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Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 67

Question 660

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: A new PSN is added to handle device administration, but Cisco ISE has the TACACS+ service disabled on that PSN even though it responds to ordinary network-access RADIUS. Which postchange outcome demonstrates correct implementation?

  1. A test administrator login to the registered switch appears in the intended ISE TACACS Live Logs.
  2. The replacement switch authenticates a known admin through its intended TACACS policy, while the old source is retired.
  3. A controlled device-admin login completes through the intended policy path with visible accounting.
  4. An authorized read-only operator runs show commands but cannot execute a prohibited configuration command.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A test administrator login to the registered switch appears in the intended ISE TACACS Live Logs. The required remediation is: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. It works because the TACACS+ device-admin service requires explicit enablement and the appropriate license; running RADIUS on a PSN is not sufficient.

Incorrect Answers

B:

ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The repeat risk here is different: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test administrator login to the registered switch appears in the intended ISE TACACS Live Logs.

C:

A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The repeat risk here is different: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test administrator login to the registered switch appears in the intended ISE TACACS Live Logs.

D:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The repeat risk here is different: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test administrator login to the registered switch appears in the intended ISE TACACS Live Logs.

Question 661

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: A new PSN is added to handle device administration, but Cisco ISE has the TACACS+ service disabled on that PSN even though it responds to ordinary network-access RADIUS. What should be added to the maintenance or security review?

  1. Retest per-command accounting after NAD software upgrades.
  2. Include device-admin service state in PSN onboarding checks.
  3. Periodically review and test TACACS+ command sets against least-privilege job functions.
  4. Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Include device-admin service state in PSN onboarding checks. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: The TACACS+ device-admin service requires explicit enablement and the appropriate license; running RADIUS on a PSN is not sufficient. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A test administrator login to the registered switch appears in the intended ISE TACACS Live Logs.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The offered option specifies “Retest per-command accounting after NAD software upgrades”. The question requires “Include device-admin service state in PSN onboarding checks”: Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. These are not equivalent responses to the stated requirement.

C:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. The needed response is: Include device-admin service state in PSN onboarding checks.

D:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. The needed response is: Include device-admin service state in PSN onboarding checks.

Question 662

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: A firewall's TACACS+ shared secret was changed on the appliance but not in ISE and every device-admin request is rejected before policy can match. What is the most appropriate next configuration or repair?

  1. Replace ambiguous permissive wildcard patterns with appropriately bounded exact or validated expression matches.
  2. Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry.
  3. Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration.
  4. Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. This is appropriate because tACACS+ server and network-device configuration must agree on their shared secret and device identity for a valid exchange. It should be verified by this evidence: The firewall's test admin login reaches its intended policy set and authenticates successfully using the updated secret.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 663

An enterprise access-control incident describes: A firewall's TACACS+ shared secret was changed on the appliance but not in ISE and every device-admin request is rejected before policy can match. What is the key technical principle in this situation?

  1. TACACS+ server and network-device configuration must agree on their shared secret and device identity for a valid exchange.
  2. The TACACS+ device-admin service requires explicit enablement and the appropriate license; running RADIUS on a PSN is not sufficient.
  3. Command sets let TACACS+ authorization apply per-command privilege limits rather than merely granting a logged-in shell.
  4. Authentication answers who logged in; authorization controls what commands that identity may execute.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

TACACS+ server and network-device configuration must agree on their shared secret and device identity for a valid exchange. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. The acceptance result is: The firewall's test admin login reaches its intended policy set and authenticates successfully using the updated secret.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. In the case being tested, Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. The necessary acceptance evidence is: TACACS+ server and network-device configuration must agree on their shared secret and device identity for a valid exchange.

C:

Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. In the case being tested, Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. The necessary acceptance evidence is: TACACS+ server and network-device configuration must agree on their shared secret and device identity for a valid exchange.

D:

Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. In the case being tested, Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. The necessary acceptance evidence is: TACACS+ server and network-device configuration must agree on their shared secret and device identity for a valid exchange.

Question 664

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: A firewall's TACACS+ shared secret was changed on the appliance but not in ISE and every device-admin request is rejected before policy can match. What result should be documented before closing the issue?

  1. The firewall's test admin login reaches its intended policy set and authenticates successfully using the updated secret.
  2. A harmless show command is allowed and the closely named destructive command is explicitly denied.
  3. The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions.
  4. A test TACACS login reaches the correct ISE device administration policy set and returns the intended result.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The firewall's test admin login reaches its intended policy set and authenticates successfully using the updated secret. The required remediation is: Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. It works because tACACS+ server and network-device configuration must agree on their shared secret and device identity for a valid exchange.

Incorrect Answers

B:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The repeat risk here is different: Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. A directly relevant preventive control is: The firewall's test admin login reaches its intended policy set and authenticates successfully using the updated secret.

C:

Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. The repeat risk here is different: Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. A directly relevant preventive control is: The firewall's test admin login reaches its intended policy set and authenticates successfully using the updated secret.

D:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The repeat risk here is different: Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. A directly relevant preventive control is: The firewall's test admin login reaches its intended policy set and authenticates successfully using the updated secret.

Question 665

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: A firewall's TACACS+ shared secret was changed on the appliance but not in ISE and every device-admin request is rejected before policy can match. Which durable safeguard best prevents a recurrence?

  1. Retest per-command accounting after NAD software upgrades.
  2. Include negative wildcard match cases in command-set change reviews.
  3. Coordinate shared-secret rotations and preserve an authorized break-glass recovery path.
  4. Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Coordinate shared-secret rotations and preserve an authorized break-glass recovery path. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: TACACS+ server and network-device configuration must agree on their shared secret and device identity for a valid exchange. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The firewall's test admin login reaches its intended policy set and authenticates successfully using the updated secret.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The offered option specifies “Retest per-command accounting after NAD software upgrades”. The question requires “Coordinate shared-secret rotations and preserve an authorized break-glass recovery path”: Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. These are not equivalent responses to the stated requirement.

B:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The needed response is: Coordinate shared-secret rotations and preserve an authorized break-glass recovery path.

D:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The needed response is: Coordinate shared-secret rotations and preserve an authorized break-glass recovery path.

Question 666

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: The helpdesk should run only `show` and `ping`, but a copied ISE device-admin command set allows `configure terminal` and reload operations. Which implementation decision directly satisfies the stated requirement?

  1. Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes.
  2. Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry.
  3. Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group.
  4. Implement supported TACACS+ command authorization and scoped command sets in addition to authentication.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. This is appropriate because command sets let TACACS+ authorization apply per-command privilege limits rather than merely granting a logged-in shell. It should be verified by this evidence: A helpdesk operator successfully runs show and ping but receives denial on a prohibited configuration command.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 667

An access-security change request states: The helpdesk should run only `show` and `ping`, but a copied ISE device-admin command set allows `configure terminal` and reload operations. Which technical behavior is MOST relevant to this design?

  1. A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions.
  2. Command sets let TACACS+ authorization apply per-command privilege limits rather than merely granting a logged-in shell.
  3. A device-admin exception should alter only the intended principal and device policy context; global command changes expand privileges broadly.
  4. TACACS+ accounting can record network-device command activity performed over CLI sessions, independently of the ISE GUI audit log.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Command sets let TACACS+ authorization apply per-command privilege limits rather than merely granting a logged-in shell. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The acceptance result is: A helpdesk operator successfully runs show and ping but receives denial on a prohibited configuration command.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. In the case being tested, Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Command sets let TACACS+ authorization apply per-command privilege limits rather than merely granting a logged-in shell.

C:

Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. In the case being tested, Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Command sets let TACACS+ authorization apply per-command privilege limits rather than merely granting a logged-in shell.

D:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. In the case being tested, Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Command sets let TACACS+ authorization apply per-command privilege limits rather than merely granting a logged-in shell.

Question 668

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: The helpdesk should run only `show` and `ping`, but a copied ISE device-admin command set allows `configure terminal` and reload operations. Which readback demonstrates that the actual problem was solved?

  1. Test logins at both sites match the correct separate policy sets and restrictions.
  2. A controlled device-admin login completes through the intended policy path with visible accounting.
  3. A helpdesk operator successfully runs show and ping but receives denial on a prohibited configuration command.
  4. The router's administrator login and commands generate matching TACACS device-administration decisions without changing ordinary endpoint RADIUS access.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A helpdesk operator successfully runs show and ping but receives denial on a prohibited configuration command. The required remediation is: Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. It works because command sets let TACACS+ authorization apply per-command privilege limits rather than merely granting a logged-in shell.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The repeat risk here is different: Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. A directly relevant preventive control is: A helpdesk operator successfully runs show and ping but receives denial on a prohibited configuration command.

B:

A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The repeat risk here is different: Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. A directly relevant preventive control is: A helpdesk operator successfully runs show and ping but receives denial on a prohibited configuration command.

D:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The repeat risk here is different: Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. A directly relevant preventive control is: A helpdesk operator successfully runs show and ping but receives denial on a prohibited configuration command.

Question 669

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: The helpdesk should run only `show` and `ping`, but a copied ISE device-admin command set allows `configure terminal` and reload operations. What validation should be repeated before subsequent rollouts?

  1. Review shell profiles and command sets together when promoting staff roles.
  2. Periodically review and test TACACS+ command sets against least-privilege job functions.
  3. Include negative wildcard match cases in command-set change reviews.
  4. Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Periodically review and test TACACS+ command sets against least-privilege job functions. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: Command sets let TACACS+ authorization apply per-command privilege limits rather than merely granting a logged-in shell. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A helpdesk operator successfully runs show and ping but receives denial on a prohibited configuration command.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The needed response is: Periodically review and test TACACS+ command sets against least-privilege job functions.

C:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The needed response is: Periodically review and test TACACS+ command sets against least-privilege job functions.

D:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The needed response is: Periodically review and test TACACS+ command sets against least-privilege job functions.

Question 670

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: A senior network operator must enter privileged EXEC mode on specific routers, but a generic TACACS+ shell profile gives every user the same low privilege level. What should the team change before declaring this work complete?

  1. Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration.
  2. Register and configure the new NAD source address, location, device type, and matching TACACS+ secret before cutover.
  3. Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group.
  4. Enable supported TACACS+ command accounting and central reporting for the managed network device.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. This is appropriate because tACACS+ authorization profiles can return shell privilege attributes independently from allowed command sets. It should be verified by this evidence: The senior operator receives the intended supported privilege, while a junior operator remains restricted.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.