McAfee Secure

Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 38

Question 370

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: A printer moves from one campus to another and ISE retains stale endpoint network context, causing the policy to treat its old location as current. What validation should be repeated before subsequent rollouts?

  1. Regression-test profiler rules with representative phones and non-phone devices.
  2. Review authorization designs for overreliance on inferred device identity.
  3. Test profile-change CoA and session-target resolution during IoT onboarding.
  4. Reassess profiling data freshness after moving or replacing physical devices.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Reassess profiling data freshness after moving or replacing physical devices. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: Endpoint identity and current location attributes can become stale between observed network sessions. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The endpoint history shows the new access switch context and the correct site-specific authorization result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Reassess profiling data freshness after moving or replacing physical devices. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Regression-test profiler rules with representative phones and non-phone devices. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Reassess profiling data freshness after moving or replacing physical devices. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Reassess profiling data freshness after moving or replacing physical devices. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 371

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: Security personnel see a sudden rise in industrial IoT devices classified as Generic after a switch firmware upgrade changes discovery attributes. What should the team change before declaring this work complete?

  1. Tune profiling rule conditions and supported classification priorities so the device matches the intended specialized endpoint profile.
  2. Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access.
  3. Compare profile evidence collected before and after the NAD change and adjust approved profiler rules for the new attribute representation.
  4. Allow narrowly scoped supported RADIUS CoA traffic from the proper PSNs to the correct NAD endpoints.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Compare profile evidence collected before and after the NAD change and adjust approved profiler rules for the new attribute representation. This is appropriate because profiling outcomes depend on observed metadata, which can change with device or network infrastructure updates. It should be verified by this evidence: Known IoT pilot models classify correctly with the new firmware without mislabeling employee laptops.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Measure false-positive classifications after changing broad OUI-based rules. In the case being tested, Reassess profiling data freshness after moving or replacing physical devices. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Compare profile evidence collected before and after the NAD change and adjust approved profiler rules for the new attribute representation.

B:

Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. In the case being tested, Reassess profiling data freshness after moving or replacing physical devices. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Compare profile evidence collected before and after the NAD change and adjust approved profiler rules for the new attribute representation.

D:

RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. In the case being tested, Reassess profiling data freshness after moving or replacing physical devices. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Compare profile evidence collected before and after the NAD change and adjust approved profiler rules for the new attribute representation.

Question 372

A campus and branch network operator reports: Security personnel see a sudden rise in industrial IoT devices classified as Generic after a switch firmware upgrade changes discovery attributes. What underlying Cisco ISE dependency explains this result?

  1. A profiling policy combines endpoint attribute evidence and confidence thresholds; collecting data is not the same as satisfying a profile rule.
  2. Profiling infers endpoint type from telemetry but does not establish that a human user has authenticated.
  3. Profiling runs where its service and probes are enabled; management-node reachability does not prove probe-node reachability.
  4. Profiling outcomes depend on observed metadata, which can change with device or network infrastructure updates.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Profiling outcomes depend on observed metadata, which can change with device or network infrastructure updates. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Compare profile evidence collected before and after the NAD change and adjust approved profiler rules for the new attribute representation. The acceptance result is: Known IoT pilot models classify correctly with the new firmware without mislabeling employee laptops.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Monitor Profiler service health and identity counts after node-role changes. The repeat risk here is different: Reassess profiling data freshness after moving or replacing physical devices. A directly relevant preventive control is: Profiling outcomes depend on observed metadata, which can change with device or network infrastructure updates.

B:

Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. The repeat risk here is different: Reassess profiling data freshness after moving or replacing physical devices. A directly relevant preventive control is: Profiling outcomes depend on observed metadata, which can change with device or network infrastructure updates.

C:

Permit appropriately scoped network-device probe traffic from the actual PSNs providing the service, not only from the PAN. The repeat risk here is different: Reassess profiling data freshness after moving or replacing physical devices. A directly relevant preventive control is: Profiling outcomes depend on observed metadata, which can change with device or network infrastructure updates.

Question 373

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: Security personnel see a sudden rise in industrial IoT devices classified as Generic after a switch firmware upgrade changes discovery attributes. Which measurable outcome proves the intended behavior?

  1. A test medical device receives the designated device type while a normal PC retains its original classification.
  2. A pilot printer transitions from Unknown to its expected profile after supported attributes arrive.
  3. The intended printers produce stable discriminating attributes and unrelated probes do not introduce incorrect classifications.
  4. Known IoT pilot models classify correctly with the new firmware without mislabeling employee laptops.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Known IoT pilot models classify correctly with the new firmware without mislabeling employee laptops. The required remediation is: Compare profile evidence collected before and after the NAD change and adjust approved profiler rules for the new attribute representation. It works because profiling outcomes depend on observed metadata, which can change with device or network infrastructure updates.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Track classifier overlap and confidence thresholds in profiler change reviews. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. The needed response is: Known IoT pilot models classify correctly with the new firmware without mislabeling employee laptops.

B:

Monitor Profiler service health and identity counts after node-role changes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. The needed response is: Known IoT pilot models classify correctly with the new firmware without mislabeling employee laptops.

C:

Select appropriate supported probes and validate their actual endpoint attributes against representative device samples. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. The needed response is: Known IoT pilot models classify correctly with the new firmware without mislabeling employee laptops.

Question 374

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: An ISE analyst treats an endpoint's inferred profiler type as proof of a user identity, granting payroll privileges to every device classified as a workstation. Which response most directly corrects the described failure?

  1. Review profiling policy conditions and certainty factors so the received phone attributes match the intended device profile.
  2. Use multiple discriminating profiler attributes and a suitably precise printer profile rather than a vendor-only classifier.
  3. Allow narrowly scoped supported RADIUS CoA traffic from the proper PSNs to the correct NAD endpoints.
  4. Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. This is appropriate because profiling infers endpoint type from telemetry but does not establish that a human user has authenticated. It should be verified by this evidence: A known workstation with an unauthorized user cannot gain payroll access solely from its profile.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Monitor Profiler service health and identity counts after node-role changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Regression-test profiler rules with representative phones and non-phone devices. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: RADIUS Access-Request direction and CoA initiation direction are different communications; successful authentication does not prove CoA reachability. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 375

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: An ISE analyst treats an endpoint's inferred profiler type as proof of a user identity, granting payroll privileges to every device classified as a workstation. Which statement best explains why the correct response works?

  1. Endpoint identity and current location attributes can become stale between observed network sessions.
  2. Profiler classification relies on an active profiling service receiving endpoint attributes; a healthy RADIUS service alone cannot classify unknown devices.
  3. Endpoint identity keyed by MAC cannot reliably distinguish simultaneous devices that present the same layer-two identifier.
  4. Profiling infers endpoint type from telemetry but does not establish that a human user has authenticated.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Profiling infers endpoint type from telemetry but does not establish that a human user has authenticated. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. The acceptance result is: A known workstation with an unauthorized user cannot gain payroll access solely from its profile.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Track classifier overlap and confidence thresholds in profiler change reviews. In the case being tested, Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Profiling infers endpoint type from telemetry but does not establish that a human user has authenticated.

B:

Review privilege inheritance in sponsor groups before exposing new guest account types. In the case being tested, Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Profiling infers endpoint type from telemetry but does not establish that a human user has authenticated.

C:

Both VMs report distinct addresses and ISE assigns the correct independent endpoint records and policies. In the case being tested, Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Profiling infers endpoint type from telemetry but does not establish that a human user has authenticated.

Question 376

An enterprise access-control incident describes: An ISE analyst treats an endpoint's inferred profiler type as proof of a user identity, granting payroll privileges to every device classified as a workstation. Which observation would BEST verify successful remediation?

  1. A test medical device receives the designated device type while a normal PC retains its original classification.
  2. A known workstation with an unauthorized user cannot gain payroll access solely from its profile.
  3. The selected phones match the phone profile while unrelated endpoints remain outside it.
  4. The branch PSN retrieves the expected switch attributes and the endpoint profile updates.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A known workstation with an unauthorized user cannot gain payroll access solely from its profile. The required remediation is: Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. It works because profiling infers endpoint type from telemetry but does not establish that a human user has authenticated.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Track classifier overlap and confidence thresholds in profiler change reviews. The repeat risk here is different: Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. A directly relevant preventive control is: A known workstation with an unauthorized user cannot gain payroll access solely from its profile.

C:

Regression-test profiler rules with representative phones and non-phone devices. The repeat risk here is different: Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. A directly relevant preventive control is: A known workstation with an unauthorized user cannot gain payroll access solely from its profile.

D:

Permit appropriately scoped network-device probe traffic from the actual PSNs providing the service, not only from the PAN. The repeat risk here is different: Keep profiler-derived device categories separate from strong user authentication and use combined identity and device conditions for privileged access. A directly relevant preventive control is: A known workstation with an unauthorized user cannot gain payroll access solely from its profile.

Question 377

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: An ISE analyst treats an endpoint's inferred profiler type as proof of a user identity, granting payroll privileges to every device classified as a workstation. What should be incorporated into the change checklist?

  1. Monitor Profiler service health and identity counts after node-role changes.
  2. Reassess profiling data freshness after moving or replacing physical devices.
  3. Review authorization designs for overreliance on inferred device identity.
  4. Use persona-aware source-IP firewall tests for distributed profiling probes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Review authorization designs for overreliance on inferred device identity. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: Profiling infers endpoint type from telemetry but does not establish that a human user has authenticated. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A known workstation with an unauthorized user cannot gain payroll access solely from its profile.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Monitor Profiler service health and identity counts after node-role changes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. The needed response is: Review authorization designs for overreliance on inferred device identity.

B:

Reassess profiling data freshness after moving or replacing physical devices. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. The needed response is: Review authorization designs for overreliance on inferred device identity.

D:

Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. The needed response is: Review authorization designs for overreliance on inferred device identity.

Question 378

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: DHCP fingerprint attributes are absent for a printer in ISE although the access switch's VLAN has a local DHCP server and the profiling probe receives no forwarded broadcasts. What is the most suitable solution within these constraints?

  1. Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes.
  2. Permit appropriately scoped network-device probe traffic from the actual PSNs providing the service, not only from the PAN.
  3. Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site.
  4. Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. This is appropriate because a DHCP probe can classify endpoint behavior only when it observes relevant DHCP discovery or option data. It should be verified by this evidence: A printer lease request reaches the profiler input and expected DHCP attributes appear on the endpoint record.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Permit appropriately scoped network-device probe traffic from the actual PSNs providing the service, not only from the PAN. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Enable supported RADIUS Change of Authorization on the NAD and send a scoped session update after profiling changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 379

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: DHCP fingerprint attributes are absent for a printer in ISE although the access switch's VLAN has a local DHCP server and the profiling probe receives no forwarded broadcasts. Which platform distinction is decisive in this scenario?

  1. Accounting messages provide ongoing network session attributes used for endpoint visibility; Access-Accept alone does not supply all session history.
  2. A DHCP probe can classify endpoint behavior only when it observes relevant DHCP discovery or option data.
  3. Probe selection determines the type and source of evidence; more traffic alone is not proof that the attributes identify an endpoint accurately.
  4. A profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A DHCP probe can classify endpoint behavior only when it observes relevant DHCP discovery or option data. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. The acceptance result is: A printer lease request reaches the profiler input and expected DHCP attributes appear on the endpoint record.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Enable RADIUS accounting on supported NADs and validate arrival of start, stop, and interim session attributes where configured. In the case being tested, Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A DHCP probe can classify endpoint behavior only when it observes relevant DHCP discovery or option data.

C:

Select appropriate supported probes and validate their actual endpoint attributes against representative device samples. In the case being tested, Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A DHCP probe can classify endpoint behavior only when it observes relevant DHCP discovery or option data.

D:

A profiler classification and a manually administered identity-group membership are distinct attributes used in policy conditions. In the case being tested, Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A DHCP probe can classify endpoint behavior only when it observes relevant DHCP discovery or option data.

Question 380

An access-security change request states: DHCP fingerprint attributes are absent for a printer in ISE although the access switch's VLAN has a local DHCP server and the profiling probe receives no forwarded broadcasts. Which acceptance test would directly establish the desired state?

  1. A printer lease request reaches the profiler input and expected DHCP attributes appear on the endpoint record.
  2. The intended printers produce stable discriminating attributes and unrelated probes do not introduce incorrect classifications.
  3. The target address resolves to its current authorized hostname and profile matches after data refresh.
  4. The printer appears once in endpoint inventory and receives a consistent restricted authorization across PSNs.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A printer lease request reaches the profiler input and expected DHCP attributes appear on the endpoint record. The required remediation is: Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. It works because a DHCP probe can classify endpoint behavior only when it observes relevant DHCP discovery or option data.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Select appropriate supported probes and validate their actual endpoint attributes against representative device samples. The repeat risk here is different: Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. A directly relevant preventive control is: A printer lease request reaches the profiler input and expected DHCP attributes appear on the endpoint record.

C:

Correct the DNS probe's authoritative resolution and record lifecycle, then refresh affected endpoint attributes. The repeat risk here is different: Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. A directly relevant preventive control is: A printer lease request reaches the profiler input and expected DHCP attributes appear on the endpoint record.

D:

Internal endpoint records and identity groups determine how MAB and endpoint-based rules resolve an observed MAC. The repeat risk here is different: Provide a supported DHCP probe input path, such as an appropriately configured helper or mirrored traffic source, for that site. A directly relevant preventive control is: A printer lease request reaches the profiler input and expected DHCP attributes appear on the endpoint record.