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Exam Code: 350-501

Exam Name Implementing and Operating Cisco Service Provider Network Core Technologies (SPCOR)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certifications: CCIE Service Provider , CCNP Service Provider

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Implementing and Operating Cisco Service Provider Network Core Technologies (SPCOR) (350-501) Practice Tests

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Cisco 350-501 Practice Test 8

Question 70

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: An EBGP session with a directly connected upstream must resist spoofed nonadjacent TCP connection attempts. Which observable result most directly verifies that this network issue was resolved?

  1. Throughput and packet-loss tests show the relevant NIC bottleneck is relieved without breaching host limits.
  2. Capacity tests differentiate aggregate class treatment from a reserved flow's guaranteed resources.
  3. A supported IOS policy is accepted and route-policy behavior matches the intended test prefixes.
  4. The authorized directly connected peer establishes BGP while lower-TTL spoofed probes fail the session check.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: An EBGP session with a directly connected upstream must resist spoofed nonadjacent TCP connection attempts. The most directly supported response is: Use supported BGP TTL security and peer authentication consistent with the direct-neighbor design. Technical basis: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication. Evidence of success: The authorized directly connected peer establishes BGP while lower-TTL spoofed probes fail the session check. Ongoing protection: Validate hop assumptions and rotate routing authentication secrets under change control.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That observation tests a different mechanism: VNF performance depends on physical and virtual I/O paths as well as compute allocation. It cannot establish this case, whose mechanism is: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication. The needed verification is: The authorized directly connected peer establishes BGP while lower-TTL spoofed probes fail the session check.

B:

DiffServ offers scalable class-based relative behavior while IntServ relies on individual resource reservation. Evidence of that behavior would not establish the required outcome here. The case-specific failure is: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication. A passing check should show: The authorized directly connected peer establishes BGP while lower-TTL spoofed probes fail the session check.

C:

Cisco IOS, IOS XE, and IOS XR have different configuration parsers and service process architectures. Evidence of that behavior would not establish the required outcome here. The case-specific failure is: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication. A passing check should show: The authorized directly connected peer establishes BGP while lower-TTL spoofed probes fail the session check.

Question 71

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: An EBGP session with a directly connected upstream must resist spoofed nonadjacent TCP connection attempts. Which underlying network infrastructure principle best explains the situation?

  1. IOS XR supports a modular architecture in which package and process handling differs from monolithic IOS.
  2. Routed optical architectures bring optical transport functions closer to IP routing control and operations.
  3. NFVI provides the virtualized resources on which individual VNF workloads depend.
  4. BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: An EBGP session with a directly connected upstream must resist spoofed nonadjacent TCP connection attempts. The most directly supported response is: Use supported BGP TTL security and peer authentication consistent with the direct-neighbor design. Technical basis: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication. Evidence of success: The authorized directly connected peer establishes BGP while lower-TTL spoofed probes fail the session check. Ongoing protection: Validate hop assumptions and rotate routing authentication secrets under change control.

Incorrect Answers

A:

IOS XR supports a modular architecture in which package and process handling differs from monolithic IOS. That is not the causal relationship tested by the current facts. The relevant principle is: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication.

B:

Routed optical architectures bring optical transport functions closer to IP routing control and operations. That is not the causal relationship tested by the current facts. The relevant principle is: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication.

C:

NFVI provides the virtualized resources on which individual VNF workloads depend. That is not the causal relationship tested by the current facts. The relevant principle is: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication.

Question 72

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: An EBGP session with a directly connected upstream must resist spoofed nonadjacent TCP connection attempts. Which continuing control best reduces recurrence of this problem?

  1. Maintain platform-specific command templates and automated syntax validation.
  2. Validate hop assumptions and rotate routing authentication secrets under change control.
  3. Check imposed label traffic classes and egress disposition in multilabel service tests.
  4. Track split ratio, optical power, and subscriber contention during service growth.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: An EBGP session with a directly connected upstream must resist spoofed nonadjacent TCP connection attempts. The most directly supported response is: Use supported BGP TTL security and peer authentication consistent with the direct-neighbor design. Technical basis: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication. Evidence of success: The authorized directly connected peer establishes BGP while lower-TTL spoofed probes fail the session check. Ongoing protection: Validate hop assumptions and rotate routing authentication secrets under change control.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Cisco IOS, IOS XE, and IOS XR have different configuration parsers and service process architectures. Maintaining that control would not track the failure described here. The relevant risk is: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication. Review this instead: Validate hop assumptions and rotate routing authentication secrets under change control.

C:

Short-pipe separates MPLS domain QoS treatment from customer IP QoS marking preservation. Maintaining that control would not track the failure described here. The relevant risk is: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication. Review this instead: Validate hop assumptions and rotate routing authentication secrets under change control.

D:

The alternative guards against: Passive optical networking multiplexes subscriber access over a shared optical distribution network. The root condition for this case is: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication. The focused prevention check is: Validate hop assumptions and rotate routing authentication secrets under change control.

Question 73

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: A provider edge imports BGP routes from a new customer but unintended prefix types and excessive routes consume memory. What is the best authorized corrective or investigative action for this service-provider network operations situation?

  1. Choose an E-Line Ethernet service with explicit service endpoints and service-level objectives.
  2. Clarify that DiffServ aggregates traffic classes and add explicit admission or reservation mechanisms if per-flow guarantees are mandatory.
  3. Bind the API to an approved management path with TLS and authenticated least-privilege identities.
  4. Install explicit peer prefix acceptance and route limits before enabling the session.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: A provider edge imports BGP routes from a new customer but unintended prefix types and excessive routes consume memory. The most directly supported response is: Install explicit peer prefix acceptance and route limits before enabling the session. Technical basis: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy. Evidence of success: The inbound routing table contains only approved customer prefixes and excess advertisements trigger defined limits. Ongoing protection: Review advertised and accepted prefix counts after every customer change.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The proposed option addresses this separate mechanism: E-Line provides a virtual point-to-point Ethernet connection across a provider transport network. The stated problem instead depends on: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy. The required response is: Install explicit peer prefix acceptance and route limits before enabling the session.

B:

The proposed option addresses this separate mechanism: DiffServ offers scalable class-based relative behavior while IntServ relies on individual resource reservation. The stated problem instead depends on: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy. The required response is: Install explicit peer prefix acceptance and route limits before enabling the session.

C:

The option fits a control for: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization. The present failure is caused by a different mechanism: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy. The targeted implementation is: Install explicit peer prefix acceptance and route limits before enabling the session.

Question 74

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: A provider edge imports BGP routes from a new customer but unintended prefix types and excessive routes consume memory. Which observable result most directly verifies that this network issue was resolved?

  1. Ethernet service tests show one authorized point-to-point connection without exposing another tenant's frames.
  2. The inbound routing table contains only approved customer prefixes and excess advertisements trigger defined limits.
  3. Unauthorized requests are rejected and approved changes appear with attributable audit records.
  4. The egress IP DSCP is preserved while core hops schedule packets using the agreed MPLS traffic class.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: A provider edge imports BGP routes from a new customer but unintended prefix types and excessive routes consume memory. The most directly supported response is: Install explicit peer prefix acceptance and route limits before enabling the session. Technical basis: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy. Evidence of success: The inbound routing table contains only approved customer prefixes and excess advertisements trigger defined limits. Ongoing protection: Review advertised and accepted prefix counts after every customer change.

Incorrect Answers

A:

E-Line provides a virtual point-to-point Ethernet connection across a provider transport network. Evidence of that behavior would not establish the required outcome here. The case-specific failure is: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy. A passing check should show: The inbound routing table contains only approved customer prefixes and excess advertisements trigger defined limits.

C:

The proposed test would be relevant to: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization. The reported problem follows from: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy. Instead, verify: The inbound routing table contains only approved customer prefixes and excess advertisements trigger defined limits.

D:

The proposed test would be relevant to: Short-pipe separates MPLS domain QoS treatment from customer IP QoS marking preservation. The reported problem follows from: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy. Instead, verify: The inbound routing table contains only approved customer prefixes and excess advertisements trigger defined limits.

Question 75

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: A provider edge imports BGP routes from a new customer but unintended prefix types and excessive routes consume memory. Which underlying network infrastructure principle best explains the situation?

  1. VNF performance depends on physical and virtual I/O paths as well as compute allocation.
  2. Segment routing encodes path instructions in segments rather than relying on per-hop RSVP signaling.
  3. BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy.
  4. IOS XR supports a modular architecture in which package and process handling differs from monolithic IOS.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: A provider edge imports BGP routes from a new customer but unintended prefix types and excessive routes consume memory. The most directly supported response is: Install explicit peer prefix acceptance and route limits before enabling the session. Technical basis: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy. Evidence of success: The inbound routing table contains only approved customer prefixes and excess advertisements trigger defined limits. Ongoing protection: Review advertised and accepted prefix counts after every customer change.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The option explains a separate issue: VNF performance depends on physical and virtual I/O paths as well as compute allocation. The reported condition instead follows from: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy.

B:

The option explains a separate issue: Segment routing encodes path instructions in segments rather than relying on per-hop RSVP signaling. The reported condition instead follows from: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy.

D:

The option explains a separate issue: IOS XR supports a modular architecture in which package and process handling differs from monolithic IOS. The reported condition instead follows from: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy.

Question 76

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: A provider edge imports BGP routes from a new customer but unintended prefix types and excessive routes consume memory. Which continuing control best reduces recurrence of this problem?

  1. Require security approval, route limits, and a time-bound blackhole withdrawal.
  2. Review advertised and accepted prefix counts after every customer change.
  3. Audit SID consistency and policy-to-topology reachability after IGP changes.
  4. Benchmark realistic packet sizes and virtual NIC placement before scaling.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: A provider edge imports BGP routes from a new customer but unintended prefix types and excessive routes consume memory. The most directly supported response is: Install explicit peer prefix acceptance and route limits before enabling the session. Technical basis: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy. Evidence of success: The inbound routing table contains only approved customer prefixes and excess advertisements trigger defined limits. Ongoing protection: Review advertised and accepted prefix counts after every customer change.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The alternative guards against: RTBH uses routing policy to steer selected attack traffic to a drop next hop. The root condition for this case is: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy. The focused prevention check is: Review advertised and accepted prefix counts after every customer change.

C:

The alternative guards against: Segment routing encodes path instructions in segments rather than relying on per-hop RSVP signaling. The root condition for this case is: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy. The focused prevention check is: Review advertised and accepted prefix counts after every customer change.

D:

That recurring practice manages a separate exposure: VNF performance depends on physical and virtual I/O paths as well as compute allocation. The present case instead depends on: BGP prefix filtering and suppression constrain what peers can inject into routing policy. The suitable ongoing safeguard is: Review advertised and accepted prefix counts after every customer change.

Question 77

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: A provider enables BGP FlowSpec for DDoS mitigation but a remote route server could inject overly broad traffic discards. What is the best authorized corrective or investigative action for this service-provider network operations situation?

  1. Profile the VNF packet datapath and attach it to a supported high-throughput virtual NIC configuration.
  2. Constrain FlowSpec acceptance to authenticated authorized peers and validate action and prefix scope.
  3. Clarify that DiffServ aggregates traffic classes and add explicit admission or reservation mechanisms if per-flow guarantees are mandatory.
  4. Plan DWDM wavelength and optical-layer capacity separately from Ethernet service tagging and IP forwarding.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: A provider enables BGP FlowSpec for DDoS mitigation but a remote route server could inject overly broad traffic discards. The most directly supported response is: Constrain FlowSpec acceptance to authenticated authorized peers and validate action and prefix scope. Technical basis: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. Evidence of success: A test mitigation rule applies only to the intended attack traffic and unauthorized broad actions are rejected. Ongoing protection: Set rule expiry, approval logs, and an emergency withdrawal procedure.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The option fits a control for: VNF performance depends on physical and virtual I/O paths as well as compute allocation. The present failure is caused by a different mechanism: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. The targeted implementation is: Constrain FlowSpec acceptance to authenticated authorized peers and validate action and prefix scope.

C:

DiffServ offers scalable class-based relative behavior while IntServ relies on individual resource reservation. That principle governs the alternative intervention. The issue described here is different: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. The case-matched corrective action is: Constrain FlowSpec acceptance to authenticated authorized peers and validate action and prefix scope.

D:

DWDM multiplexes optical channels, while Ethernet VLAN tags distinguish packet-level service membership. That principle governs the alternative intervention. The issue described here is different: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. The case-matched corrective action is: Constrain FlowSpec acceptance to authenticated authorized peers and validate action and prefix scope.

Question 78

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: A provider enables BGP FlowSpec for DDoS mitigation but a remote route server could inject overly broad traffic discards. Which observable result most directly verifies that this network issue was resolved?

  1. A test mitigation rule applies only to the intended attack traffic and unauthorized broad actions are rejected.
  2. Packets with the same flow label still receive only the treatment assigned by policy and queue configuration.
  3. Discard counters rise for the victim destination while neighboring prefixes keep forwarding normally.
  4. Throughput and packet-loss tests show the relevant NIC bottleneck is relieved without breaching host limits.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: A provider enables BGP FlowSpec for DDoS mitigation but a remote route server could inject overly broad traffic discards. The most directly supported response is: Constrain FlowSpec acceptance to authenticated authorized peers and validate action and prefix scope. Technical basis: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. Evidence of success: A test mitigation rule applies only to the intended attack traffic and unauthorized broad actions are rejected. Ongoing protection: Set rule expiry, approval logs, and an emergency withdrawal procedure.

Incorrect Answers

B:

That observation tests a different mechanism: The IPv6 flow label identifies related packet flows but does not itself reserve forwarding resources. It cannot establish this case, whose mechanism is: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. The needed verification is: A test mitigation rule applies only to the intended attack traffic and unauthorized broad actions are rejected.

C:

That observation tests a different mechanism: RTBH uses routing policy to steer selected attack traffic to a drop next hop. It cannot establish this case, whose mechanism is: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. The needed verification is: A test mitigation rule applies only to the intended attack traffic and unauthorized broad actions are rejected.

D:

That observation tests a different mechanism: VNF performance depends on physical and virtual I/O paths as well as compute allocation. It cannot establish this case, whose mechanism is: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. The needed verification is: A test mitigation rule applies only to the intended attack traffic and unauthorized broad actions are rejected.

Question 79

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: A provider enables BGP FlowSpec for DDoS mitigation but a remote route server could inject overly broad traffic discards. Which underlying network infrastructure principle best explains the situation?

  1. BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled.
  2. Cisco IOS, IOS XE, and IOS XR have different configuration parsers and service process architectures.
  3. DDoS traceback correlates network observations; a source IP alone may not reveal the true ingress path.
  4. Short-pipe separates MPLS domain QoS treatment from customer IP QoS marking preservation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: A provider enables BGP FlowSpec for DDoS mitigation but a remote route server could inject overly broad traffic discards. The most directly supported response is: Constrain FlowSpec acceptance to authenticated authorized peers and validate action and prefix scope. Technical basis: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. Evidence of success: A test mitigation rule applies only to the intended attack traffic and unauthorized broad actions are rejected. Ongoing protection: Set rule expiry, approval logs, and an emergency withdrawal procedure.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The alternative principle describes: Cisco IOS, IOS XE, and IOS XR have different configuration parsers and service process architectures. In this question, the decisive mechanism is: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. These are distinct technical causes, even when they share a platform.

C:

The alternative principle describes: DDoS traceback correlates network observations; a source IP alone may not reveal the true ingress path. In this question, the decisive mechanism is: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. These are distinct technical causes, even when they share a platform.

D:

The alternative principle describes: Short-pipe separates MPLS domain QoS treatment from customer IP QoS marking preservation. In this question, the decisive mechanism is: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. These are distinct technical causes, even when they share a platform.

Question 80

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: A provider enables BGP FlowSpec for DDoS mitigation but a remote route server could inject overly broad traffic discards. Which continuing control best reduces recurrence of this problem?

  1. Set rule expiry, approval logs, and an emergency withdrawal procedure.
  2. Review privilege assignments and fallback access under routine audits.
  3. Benchmark realistic packet sizes and virtual NIC placement before scaling.
  4. Validate endpoint membership, OAM continuity, and tenant separation at provisioning and renewal.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: A provider enables BGP FlowSpec for DDoS mitigation but a remote route server could inject overly broad traffic discards. The most directly supported response is: Constrain FlowSpec acceptance to authenticated authorized peers and validate action and prefix scope. Technical basis: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. Evidence of success: A test mitigation rule applies only to the intended attack traffic and unauthorized broad actions are rejected. Ongoing protection: Set rule expiry, approval logs, and an emergency withdrawal procedure.

Incorrect Answers

B:

That recurring practice manages a separate exposure: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration. The present case instead depends on: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. The suitable ongoing safeguard is: Set rule expiry, approval logs, and an emergency withdrawal procedure.

C:

That recurring practice manages a separate exposure: VNF performance depends on physical and virtual I/O paths as well as compute allocation. The present case instead depends on: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. The suitable ongoing safeguard is: Set rule expiry, approval logs, and an emergency withdrawal procedure.

D:

E-Line provides a virtual point-to-point Ethernet connection across a provider transport network. Maintaining that control would not track the failure described here. The relevant risk is: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. Review this instead: Set rule expiry, approval logs, and an emergency withdrawal procedure.