McAfee Secure

Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

Cisco 300-715 Bundle $25.00
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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 40

Question 390

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: An organization wants to classify connected endpoint operating systems from observed web traffic, but only RADIUS accounting is enabled and the HTTP probe never sees permitted traffic. What is the most appropriate next configuration or repair?

  1. Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes.
  2. Enable and validate an appropriate profiling collection method for network-device discovery attributes, such as supported RADIUS or SNMP data.
  3. Review profiling policy conditions and certainty factors so the received phone attributes match the intended device profile.
  4. Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. This is appropriate because hTTP profiling requires eligible HTTP header metadata; RADIUS authentication attributes alone cannot supply all such browser-derived details. It should be verified by this evidence: A controlled HTTP request contributes the expected supported user-agent attribute to the endpoint profile.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Enable and validate an appropriate profiling collection method for network-device discovery attributes, such as supported RADIUS or SNMP data. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Monitor Profiler service health and identity counts after node-role changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 391

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: An organization wants to classify connected endpoint operating systems from observed web traffic, but only RADIUS accounting is enabled and the HTTP probe never sees permitted traffic. What is the key technical principle in this situation?

  1. HTTP profiling requires eligible HTTP header metadata; RADIUS authentication attributes alone cannot supply all such browser-derived details.
  2. DNS lookup is contextual enrichment; stale or conflicting records can attach the wrong name to an IP endpoint.
  3. Profiling runs where its service and probes are enabled; management-node reachability does not prove probe-node reachability.
  4. Multiple profiling policies may match overlapping attributes; specificity, confidence, and evaluation design determine the useful classification.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

HTTP profiling requires eligible HTTP header metadata; RADIUS authentication attributes alone cannot supply all such browser-derived details. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. The acceptance result is: A controlled HTTP request contributes the expected supported user-agent attribute to the endpoint profile.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. In the case being tested, Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. The necessary acceptance evidence is: HTTP profiling requires eligible HTTP header metadata; RADIUS authentication attributes alone cannot supply all such browser-derived details.

C:

Permit appropriately scoped network-device probe traffic from the actual PSNs providing the service, not only from the PAN. In the case being tested, Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. The necessary acceptance evidence is: HTTP profiling requires eligible HTTP header metadata; RADIUS authentication attributes alone cannot supply all such browser-derived details.

D:

Measure false-positive classifications after changing broad OUI-based rules. In the case being tested, Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. The necessary acceptance evidence is: HTTP profiling requires eligible HTTP header metadata; RADIUS authentication attributes alone cannot supply all such browser-derived details.

Question 392

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: An organization wants to classify connected endpoint operating systems from observed web traffic, but only RADIUS accounting is enabled and the HTTP probe never sees permitted traffic. What result should be documented before closing the issue?

  1. A printer lease request reaches the profiler input and expected DHCP attributes appear on the endpoint record.
  2. A controlled HTTP request contributes the expected supported user-agent attribute to the endpoint profile.
  3. The intended printers produce stable discriminating attributes and unrelated probes do not introduce incorrect classifications.
  4. The selected phones match the phone profile while unrelated endpoints remain outside it.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A controlled HTTP request contributes the expected supported user-agent attribute to the endpoint profile. The required remediation is: Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. It works because hTTP profiling requires eligible HTTP header metadata; RADIUS authentication attributes alone cannot supply all such browser-derived details.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. The repeat risk here is different: Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. A directly relevant preventive control is: A controlled HTTP request contributes the expected supported user-agent attribute to the endpoint profile.

C:

Select appropriate supported probes and validate their actual endpoint attributes against representative device samples. The repeat risk here is different: Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. A directly relevant preventive control is: A controlled HTTP request contributes the expected supported user-agent attribute to the endpoint profile.

D:

Regression-test profiler rules with representative phones and non-phone devices. The repeat risk here is different: Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. A directly relevant preventive control is: A controlled HTTP request contributes the expected supported user-agent attribute to the endpoint profile.

Question 393

An access-security change request states: An organization wants to classify connected endpoint operating systems from observed web traffic, but only RADIUS accounting is enabled and the HTTP probe never sees permitted traffic. Which durable safeguard best prevents a recurrence?

  1. Review privacy limits and observe only approved traffic for HTTP profiling.
  2. Review device discovery advertisements and profiling telemetry as separate dependencies.
  3. Document data-source relevance and control probe collection scope for each profiling use case.
  4. Track classifier overlap and confidence thresholds in profiler change reviews.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Review privacy limits and observe only approved traffic for HTTP profiling. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: HTTP profiling requires eligible HTTP header metadata; RADIUS authentication attributes alone cannot supply all such browser-derived details. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A controlled HTTP request contributes the expected supported user-agent attribute to the endpoint profile.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Correct supported SNMP probe credentials and permitted network path, then validate switch query and trap receipt. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. The needed response is: Review privacy limits and observe only approved traffic for HTTP profiling.

C:

Permit appropriately scoped network-device probe traffic from the actual PSNs providing the service, not only from the PAN. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. The needed response is: Review privacy limits and observe only approved traffic for HTTP profiling.

D:

Track classifier overlap and confidence thresholds in profiler change reviews. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. The needed response is: Review privacy limits and observe only approved traffic for HTTP profiling.

Question 394

An enterprise access-control incident describes: An ISE endpoint record resolves to an outdated hostname after a DNS service migration, and profiling rules based on that name misclassify the endpoint. Which implementation decision directly satisfies the stated requirement?

  1. Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured.
  2. Select appropriate supported probes and validate their actual endpoint attributes against representative device samples.
  3. Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes.
  4. Enable Profiler on suitable authorized nodes and validate the required endpoint attribute collection and profiling policies.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. This is appropriate because dNS lookup is contextual enrichment; stale or conflicting records can attach the wrong name to an IP endpoint. It should be verified by this evidence: The target address resolves to its current authorized hostname and profile matches after data refresh.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Select appropriate supported probes and validate their actual endpoint attributes against representative device samples. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Review privilege inheritance in sponsor groups before exposing new guest account types. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 395

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: An ISE endpoint record resolves to an outdated hostname after a DNS service migration, and profiling rules based on that name misclassify the endpoint. Which technical behavior is MOST relevant to this design?

  1. SNMP profiling may depend on authenticated device queries in addition to unsolicited traps; stale credentials interrupt data collection.
  2. Profiling runs where its service and probes are enabled; management-node reachability does not prove probe-node reachability.
  3. MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record.
  4. DNS lookup is contextual enrichment; stale or conflicting records can attach the wrong name to an IP endpoint.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

DNS lookup is contextual enrichment; stale or conflicting records can attach the wrong name to an IP endpoint. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. The acceptance result is: The target address resolves to its current authorized hostname and profile matches after data refresh.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Correct supported SNMP probe credentials and permitted network path, then validate switch query and trap receipt. In the case being tested, Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. The necessary acceptance evidence is: DNS lookup is contextual enrichment; stale or conflicting records can attach the wrong name to an IP endpoint.

B:

Permit appropriately scoped network-device probe traffic from the actual PSNs providing the service, not only from the PAN. In the case being tested, Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. The necessary acceptance evidence is: DNS lookup is contextual enrichment; stale or conflicting records can attach the wrong name to an IP endpoint.

C:

MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. In the case being tested, Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. The necessary acceptance evidence is: DNS lookup is contextual enrichment; stale or conflicting records can attach the wrong name to an IP endpoint.

Question 396

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: An ISE endpoint record resolves to an outdated hostname after a DNS service migration, and profiling rules based on that name misclassify the endpoint. Which readback demonstrates that the actual problem was solved?

  1. The intended printers produce stable discriminating attributes and unrelated probes do not introduce incorrect classifications.
  2. A printer lease request reaches the profiler input and expected DHCP attributes appear on the endpoint record.
  3. Both VMs report distinct addresses and ISE assigns the correct independent endpoint records and policies.
  4. The target address resolves to its current authorized hostname and profile matches after data refresh.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The target address resolves to its current authorized hostname and profile matches after data refresh. The required remediation is: Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. It works because dNS lookup is contextual enrichment; stale or conflicting records can attach the wrong name to an IP endpoint.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Select appropriate supported probes and validate their actual endpoint attributes against representative device samples. The repeat risk here is different: Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. A directly relevant preventive control is: The target address resolves to its current authorized hostname and profile matches after data refresh.

B:

Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. The repeat risk here is different: Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. A directly relevant preventive control is: The target address resolves to its current authorized hostname and profile matches after data refresh.

C:

Both VMs report distinct addresses and ISE assigns the correct independent endpoint records and policies. The repeat risk here is different: Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. A directly relevant preventive control is: The target address resolves to its current authorized hostname and profile matches after data refresh.

Question 397

A campus and branch network operator reports: An ISE endpoint record resolves to an outdated hostname after a DNS service migration, and profiling rules based on that name misclassify the endpoint. What validation should be repeated before subsequent rollouts?

  1. Review privacy limits and observe only approved traffic for HTTP profiling.
  2. Reconcile DNS aging and DHCP registration with endpoint profiling.
  3. Monitor accounting delivery independently of successful authentication totals.
  4. Require device-role evidence before promoting Unknown endpoints into privileged groups.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Reconcile DNS aging and DHCP registration with endpoint profiling. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: DNS lookup is contextual enrichment; stale or conflicting records can attach the wrong name to an IP endpoint. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The target address resolves to its current authorized hostname and profile matches after data refresh.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. The needed response is: Reconcile DNS aging and DHCP registration with endpoint profiling.

C:

Select appropriate supported probes and validate their actual endpoint attributes against representative device samples. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. The needed response is: Reconcile DNS aging and DHCP registration with endpoint profiling.

D:

A mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. The needed response is: Reconcile DNS aging and DHCP registration with endpoint profiling.

Question 398

An access-security change request states: A branch deployment receives no RADIUS accounting updates, leaving the profiler with stale session context even though RADIUS Access-Accept responses are delivered. What should the team change before declaring this work complete?

  1. Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured.
  2. Permit appropriately scoped network-device probe traffic from the actual PSNs providing the service, not only from the PAN.
  3. Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content.
  4. Remove or disable the retired endpoint identity and verify the associated MAB policy no longer authorizes it.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. This is appropriate because accounting messages provide ongoing network session attributes used for endpoint visibility; Access-Accept alone does not supply all session history. It should be verified by this evidence: A test client session generates matching accounting records and its latest access-port context updates.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Permit appropriately scoped network-device probe traffic from the actual PSNs providing the service, not only from the PAN. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: an authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 399

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: A branch deployment receives no RADIUS accounting updates, leaving the profiler with stale session context even though RADIUS Access-Accept responses are delivered. What underlying Cisco ISE dependency explains this result?

  1. Accounting messages provide ongoing network session attributes used for endpoint visibility; Access-Accept alone does not supply all session history.
  2. Profiling runs where its service and probes are enabled; management-node reachability does not prove probe-node reachability.
  3. DNS lookup is contextual enrichment; stale or conflicting records can attach the wrong name to an IP endpoint.
  4. Profiling infers endpoint type from telemetry but does not establish that a human user has authenticated.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Accounting messages provide ongoing network session attributes used for endpoint visibility; Access-Accept alone does not supply all session history. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. The acceptance result is: A test client session generates matching accounting records and its latest access-port context updates.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Permit appropriately scoped network-device probe traffic from the actual PSNs providing the service, not only from the PAN. In the case being tested, Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Accounting messages provide ongoing network session attributes used for endpoint visibility; Access-Accept alone does not supply all session history.

C:

Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. In the case being tested, Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Accounting messages provide ongoing network session attributes used for endpoint visibility; Access-Accept alone does not supply all session history.

D:

Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. In the case being tested, Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Accounting messages provide ongoing network session attributes used for endpoint visibility; Access-Accept alone does not supply all session history.

Question 400

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: A branch deployment receives no RADIUS accounting updates, leaving the profiler with stale session context even though RADIUS Access-Accept responses are delivered. Which measurable outcome proves the intended behavior?

  1. A controlled HTTP request contributes the expected supported user-agent attribute to the endpoint profile.
  2. A test client session generates matching accounting records and its latest access-port context updates.
  3. The target address resolves to its current authorized hostname and profile matches after data refresh.
  4. The endpoint history shows the new access switch context and the correct site-specific authorization result.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A test client session generates matching accounting records and its latest access-port context updates. The required remediation is: Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. It works because accounting messages provide ongoing network session attributes used for endpoint visibility; Access-Accept alone does not supply all session history.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. The repeat risk here is different: Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test client session generates matching accounting records and its latest access-port context updates.

C:

Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. The repeat risk here is different: Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test client session generates matching accounting records and its latest access-port context updates.

D:

Reassess profiling data freshness after moving or replacing physical devices. The repeat risk here is different: Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test client session generates matching accounting records and its latest access-port context updates.