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Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 65

Question 640

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: A switch accepts a network engineer's password but the engineer can access unrestricted privileged configuration because command authorization was never enabled. Which technical behavior is MOST relevant to this design?

  1. Authentication answers who logged in; authorization controls what commands that identity may execute.
  2. TACACS+ accounting can record network-device command activity performed over CLI sessions, independently of the ISE GUI audit log.
  3. RADIUS network-access authentication and TACACS+ device administration are different AAA services with different policy objects and command-level controls.
  4. Command sets let TACACS+ authorization apply per-command privilege limits rather than merely granting a logged-in shell.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Authentication answers who logged in; authorization controls what commands that identity may execute. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Implement supported TACACS+ command authorization and scoped command sets in addition to authentication. The acceptance result is: An authorized read-only operator runs show commands but cannot execute a prohibited configuration command.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The repeat risk here is different: Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. A directly relevant preventive control is: Authentication answers who logged in; authorization controls what commands that identity may execute.

C:

Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. The repeat risk here is different: Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. A directly relevant preventive control is: Authentication answers who logged in; authorization controls what commands that identity may execute.

D:

Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The repeat risk here is different: Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. A directly relevant preventive control is: Authentication answers who logged in; authorization controls what commands that identity may execute.

Question 641

A campus and branch network operator reports: A switch accepts a network engineer's password but the engineer can access unrestricted privileged configuration because command authorization was never enabled. Which readback demonstrates that the actual problem was solved?

  1. An authorized read-only operator runs show commands but cannot execute a prohibited configuration command.
  2. The router's administrator login and commands generate matching TACACS device-administration decisions without changing ordinary endpoint RADIUS access.
  3. A test TACACS login reaches the correct ISE device administration policy set and returns the intended result.
  4. The firewall's test admin login reaches its intended policy set and authenticates successfully using the updated secret.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

An authorized read-only operator runs show commands but cannot execute a prohibited configuration command. The required remediation is: Implement supported TACACS+ command authorization and scoped command sets in addition to authentication. It works because authentication answers who logged in; authorization controls what commands that identity may execute.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The needed response is: An authorized read-only operator runs show commands but cannot execute a prohibited configuration command.

C:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The needed response is: An authorized read-only operator runs show commands but cannot execute a prohibited configuration command.

D:

Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The needed response is: An authorized read-only operator runs show commands but cannot execute a prohibited configuration command.

Question 642

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: A switch accepts a network engineer's password but the engineer can access unrestricted privileged configuration because command authorization was never enabled. What validation should be repeated before subsequent rollouts?

  1. Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes.
  2. Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership.
  3. Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role.
  4. Periodically review and test TACACS+ command sets against least-privilege job functions.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: Authentication answers who logged in; authorization controls what commands that identity may execute. The ongoing acceptance check remains: An authorized read-only operator runs show commands but cannot execute a prohibited configuration command.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 643

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: A branch router uses RADIUS network-access port settings for TACACS+ administration and never receives a device-admin reply despite reachable ISE policy nodes. What should the team change before declaring this work complete?

  1. Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties.
  2. Implement supported TACACS+ command authorization and scoped command sets in addition to authentication.
  3. Configure supported TACACS+ transport and service settings on the router and enable the corresponding ISE device-admin service.
  4. Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Configure supported TACACS+ transport and service settings on the router and enable the corresponding ISE device-admin service. This is appropriate because tACACS+ and RADIUS use different protocol and service endpoints; correct IP reachability does not make their ports interchangeable. It should be verified by this evidence: A test TACACS login reaches the correct ISE device administration policy set and returns the intended result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. In the case being tested, Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Configure supported TACACS+ transport and service settings on the router and enable the corresponding ISE device-admin service.

B:

Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. In the case being tested, Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Configure supported TACACS+ transport and service settings on the router and enable the corresponding ISE device-admin service.

D:

Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. In the case being tested, Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Configure supported TACACS+ transport and service settings on the router and enable the corresponding ISE device-admin service.

Question 644

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: A branch router uses RADIUS network-access port settings for TACACS+ administration and never receives a device-admin reply despite reachable ISE policy nodes. What underlying Cisco ISE dependency explains this result?

  1. TACACS+ accounting can record network-device command activity performed over CLI sessions, independently of the ISE GUI audit log.
  2. RADIUS network-access authentication and TACACS+ device administration are different AAA services with different policy objects and command-level controls.
  3. TACACS+ and RADIUS use different protocol and service endpoints; correct IP reachability does not make their ports interchangeable.
  4. Command sets let TACACS+ authorization apply per-command privilege limits rather than merely granting a logged-in shell.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

TACACS+ and RADIUS use different protocol and service endpoints; correct IP reachability does not make their ports interchangeable. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Configure supported TACACS+ transport and service settings on the router and enable the corresponding ISE device-admin service. The acceptance result is: A test TACACS login reaches the correct ISE device administration policy set and returns the intended result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The repeat risk here is different: Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. A directly relevant preventive control is: TACACS+ and RADIUS use different protocol and service endpoints; correct IP reachability does not make their ports interchangeable.

B:

Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. The repeat risk here is different: Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. A directly relevant preventive control is: TACACS+ and RADIUS use different protocol and service endpoints; correct IP reachability does not make their ports interchangeable.

D:

Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The repeat risk here is different: Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. A directly relevant preventive control is: TACACS+ and RADIUS use different protocol and service endpoints; correct IP reachability does not make their ports interchangeable.

Question 645

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: A branch router uses RADIUS network-access port settings for TACACS+ administration and never receives a device-admin reply despite reachable ISE policy nodes. Which measurable outcome proves the intended behavior?

  1. A test TACACS login reaches the correct ISE device administration policy set and returns the intended result.
  2. Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account.
  3. The router's administrator login and commands generate matching TACACS device-administration decisions without changing ordinary endpoint RADIUS access.
  4. A test administrator login to the registered switch appears in the intended ISE TACACS Live Logs.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A test TACACS login reaches the correct ISE device administration policy set and returns the intended result. The required remediation is: Configure supported TACACS+ transport and service settings on the router and enable the corresponding ISE device-admin service. It works because tACACS+ and RADIUS use different protocol and service endpoints; correct IP reachability does not make their ports interchangeable.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The needed response is: A test TACACS login reaches the correct ISE device administration policy set and returns the intended result.

C:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The needed response is: A test TACACS login reaches the correct ISE device administration policy set and returns the intended result.

D:

Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The needed response is: A test TACACS login reaches the correct ISE device administration policy set and returns the intended result.

Question 646

An enterprise access-control incident describes: A branch router uses RADIUS network-access port settings for TACACS+ administration and never receives a device-admin reply despite reachable ISE policy nodes. Which ongoing practice is most appropriate for this failure mode?

  1. Review management network isolation and protocol protection whenever adding TACACS+ endpoints.
  2. Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation.
  3. Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes.
  4. Update ISE NAD inventory as part of device replacement and loopback renumbering.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: TACACS+ and RADIUS use different protocol and service endpoints; correct IP reachability does not make their ports interchangeable. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A test TACACS login reaches the correct ISE device administration policy set and returns the intended result.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 647

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: Security policy requires administrative command records with a clear start and completion context, yet engineers propose using only HTTPS web-interface logs to reconstruct SSH configuration activity. Which response most directly corrects the described failure?

  1. Enable supported TACACS+ command accounting and central reporting for the managed network device.
  2. Use supported TACACS+ accounting on the network device and correlate it with ISE device administration reports.
  3. Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components.
  4. Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Use supported TACACS+ accounting on the network device and correlate it with ISE device administration reports. This is appropriate because tACACS+ accounting can record network-device command activity performed over CLI sessions, independently of the ISE GUI audit log. It should be verified by this evidence: The ISE device administration report ties a test SSH command to its operator and NAD identity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. In the case being tested, Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Use supported TACACS+ accounting on the network device and correlate it with ISE device administration reports.

C:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. In the case being tested, Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Use supported TACACS+ accounting on the network device and correlate it with ISE device administration reports.

D:

Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. In the case being tested, Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Use supported TACACS+ accounting on the network device and correlate it with ISE device administration reports.

Question 648

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: Security policy requires administrative command records with a clear start and completion context, yet engineers propose using only HTTPS web-interface logs to reconstruct SSH configuration activity. Which statement best explains why the correct response works?

  1. RADIUS network-access authentication and TACACS+ device administration are different AAA services with different policy objects and command-level controls.
  2. TACACS+ accounting can record network-device command activity performed over CLI sessions, independently of the ISE GUI audit log.
  3. TACACS+ does not by itself replace the need for a trusted protected management path; authentication and authorization are distinct from full transport protection.
  4. TACACS+ authorization profiles can return shell privilege attributes independently from allowed command sets.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

TACACS+ accounting can record network-device command activity performed over CLI sessions, independently of the ISE GUI audit log. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Use supported TACACS+ accounting on the network device and correlate it with ISE device administration reports. The acceptance result is: The ISE device administration report ties a test SSH command to its operator and NAD identity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. The repeat risk here is different: Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. A directly relevant preventive control is: TACACS+ accounting can record network-device command activity performed over CLI sessions, independently of the ISE GUI audit log.

C:

Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The repeat risk here is different: Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. A directly relevant preventive control is: TACACS+ accounting can record network-device command activity performed over CLI sessions, independently of the ISE GUI audit log.

D:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The repeat risk here is different: Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. A directly relevant preventive control is: TACACS+ accounting can record network-device command activity performed over CLI sessions, independently of the ISE GUI audit log.

Question 649

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: Security policy requires administrative command records with a clear start and completion context, yet engineers propose using only HTTPS web-interface logs to reconstruct SSH configuration activity. Which recurring operational control would reduce this risk?

  1. Review management network isolation and protocol protection whenever adding TACACS+ endpoints.
  2. Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role.
  3. Verify CLI accounting completeness when introducing new device families.
  4. Include device-admin service state in PSN onboarding checks.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Verify CLI accounting completeness when introducing new device families. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: TACACS+ accounting can record network-device command activity performed over CLI sessions, independently of the ISE GUI audit log. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The ISE device administration report ties a test SSH command to its operator and NAD identity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The needed response is: Verify CLI accounting completeness when introducing new device families.

B:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The needed response is: Verify CLI accounting completeness when introducing new device families.

D:

Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The needed response is: Verify CLI accounting completeness when introducing new device families.

Question 650

An enterprise access-control incident describes: A security engineer claims placing a network device under TACACS+ proves privileged commands are encrypted end to end across every intermediate network segment. What is the most suitable solution within these constraints?

  1. Use supported TACACS+ accounting on the network device and correlate it with ISE device administration reports.
  2. Configure a distinct supported TACACS+ device-administration service and policy for administrator authentication, command authorization, and accounting.
  3. Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties.
  4. Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. This is appropriate because tACACS+ does not by itself replace the need for a trusted protected management path; authentication and authorization are distinct from full transport protection. It should be verified by this evidence: Management traffic follows the approved secured route and a network-path audit confirms the intended additional safeguards.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.