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Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 68

Question 670

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: A senior network operator must enter privileged EXEC mode on specific routers, but a generic TACACS+ shell profile gives every user the same low privilege level. What should the team change before declaring this work complete?

  1. Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration.
  2. Register and configure the new NAD source address, location, device type, and matching TACACS+ secret before cutover.
  3. Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group.
  4. Enable supported TACACS+ command accounting and central reporting for the managed network device.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. This is appropriate because tACACS+ authorization profiles can return shell privilege attributes independently from allowed command sets. It should be verified by this evidence: The senior operator receives the intended supported privilege, while a junior operator remains restricted.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Enable the supported ISE Device Administration service on intended PSNs and verify licensing and matching NAD configuration. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 671

A campus and branch network operator reports: A senior network operator must enter privileged EXEC mode on specific routers, but a generic TACACS+ shell profile gives every user the same low privilege level. What underlying Cisco ISE dependency explains this result?

  1. Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access.
  2. TACACS+ authorization profiles can return shell privilege attributes independently from allowed command sets.
  3. A device-admin exception should alter only the intended principal and device policy context; global command changes expand privileges broadly.
  4. TACACS+ accounting can record network-device command activity performed over CLI sessions, independently of the ISE GUI audit log.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

TACACS+ authorization profiles can return shell privilege attributes independently from allowed command sets. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The acceptance result is: The senior operator receives the intended supported privilege, while a junior operator remains restricted.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. In the case being tested, Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The necessary acceptance evidence is: TACACS+ authorization profiles can return shell privilege attributes independently from allowed command sets.

C:

Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. In the case being tested, Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The necessary acceptance evidence is: TACACS+ authorization profiles can return shell privilege attributes independently from allowed command sets.

D:

Maintain protocol-specific AAA network port and service documentation. In the case being tested, Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The necessary acceptance evidence is: TACACS+ authorization profiles can return shell privilege attributes independently from allowed command sets.

Question 672

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: A senior network operator must enter privileged EXEC mode on specific routers, but a generic TACACS+ shell profile gives every user the same low privilege level. Which measurable outcome proves the intended behavior?

  1. The senior operator receives the intended supported privilege, while a junior operator remains restricted.
  2. A controlled device-admin login completes through the intended policy path with visible accounting.
  3. The replacement switch authenticates a known admin through its intended TACACS policy, while the old source is retired.
  4. The router's administrator login and commands generate matching TACACS device-administration decisions without changing ordinary endpoint RADIUS access.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The senior operator receives the intended supported privilege, while a junior operator remains restricted. The required remediation is: Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. It works because tACACS+ authorization profiles can return shell privilege attributes independently from allowed command sets.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The repeat risk here is different: Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. A directly relevant preventive control is: The senior operator receives the intended supported privilege, while a junior operator remains restricted.

C:

ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. The repeat risk here is different: Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. A directly relevant preventive control is: The senior operator receives the intended supported privilege, while a junior operator remains restricted.

D:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The repeat risk here is different: Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. A directly relevant preventive control is: The senior operator receives the intended supported privilege, while a junior operator remains restricted.

Question 673

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: A senior network operator must enter privileged EXEC mode on specific routers, but a generic TACACS+ shell profile gives every user the same low privilege level. Which ongoing practice is most appropriate for this failure mode?

  1. Test external TACACS proxy and fallback behavior before deployment.
  2. Require expiration and audit of emergency TACACS+ command exceptions.
  3. Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership.
  4. Review shell profiles and command sets together when promoting staff roles.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Review shell profiles and command sets together when promoting staff roles. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: TACACS+ authorization profiles can return shell privilege attributes independently from allowed command sets. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The senior operator receives the intended supported privilege, while a junior operator remains restricted.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The needed response is: Review shell profiles and command sets together when promoting staff roles.

B:

Restore supported command accounting on the switch and verify ISE receives the corresponding accounting records. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The needed response is: Review shell profiles and command sets together when promoting staff roles.

C:

Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The needed response is: Review shell profiles and command sets together when promoting staff roles.

Question 674

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: Cisco ISE has a device-admin policy for the European branch, but requests from Asian routers match it because the network-device location condition is defined as All Locations. Which response most directly corrects the described failure?

  1. Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set.
  2. Register and configure the new NAD source address, location, device type, and matching TACACS+ secret before cutover.
  3. Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role.
  4. Enable supported TACACS+ command accounting and central reporting for the managed network device.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. This is appropriate because device administration policy selection can match registered NAD metadata, not only the username; broad groups can create accidental cross-site privilege. It should be verified by this evidence: Test logins at both sites match the correct separate policy sets and restrictions.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: ISE identifies the network device that sends a TACACS+ request; an unregistered or mismatched source may fail device validation before authorization. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Separate device-admin and endpoint network-access policy ownership. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 675

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: Cisco ISE has a device-admin policy for the European branch, but requests from Asian routers match it because the network-device location condition is defined as All Locations. Which statement best explains why the correct response works?

  1. Device administration policy selection can match registered NAD metadata, not only the username; broad groups can create accidental cross-site privilege.
  2. A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions.
  3. Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access.
  4. Authentication answers who logged in; authorization controls what commands that identity may execute.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Device administration policy selection can match registered NAD metadata, not only the username; broad groups can create accidental cross-site privilege. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The acceptance result is: Test logins at both sites match the correct separate policy sets and restrictions.

Incorrect Answers

B:

A proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. In the case being tested, Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Device administration policy selection can match registered NAD metadata, not only the username; broad groups can create accidental cross-site privilege.

C:

Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. In the case being tested, Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Device administration policy selection can match registered NAD metadata, not only the username; broad groups can create accidental cross-site privilege.

D:

Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. In the case being tested, Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Device administration policy selection can match registered NAD metadata, not only the username; broad groups can create accidental cross-site privilege.

Question 676

An enterprise access-control incident describes: Cisco ISE has a device-admin policy for the European branch, but requests from Asian routers match it because the network-device location condition is defined as All Locations. Which observation would BEST verify successful remediation?

  1. A helpdesk operator successfully runs show and ping but receives denial on a prohibited configuration command.
  2. A simulated PSN outage permits only the approved emergency administrator through the specified fallback and records the exception afterward.
  3. Test logins at both sites match the correct separate policy sets and restrictions.
  4. Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Test logins at both sites match the correct separate policy sets and restrictions. The required remediation is: Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. It works because device administration policy selection can match registered NAD metadata, not only the username; broad groups can create accidental cross-site privilege.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The repeat risk here is different: Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. A directly relevant preventive control is: Test logins at both sites match the correct separate policy sets and restrictions.

B:

Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. The repeat risk here is different: Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. A directly relevant preventive control is: Test logins at both sites match the correct separate policy sets and restrictions.

D:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The repeat risk here is different: Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. A directly relevant preventive control is: Test logins at both sites match the correct separate policy sets and restrictions.

Question 677

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: Cisco ISE has a device-admin policy for the European branch, but requests from Asian routers match it because the network-device location condition is defined as All Locations. What should be incorporated into the change checklist?

  1. Audit NAD group hierarchy after site expansions and migrations.
  2. Coordinate shared-secret rotations and preserve an authorized break-glass recovery path.
  3. Periodically review and test TACACS+ command sets against least-privilege job functions.
  4. Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Audit NAD group hierarchy after site expansions and migrations. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: Device administration policy selection can match registered NAD metadata, not only the username; broad groups can create accidental cross-site privilege. The ongoing acceptance check remains: Test logins at both sites match the correct separate policy sets and restrictions.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. The needed response is: Audit NAD group hierarchy after site expansions and migrations.

C:

Configure an appropriate TACACS+ shell profile and role-based policy condition for the authorized administrator group. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. The needed response is: Audit NAD group hierarchy after site expansions and migrations.

D:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. The needed response is: Audit NAD group hierarchy after site expansions and migrations.

Question 678

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: A contractor administrator must issue one temporary diagnostic command, but the team changes the global TACACS+ command set to allow it for everyone. What is the most suitable solution within these constraints?

  1. Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes.
  2. Select the correct local regular policy or an approved reachable proxy sequence and validate its external dependency.
  3. Implement supported TACACS+ command authorization and scoped command sets in addition to authentication.
  4. Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. This is appropriate because a device-admin exception should alter only the intended principal and device policy context; global command changes expand privileges broadly. It should be verified by this evidence: The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Apply a restricted TACACS+ command set that permits only required commands and denies sensitive configuration changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: a proxy-sequence policy forwards TACACS requests to designated remote servers; a missing or unreachable upstream prevents timely decisions. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Audit device-admin accounting coverage for privileged changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 679

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: A contractor administrator must issue one temporary diagnostic command, but the team changes the global TACACS+ command set to allow it for everyone. Which platform distinction is decisive in this scenario?

  1. TACACS+ server and network-device configuration must agree on their shared secret and device identity for a valid exchange.
  2. Device administration policy selection can match registered NAD metadata, not only the username; broad groups can create accidental cross-site privilege.
  3. TACACS+ and RADIUS use different protocol and service endpoints; correct IP reachability does not make their ports interchangeable.
  4. A device-admin exception should alter only the intended principal and device policy context; global command changes expand privileges broadly.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A device-admin exception should alter only the intended principal and device policy context; global command changes expand privileges broadly. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. The acceptance result is: The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Synchronize the device-specific TACACS+ shared secret and confirm the correct source address maps to the intended NAD entry. In the case being tested, Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A device-admin exception should alter only the intended principal and device policy context; global command changes expand privileges broadly.

B:

Use precise NAD location and device-type group conditions in the ISE TACACS device-admin policy set. In the case being tested, Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A device-admin exception should alter only the intended principal and device policy context; global command changes expand privileges broadly.

C:

Test both allowed and denied command categories for each admin role. In the case being tested, Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A device-admin exception should alter only the intended principal and device policy context; global command changes expand privileges broadly.

Question 680

An access-security change request states: A contractor administrator must issue one temporary diagnostic command, but the team changes the global TACACS+ command set to allow it for everyone. Which acceptance test would directly establish the desired state?

  1. A simulated PSN outage permits only the approved emergency administrator through the specified fallback and records the exception afterward.
  2. A harmless show command is allowed and the closely named destructive command is explicitly denied.
  3. The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions.
  4. Two named operators receive their expected different command permissions and each command is attributed to its own account.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions. The required remediation is: Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. It works because a device-admin exception should alter only the intended principal and device policy context; global command changes expand privileges broadly.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Centralized TACACS+ requires reachable authorization infrastructure; an explicit device-side emergency method can preserve controlled recovery without granting normal users extra access. The repeat risk here is different: Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. A directly relevant preventive control is: The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions.

B:

TACACS+ command sets can use matching patterns; overbroad expressions permit commands beyond the role's intended list. The repeat risk here is different: Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. A directly relevant preventive control is: The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions.

D:

Implement supported centralized AAA login identity, role authorization, and command accounting as distinct, separately tested components. The repeat risk here is different: Create a narrowly scoped, time-governed authorization exception for the contractor and target device rather than modifying the shared role. A directly relevant preventive control is: The contractor performs the approved command only on the named device while ordinary operators retain their normal restrictions.