McAfee Secure

Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 45

Question 440

A campus and branch network operator reports: An organization imports a CSV containing several hundred IoT MAC addresses with inconsistent separators and duplicate entries, then assigns every row the same administrator-level role. Which recurring operational control would reduce this risk?

  1. Tie endpoint identity revocation to equipment decommissioning records.
  2. Review endpoint identity groups against profiler labels during periodic access certification.
  3. Maintain a NAD CoA capability matrix for multi-vendor and mixed-version deployments.
  4. Implement input validation and change review for bulk endpoint inventory uploads.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Implement input validation and change review for bulk endpoint inventory uploads. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A representative import sample contains unique endpoints with intended limited groups and no privileged authorization.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. The repeat risk here is different: Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. A directly relevant preventive control is: Implement input validation and change review for bulk endpoint inventory uploads.

B:

A profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions. The repeat risk here is different: Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. A directly relevant preventive control is: Implement input validation and change review for bulk endpoint inventory uploads.

C:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The repeat risk here is different: Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. A directly relevant preventive control is: Implement input validation and change review for bulk endpoint inventory uploads.

Question 441

An access-security change request states: An ISE analyst moves all unidentified endpoints into a trusted device identity group solely because their hostname contains the manufacturer's common prefix. Which administrative action BEST addresses this specific situation?

  1. Remove or disable the retired endpoint identity and verify the associated MAB policy no longer authorizes it.
  2. Resolve the duplicate MAC at the virtualization layer and update endpoint identity records only after uniqueness is restored.
  3. Tune profiling rule conditions and supported classification priorities so the device matches the intended specialized endpoint profile.
  4. Retain unknown devices in restricted policy until a validated classification or approved registration establishes the device role.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Retain unknown devices in restricted policy until a validated classification or approved registration establishes the device role. This is appropriate because a mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. It should be verified by this evidence: An unverified hostname spoof does not obtain trusted-device access and a registered sample receives its permitted profile.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: a mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. The needed response is: Retain unknown devices in restricted policy until a validated classification or approved registration establishes the device role.

B:

A profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: a mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. The needed response is: Retain unknown devices in restricted policy until a validated classification or approved registration establishes the device role.

C:

Measure false-positive classifications after changing broad OUI-based rules. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: a mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. The needed response is: Retain unknown devices in restricted policy until a validated classification or approved registration establishes the device role.

Question 442

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: An ISE analyst moves all unidentified endpoints into a trusted device identity group solely because their hostname contains the manufacturer's common prefix. Which architectural fact determines the appropriate fix?

  1. A mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes.
  2. A profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions.
  3. An authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically.
  4. CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Retain unknown devices in restricted policy until a validated classification or approved registration establishes the device role. The acceptance result is: An unverified hostname spoof does not obtain trusted-device access and a registered sample receives its permitted profile.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: a profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

A mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: an authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

A mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 443

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: An ISE analyst moves all unidentified endpoints into a trusted device identity group solely because their hostname contains the manufacturer's common prefix. Which postchange outcome demonstrates correct implementation?

  1. An unverified hostname spoof does not obtain trusted-device access and a registered sample receives its permitted profile.
  2. The printer appears once in endpoint inventory and receives a consistent restricted authorization across PSNs.
  3. The registered camera matches the limited camera policy and does not inherit employee workstation rights.
  4. The PSN retrieves the expected switch-port and neighbor attributes after credential repair.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

An unverified hostname spoof does not obtain trusted-device access and a registered sample receives its permitted profile. The required remediation is: Retain unknown devices in restricted policy until a validated classification or approved registration establishes the device role. It works because a mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. In the case being tested, a mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. The necessary acceptance evidence is: An unverified hostname spoof does not obtain trusted-device access and a registered sample receives its permitted profile.

C:

The offered option specifies “The registered camera matches the limited camera policy and does not inherit employee workstation rights”. The question requires “An unverified hostname spoof does not obtain trusted-device access and a registered sample receives its permitted profile”: a mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. These are not equivalent responses to the stated requirement.

D:

Correct supported SNMP probe credentials and permitted network path, then validate switch query and trap receipt. In the case being tested, a mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. The necessary acceptance evidence is: An unverified hostname spoof does not obtain trusted-device access and a registered sample receives its permitted profile.

Question 444

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: An ISE analyst moves all unidentified endpoints into a trusted device identity group solely because their hostname contains the manufacturer's common prefix. What should be added to the maintenance or security review?

  1. Require device-role evidence before promoting Unknown endpoints into privileged groups.
  2. Deduplicate inventory feeds before importing internal endpoint records.
  3. Implement input validation and change review for bulk endpoint inventory uploads.
  4. Use known-device inventories as acceptance samples for infrastructure upgrades.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Require device-role evidence before promoting Unknown endpoints into privileged groups. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: A mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. The ongoing acceptance check remains: An unverified hostname spoof does not obtain trusted-device access and a registered sample receives its permitted profile.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The repeat risk here is different: a mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. A directly relevant preventive control is: Require device-role evidence before promoting Unknown endpoints into privileged groups.

C:

Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. The repeat risk here is different: a mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. A directly relevant preventive control is: Require device-role evidence before promoting Unknown endpoints into privileged groups.

D:

The offered option specifies “Use known-device inventories as acceptance samples for infrastructure upgrades”. The question requires “Require device-role evidence before promoting Unknown endpoints into privileged groups”: a mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. These are not equivalent responses to the stated requirement.

Question 445

A campus and branch network operator reports: A managed scanner changes its network adapter and therefore its MAC address, but staff expect the old internal endpoint entry to match after hardware replacement. What is the most appropriate next configuration or repair?

  1. Retire the old identifier and enroll the replacement endpoint record after verifying the new device and its assigned role.
  2. Retain unknown devices in restricted policy until a validated classification or approved registration establishes the device role.
  3. Validate and normalize MAC identifiers, reject duplicates, and place eligible endpoints in narrowly scoped identity groups during import.
  4. Use the supported session identifiers and correct NAD context to target only the intended endpoint during CoA.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Retire the old identifier and enroll the replacement endpoint record after verifying the new device and its assigned role. This is appropriate because mAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. It should be verified by this evidence: The replacement scanner is authorized under its new verified MAC and the retired MAC is denied.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. The needed response is: Retire the old identifier and enroll the replacement endpoint record after verifying the new device and its assigned role.

C:

Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. The needed response is: Retire the old identifier and enroll the replacement endpoint record after verifying the new device and its assigned role.

D:

CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. The needed response is: Retire the old identifier and enroll the replacement endpoint record after verifying the new device and its assigned role.

Question 446

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: A managed scanner changes its network adapter and therefore its MAC address, but staff expect the old internal endpoint entry to match after hardware replacement. What is the key technical principle in this situation?

  1. Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check.
  2. MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record.
  3. An authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically.
  4. Accounting messages provide ongoing network session attributes used for endpoint visibility; Access-Accept alone does not supply all session history.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Retire the old identifier and enroll the replacement endpoint record after verifying the new device and its assigned role. The acceptance result is: The replacement scanner is authorized under its new verified MAC and the retired MAC is denied.

Incorrect Answers

A:

MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: an authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 447

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: A managed scanner changes its network adapter and therefore its MAC address, but staff expect the old internal endpoint entry to match after hardware replacement. What result should be documented before closing the issue?

  1. Both VMs report distinct addresses and ISE assigns the correct independent endpoint records and policies.
  2. The printer appears once in endpoint inventory and receives a consistent restricted authorization across PSNs.
  3. The replacement scanner is authorized under its new verified MAC and the retired MAC is denied.
  4. A printer lease request reaches the profiler input and expected DHCP attributes appear on the endpoint record.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The replacement scanner is authorized under its new verified MAC and the retired MAC is denied. The required remediation is: Retire the old identifier and enroll the replacement endpoint record after verifying the new device and its assigned role. It works because mAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Both VMs report distinct addresses and ISE assigns the correct independent endpoint records and policies. In the case being tested, MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The replacement scanner is authorized under its new verified MAC and the retired MAC is denied.

B:

Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. In the case being tested, MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The replacement scanner is authorized under its new verified MAC and the retired MAC is denied.

D:

Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. In the case being tested, MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The replacement scanner is authorized under its new verified MAC and the retired MAC is denied.

Question 448

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: A managed scanner changes its network adapter and therefore its MAC address, but staff expect the old internal endpoint entry to match after hardware replacement. Which durable safeguard best prevents a recurrence?

  1. Deduplicate inventory feeds before importing internal endpoint records.
  2. Implement input validation and change review for bulk endpoint inventory uploads.
  3. Document data-source relevance and control probe collection scope for each profiling use case.
  4. Include endpoint MAC changes in hardware repair and return-to-service procedures.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Include endpoint MAC changes in hardware repair and return-to-service procedures. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The replacement scanner is authorized under its new verified MAC and the retired MAC is denied.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The repeat risk here is different: MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. A directly relevant preventive control is: Include endpoint MAC changes in hardware repair and return-to-service procedures.

B:

Endpoint provisioning requires unique valid MAC identities and appropriate classification; an import file alone is not an authorization safety check. The repeat risk here is different: MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. A directly relevant preventive control is: Include endpoint MAC changes in hardware repair and return-to-service procedures.

C:

Permit appropriately scoped network-device probe traffic from the actual PSNs providing the service, not only from the PAN. The repeat risk here is different: MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. A directly relevant preventive control is: Include endpoint MAC changes in hardware repair and return-to-service procedures.

Question 449

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: An endpoint is correctly profiled as a camera yet stays in a generic identity group whose authorization rule returns employee access. Which implementation decision directly satisfies the stated requirement?

  1. Resolve the duplicate MAC at the virtualization layer and update endpoint identity records only after uniqueness is restored.
  2. Retain unknown devices in restricted policy until a validated classification or approved registration establishes the device role.
  3. Align its internal endpoint identity group and applicable authorization condition with the least-privilege camera profile.
  4. Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Align its internal endpoint identity group and applicable authorization condition with the least-privilege camera profile. This is appropriate because a profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions. It should be verified by this evidence: The registered camera matches the limited camera policy and does not inherit employee workstation rights.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The offered option specifies “Resolve the duplicate MAC at the virtualization layer and update endpoint identity records only after uniqueness is restored”. The question requires “Align its internal endpoint identity group and applicable authorization condition with the least-privilege camera profile”: a profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions. These are not equivalent responses to the stated requirement.

B:

A mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: a profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions. The needed response is: Align its internal endpoint identity group and applicable authorization condition with the least-privilege camera profile.

D:

Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: a profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions. The needed response is: Align its internal endpoint identity group and applicable authorization condition with the least-privilege camera profile.

Question 450

An enterprise access-control incident describes: An endpoint is correctly profiled as a camera yet stays in a generic identity group whose authorization rule returns employee access. Which technical behavior is MOST relevant to this design?

  1. MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record.
  2. A profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions.
  3. Endpoint identity keyed by MAC cannot reliably distinguish simultaneous devices that present the same layer-two identifier.
  4. CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Align its internal endpoint identity group and applicable authorization condition with the least-privilege camera profile. The acceptance result is: The registered camera matches the limited camera policy and does not inherit employee workstation rights.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: MAB endpoint identity is keyed to observed MAC identity, so a hardware change does not automatically inherit the former authorization record. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

A profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Both VMs report distinct addresses and ISE assigns the correct independent endpoint records and policies. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

A profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.