McAfee Secure

Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 66

Question 650

An enterprise access-control incident describes: A security engineer claims placing a network device under TACACS+ proves privileged commands are encrypted end to end across every intermediate network segment. What is the most suitable solution within these constraints?

  1. Use supported TACACS+ accounting on the network device and correlate it with ISE device administration reports.
  2. Configure a distinct supported TACACS+ device-administration service and policy for administrator authentication, command authorization, and accounting.
  3. Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties.
  4. Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. This is appropriate because tACACS+ does not by itself replace the need for a trusted protected management path; authentication and authorization are distinct from full transport protection. It should be verified by this evidence: Management traffic follows the approved secured route and a network-path audit confirms the intended additional safeguards.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 651

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: A security engineer claims placing a network device under TACACS+ proves privileged commands are encrypted end to end across every intermediate network segment. Which platform distinction is decisive in this scenario?

  1. TACACS+ accounting can record network-device command activity performed over CLI sessions, independently of the ISE GUI audit log.
  2. TACACS+ and RADIUS use different protocol and service endpoints; correct IP reachability does not make their ports interchangeable.
  3. Command authorization, shell login, and accounting are separate configured steps; upgrading one device can disrupt logging without preventing login.
  4. TACACS+ does not by itself replace the need for a trusted protected management path; authentication and authorization are distinct from full transport protection.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

TACACS+ does not by itself replace the need for a trusted protected management path; authentication and authorization are distinct from full transport protection. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The acceptance result is: Management traffic follows the approved secured route and a network-path audit confirms the intended additional safeguards.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. In the case being tested, Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The necessary acceptance evidence is: TACACS+ does not by itself replace the need for a trusted protected management path; authentication and authorization are distinct from full transport protection.

B:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. In the case being tested, Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The necessary acceptance evidence is: TACACS+ does not by itself replace the need for a trusted protected management path; authentication and authorization are distinct from full transport protection.

C:

Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. In the case being tested, Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The necessary acceptance evidence is: TACACS+ does not by itself replace the need for a trusted protected management path; authentication and authorization are distinct from full transport protection.

Question 652

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: A security engineer claims placing a network device under TACACS+ proves privileged commands are encrypted end to end across every intermediate network segment. Which acceptance test would directly establish the desired state?

  1. Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account.
  2. The router's administrator login and commands generate matching TACACS device-administration decisions without changing ordinary endpoint RADIUS access.
  3. Test logins at both sites match the correct separate policy sets and restrictions.
  4. Management traffic follows the approved secured route and a network-path audit confirms the intended additional safeguards.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Management traffic follows the approved secured route and a network-path audit confirms the intended additional safeguards. The required remediation is: Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. It works because tACACS+ does not by itself replace the need for a trusted protected management path; authentication and authorization are distinct from full transport protection.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The repeat risk here is different: Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. A directly relevant preventive control is: Management traffic follows the approved secured route and a network-path audit confirms the intended additional safeguards.

B:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The repeat risk here is different: Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. A directly relevant preventive control is: Management traffic follows the approved secured route and a network-path audit confirms the intended additional safeguards.

C:

Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The repeat risk here is different: Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. A directly relevant preventive control is: Management traffic follows the approved secured route and a network-path audit confirms the intended additional safeguards.

Question 653

A campus and branch network operator reports: A security engineer claims placing a network device under TACACS+ proves privileged commands are encrypted end to end across every intermediate network segment. Which governance step most directly targets the root cause?

  1. Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role.
  2. Review management network isolation and protocol protection whenever adding TACACS+ endpoints.
  3. Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership.
  4. Test external TACACS proxy and fallback behavior before deployment.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Review management network isolation and protocol protection whenever adding TACACS+ endpoints. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: TACACS+ does not by itself replace the need for a trusted protected management path; authentication and authorization are distinct from full transport protection. The ongoing acceptance check remains: Management traffic follows the approved secured route and a network-path audit confirms the intended additional safeguards.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The needed response is: Review management network isolation and protocol protection whenever adding TACACS+ endpoints.

C:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The needed response is: Review management network isolation and protocol protection whenever adding TACACS+ endpoints.

D:

A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The needed response is: Review management network isolation and protocol protection whenever adding TACACS+ endpoints.

Question 654

An access-security change request states: A campus operator uses one shared local enable password across routers because the group assumes AAA authentication, authorization, and accounting are a single indivisible switch feature. Which change is justified by the observed evidence?

  1. Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components.
  2. Implement supported TACACS+ command authorization and scoped command sets in addition to authentication.
  3. Configure a distinct supported TACACS+ device-administration service and policy for administrator authentication, command authorization, and accounting.
  4. Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. This is appropriate because aAA separates identity validation, permitted operations, and activity recording; a shared password does not establish individual accountability. It should be verified by this evidence: Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 655

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: A campus operator uses one shared local enable password across routers because the group assumes AAA authentication, authorization, and accounting are a single indivisible switch feature. What mechanism governs this authentication or management outcome?

  1. TACACS+ does not by itself replace the need for a trusted protected management path; authentication and authorization are distinct from full transport protection.
  2. AAA separates identity validation, permitted operations, and activity recording; a shared password does not establish individual accountability.
  3. TACACS+ and RADIUS use different protocol and service endpoints; correct IP reachability does not make their ports interchangeable.
  4. Device administration policy selection can match registered NAD metadata, not only the username; broad groups can create accidental cross-site privilege.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

AAA separates identity validation, permitted operations, and activity recording; a shared password does not establish individual accountability. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The acceptance result is: Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. In the case being tested, Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The necessary acceptance evidence is: AAA separates identity validation, permitted operations, and activity recording; a shared password does not establish individual accountability.

C:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. In the case being tested, Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The necessary acceptance evidence is: AAA separates identity validation, permitted operations, and activity recording; a shared password does not establish individual accountability.

D:

Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. In the case being tested, Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The necessary acceptance evidence is: AAA separates identity validation, permitted operations, and activity recording; a shared password does not establish individual accountability.

Question 656

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: A campus operator uses one shared local enable password across routers because the group assumes AAA authentication, authorization, and accounting are a single indivisible switch feature. What is the strongest evidence that this requirement is met?

  1. An authorized read-only operator runs show commands but cannot execute a prohibited configuration command.
  2. Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account.
  3. The router's administrator login and commands generate matching TACACS device-administration decisions without changing ordinary endpoint RADIUS access.
  4. A test configuration command appears in the correct device-admin accounting report with its identity and device.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account. The required remediation is: Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. It works because aAA separates identity validation, permitted operations, and activity recording; a shared password does not establish individual accountability.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The repeat risk here is different: Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. A directly relevant preventive control is: Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account.

C:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The repeat risk here is different: Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. A directly relevant preventive control is: Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account.

D:

Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. The repeat risk here is different: Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. A directly relevant preventive control is: Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account.

Question 657

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: A campus operator uses one shared local enable password across routers because the group assumes AAA authentication, authorization, and accounting are a single indivisible switch feature. Which recurring operational control would reduce this risk?

  1. Eliminate shared device-admin credentials and test all three AAA stages before declaring compliance.
  2. Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes.
  3. Verify CLI accounting completeness when introducing new device families.
  4. Review shell profiles and command sets together when promoting staff roles.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Eliminate shared device-admin credentials and test all three AAA stages before declaring compliance. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: AAA separates identity validation, permitted operations, and activity recording; a shared password does not establish individual accountability. The ongoing acceptance check remains: Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. The needed response is: Eliminate shared device-admin credentials and test all three AAA stages before declaring compliance.

C:

Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. The needed response is: Eliminate shared device-admin credentials and test all three AAA stages before declaring compliance.

D:

Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. The needed response is: Eliminate shared device-admin credentials and test all three AAA stages before declaring compliance.

Question 658

A campus and branch network operator reports: A new PSN is added to handle device administration, but Cisco ISE has the TACACS+ service disabled on that PSN even though it responds to ordinary network-access RADIUS. Which administrative action BEST addresses this specific situation?

  1. Register and configure the new NAD source address, location, device type, and matching TACACS+ secret before cutover.
  2. Design and test an approved, tightly protected network-device AAA fallback for genuine ISE server unavailability.
  3. Configure supported TACACS+ transport and service settings on the router and enable the corresponding ISE device-admin service.
  4. Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. This is appropriate because the TACACS+ device-admin service requires explicit enablement and the appropriate license; running RADIUS on a PSN is not sufficient. It should be verified by this evidence: A test administrator login to the registered switch appears in the intended ISE TACACS Live Logs.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 659

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: A new PSN is added to handle device administration, but Cisco ISE has the TACACS+ service disabled on that PSN even though it responds to ordinary network-access RADIUS. Which architectural fact determines the appropriate fix?

  1. TACACS+ server and network-device configuration must agree on their shared secret and device identity for a valid exchange.
  2. The TACACS+ device-admin service requires explicit enablement and the appropriate license; running RADIUS on a PSN is not sufficient.
  3. A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions.
  4. RADIUS network-access authentication and TACACS+ device administration are different AAA services with different policy objects and command-level controls.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The TACACS+ device-admin service requires explicit enablement and the appropriate license; running RADIUS on a PSN is not sufficient. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. The acceptance result is: A test administrator login to the registered switch appears in the intended ISE TACACS Live Logs.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. In the case being tested, Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The TACACS+ device-admin service requires explicit enablement and the appropriate license; running RADIUS on a PSN is not sufficient.

C:

A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. In the case being tested, Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The TACACS+ device-admin service requires explicit enablement and the appropriate license; running RADIUS on a PSN is not sufficient.

D:

Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. In the case being tested, Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The TACACS+ device-admin service requires explicit enablement and the appropriate license; running RADIUS on a PSN is not sufficient.

Question 660

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: A new PSN is added to handle device administration, but Cisco ISE has the TACACS+ service disabled on that PSN even though it responds to ordinary network-access RADIUS. Which postchange outcome demonstrates correct implementation?

  1. A test administrator login to the registered switch appears in the intended ISE TACACS Live Logs.
  2. The replacement switch authenticates a known admin through its intended TACACS policy, while the old source is retired.
  3. A controlled device-admin login completes through the intended policy path with visible accounting.
  4. An authorized read-only operator runs show commands but cannot execute a prohibited configuration command.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A test administrator login to the registered switch appears in the intended ISE TACACS Live Logs. The required remediation is: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. It works because the TACACS+ device-admin service requires explicit enablement and the appropriate license; running RADIUS on a PSN is not sufficient.

Incorrect Answers

B:

ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The repeat risk here is different: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test administrator login to the registered switch appears in the intended ISE TACACS Live Logs.

C:

A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The repeat risk here is different: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test administrator login to the registered switch appears in the intended ISE TACACS Live Logs.

D:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The repeat risk here is different: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test administrator login to the registered switch appears in the intended ISE TACACS Live Logs.