must be constrained because MACs can be impersonated.
  4. Closed mode restricts ordinary data access before a valid authentication result, enforcing the port's intended admission barrier.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

RADIUS session authorization can remain cached on the network access device after ISE's endpoint classification changes. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The acceptance result is: The same endpoint moves to the authorized IoT policy on reauthorization without changing neighboring port sessions.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. In the case being tested, Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The necessary acceptance evidence is: RADIUS session authorization can remain cached on the network access device after ISE's endpoint classification changes.

C:

Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. In the case being tested, Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The necessary acceptance evidence is: RADIUS session authorization can remain cached on the network access device after ISE's endpoint classification changes.

D:

Apply an appropriate closed-mode wired 802.1X configuration with necessary tightly controlled exceptions. In the case being tested, Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The necessary acceptance evidence is: RADIUS session authorization can remain cached on the network access device after ISE's endpoint classification changes.

Question 196

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: A newly profiled building sensor should move from temporary MAB isolation to its approved IoT group, but it stays in the staging authorization result for hours. Which postchange outcome demonstrates correct implementation?

  1. A registered scanner receives the approved restricted access while an arbitrary new MAC is denied or quarantined.
  2. The same endpoint moves to the authorized IoT policy on reauthorization without changing neighboring port sessions.
  3. The approved printer reaches its print server and an unregistered MAC cannot access the protected network.
  4. A bad-password test stays denied, and a separate approved outage scenario receives only the documented continuity role.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The same endpoint moves to the authorized IoT policy on reauthorization without changing neighboring port sessions. The required remediation is: Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. It works because rADIUS session authorization can remain cached on the network access device after ISE's endpoint classification changes.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. The repeat risk here is different: Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. A directly relevant preventive control is: The same endpoint moves to the authorized IoT policy on reauthorization without changing neighboring port sessions.

C:

Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. The repeat risk here is different: Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. A directly relevant preventive control is: The same endpoint moves to the authorized IoT policy on reauthorization without changing neighboring port sessions.

D:

Change the authentication and authorization exception actions to controlled denial or strictly limited approved critical access. The repeat risk here is different: Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. A directly relevant preventive control is: The same endpoint moves to the authorized IoT policy on reauthorization without changing neighboring port sessions.

Question 197

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: A newly profiled building sensor should move from temporary MAB isolation to its approved IoT group, but it stays in the staging authorization result for hours. What should be added to the maintenance or security review?

  1. Test MAC formatting from each switch family before importing large device inventories.
  2. Treat MAB as exception-based admission and migrate devices to stronger authentication when capable.
  3. Document and test certificate naming conventions during enrollment-template changes.
  4. Verify MAB profiling transitions and CoA support during endpoint onboarding.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Verify MAB profiling transitions and CoA support during endpoint onboarding. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: RADIUS session authorization can remain cached on the network access device after ISE's endpoint classification changes. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The same endpoint moves to the authorized IoT policy on reauthorization without changing neighboring port sessions.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. The needed response is: Verify MAB profiling transitions and CoA support during endpoint onboarding.

B:

Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. The needed response is: Verify MAB profiling transitions and CoA support during endpoint onboarding.

C:

Document and test certificate naming conventions during enrollment-template changes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. The needed response is: Verify MAB profiling transitions and CoA support during endpoint onboarding.

Question 198

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: A campus wants finance and research roles separated across multiple VLANs and subnets without maintaining IP-specific ACLs on every access switch. What is the most appropriate next configuration or repair?

  1. Reauthenticate the session using supported CoA or session refresh and verify the resulting TrustSec authorization.
  2. Create a controlled static IP-to-SGT mapping for the approved server and distribute it through the supported method.
  3. Correct the PSN's NTP configuration and verify time synchronization with identity infrastructure before resetting user credentials.
  4. Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. This is appropriate because trustSec labels traffic with logical security group identity so enforcement can follow roles rather than changing IP addressing. It should be verified by this evidence: A finance endpoint is assigned the correct SGT and the supported enforcement point blocks prohibited research access.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Reauthenticate the session using supported CoA or session refresh and verify the resulting TrustSec authorization. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Create a controlled static IP-to-SGT mapping for the approved server and distribute it through the supported method. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Run cross-domain sign-in regression tests when adding or replacing PSNs. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 199

A campus and branch network operator reports: A campus wants finance and research roles separated across multiple VLANs and subnets without maintaining IP-specific ACLs on every access switch. What is the key technical principle in this situation?

  1. TrustSec role enforcement requires a mapping from source identity to SGT; not all transit links transport the tag natively.
  2. A central security group policy is effective only when the network's enforcement points have the current role and ACL state.
  3. MAC Authentication Bypass uses the endpoint MAC identifier as an authentication basis, so access must be constrained because MACs can be impersonated.
  4. TrustSec labels traffic with logical security group identity so enforcement can follow roles rather than changing IP addressing.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

TrustSec labels traffic with logical security group identity so enforcement can follow roles rather than changing IP addressing. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. The acceptance result is: A finance endpoint is assigned the correct SGT and the supported enforcement point blocks prohibited research access.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use a supported identity-to-SGT propagation method, such as SXP or an approved mapping, where inline tagging is unavailable. In the case being tested, Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. The necessary acceptance evidence is: TrustSec labels traffic with logical security group identity so enforcement can follow roles rather than changing IP addressing.

B:

Use approved TrustSec policy distribution and verify that devices receive and enforce the current SGACL definition and matrix updates. In the case being tested, Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. The necessary acceptance evidence is: TrustSec labels traffic with logical security group identity so enforcement can follow roles rather than changing IP addressing.

C:

Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. In the case being tested, Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. The necessary acceptance evidence is: TrustSec labels traffic with logical security group identity so enforcement can follow roles rather than changing IP addressing.

Question 200

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: A campus wants finance and research roles separated across multiple VLANs and subnets without maintaining IP-specific ACLs on every access switch. What result should be documented before closing the issue?

  1. The correct server subnet or host is mapped to the intended tag and a nearby unlisted host does not inherit it.
  2. A finance endpoint is assigned the correct SGT and the supported enforcement point blocks prohibited research access.
  3. The affected endpoint's session reflects the new SGT and its enforcement matrix behavior changes accordingly.
  4. The approved printer reaches its print server and an unregistered MAC cannot access the protected network.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A finance endpoint is assigned the correct SGT and the supported enforcement point blocks prohibited research access. The required remediation is: Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. It works because trustSec labels traffic with logical security group identity so enforcement can follow roles rather than changing IP addressing.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Create a controlled static IP-to-SGT mapping for the approved server and distribute it through the supported method. The repeat risk here is different: Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. A directly relevant preventive control is: A finance endpoint is assigned the correct SGT and the supported enforcement point blocks prohibited research access.

C:

Reauthenticate the session using supported CoA or session refresh and verify the resulting TrustSec authorization. The repeat risk here is different: Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. A directly relevant preventive control is: A finance endpoint is assigned the correct SGT and the supported enforcement point blocks prohibited research access.

D:

Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. The repeat risk here is different: Assign suitable Security Group Tags in ISE and apply group-based Cisco TrustSec enforcement using supported security group ACL policies. A directly relevant preventive control is: A finance endpoint is assigned the correct SGT and the supported enforcement point blocks prohibited research access.