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Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 70

Question 690

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: The organization replaces a network switch, and its TACACS+ requests originate from a new loopback IP not registered in ISE, so valid admins cannot log in. What is the key technical principle in this situation?

  1. The TACACS+ device-admin service requires explicit enablement and the appropriate license; running RADIUS on a PSN is not sufficient.
  2. ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization.
  3. TACACS+ authorization profiles can return shell privilege attributes independently from allowed command sets.
  4. TACACS+ and RADIUS use different protocol and service endpoints; correct IP reachability does not make their ports interchangeable.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Register and configure the new NAD source address, location, device type, and matching TACACS+ secret before cutover. The acceptance result is: The replacement switch authenticates a known admin through its intended TACACS policy, while the old source is retired.

Incorrect Answers

A:

ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 691

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: The organization replaces a network switch, and its TACACS+ requests originate from a new loopback IP not registered in ISE, so valid admins cannot log in. What result should be documented before closing the issue?

  1. A test configuration command appears in the correct device-admin accounting report with its identity and device.
  2. The replacement switch authenticates a known admin through its intended TACACS policy, while the old source is retired.
  3. A harmless show command is allowed and the closely named destructive command is explicitly denied.
  4. The ISE device administration report ties a test SSH command to its operator and NAD identity.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The replacement switch authenticates a known admin through its intended TACACS policy, while the old source is retired. The required remediation is: Register and configure the new NAD source address, location, device type, and matching TACACS+ secret before cutover. It works because iSE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. In the case being tested, ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The replacement switch authenticates a known admin through its intended TACACS policy, while the old source is retired.

C:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. In the case being tested, ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The replacement switch authenticates a known admin through its intended TACACS policy, while the old source is retired.

D:

The offered option specifies “The ISE device administration report ties a test SSH command to its operator and NAD identity”. The question requires “The replacement switch authenticates a known admin through its intended TACACS policy, while the old source is retired”: ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. These are not equivalent responses to the stated requirement.

Question 692

An access-security change request states: The organization replaces a network switch, and its TACACS+ requests originate from a new loopback IP not registered in ISE, so valid admins cannot log in. Which durable safeguard best prevents a recurrence?

  1. Update ISE NAD inventory as part of device replacement and loopback renumbering.
  2. Audit NAD group hierarchy after site expansions and migrations.
  3. Coordinate shared-secret rotations and preserve an authorized break-glass recovery path.
  4. Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Update ISE NAD inventory as part of device replacement and loopback renumbering. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The replacement switch authenticates a known admin through its intended TACACS policy, while the old source is retired.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. The repeat risk here is different: ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. A directly relevant preventive control is: Update ISE NAD inventory as part of device replacement and loopback renumbering.

C:

Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The repeat risk here is different: ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. A directly relevant preventive control is: Update ISE NAD inventory as part of device replacement and loopback renumbering.

D:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The repeat risk here is different: ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. A directly relevant preventive control is: Update ISE NAD inventory as part of device replacement and loopback renumbering.

Question 693

An enterprise access-control incident describes: One ISE device-admin policy author enables an external TACACS proxy sequence without verifying the remote server's reachability, causing administrator requests to time out. Which implementation decision directly satisfies the stated requirement?

  1. Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set.
  2. Register and configure the new NAD source address, location, device type, and matching TACACS+ secret before cutover.
  3. Select the correct local regular policy or an approved reachable proxy sequence and validate its external dependency.
  4. Configure a distinct supported TACACS+ device-administration service and policy for administrator authentication, command authorization, and accounting.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Select the correct local regular policy or an approved reachable proxy sequence and validate its external dependency. This is appropriate because a proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. It should be verified by this evidence: A controlled device-admin login completes through the intended policy path with visible accounting.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: a proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The needed response is: Select the correct local regular policy or an approved reachable proxy sequence and validate its external dependency.

B:

ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: a proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The needed response is: Select the correct local regular policy or an approved reachable proxy sequence and validate its external dependency.

D:

Use stage-specific posture error classification instead of broad credential resets. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: a proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The needed response is: Select the correct local regular policy or an approved reachable proxy sequence and validate its external dependency.

Question 694

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: One ISE device-admin policy author enables an external TACACS proxy sequence without verifying the remote server's reachability, causing administrator requests to time out. Which technical behavior is MOST relevant to this design?

  1. TACACS+ server and network-device configuration must agree on their shared secret and device identity for a valid exchange.
  2. Device administration policy selection can match registered NAD metadata, not only the username; broad groups can create accidental cross-site privilege.
  3. TACACS+ does not by itself replace the need for a trusted protected management path; authentication and authorization are distinct from full transport protection.
  4. A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Select the correct local regular policy or an approved reachable proxy sequence and validate its external dependency. The acceptance result is: A controlled device-admin login completes through the intended policy path with visible accounting.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 695

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: One ISE device-admin policy author enables an external TACACS proxy sequence without verifying the remote server's reachability, causing administrator requests to time out. Which readback demonstrates that the actual problem was solved?

  1. The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions.
  2. A harmless show command is allowed and the closely named destructive command is explicitly denied.
  3. The router's administrator login and commands generate matching TACACS device-administration decisions without changing ordinary endpoint RADIUS access.
  4. A controlled device-admin login completes through the intended policy path with visible accounting.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A controlled device-admin login completes through the intended policy path with visible accounting. The required remediation is: Select the correct local regular policy or an approved reachable proxy sequence and validate its external dependency. It works because a proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. In the case being tested, a proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A controlled device-admin login completes through the intended policy path with visible accounting.

B:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. In the case being tested, a proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A controlled device-admin login completes through the intended policy path with visible accounting.

C:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. In the case being tested, a proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A controlled device-admin login completes through the intended policy path with visible accounting.

Question 696

A campus and branch network operator reports: One ISE device-admin policy author enables an external TACACS proxy sequence without verifying the remote server's reachability, causing administrator requests to time out. What validation should be repeated before subsequent rollouts?

  1. Test external TACACS proxy and fallback behavior before deployment.
  2. Update ISE NAD inventory as part of device replacement and loopback renumbering.
  3. Review shell profiles and command sets together when promoting staff roles.
  4. Review management network isolation and protocol protection whenever adding TACACS+ endpoints.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Test external TACACS proxy and fallback behavior before deployment. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A controlled device-admin login completes through the intended policy path with visible accounting.

Incorrect Answers

B:

ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The repeat risk here is different: a proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. A directly relevant preventive control is: Test external TACACS proxy and fallback behavior before deployment.

C:

Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The repeat risk here is different: a proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. A directly relevant preventive control is: Test external TACACS proxy and fallback behavior before deployment.

D:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The repeat risk here is different: a proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. A directly relevant preventive control is: Test external TACACS proxy and fallback behavior before deployment.

Question 697

An access-security change request states: An administrator loses remote device access during an ISE outage, and the team has no documented local emergency login because TACACS+ was deployed as the sole method. What should the team change before declaring this work complete?

  1. Design and test an approved, tightly protected network-device AAA fallback for genuine ISE server unavailability.
  2. Replace ambiguous permissive wildcard patterns with appropriately bounded exact or validated expression matches.
  3. Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records.
  4. Implement supported TACACS+ command authorization and scoped command sets in addition to authentication.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Design and test an approved, tightly protected network-device AAA fallback for genuine ISE server unavailability. This is appropriate because centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. It should be verified by this evidence: A simulated PSN outage permits only the approved emergency administrator through the specified fallback and records the exception afterward.

Incorrect Answers

B:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. The needed response is: Design and test an approved, tightly protected network-device AAA fallback for genuine ISE server unavailability.

C:

Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. The needed response is: Design and test an approved, tightly protected network-device AAA fallback for genuine ISE server unavailability.

D:

Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. The needed response is: Design and test an approved, tightly protected network-device AAA fallback for genuine ISE server unavailability.

Question 698

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: An administrator loses remote device access during an ISE outage, and the team has no documented local emergency login because TACACS+ was deployed as the sole method. What underlying Cisco ISE dependency explains this result?

  1. Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access.
  2. TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list.
  3. A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions.
  4. TACACS+ does not by itself replace the need for a trusted protected management path; authentication and authorization are distinct from full transport protection.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Design and test an approved, tightly protected network-device AAA fallback for genuine ISE server unavailability. The acceptance result is: A simulated PSN outage permits only the approved emergency administrator through the specified fallback and records the exception afterward.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: a proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Protect the device-to-ISE management path with supported additional network security and accurately document TACACS+ transport properties. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 699

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: An administrator loses remote device access during an ISE outage, and the team has no documented local emergency login because TACACS+ was deployed as the sole method. Which measurable outcome proves the intended behavior?

  1. A simulated PSN outage permits only the approved emergency administrator through the specified fallback and records the exception afterward.
  2. The senior operator receives the intended supported privilege, while a junior operator remains restricted.
  3. The firewall's test admin login reaches its intended policy set and authenticates successfully using the updated secret.
  4. Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A simulated PSN outage permits only the approved emergency administrator through the specified fallback and records the exception afterward. The required remediation is: Design and test an approved, tightly protected network-device AAA fallback for genuine ISE server unavailability. It works because centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. In the case being tested, Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A simulated PSN outage permits only the approved emergency administrator through the specified fallback and records the exception afterward.

C:

Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. In the case being tested, Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A simulated PSN outage permits only the approved emergency administrator through the specified fallback and records the exception afterward.

D:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. In the case being tested, Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A simulated PSN outage permits only the approved emergency administrator through the specified fallback and records the exception afterward.

Question 700

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: An administrator loses remote device access during an ISE outage, and the team has no documented local emergency login because TACACS+ was deployed as the sole method. Which ongoing practice is most appropriate for this failure mode?

  1. Rotate emergency credentials, restrict fallback activation, and rehearse ISE outage recovery.
  2. Audit NAD group hierarchy after site expansions and migrations.
  3. Include negative wildcard match cases in command-set change reviews.
  4. Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Rotate emergency credentials, restrict fallback activation, and rehearse ISE outage recovery. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A simulated PSN outage permits only the approved emergency administrator through the specified fallback and records the exception afterward.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. The repeat risk here is different: Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. A directly relevant preventive control is: Rotate emergency credentials, restrict fallback activation, and rehearse ISE outage recovery.

C:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The repeat risk here is different: Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. A directly relevant preventive control is: Rotate emergency credentials, restrict fallback activation, and rehearse ISE outage recovery.

D:

Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. The repeat risk here is different: Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. A directly relevant preventive control is: Rotate emergency credentials, restrict fallback activation, and rehearse ISE outage recovery.