McAfee Secure

Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 42

Question 410

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: A printer is newly classified by ISE but the switch continues applying its generic quarantine ACL until a user unplugs its Ethernet cable. Which change is justified by the observed evidence?

  1. Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes.
  2. Use the supported session identifiers and correct NAD context to target only the intended endpoint during CoA.
  3. Allow narrowly scoped supported RADIUS CoA traffic from the proper PSNs to the correct NAD endpoints.
  4. Enable Profiler on suitable authorized nodes and validate the required endpoint attribute collection and profiling policies.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. This is appropriate because profiling changes in ISE do not automatically replace an already installed NAD authorization result without CoA or reauthentication. It should be verified by this evidence: The active printer session changes to its restricted printer policy without a physical port reset.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Review privilege inheritance in sponsor groups before exposing new guest account types. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 411

An access-security change request states: A printer is newly classified by ISE but the switch continues applying its generic quarantine ACL until a user unplugs its Ethernet cable. What result should be documented before closing the issue?

  1. The active printer session changes to its restricted printer policy without a physical port reset.
  2. The test switch accepts the appropriate session update and enforces the intended device policy.
  3. A test CoA request is delivered and acknowledged without opening unrestricted network paths.
  4. The replacement scanner is authorized under its new verified MAC and the retired MAC is denied.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The active printer session changes to its restricted printer policy without a physical port reset. The required remediation is: Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. It works because profiling changes in ISE do not automatically replace an already installed NAD authorization result without CoA or reauthentication.

Incorrect Answers

B:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. In the case being tested, Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The active printer session changes to its restricted printer policy without a physical port reset.

C:

RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. In the case being tested, Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The active printer session changes to its restricted printer policy without a physical port reset.

D:

MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. In the case being tested, Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The active printer session changes to its restricted printer policy without a physical port reset.

Question 412

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: A printer is newly classified by ISE but the switch continues applying its generic quarantine ACL until a user unplugs its Ethernet cable. Which durable safeguard best prevents a recurrence?

  1. Test profile-change CoA and session-target resolution during IoT onboarding.
  2. Include reverse-direction CoA checks in NAC firewall change validation.
  3. Coordinate NAD and ISE RADIUS secret rotation for both authentication and CoA.
  4. Deduplicate inventory feeds before importing internal endpoint records.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Test profile-change CoA and session-target resolution during IoT onboarding. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: Profiling changes in ISE do not automatically replace an already installed NAD authorization result without CoA or reauthentication. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The active printer session changes to its restricted printer policy without a physical port reset.

Incorrect Answers

B:

RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. The repeat risk here is different: Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. A directly relevant preventive control is: Test profile-change CoA and session-target resolution during IoT onboarding.

C:

RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. The repeat risk here is different: Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. A directly relevant preventive control is: Test profile-change CoA and session-target resolution during IoT onboarding.

D:

Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The repeat risk here is different: Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. A directly relevant preventive control is: Test profile-change CoA and session-target resolution during IoT onboarding.

Question 413

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: ISE sends a CoA to a wireless controller, but the controller returns an invalid-authenticator error after its shared secret was rotated on only one side. Which administrative action BEST addresses this specific situation?

  1. Synchronize the approved RADIUS CoA shared secret and security settings on the controller and ISE.
  2. Select a CoA or reauthentication type supported by that NAD platform and validate its authorization transition.
  3. Allow narrowly scoped supported RADIUS CoA traffic from the proper PSNs to the correct NAD endpoints.
  4. Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Synchronize the approved RADIUS CoA shared secret and security settings on the controller and ISE. This is appropriate because rADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. It should be verified by this evidence: A controlled CoA receives a successful acknowledgment and changes only the target test session.

Incorrect Answers

B:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. The needed response is: Synchronize the approved RADIUS CoA shared secret and security settings on the controller and ISE.

C:

RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. The needed response is: Synchronize the approved RADIUS CoA shared secret and security settings on the controller and ISE.

D:

Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. The needed response is: Synchronize the approved RADIUS CoA shared secret and security settings on the controller and ISE.

Question 414

A campus and branch network operator reports: ISE sends a CoA to a wireless controller, but the controller returns an invalid-authenticator error after its shared secret was rotated on only one side. Which architectural fact determines the appropriate fix?

  1. CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection.
  2. CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action.
  3. CDP and LLDP descriptions describe attached device characteristics, but ISE must receive them through a supported probe or NAD attribute path.
  4. RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Synchronize the approved RADIUS CoA shared secret and security settings on the controller and ISE. The acceptance result is: A controlled CoA receives a successful acknowledgment and changes only the target test session.

Incorrect Answers

A:

RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Enable and validate an appropriate profiling collection method for network-device discovery attributes, such as supported RADIUS or SNMP data. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 415

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: ISE sends a CoA to a wireless controller, but the controller returns an invalid-authenticator error after its shared secret was rotated on only one side. Which postchange outcome demonstrates correct implementation?

  1. The test switch accepts the appropriate session update and enforces the intended device policy.
  2. The targeted endpoint reauthenticates and the unrelated user's session remains active.
  3. The registered camera matches the limited camera policy and does not inherit employee workstation rights.
  4. A controlled CoA receives a successful acknowledgment and changes only the target test session.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A controlled CoA receives a successful acknowledgment and changes only the target test session. The required remediation is: Synchronize the approved RADIUS CoA shared secret and security settings on the controller and ISE. It works because rADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings.

Incorrect Answers

A:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. In the case being tested, RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A controlled CoA receives a successful acknowledgment and changes only the target test session.

B:

CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. In the case being tested, RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A controlled CoA receives a successful acknowledgment and changes only the target test session.

C:

The offered option specifies “The registered camera matches the limited camera policy and does not inherit employee workstation rights”. The question requires “A controlled CoA receives a successful acknowledgment and changes only the target test session”: RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. These are not equivalent responses to the stated requirement.

Question 416

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: ISE sends a CoA to a wireless controller, but the controller returns an invalid-authenticator error after its shared secret was rotated on only one side. What should be added to the maintenance or security review?

  1. Maintain a NAD CoA capability matrix for multi-vendor and mixed-version deployments.
  2. Require session identity validation before automating endpoint disconnects.
  3. Include endpoint MAC changes in hardware repair and return-to-service procedures.
  4. Coordinate NAD and ISE RADIUS secret rotation for both authentication and CoA.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Coordinate NAD and ISE RADIUS secret rotation for both authentication and CoA. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A controlled CoA receives a successful acknowledgment and changes only the target test session.

Incorrect Answers

A:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The repeat risk here is different: RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. A directly relevant preventive control is: Coordinate NAD and ISE RADIUS secret rotation for both authentication and CoA.

B:

CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. The repeat risk here is different: RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. A directly relevant preventive control is: Coordinate NAD and ISE RADIUS secret rotation for both authentication and CoA.

C:

MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. The repeat risk here is different: RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. A directly relevant preventive control is: Coordinate NAD and ISE RADIUS secret rotation for both authentication and CoA.

Question 417

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: A CoA disconnect request reaches the expected switch but removes an unrelated user's session because the target identifier was built from a shared VLAN instead of a unique session. What is the most appropriate next configuration or repair?

  1. Select a CoA or reauthentication type supported by that NAD platform and validate its authorization transition.
  2. Use the supported session identifiers and correct NAD context to target only the intended endpoint during CoA.
  3. Allow narrowly scoped supported RADIUS CoA traffic from the proper PSNs to the correct NAD endpoints.
  4. Enable Profiler on suitable authorized nodes and validate the required endpoint attribute collection and profiling policies.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Use the supported session identifiers and correct NAD context to target only the intended endpoint during CoA. This is appropriate because coA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. It should be verified by this evidence: The targeted endpoint reauthenticates and the unrelated user's session remains active.

Incorrect Answers

A:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. The needed response is: Use the supported session identifiers and correct NAD context to target only the intended endpoint during CoA.

C:

RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. The needed response is: Use the supported session identifiers and correct NAD context to target only the intended endpoint during CoA.

D:

Review privilege inheritance in sponsor groups before exposing new guest account types. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. The needed response is: Use the supported session identifiers and correct NAD context to target only the intended endpoint during CoA.

Question 418

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: A CoA disconnect request reaches the expected switch but removes an unrelated user's session because the target identifier was built from a shared VLAN instead of a unique session. What is the key technical principle in this situation?

  1. CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action.
  2. Profiling changes in ISE do not automatically replace an already installed NAD authorization result without CoA or reauthentication.
  3. CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection.
  4. HTTP profiling requires eligible HTTP header metadata; RADIUS authentication attributes alone cannot supply all such browser-derived details.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Use the supported session identifiers and correct NAD context to target only the intended endpoint during CoA. The acceptance result is: The targeted endpoint reauthenticates and the unrelated user's session remains active.

Incorrect Answers

A:

CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

The offered option specifies “Profiling changes in ISE do not automatically replace an already installed NAD authorization result without CoA or reauthentication”. The question requires “CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection”: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. These are not equivalent responses to the stated requirement.

D:

CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 419

An enterprise access-control incident describes: A CoA disconnect request reaches the expected switch but removes an unrelated user's session because the target identifier was built from a shared VLAN instead of a unique session. What result should be documented before closing the issue?

  1. The test switch accepts the appropriate session update and enforces the intended device policy.
  2. The targeted endpoint reauthenticates and the unrelated user's session remains active.
  3. The active printer session changes to its restricted printer policy without a physical port reset.
  4. The registered camera matches the limited camera policy and does not inherit employee workstation rights.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The targeted endpoint reauthenticates and the unrelated user's session remains active. The required remediation is: Use the supported session identifiers and correct NAD context to target only the intended endpoint during CoA. It works because coA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection.

Incorrect Answers

A:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. In the case being tested, CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The targeted endpoint reauthenticates and the unrelated user's session remains active.

C:

Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. In the case being tested, CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The targeted endpoint reauthenticates and the unrelated user's session remains active.

D:

The offered option specifies “The registered camera matches the limited camera policy and does not inherit employee workstation rights”. The question requires “The targeted endpoint reauthenticates and the unrelated user's session remains active”: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. These are not equivalent responses to the stated requirement.

Question 420

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: A CoA disconnect request reaches the expected switch but removes an unrelated user's session because the target identifier was built from a shared VLAN instead of a unique session. Which durable safeguard best prevents a recurrence?

  1. Coordinate NAD and ISE RADIUS secret rotation for both authentication and CoA.
  2. Require session identity validation before automating endpoint disconnects.
  3. Maintain a NAD CoA capability matrix for multi-vendor and mixed-version deployments.
  4. Track classifier overlap and confidence thresholds in profiler change reviews.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Require session identity validation before automating endpoint disconnects. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The targeted endpoint reauthenticates and the unrelated user's session remains active.

Incorrect Answers

A:

RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. The repeat risk here is different: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. A directly relevant preventive control is: Require session identity validation before automating endpoint disconnects.

C:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The repeat risk here is different: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. A directly relevant preventive control is: Require session identity validation before automating endpoint disconnects.

D:

Track classifier overlap and confidence thresholds in profiler change reviews. The repeat risk here is different: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. A directly relevant preventive control is: Require session identity validation before automating endpoint disconnects.