McAfee Secure

Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 43

Question 420

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: A CoA disconnect request reaches the expected switch but removes an unrelated user's session because the target identifier was built from a shared VLAN instead of a unique session. Which durable safeguard best prevents a recurrence?

  1. Coordinate NAD and ISE RADIUS secret rotation for both authentication and CoA.
  2. Require session identity validation before automating endpoint disconnects.
  3. Maintain a NAD CoA capability matrix for multi-vendor and mixed-version deployments.
  4. Track classifier overlap and confidence thresholds in profiler change reviews.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Require session identity validation before automating endpoint disconnects. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The targeted endpoint reauthenticates and the unrelated user's session remains active.

Incorrect Answers

A:

RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. The repeat risk here is different: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. A directly relevant preventive control is: Require session identity validation before automating endpoint disconnects.

C:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The repeat risk here is different: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. A directly relevant preventive control is: Require session identity validation before automating endpoint disconnects.

D:

Track classifier overlap and confidence thresholds in profiler change reviews. The repeat risk here is different: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. A directly relevant preventive control is: Require session identity validation before automating endpoint disconnects.

Question 421

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: A newly profiled device should gain narrower access, but one switch model does not support the CoA action sent by ISE and returns a negative response. Which implementation decision directly satisfies the stated requirement?

  1. Select a CoA or reauthentication type supported by that NAD platform and validate its authorization transition.
  2. Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes.
  3. Synchronize the approved RADIUS CoA shared secret and security settings on the controller and ISE.
  4. Permit appropriately scoped network-device probe traffic from the actual PSNs providing the service, not only from the PAN.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Select a CoA or reauthentication type supported by that NAD platform and validate its authorization transition. This is appropriate because coA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. It should be verified by this evidence: The test switch accepts the appropriate session update and enforces the intended device policy.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The needed response is: Select a CoA or reauthentication type supported by that NAD platform and validate its authorization transition.

C:

RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The needed response is: Select a CoA or reauthentication type supported by that NAD platform and validate its authorization transition.

D:

Permit appropriately scoped network-device probe traffic from the actual PSNs providing the service, not only from the PAN. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The needed response is: Select a CoA or reauthentication type supported by that NAD platform and validate its authorization transition.

Question 422

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: A newly profiled device should gain narrower access, but one switch model does not support the CoA action sent by ISE and returns a negative response. Which technical behavior is MOST relevant to this design?

  1. CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection.
  2. RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings.
  3. CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action.
  4. Endpoint identity and current location attributes can become stale between observed network sessions.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Select a CoA or reauthentication type supported by that NAD platform and validate its authorization transition. The acceptance result is: The test switch accepts the appropriate session update and enforces the intended device policy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Track classifier overlap and confidence thresholds in profiler change reviews. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 423

An access-security change request states: A newly profiled device should gain narrower access, but one switch model does not support the CoA action sent by ISE and returns a negative response. Which readback demonstrates that the actual problem was solved?

  1. A test CoA request is delivered and acknowledged without opening unrestricted network paths.
  2. The test switch accepts the appropriate session update and enforces the intended device policy.
  3. A controlled CoA receives a successful acknowledgment and changes only the target test session.
  4. The intended printers match the specialized profile and a workstation using the same NIC vendor does not.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The test switch accepts the appropriate session update and enforces the intended device policy. The required remediation is: Select a CoA or reauthentication type supported by that NAD platform and validate its authorization transition. It works because coA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action.

Incorrect Answers

A:

RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. In the case being tested, CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The test switch accepts the appropriate session update and enforces the intended device policy.

C:

RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. In the case being tested, CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The test switch accepts the appropriate session update and enforces the intended device policy.

D:

Measure false-positive classifications after changing broad OUI-based rules. In the case being tested, CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The test switch accepts the appropriate session update and enforces the intended device policy.

Question 424

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: A newly profiled device should gain narrower access, but one switch model does not support the CoA action sent by ISE and returns a negative response. What validation should be repeated before subsequent rollouts?

  1. Test profile-change CoA and session-target resolution during IoT onboarding.
  2. Maintain a NAD CoA capability matrix for multi-vendor and mixed-version deployments.
  3. Coordinate NAD and ISE RADIUS secret rotation for both authentication and CoA.
  4. Review privacy limits and observe only approved traffic for HTTP profiling.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Maintain a NAD CoA capability matrix for multi-vendor and mixed-version deployments. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The test switch accepts the appropriate session update and enforces the intended device policy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. The repeat risk here is different: CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. A directly relevant preventive control is: Maintain a NAD CoA capability matrix for multi-vendor and mixed-version deployments.

C:

RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. The repeat risk here is different: CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. A directly relevant preventive control is: Maintain a NAD CoA capability matrix for multi-vendor and mixed-version deployments.

D:

Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. The repeat risk here is different: CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. A directly relevant preventive control is: Maintain a NAD CoA capability matrix for multi-vendor and mixed-version deployments.

Question 425

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: A campus CoA integration is blocked by a firewall that permits authentication requests to ISE but not the necessary ISE-initiated authorization changes back to the NAD. What should the team change before declaring this work complete?

  1. Synchronize the approved RADIUS CoA shared secret and security settings on the controller and ISE.
  2. Select a CoA or reauthentication type supported by that NAD platform and validate its authorization transition.
  3. Select appropriate supported probes and validate their actual endpoint attributes against representative device samples.
  4. Allow narrowly scoped supported RADIUS CoA traffic from the proper PSNs to the correct NAD endpoints.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Allow narrowly scoped supported RADIUS CoA traffic from the proper PSNs to the correct NAD endpoints. This is appropriate because rADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. It should be verified by this evidence: A test CoA request is delivered and acknowledged without opening unrestricted network paths.

Incorrect Answers

A:

RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. The needed response is: Allow narrowly scoped supported RADIUS CoA traffic from the proper PSNs to the correct NAD endpoints.

B:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. The needed response is: Allow narrowly scoped supported RADIUS CoA traffic from the proper PSNs to the correct NAD endpoints.

C:

Select appropriate supported probes and validate their actual endpoint attributes against representative device samples. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. The needed response is: Allow narrowly scoped supported RADIUS CoA traffic from the proper PSNs to the correct NAD endpoints.

Question 426

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: A campus CoA integration is blocked by a firewall that permits authentication requests to ISE but not the necessary ISE-initiated authorization changes back to the NAD. What underlying Cisco ISE dependency explains this result?

  1. CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection.
  2. RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings.
  3. HTTP profiling requires eligible HTTP header metadata; RADIUS authentication attributes alone cannot supply all such browser-derived details.
  4. RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Allow narrowly scoped supported RADIUS CoA traffic from the proper PSNs to the correct NAD endpoints. The acceptance result is: A test CoA request is delivered and acknowledged without opening unrestricted network paths.

Incorrect Answers

A:

RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: CoA actions are applied to a session; overly broad or ambiguous identifiers can modify the wrong authenticated connection. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Configure supported HTTP profiling observation and its approved traffic visibility path without exposing unrelated user browsing content. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 427

A campus and branch network operator reports: A campus CoA integration is blocked by a firewall that permits authentication requests to ISE but not the necessary ISE-initiated authorization changes back to the NAD. Which measurable outcome proves the intended behavior?

  1. The active printer session changes to its restricted printer policy without a physical port reset.
  2. A test CoA request is delivered and acknowledged without opening unrestricted network paths.
  3. A controlled CoA receives a successful acknowledgment and changes only the target test session.
  4. The intended printers match the specialized profile and a workstation using the same NIC vendor does not.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A test CoA request is delivered and acknowledged without opening unrestricted network paths. The required remediation is: Allow narrowly scoped supported RADIUS CoA traffic from the proper PSNs to the correct NAD endpoints. It works because rADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. In the case being tested, RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A test CoA request is delivered and acknowledged without opening unrestricted network paths.

C:

RADIUS CoA is a protected control exchange requiring compatible shared authentication and supported destination settings. In the case being tested, RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A test CoA request is delivered and acknowledged without opening unrestricted network paths.

D:

Measure false-positive classifications after changing broad OUI-based rules. In the case being tested, RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A test CoA request is delivered and acknowledged without opening unrestricted network paths.

Question 428

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: A campus CoA integration is blocked by a firewall that permits authentication requests to ISE but not the necessary ISE-initiated authorization changes back to the NAD. Which ongoing practice is most appropriate for this failure mode?

  1. Include reverse-direction CoA checks in NAC firewall change validation.
  2. Test profile-change CoA and session-target resolution during IoT onboarding.
  3. Maintain a NAD CoA capability matrix for multi-vendor and mixed-version deployments.
  4. Regression-test profiler rules with representative phones and non-phone devices.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Include reverse-direction CoA checks in NAC firewall change validation. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A test CoA request is delivered and acknowledged without opening unrestricted network paths.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. The repeat risk here is different: RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. A directly relevant preventive control is: Include reverse-direction CoA checks in NAC firewall change validation.

C:

CoA packet support and action semantics vary among NADs; ISE's classification alone cannot overcome an unsupported device action. The repeat risk here is different: RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. A directly relevant preventive control is: Include reverse-direction CoA checks in NAC firewall change validation.

D:

Regression-test profiler rules with representative phones and non-phone devices. The repeat risk here is different: RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. A directly relevant preventive control is: Include reverse-direction CoA checks in NAC firewall change validation.

Question 429

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: A shared office printer is imported twice into ISE using the same MAC with different groups, and the effective endpoint authorization becomes inconsistent. Which response most directly corrects the described failure?

  1. Remove or disable the retired endpoint identity and verify the associated MAB policy no longer authorizes it.
  2. Resolve the duplicate MAC at the virtualization layer and update endpoint identity records only after uniqueness is restored.
  3. Tune profiling rule conditions and supported classification priorities so the device matches the intended specialized endpoint profile.
  4. Reconcile to one authoritative endpoint identity record and assign the approved identity group and descriptive attributes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Reconcile to one authoritative endpoint identity record and assign the approved identity group and descriptive attributes. This is appropriate because internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. It should be verified by this evidence: The printer appears once in endpoint inventory and receives a consistent restricted authorization across PSNs.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An authorized MAC identity can outlive its physical device; deleting hardware does not revoke ISE endpoint authorization automatically. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The needed response is: Reconcile to one authoritative endpoint identity record and assign the approved identity group and descriptive attributes.

B:

A profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The needed response is: Reconcile to one authoritative endpoint identity record and assign the approved identity group and descriptive attributes.

C:

Measure false-positive classifications after changing broad OUI-based rules. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The needed response is: Reconcile to one authoritative endpoint identity record and assign the approved identity group and descriptive attributes.

Question 430

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: A shared office printer is imported twice into ISE using the same MAC with different groups, and the effective endpoint authorization becomes inconsistent. Which statement best explains why the correct response works?

  1. Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC.
  2. Endpoint identity keyed by MAC cannot reliably distinguish simultaneous devices that present the same layer-two identifier.
  3. A mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes.
  4. A profiling policy combines endpoint attribute evidence and confidence thresholds; collecting data is not the same as satisfying a profile rule.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Reconcile to one authoritative endpoint identity record and assign the approved identity group and descriptive attributes. The acceptance result is: The printer appears once in endpoint inventory and receives a consistent restricted authorization across PSNs.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Both VMs report distinct addresses and ISE assigns the correct independent endpoint records and policies. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: a mutable hostname is weaker evidence than an approved endpoint registration and corroborating profiler attributes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Monitor Profiler service health and identity counts after node-role changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.