Question 70
Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: An EBGP session with a directly connected upstream must resist spoofed nonadjacent TCP connection attempts. Which observable result most directly verifies that this network issue was resolved?
Explanation
Correct Answer
For this scenario, the observed situation is: An EBGP session with a directly connected upstream must resist spoofed nonadjacent TCP connection attempts. The most directly supported response is: Use supported BGP TTL security and peer authentication consistent with the direct-neighbor design. Technical basis: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication. Evidence of success: The authorized directly connected peer establishes BGP while lower-TTL spoofed probes fail the session check. Ongoing protection: Validate hop assumptions and rotate routing authentication secrets under change control.
Incorrect Answers
That observation tests a different mechanism: VNF performance depends on physical and virtual I/O paths as well as compute allocation. It cannot establish this case, whose mechanism is: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication. The needed verification is: The authorized directly connected peer establishes BGP while lower-TTL spoofed probes fail the session check.
DiffServ offers scalable class-based relative behavior while IntServ relies on individual resource reservation. Evidence of that behavior would not establish the required outcome here. The case-specific failure is: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication. A passing check should show: The authorized directly connected peer establishes BGP while lower-TTL spoofed probes fail the session check.
Cisco IOS, IOS XE, and IOS XR have different configuration parsers and service process architectures. Evidence of that behavior would not establish the required outcome here. The case-specific failure is: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication. A passing check should show: The authorized directly connected peer establishes BGP while lower-TTL spoofed probes fail the session check.