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Exam Code: 350-501

Exam Name Implementing and Operating Cisco Service Provider Network Core Technologies (SPCOR)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certifications: CCIE Service Provider , CCNP Service Provider

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Implementing and Operating Cisco Service Provider Network Core Technologies (SPCOR) (350-501) Practice Tests

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Cisco 350-501 Practice Test 9

Question 80

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: A provider enables BGP FlowSpec for DDoS mitigation but a remote route server could inject overly broad traffic discards. Which continuing control best reduces recurrence of this problem?

  1. Set rule expiry, approval logs, and an emergency withdrawal procedure.
  2. Review privilege assignments and fallback access under routine audits.
  3. Benchmark realistic packet sizes and virtual NIC placement before scaling.
  4. Validate endpoint membership, OAM continuity, and tenant separation at provisioning and renewal.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: A provider enables BGP FlowSpec for DDoS mitigation but a remote route server could inject overly broad traffic discards. The most directly supported response is: Constrain FlowSpec acceptance to authenticated authorized peers and validate action and prefix scope. Technical basis: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. Evidence of success: A test mitigation rule applies only to the intended attack traffic and unauthorized broad actions are rejected. Ongoing protection: Set rule expiry, approval logs, and an emergency withdrawal procedure.

Incorrect Answers

B:

That recurring practice manages a separate exposure: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration. The present case instead depends on: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. The suitable ongoing safeguard is: Set rule expiry, approval logs, and an emergency withdrawal procedure.

C:

That recurring practice manages a separate exposure: VNF performance depends on physical and virtual I/O paths as well as compute allocation. The present case instead depends on: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. The suitable ongoing safeguard is: Set rule expiry, approval logs, and an emergency withdrawal procedure.

D:

E-Line provides a virtual point-to-point Ethernet connection across a provider transport network. Maintaining that control would not track the failure described here. The relevant risk is: BGP FlowSpec distributes traffic-filtering rules whose policy scope must be explicitly controlled. Review this instead: Set rule expiry, approval logs, and an emergency withdrawal procedure.

Question 81

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: An engineer grants a common shared administrator credential across hundreds of provider routers without command accountability. What is the best authorized corrective or investigative action for this service-provider network operations situation?

  1. Apply the documented IOS XR package and process lifecycle under a maintenance and rollback plan.
  2. Choose an E-Line Ethernet service with explicit service endpoints and service-level objectives.
  3. Use per-user AAA with TACACS+ authorization and command accounting for supported management access.
  4. Apply controlled remotely triggered blackhole routing with narrowly scoped destination filtering.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: An engineer grants a common shared administrator credential across hundreds of provider routers without command accountability. The most directly supported response is: Use per-user AAA with TACACS+ authorization and command accounting for supported management access. Technical basis: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration. Evidence of success: A privileged configuration action maps to one authenticated operator and approved role. Ongoing protection: Review privilege assignments and fallback access under routine audits.

Incorrect Answers

A:

IOS XR supports a modular architecture in which package and process handling differs from monolithic IOS. That principle governs the alternative intervention. The issue described here is different: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration. The case-matched corrective action is: Use per-user AAA with TACACS+ authorization and command accounting for supported management access.

B:

E-Line provides a virtual point-to-point Ethernet connection across a provider transport network. That principle governs the alternative intervention. The issue described here is different: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration. The case-matched corrective action is: Use per-user AAA with TACACS+ authorization and command accounting for supported management access.

D:

The proposed option addresses this separate mechanism: RTBH uses routing policy to steer selected attack traffic to a drop next hop. The stated problem instead depends on: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration. The required response is: Use per-user AAA with TACACS+ authorization and command accounting for supported management access.

Question 82

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: An engineer grants a common shared administrator credential across hundreds of provider routers without command accountability. Which observable result most directly verifies that this network issue was resolved?

  1. The targeted component is updated with verified routing process health and no unexpected forwarding loss.
  2. Link engineering documents show wavelength allocation and measured optical reach for each routed handoff.
  3. A privileged configuration action maps to one authenticated operator and approved role.
  4. Spoofed source tests fail while legitimate asymmetric return paths remain reachable under the chosen mode.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: An engineer grants a common shared administrator credential across hundreds of provider routers without command accountability. The most directly supported response is: Use per-user AAA with TACACS+ authorization and command accounting for supported management access. Technical basis: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration. Evidence of success: A privileged configuration action maps to one authenticated operator and approved role. Ongoing protection: Review privilege assignments and fallback access under routine audits.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That observation tests a different mechanism: IOS XR supports a modular architecture in which package and process handling differs from monolithic IOS. It cannot establish this case, whose mechanism is: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration. The needed verification is: A privileged configuration action maps to one authenticated operator and approved role.

B:

DWDM multiplexes optical channels, while Ethernet VLAN tags distinguish packet-level service membership. Evidence of that behavior would not establish the required outcome here. The case-specific failure is: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration. A passing check should show: A privileged configuration action maps to one authenticated operator and approved role.

D:

Strict uRPF can reject valid asymmetric traffic because it expects the best return path on the same interface. Evidence of that behavior would not establish the required outcome here. The case-specific failure is: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration. A passing check should show: A privileged configuration action maps to one authenticated operator and approved role.

Question 83

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: An engineer grants a common shared administrator credential across hundreds of provider routers without command accountability. Which underlying network infrastructure principle best explains the situation?

  1. IOS XE separates its network control features from any underlying host facilities exposed to operators.
  2. VNF performance depends on physical and virtual I/O paths as well as compute allocation.
  3. Fronthaul and midhaul interfaces can have tighter timing and delay bounds than general backhaul.
  4. AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: An engineer grants a common shared administrator credential across hundreds of provider routers without command accountability. The most directly supported response is: Use per-user AAA with TACACS+ authorization and command accounting for supported management access. Technical basis: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration. Evidence of success: A privileged configuration action maps to one authenticated operator and approved role. Ongoing protection: Review privilege assignments and fallback access under routine audits.

Incorrect Answers

A:

IOS XE separates its network control features from any underlying host facilities exposed to operators. That is not the causal relationship tested by the current facts. The relevant principle is: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration.

B:

VNF performance depends on physical and virtual I/O paths as well as compute allocation. That is not the causal relationship tested by the current facts. The relevant principle is: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration.

C:

Fronthaul and midhaul interfaces can have tighter timing and delay bounds than general backhaul. That is not the causal relationship tested by the current facts. The relevant principle is: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration.

Question 84

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: An engineer grants a common shared administrator credential across hundreds of provider routers without command accountability. Which continuing control best reduces recurrence of this problem?

  1. Test restart, rolling update, and data retention under operational failure conditions.
  2. Review privilege assignments and fallback access under routine audits.
  3. Measure timing distribution and packet-delay variation continuously for radio transport slices.
  4. Document bandwidth guarantees and capacity thresholds in service admission policies.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: An engineer grants a common shared administrator credential across hundreds of provider routers without command accountability. The most directly supported response is: Use per-user AAA with TACACS+ authorization and command accounting for supported management access. Technical basis: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration. Evidence of success: A privileged configuration action maps to one authenticated operator and approved role. Ongoing protection: Review privilege assignments and fallback access under routine audits.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Containers package application processes while storage durability must be designed independently. Maintaining that control would not track the failure described here. The relevant risk is: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration. Review this instead: Review privilege assignments and fallback access under routine audits.

C:

Fronthaul and midhaul interfaces can have tighter timing and delay bounds than general backhaul. Maintaining that control would not track the failure described here. The relevant risk is: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration. Review this instead: Review privilege assignments and fallback access under routine audits.

D:

The alternative guards against: DiffServ offers scalable class-based relative behavior while IntServ relies on individual resource reservation. The root condition for this case is: AAA separates authentication, authorization, and accounting while TACACS+ supports centralized device administration. The focused prevention check is: Review privilege assignments and fallback access under routine audits.

Question 85

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: A provisioning portal publishes a router REST API on an unencrypted public interface with no request authorization. What is the best authorized corrective or investigative action for this service-provider network operations situation?

  1. Bind the API to an approved management path with TLS and authenticated least-privilege identities.
  2. Clarify that DiffServ aggregates traffic classes and add explicit admission or reservation mechanisms if per-flow guarantees are mandatory.
  3. Apply the documented IOS XR package and process lifecycle under a maintenance and rollback plan.
  4. Plan DWDM wavelength and optical-layer capacity separately from Ethernet service tagging and IP forwarding.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: A provisioning portal publishes a router REST API on an unencrypted public interface with no request authorization. The most directly supported response is: Bind the API to an approved management path with TLS and authenticated least-privilege identities. Technical basis: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization. Evidence of success: Unauthorized requests are rejected and approved changes appear with attributable audit records. Ongoing protection: Test API certificate expiry, scope restrictions, and management reachability quarterly.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The proposed option addresses this separate mechanism: DiffServ offers scalable class-based relative behavior while IntServ relies on individual resource reservation. The stated problem instead depends on: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization. The required response is: Bind the API to an approved management path with TLS and authenticated least-privilege identities.

C:

The option fits a control for: IOS XR supports a modular architecture in which package and process handling differs from monolithic IOS. The present failure is caused by a different mechanism: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization. The targeted implementation is: Bind the API to an approved management path with TLS and authenticated least-privilege identities.

D:

The option fits a control for: DWDM multiplexes optical channels, while Ethernet VLAN tags distinguish packet-level service membership. The present failure is caused by a different mechanism: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization. The targeted implementation is: Bind the API to an approved management path with TLS and authenticated least-privilege identities.

Question 86

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: A provisioning portal publishes a router REST API on an unencrypted public interface with no request authorization. Which observable result most directly verifies that this network issue was resolved?

  1. Spoofed source tests fail while legitimate asymmetric return paths remain reachable under the chosen mode.
  2. Throughput and packet-loss tests show the relevant NIC bottleneck is relieved without breaching host limits.
  3. Unauthorized requests are rejected and approved changes appear with attributable audit records.
  4. A supported IOS policy is accepted and route-policy behavior matches the intended test prefixes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: A provisioning portal publishes a router REST API on an unencrypted public interface with no request authorization. The most directly supported response is: Bind the API to an approved management path with TLS and authenticated least-privilege identities. Technical basis: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization. Evidence of success: Unauthorized requests are rejected and approved changes appear with attributable audit records. Ongoing protection: Test API certificate expiry, scope restrictions, and management reachability quarterly.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Strict uRPF can reject valid asymmetric traffic because it expects the best return path on the same interface. Evidence of that behavior would not establish the required outcome here. The case-specific failure is: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization. A passing check should show: Unauthorized requests are rejected and approved changes appear with attributable audit records.

B:

The proposed test would be relevant to: VNF performance depends on physical and virtual I/O paths as well as compute allocation. The reported problem follows from: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization. Instead, verify: Unauthorized requests are rejected and approved changes appear with attributable audit records.

D:

The proposed test would be relevant to: Cisco IOS, IOS XE, and IOS XR have different configuration parsers and service process architectures. The reported problem follows from: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization. Instead, verify: Unauthorized requests are rejected and approved changes appear with attributable audit records.

Question 87

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: A provisioning portal publishes a router REST API on an unencrypted public interface with no request authorization. Which underlying network infrastructure principle best explains the situation?

  1. Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization.
  2. IOS XR supports a modular architecture in which package and process handling differs from monolithic IOS.
  3. Strict uRPF can reject valid asymmetric traffic because it expects the best return path on the same interface.
  4. Passive optical networking multiplexes subscriber access over a shared optical distribution network.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: A provisioning portal publishes a router REST API on an unencrypted public interface with no request authorization. The most directly supported response is: Bind the API to an approved management path with TLS and authenticated least-privilege identities. Technical basis: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization. Evidence of success: Unauthorized requests are rejected and approved changes appear with attributable audit records. Ongoing protection: Test API certificate expiry, scope restrictions, and management reachability quarterly.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The option explains a separate issue: IOS XR supports a modular architecture in which package and process handling differs from monolithic IOS. The reported condition instead follows from: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization.

C:

The option explains a separate issue: Strict uRPF can reject valid asymmetric traffic because it expects the best return path on the same interface. The reported condition instead follows from: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization.

D:

The option explains a separate issue: Passive optical networking multiplexes subscriber access over a shared optical distribution network. The reported condition instead follows from: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization.

Question 88

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: A provisioning portal publishes a router REST API on an unencrypted public interface with no request authorization. Which continuing control best reduces recurrence of this problem?

  1. Test API certificate expiry, scope restrictions, and management reachability quarterly.
  2. Test reverse-path lookup behavior against all active policy routes before enforcing anti-spoofing.
  3. Review end-to-end classification rules rather than equating flow identifiers with QoS guarantees.
  4. Maintain platform-specific command templates and automated syntax validation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: A provisioning portal publishes a router REST API on an unencrypted public interface with no request authorization. The most directly supported response is: Bind the API to an approved management path with TLS and authenticated least-privilege identities. Technical basis: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization. Evidence of success: Unauthorized requests are rejected and approved changes appear with attributable audit records. Ongoing protection: Test API certificate expiry, scope restrictions, and management reachability quarterly.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The alternative guards against: Strict uRPF can reject valid asymmetric traffic because it expects the best return path on the same interface. The root condition for this case is: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization. The focused prevention check is: Test API certificate expiry, scope restrictions, and management reachability quarterly.

C:

The alternative guards against: The IPv6 flow label identifies related packet flows but does not itself reserve forwarding resources. The root condition for this case is: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization. The focused prevention check is: Test API certificate expiry, scope restrictions, and management reachability quarterly.

D:

That recurring practice manages a separate exposure: Cisco IOS, IOS XE, and IOS XR have different configuration parsers and service process architectures. The present case instead depends on: Management API exposure is a separate attack surface requiring transport security and authorization. The suitable ongoing safeguard is: Test API certificate expiry, scope restrictions, and management reachability quarterly.

Question 89

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: During a distributed denial-of-service incident, operators cannot determine which upstream path originated the flood traffic. What is the best authorized corrective or investigative action for this service-provider network operations situation?

  1. Coordinate flow telemetry and supported traceback observations with upstream providers before selecting mitigation points.
  2. Configure supported MACsec on both ends with compatible key management and cipher capabilities.
  3. Choose an E-Line Ethernet service with explicit service endpoints and service-level objectives.
  4. Apply supported control-plane policing or LPTS rate controls for approved BGP neighbor traffic.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: During a distributed denial-of-service incident, operators cannot determine which upstream path originated the flood traffic. The most directly supported response is: Coordinate flow telemetry and supported traceback observations with upstream providers before selecting mitigation points. Technical basis: DDoS traceback correlates network observations; a source IP alone may not reveal the true ingress path. Evidence of success: Flow records and ingress interface evidence identify the likely inbound attack path. Ongoing protection: Retain sampled flow data and contact procedures for mitigation partners.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The option fits a control for: MACsec provides link-layer confidentiality and integrity for Ethernet hop-by-hop connections. The present failure is caused by a different mechanism: DDoS traceback correlates network observations; a source IP alone may not reveal the true ingress path. The targeted implementation is: Coordinate flow telemetry and supported traceback observations with upstream providers before selecting mitigation points.

C:

E-Line provides a virtual point-to-point Ethernet connection across a provider transport network. That principle governs the alternative intervention. The issue described here is different: DDoS traceback correlates network observations; a source IP alone may not reveal the true ingress path. The case-matched corrective action is: Coordinate flow telemetry and supported traceback observations with upstream providers before selecting mitigation points.

D:

CoPP and IOS XR LPTS protect router control-plane input from excessive or untrusted packets. That principle governs the alternative intervention. The issue described here is different: DDoS traceback correlates network observations; a source IP alone may not reveal the true ingress path. The case-matched corrective action is: Coordinate flow telemetry and supported traceback observations with upstream providers before selecting mitigation points.

Question 90

Original unofficial Cisco 350-501 SPCOR v1.1 service-provider network operations scenario: During a distributed denial-of-service incident, operators cannot determine which upstream path originated the flood traffic. Which observable result most directly verifies that this network issue was resolved?

  1. NETCONF or supported CLI queries report the intended interface and routing configuration.
  2. Flow records and ingress interface evidence identify the likely inbound attack path.
  3. The authorized directly connected peer establishes BGP while lower-TTL spoofed probes fail the session check.
  4. Capacity tests differentiate aggregate class treatment from a reserved flow's guaranteed resources.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For this scenario, the observed situation is: During a distributed denial-of-service incident, operators cannot determine which upstream path originated the flood traffic. The most directly supported response is: Coordinate flow telemetry and supported traceback observations with upstream providers before selecting mitigation points. Technical basis: DDoS traceback correlates network observations; a source IP alone may not reveal the true ingress path. Evidence of success: Flow records and ingress interface evidence identify the likely inbound attack path. Ongoing protection: Retain sampled flow data and contact procedures for mitigation partners.

Incorrect Answers

A:

The proposed test would be relevant to: IOS XE separates its network control features from any underlying host facilities exposed to operators. The reported problem follows from: DDoS traceback correlates network observations; a source IP alone may not reveal the true ingress path. Instead, verify: Flow records and ingress interface evidence identify the likely inbound attack path.

C:

That observation tests a different mechanism: BGP TTL security relies on expected hop distance and complements transport-level authentication. It cannot establish this case, whose mechanism is: DDoS traceback correlates network observations; a source IP alone may not reveal the true ingress path. The needed verification is: Flow records and ingress interface evidence identify the likely inbound attack path.

D:

That observation tests a different mechanism: DiffServ offers scalable class-based relative behavior while IntServ relies on individual resource reservation. It cannot establish this case, whose mechanism is: DDoS traceback correlates network observations; a source IP alone may not reveal the true ingress path. The needed verification is: Flow records and ingress interface evidence identify the likely inbound attack path.