McAfee Secure

Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 44

Question 430

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: A shared office printer is imported twice into ISE using the same MAC with different groups, and the effective endpoint authorization becomes inconsistent. Which statement best explains why the correct response works?

  1. Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC.
  2. Endpoint identity keyed by MAC cannot reliably distinguish simultaneous devices that present the same layer-two identifier.
  3. A mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes.
  4. A profiling policy combines endpoint attribute evidence and confidence thresholds; collecting data is not the same as satisfying a profile rule.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Reconcile to one authoritative endpoint identity record and assign the approved identity group and descriptive attributes. The acceptance result is: The printer appears once in endpoint inventory and receives a consistent restricted authorization across PSNs.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Both VMs report distinct addresses and ISE assigns the correct independent endpoint records and policies. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: a mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Monitor Profiler service health and identity counts after node-role changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 431

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: A shared office printer is imported twice into ISE using the same MAC with different groups, and the effective endpoint authorization becomes inconsistent. Which observation would BEST verify successful remediation?

  1. An unverified hostname spoof does not obtain trusted-device access and a registered sample receives its permitted profile.
  2. Both VMs report distinct addresses and ISE assigns the correct independent endpoint records and policies.
  3. A controlled CoA receives a successful acknowledgment and changes only the target test session.
  4. The printer appears once in endpoint inventory and receives a consistent restricted authorization across PSNs.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The printer appears once in endpoint inventory and receives a consistent restricted authorization across PSNs. The required remediation is: Reconcile to one authoritative endpoint identity record and assign the approved identity group and descriptive attributes. It works because internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. In the case being tested, Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The printer appears once in endpoint inventory and receives a consistent restricted authorization across PSNs.

B:

Both VMs report distinct addresses and ISE assigns the correct independent endpoint records and policies. In the case being tested, Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The printer appears once in endpoint inventory and receives a consistent restricted authorization across PSNs.

C:

RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. In the case being tested, Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The printer appears once in endpoint inventory and receives a consistent restricted authorization across PSNs.

Question 432

An enterprise access-control incident describes: A shared office printer is imported twice into ISE using the same MAC with different groups, and the effective endpoint authorization becomes inconsistent. What should be incorporated into the change checklist?

  1. Deduplicate inventory feeds before importing internal endpoint records.
  2. Include endpoint MAC changes in hardware repair and return-to-service procedures.
  3. Require device-role evidence before promoting Unknown endpoints into privileged groups.
  4. Monitor Profiler service health and identity counts after node-role changes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Deduplicate inventory feeds before importing internal endpoint records. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The printer appears once in endpoint inventory and receives a consistent restricted authorization across PSNs.

Incorrect Answers

B:

MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. The repeat risk here is different: Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. A directly relevant preventive control is: Deduplicate inventory feeds before importing internal endpoint records.

C:

A mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. The repeat risk here is different: Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. A directly relevant preventive control is: Deduplicate inventory feeds before importing internal endpoint records.

D:

Monitor Profiler service health and identity counts after node-role changes. The repeat risk here is different: Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. A directly relevant preventive control is: Deduplicate inventory feeds before importing internal endpoint records.

Question 433

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: A retired access badge reader remains in an authorized internal-endpoint group long after disposal, potentially allowing a replacement device to reuse its MAC record. What is the most suitable solution within these constraints?

  1. Remove or disable the retired endpoint identity and verify the associated MAB policy no longer authorizes it.
  2. Validate and normalize MAC identifiers, reject duplicates, and place eligible endpoints in narrowly scoped identity groups during import.
  3. Reconcile to one authoritative endpoint identity record and assign the approved identity group and descriptive attributes.
  4. Allow narrowly scoped supported RADIUS CoA traffic from the proper PSNs to the correct NAD endpoints.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Remove or disable the retired endpoint identity and verify the associated MAB policy no longer authorizes it. This is appropriate because an authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. It should be verified by this evidence: A test using the retired identifier receives the defined deny or isolation profile.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: an authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. The needed response is: Remove or disable the retired endpoint identity and verify the associated MAB policy no longer authorizes it.

C:

Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: an authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. The needed response is: Remove or disable the retired endpoint identity and verify the associated MAB policy no longer authorizes it.

D:

RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: an authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. The needed response is: Remove or disable the retired endpoint identity and verify the associated MAB policy no longer authorizes it.

Question 434

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: A retired access badge reader remains in an authorized internal-endpoint group long after disposal, potentially allowing a replacement device to reuse its MAC record. Which platform distinction is decisive in this scenario?

  1. Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC.
  2. An authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically.
  3. Endpoint identity keyed by MAC cannot reliably distinguish simultaneous devices that present the same layer-two identifier.
  4. Profiling runs where its service and probes are enabled; management-node reachability does not prove probe-node reachability.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

An authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Remove or disable the retired endpoint identity and verify the associated MAB policy no longer authorizes it. The acceptance result is: A test using the retired identifier receives the defined deny or isolation profile.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

An authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Both VMs report distinct addresses and ISE assigns the correct independent endpoint records and policies. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

An authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Permit appropriately scoped network-device probe traffic from the actual PSNs providing the service, not only from the PAN. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 435

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: A retired access badge reader remains in an authorized internal-endpoint group long after disposal, potentially allowing a replacement device to reuse its MAC record. Which acceptance test would directly establish the desired state?

  1. The replacement scanner is authorized under its new verified MAC and the retired MAC is denied.
  2. An unverified hostname spoof does not obtain trusted-device access and a registered sample receives its permitted profile.
  3. A controlled HTTP request contributes the expected supported user-agent attribute to the endpoint profile.
  4. A test using the retired identifier receives the defined deny or isolation profile.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A test using the retired identifier receives the defined deny or isolation profile. The required remediation is: Remove or disable the retired endpoint identity and verify the associated MAB policy no longer authorizes it. It works because an authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically.

Incorrect Answers

A:

MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. In the case being tested, an authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A test using the retired identifier receives the defined deny or isolation profile.

B:

A mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. In the case being tested, an authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A test using the retired identifier receives the defined deny or isolation profile.

C:

Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. In the case being tested, an authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A test using the retired identifier receives the defined deny or isolation profile.

Question 436

An access-security change request states: A retired access badge reader remains in an authorized internal-endpoint group long after disposal, potentially allowing a replacement device to reuse its MAC record. Which governance step most directly targets the root cause?

  1. Tie endpoint identity revocation to equipment decommissioning records.
  2. Check MAC uniqueness in virtual machine cloning and image provisioning pipelines.
  3. Include endpoint MAC changes in hardware repair and return-to-service procedures.
  4. Reconcile DNS aging and DHCP registration with endpoint profiling.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Tie endpoint identity revocation to equipment decommissioning records. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: An authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A test using the retired identifier receives the defined deny or isolation profile.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Both VMs report distinct addresses and ISE assigns the correct independent endpoint records and policies. The repeat risk here is different: an authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. A directly relevant preventive control is: Tie endpoint identity revocation to equipment decommissioning records.

C:

MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. The repeat risk here is different: an authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. A directly relevant preventive control is: Tie endpoint identity revocation to equipment decommissioning records.

D:

Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. The repeat risk here is different: an authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. A directly relevant preventive control is: Tie endpoint identity revocation to equipment decommissioning records.

Question 437

An enterprise access-control incident describes: An organization imports a CSV containing several hundred IoT MAC addresses with inconsistent separators and duplicate entries, then assigns every row the same administrator-level role. Which change is justified by the observed evidence?

  1. Resolve the duplicate MAC at the virtualization layer and update endpoint identity records only after uniqueness is restored.
  2. Validate and normalize MAC identifiers, reject duplicates, and place eligible endpoints in narrowly scoped identity groups during import.
  3. Remove or disable the retired endpoint identity and verify the associated MAB policy no longer authorizes it.
  4. Tune profiling rule conditions and supported classification priorities so the device matches the intended specialized endpoint profile.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Validate and normalize MAC identifiers, reject duplicates, and place eligible endpoints in narrowly scoped identity groups during import. This is appropriate because endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. It should be verified by this evidence: A representative import sample contains unique endpoints with intended limited groups and no privileged authorization.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. The needed response is: Validate and normalize MAC identifiers, reject duplicates, and place eligible endpoints in narrowly scoped identity groups during import.

C:

An authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. The needed response is: Validate and normalize MAC identifiers, reject duplicates, and place eligible endpoints in narrowly scoped identity groups during import.

D:

Measure false-positive classifications after changing broad OUI-based rules. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. The needed response is: Validate and normalize MAC identifiers, reject duplicates, and place eligible endpoints in narrowly scoped identity groups during import.

Question 438

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: An organization imports a CSV containing several hundred IoT MAC addresses with inconsistent separators and duplicate entries, then assigns every row the same administrator-level role. What mechanism governs this authentication or management outcome?

  1. An authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically.
  2. Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check.
  3. MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record.
  4. SNMP profiling may depend on authenticated device queries in addition to unsolicited traps; stale credentials interrupt data collection.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Validate and normalize MAC identifiers, reject duplicates, and place eligible endpoints in narrowly scoped identity groups during import. The acceptance result is: A representative import sample contains unique endpoints with intended limited groups and no privileged authorization.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: an authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Correct supported SNMP probe credentials and permitted network path, then validate switch query and trap receipt. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 439

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: An organization imports a CSV containing several hundred IoT MAC addresses with inconsistent separators and duplicate entries, then assigns every row the same administrator-level role. What is the strongest evidence that this requirement is met?

  1. Both VMs report distinct addresses and ISE assigns the correct independent endpoint records and policies.
  2. A test using the retired identifier receives the defined deny or isolation profile.
  3. A representative import sample contains unique endpoints with intended limited groups and no privileged authorization.
  4. A printer lease request reaches the profiler input and expected DHCP attributes appear on the endpoint record.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A representative import sample contains unique endpoints with intended limited groups and no privileged authorization. The required remediation is: Validate and normalize MAC identifiers, reject duplicates, and place eligible endpoints in narrowly scoped identity groups during import. It works because endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Both VMs report distinct addresses and ISE assigns the correct independent endpoint records and policies. In the case being tested, Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A representative import sample contains unique endpoints with intended limited groups and no privileged authorization.

B:

An authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. In the case being tested, Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A representative import sample contains unique endpoints with intended limited groups and no privileged authorization.

D:

Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. In the case being tested, Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A representative import sample contains unique endpoints with intended limited groups and no privileged authorization.

Question 440

A campus and branch network operator reports: An organization imports a CSV containing several hundred IoT MAC addresses with inconsistent separators and duplicate entries, then assigns every row the same administrator-level role. Which recurring operational control would reduce this risk?

  1. Tie endpoint identity revocation to equipment decommissioning records.
  2. Review endpoint identity groups against profiler labels during periodic access certification.
  3. Maintain a NAD CoA capability matrix for multi-vendor and mixed-version deployments.
  4. Implement input validation and change review for bulk endpoint inventory uploads.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Implement input validation and change review for bulk endpoint inventory uploads. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A representative import sample contains unique endpoints with intended limited groups and no privileged authorization.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. The repeat risk here is different: Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. A directly relevant preventive control is: Implement input validation and change review for bulk endpoint inventory uploads.

B:

A profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions. The repeat risk here is different: Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. A directly relevant preventive control is: Implement input validation and change review for bulk endpoint inventory uploads.

C:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The repeat risk here is different: Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. A directly relevant preventive control is: Implement input validation and change review for bulk endpoint inventory uploads.