McAfee Secure

Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

Cisco 300-715 Bundle $25.00
300-715 Sample 1 300-715 Sample 2 300-715 Sample 3 300-715 Sample 4 300-715 Sample 5 300-715 Sample 6 300-715 Sample 7 300-715 Sample 8 300-715 Sample 9 300-715 Sample 10

100% Cisco 300-715 Guaranteed Success With Testking Training Materials

Get Real 300-715 Exam Questions & Expert Verified Answers as Experienced on the Real Exam!

  • Questions & Answers

    300-715 Questions & Answers

    433 Questions & Answers

    The ultimate exam preparation tool, Questions & Answers mirrors the actual 300-715 exam while allowing you to hone and measure every aspect of your test-taking ability.

  • 300-715 Video Course

    300-715 Training Course

    73 Video Lectures

    300-715 Video Course is developed by Cisco Professionals to help you pass the 300-715 exam.

    Description

    This course will improve your knowledge and skills required to pass Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE) exam.

Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE) (300-715) Practice Tests

Satisfaction Guaranteed

Money Back Guarantee

Testking provides hassle-free money back guarantee with our products. That is because we have 100% trust in the abilities of our professional and experience product team, and our record is a proof of that.

99.6% PASS RATE
Total Cost: $164.98
Bundle Price: $139.98

Purchase Individually

  • Questions & Answers

    Questions & Answers

    433 Questions

    $124.99
  • 300-715 Video Course

    Training Course

    73 Video Lectures

    $39.99

Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 64

Question 630

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: A helpdesk engineer resets client certificates whenever posture failures occur, even when the Posture Work Center reports an unreachable remediation repository. Which recurring operational control would reduce this risk?

  1. Review posture refresh timings against endpoint update and security response objectives.
  2. Retain condition-level posture evidence with high-impact access-denial tickets.
  3. Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets.
  4. Verify least-privilege access in every posture state before production rollout.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: Posture remediation resources can fail independently of EAP certificate authentication and ISE policy evaluation. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The endpoint downloads the missing approved remediation resource, passes posture, and reauthorizes without replacing valid certificates.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Review posture refresh timings against endpoint update and security response objectives. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Retain condition-level posture evidence with high-impact access-denial tickets. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

The offered option specifies “Verify least-privilege access in every posture state before production rollout”. The question requires “Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets”: Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. These are not equivalent responses to the stated requirement.

Question 631

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: A network administrator logs into routers through SSH using TACACS+, but the team assumes the same user RADIUS policy automatically authorizes every configuration command. Which administrative action BEST addresses this specific situation?

  1. Implement supported TACACS+ command authorization and scoped command sets in addition to authentication.
  2. Configure a distinct supported TACACS+ device-administration service and policy for administrator authentication, command authorization, and accounting.
  3. Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components.
  4. Replace ambiguous permissive wildcard patterns with appropriately bounded exact or validated expression matches.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Configure a distinct supported TACACS+ device-administration service and policy for administrator authentication, command authorization, and accounting. This is appropriate because rADIUS network-access authentication and TACACS+ device administration are different AAA services with different policy objects and command-level controls. It should be verified by this evidence: The router's administrator login and commands generate matching TACACS device-administration decisions without changing ordinary endpoint RADIUS access.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. In the case being tested, Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Configure a distinct supported TACACS+ device-administration service and policy for administrator authentication, command authorization, and accounting.

C:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. In the case being tested, Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Configure a distinct supported TACACS+ device-administration service and policy for administrator authentication, command authorization, and accounting.

D:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. In the case being tested, Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Configure a distinct supported TACACS+ device-administration service and policy for administrator authentication, command authorization, and accounting.

Question 632

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: A network administrator logs into routers through SSH using TACACS+, but the team assumes the same user RADIUS policy automatically authorizes every configuration command. Which architectural fact determines the appropriate fix?

  1. AAA separates identity validation, permitted operations, and activity recording; a shared password does not establish individual accountability.
  2. RADIUS network-access authentication and TACACS+ device administration are different AAA services with different policy objects and command-level controls.
  3. TACACS+ accounting can record network-device command activity performed over CLI sessions, independently of the ISE GUI audit log.
  4. Device administration policy selection can match registered NAD metadata, not only the username; broad groups can create accidental cross-site privilege.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

RADIUS network-access authentication and TACACS+ device administration are different AAA services with different policy objects and command-level controls. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Configure a distinct supported TACACS+ device-administration service and policy for administrator authentication, command authorization, and accounting. The acceptance result is: The router's administrator login and commands generate matching TACACS device-administration decisions without changing ordinary endpoint RADIUS access.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The repeat risk here is different: Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. A directly relevant preventive control is: RADIUS network-access authentication and TACACS+ device administration are different AAA services with different policy objects and command-level controls.

C:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The repeat risk here is different: Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. A directly relevant preventive control is: RADIUS network-access authentication and TACACS+ device administration are different AAA services with different policy objects and command-level controls.

D:

Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The repeat risk here is different: Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. A directly relevant preventive control is: RADIUS network-access authentication and TACACS+ device administration are different AAA services with different policy objects and command-level controls.

Question 633

An enterprise access-control incident describes: A network administrator logs into routers through SSH using TACACS+, but the team assumes the same user RADIUS policy automatically authorizes every configuration command. Which postchange outcome demonstrates correct implementation?

  1. Management traffic follows the approved secured route and a network-path audit confirms the intended additional safeguards.
  2. Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account.
  3. The router's administrator login and commands generate matching TACACS device-administration decisions without changing ordinary endpoint RADIUS access.
  4. A helpdesk operator successfully runs show and ping but receives denial on a prohibited configuration command.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The router's administrator login and commands generate matching TACACS device-administration decisions without changing ordinary endpoint RADIUS access. The required remediation is: Configure a distinct supported TACACS+ device-administration service and policy for administrator authentication, command authorization, and accounting. It works because rADIUS network-access authentication and TACACS+ device administration are different AAA services with different policy objects and command-level controls.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The needed response is: The router's administrator login and commands generate matching TACACS device-administration decisions without changing ordinary endpoint RADIUS access.

B:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The needed response is: The router's administrator login and commands generate matching TACACS device-administration decisions without changing ordinary endpoint RADIUS access.

D:

Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The needed response is: The router's administrator login and commands generate matching TACACS device-administration decisions without changing ordinary endpoint RADIUS access.

Question 634

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: A network administrator logs into routers through SSH using TACACS+, but the team assumes the same user RADIUS policy automatically authorizes every configuration command. What should be added to the maintenance or security review?

  1. Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role.
  2. Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes.
  3. Include device-admin service state in PSN onboarding checks.
  4. Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: RADIUS network-access authentication and TACACS+ device administration are different AAA services with different policy objects and command-level controls. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The router's administrator login and commands generate matching TACACS device-administration decisions without changing ordinary endpoint RADIUS access.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 635

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: An operations center wants to see which engineer entered a configuration command after an outage, but only user login authentication is recorded. What is the most appropriate next configuration or repair?

  1. Enable supported TACACS+ command accounting and central reporting for the managed network device.
  2. Configure a distinct supported TACACS+ device-administration service and policy for administrator authentication, command authorization, and accounting.
  3. Configure supported TACACS+ transport and service settings on the router and enable the corresponding ISE device-admin service.
  4. Replace ambiguous permissive wildcard patterns with appropriately bounded exact or validated expression matches.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Enable supported TACACS+ command accounting and central reporting for the managed network device. This is appropriate because aAA accounting records performed activity, while authentication alone identifies a login and cannot reconstruct command execution history. It should be verified by this evidence: A harmless test configuration command appears with the engineer, device, command, and timestamp in ISE reports.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. In the case being tested, Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Enable supported TACACS+ command accounting and central reporting for the managed network device.

C:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. In the case being tested, Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Enable supported TACACS+ command accounting and central reporting for the managed network device.

D:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. In the case being tested, Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Enable supported TACACS+ command accounting and central reporting for the managed network device.

Question 636

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: An operations center wants to see which engineer entered a configuration command after an outage, but only user login authentication is recorded. What is the key technical principle in this situation?

  1. TACACS+ and RADIUS use different protocol and service endpoints; correct IP reachability does not make their ports interchangeable.
  2. TACACS+ accounting can record network-device command activity performed over CLI sessions, independently of the ISE GUI audit log.
  3. AAA accounting records performed activity, while authentication alone identifies a login and cannot reconstruct command execution history.
  4. Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

AAA accounting records performed activity, while authentication alone identifies a login and cannot reconstruct command execution history. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Enable supported TACACS+ command accounting and central reporting for the managed network device. The acceptance result is: A harmless test configuration command appears with the engineer, device, command, and timestamp in ISE reports.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The repeat risk here is different: Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. A directly relevant preventive control is: AAA accounting records performed activity, while authentication alone identifies a login and cannot reconstruct command execution history.

B:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The repeat risk here is different: Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. A directly relevant preventive control is: AAA accounting records performed activity, while authentication alone identifies a login and cannot reconstruct command execution history.

D:

Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. The repeat risk here is different: Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. A directly relevant preventive control is: AAA accounting records performed activity, while authentication alone identifies a login and cannot reconstruct command execution history.

Question 637

An access-security change request states: An operations center wants to see which engineer entered a configuration command after an outage, but only user login authentication is recorded. What result should be documented before closing the issue?

  1. Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account.
  2. An authorized read-only operator runs show commands but cannot execute a prohibited configuration command.
  3. A harmless test configuration command appears with the engineer, device, command, and timestamp in ISE reports.
  4. A test configuration command appears in the correct device-admin accounting report with its identity and device.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A harmless test configuration command appears with the engineer, device, command, and timestamp in ISE reports. The required remediation is: Enable supported TACACS+ command accounting and central reporting for the managed network device. It works because aAA accounting records performed activity, while authentication alone identifies a login and cannot reconstruct command execution history.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. The needed response is: A harmless test configuration command appears with the engineer, device, command, and timestamp in ISE reports.

B:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. The needed response is: A harmless test configuration command appears with the engineer, device, command, and timestamp in ISE reports.

D:

Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. The needed response is: A harmless test configuration command appears with the engineer, device, command, and timestamp in ISE reports.

Question 638

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: An operations center wants to see which engineer entered a configuration command after an outage, but only user login authentication is recorded. Which durable safeguard best prevents a recurrence?

  1. Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes.
  2. Verify CLI accounting completeness when introducing new device families.
  3. Review management network isolation and protocol protection whenever adding TACACS+ endpoints.
  4. Require expiration and audit of emergency TACACS+ command exceptions.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: AAA accounting records performed activity, while authentication alone identifies a login and cannot reconstruct command execution history. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A harmless test configuration command appears with the engineer, device, command, and timestamp in ISE reports.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 639

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: A switch accepts a network engineer's password but the engineer can access unrestricted privileged configuration because command authorization was never enabled. Which implementation decision directly satisfies the stated requirement?

  1. Implement supported TACACS+ command authorization and scoped command sets in addition to authentication.
  2. Use supported TACACS+ accounting on the network device and correlate it with ISE device administration reports.
  3. Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components.
  4. Design and test an approved, tightly protected network-device AAA fallback for genuine ISE server unavailability.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Implement supported TACACS+ command authorization and scoped command sets in addition to authentication. This is appropriate because authentication answers who logged in; authorization controls what commands that identity may execute. It should be verified by this evidence: An authorized read-only operator runs show commands but cannot execute a prohibited configuration command.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. In the case being tested, Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Implement supported TACACS+ command authorization and scoped command sets in addition to authentication.

C:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. In the case being tested, Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Implement supported TACACS+ command authorization and scoped command sets in addition to authentication.

D:

Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. In the case being tested, Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Implement supported TACACS+ command authorization and scoped command sets in addition to authentication.

Question 640

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: A switch accepts a network engineer's password but the engineer can access unrestricted privileged configuration because command authorization was never enabled. Which technical behavior is MOST relevant to this design?

  1. Authentication answers who logged in; authorization controls what commands that identity may execute.
  2. TACACS+ accounting can record network-device command activity performed over CLI sessions, independently of the ISE GUI audit log.
  3. RADIUS network-access authentication and TACACS+ device administration are different AAA services with different policy objects and command-level controls.
  4. Command sets let TACACS+ authorization apply per-command privilege limits rather than merely granting a logged-in shell.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Authentication answers who logged in; authorization controls what commands that identity may execute. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Implement supported TACACS+ command authorization and scoped command sets in addition to authentication. The acceptance result is: An authorized read-only operator runs show commands but cannot execute a prohibited configuration command.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The repeat risk here is different: Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. A directly relevant preventive control is: Authentication answers who logged in; authorization controls what commands that identity may execute.

C:

Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. The repeat risk here is different: Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. A directly relevant preventive control is: Authentication answers who logged in; authorization controls what commands that identity may execute.

D:

Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The repeat risk here is different: Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. A directly relevant preventive control is: Authentication answers who logged in; authorization controls what commands that identity may execute.