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Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 69

Question 680

An access-security change request states: A contractor administrator must issue one temporary diagnostic command, but the team changes the global TACACS+ command set to allow it for everyone. Which acceptance test would directly establish the desired state?

  1. A simulated PSN outage permits only the approved emergency administrator through the specified fallback and records the exception afterward.
  2. A harmless show command is allowed and the closely named destructive command is explicitly denied.
  3. The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions.
  4. Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions. The required remediation is: Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. It works because a device-admin exception should alter only the intended principal and device policy context; global command changes expand privileges broadly.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. The repeat risk here is different: Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. A directly relevant preventive control is: The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions.

B:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The repeat risk here is different: Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. A directly relevant preventive control is: The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions.

D:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The repeat risk here is different: Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. A directly relevant preventive control is: The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions.

Question 681

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: A contractor administrator must issue one temporary diagnostic command, but the team changes the global TACACS+ command set to allow it for everyone. Which governance step most directly targets the root cause?

  1. Require expiration and audit of emergency TACACS+ command exceptions.
  2. Include negative wildcard match cases in command-set change reviews.
  3. Periodically review and test TACACS+ command sets against least-privilege job functions.
  4. Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Require expiration and audit of emergency TACACS+ command exceptions. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: A device-admin exception should alter only the intended principal and device policy context; global command changes expand privileges broadly. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions.

Incorrect Answers

B:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. The needed response is: Require expiration and audit of emergency TACACS+ command exceptions.

C:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. The needed response is: Require expiration and audit of emergency TACACS+ command exceptions.

D:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. The needed response is: Require expiration and audit of emergency TACACS+ command exceptions.

Question 682

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: TACACS Live Logs show successful network-device administrator login but no command accounting after a switch IOS upgrade that disabled per-command reporting. Which change is justified by the observed evidence?

  1. Register and configure the new NAD source address, location, device type, and matching TACACS+ secret before cutover.
  2. Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes.
  3. Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records.
  4. Configure a distinct supported TACACS+ device-administration service and policy for administrator authentication, command authorization, and accounting.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. This is appropriate because command authorization, shell login, and accounting are separate configured steps; upgrading one device can disrupt logging without preventing login. It should be verified by this evidence: A test configuration command appears in the correct device-admin accounting report with its identity and device.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 683

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: TACACS Live Logs show successful network-device administrator login but no command accounting after a switch IOS upgrade that disabled per-command reporting. What mechanism governs this authentication or management outcome?

  1. A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions.
  2. Command authorization, shell login, and accounting are separate configured steps; upgrading one device can disrupt logging without preventing login.
  3. Device administration policy selection can match registered NAD metadata, not only the username; broad groups can create accidental cross-site privilege.
  4. AAA accounting records performed activity, while authentication alone identifies a login and cannot reconstruct command execution history.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Command authorization, shell login, and accounting are separate configured steps; upgrading one device can disrupt logging without preventing login. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. The acceptance result is: A test configuration command appears in the correct device-admin accounting report with its identity and device.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. In the case being tested, Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Command authorization, shell login, and accounting are separate configured steps; upgrading one device can disrupt logging without preventing login.

C:

Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. In the case being tested, Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Command authorization, shell login, and accounting are separate configured steps; upgrading one device can disrupt logging without preventing login.

D:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. In the case being tested, Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Command authorization, shell login, and accounting are separate configured steps; upgrading one device can disrupt logging without preventing login.

Question 684

A campus and branch network operator reports: TACACS Live Logs show successful network-device administrator login but no command accounting after a switch IOS upgrade that disabled per-command reporting. What is the strongest evidence that this requirement is met?

  1. The senior operator receives the intended supported privilege, while a junior operator remains restricted.
  2. The replacement switch authenticates a known admin through its intended TACACS policy, while the old source is retired.
  3. A test configuration command appears in the correct device-admin accounting report with its identity and device.
  4. A test TACACS login reaches the correct ISE device administration policy set and returns the intended result.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A test configuration command appears in the correct device-admin accounting report with its identity and device. The required remediation is: Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. It works because command authorization, shell login, and accounting are separate configured steps; upgrading one device can disrupt logging without preventing login.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The repeat risk here is different: Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test configuration command appears in the correct device-admin accounting report with its identity and device.

B:

ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The repeat risk here is different: Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test configuration command appears in the correct device-admin accounting report with its identity and device.

D:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. The repeat risk here is different: Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test configuration command appears in the correct device-admin accounting report with its identity and device.

Question 685

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: A TACACS command set uses a broad wildcard that unintentionally allows a destructive command whose prefix resembles an approved read-only command. Which administrative action BEST addresses this specific situation?

  1. Replace ambiguous permissive wildcard patterns with appropriately bounded exact or validated expression matches.
  2. Select the correct local regular policy or an approved reachable proxy sequence and validate its external dependency.
  3. Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group.
  4. Implement supported TACACS+ command authorization and scoped command sets in addition to authentication.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Replace ambiguous permissive wildcard patterns with appropriately bounded exact or validated expression matches. This is appropriate because tACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. It should be verified by this evidence: A harmless show command is allowed and the closely named destructive command is explicitly denied.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The needed response is: Replace ambiguous permissive wildcard patterns with appropriately bounded exact or validated expression matches.

C:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The needed response is: Replace ambiguous permissive wildcard patterns with appropriately bounded exact or validated expression matches.

D:

Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The needed response is: Replace ambiguous permissive wildcard patterns with appropriately bounded exact or validated expression matches.

Question 686

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: A TACACS command set uses a broad wildcard that unintentionally allows a destructive command whose prefix resembles an approved read-only command. Which architectural fact determines the appropriate fix?

  1. TACACS+ server and network-device configuration must agree on their shared secret and device identity for a valid exchange.
  2. The TACACS+ device-admin service requires explicit enablement and the appropriate license; running RADIUS on a PSN is not sufficient.
  3. AAA separates identity validation, permitted operations, and activity recording; a shared password does not establish individual accountability.
  4. TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Replace ambiguous permissive wildcard patterns with appropriately bounded exact or validated expression matches. The acceptance result is: A harmless show command is allowed and the closely named destructive command is explicitly denied.

Incorrect Answers

A:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 687

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: A TACACS command set uses a broad wildcard that unintentionally allows a destructive command whose prefix resembles an approved read-only command. Which postchange outcome demonstrates correct implementation?

  1. The firewall's test admin login reaches its intended policy set and authenticates successfully using the updated secret.
  2. A harmless show command is allowed and the closely named destructive command is explicitly denied.
  3. The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions.
  4. An authorized read-only operator runs show commands but cannot execute a prohibited configuration command.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A harmless show command is allowed and the closely named destructive command is explicitly denied. The required remediation is: Replace ambiguous permissive wildcard patterns with appropriately bounded exact or validated expression matches. It works because tACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. In the case being tested, TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A harmless show command is allowed and the closely named destructive command is explicitly denied.

C:

Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. In the case being tested, TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A harmless show command is allowed and the closely named destructive command is explicitly denied.

D:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. In the case being tested, TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A harmless show command is allowed and the closely named destructive command is explicitly denied.

Question 688

An enterprise access-control incident describes: A TACACS command set uses a broad wildcard that unintentionally allows a destructive command whose prefix resembles an approved read-only command. What should be added to the maintenance or security review?

  1. Review shell profiles and command sets together when promoting staff roles.
  2. Coordinate shared-secret rotations and preserve an authorized break-glass recovery path.
  3. Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role.
  4. Include negative wildcard match cases in command-set change reviews.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Include negative wildcard match cases in command-set change reviews. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A harmless show command is allowed and the closely named destructive command is explicitly denied.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The repeat risk here is different: TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. A directly relevant preventive control is: Include negative wildcard match cases in command-set change reviews.

B:

Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The repeat risk here is different: TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. A directly relevant preventive control is: Include negative wildcard match cases in command-set change reviews.

C:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The repeat risk here is different: TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. A directly relevant preventive control is: Include negative wildcard match cases in command-set change reviews.

Question 689

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: The organization replaces a network switch, and its TACACS+ requests originate from a new loopback IP not registered in ISE, so valid admins cannot log in. What is the most appropriate next configuration or repair?

  1. Register and configure the new NAD source address, location, device type, and matching TACACS+ secret before cutover.
  2. Design and test an approved, tightly protected network-device AAA fallback for genuine ISE server unavailability.
  3. Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group.
  4. Configure a distinct supported TACACS+ device-administration service and policy for administrator authentication, command authorization, and accounting.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Register and configure the new NAD source address, location, device type, and matching TACACS+ secret before cutover. This is appropriate because iSE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. It should be verified by this evidence: The replacement switch authenticates a known admin through its intended TACACS policy, while the old source is retired.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The needed response is: Register and configure the new NAD source address, location, device type, and matching TACACS+ secret before cutover.

C:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The needed response is: Register and configure the new NAD source address, location, device type, and matching TACACS+ secret before cutover.

D:

Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The needed response is: Register and configure the new NAD source address, location, device type, and matching TACACS+ secret before cutover.

Question 690

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: The organization replaces a network switch, and its TACACS+ requests originate from a new loopback IP not registered in ISE, so valid admins cannot log in. What is the key technical principle in this situation?

  1. The TACACS+ device-admin service requires explicit enablement and the appropriate license; running RADIUS on a PSN is not sufficient.
  2. ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization.
  3. TACACS+ authorization profiles can return shell privilege attributes independently from allowed command sets.
  4. TACACS+ and RADIUS use different protocol and service endpoints; correct IP reachability does not make their ports interchangeable.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Register and configure the new NAD source address, location, device type, and matching TACACS+ secret before cutover. The acceptance result is: The replacement switch authenticates a known admin through its intended TACACS policy, while the old source is retired.

Incorrect Answers

A:

ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.