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Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 11

Question 100

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: A wired EAP-TLS client presents a certificate from an untrusted private CA, and an engineer edits the AD password policy instead of the certificate trust path. Which statement best explains why the correct response works?

  1. Identity-store ordering and duplicate account representations can change or block authentication when a username exists in multiple databases.
  2. The ISE internal identity store can validate accounts without relying on an external AD or LDAP directory for the intended test.
  3. MAB identity lookup depends on consistent endpoint MAC representation and correct RADIUS attributes, not an ordinary employee password.
  4. Certificate-based authentication validates X.509 trust, identity extraction, and permitted EAP methods rather than a password lookup alone.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Certificate-based authentication validates X.509 trust, identity extraction, and permitted EAP methods rather than a password lookup alone. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Install and trust the approved issuing CA chain in ISE and configure an appropriate certificate authentication profile and EAP-TLS policy. The acceptance result is: The approved client certificate passes validation while a certificate from an unknown CA fails.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Alert on ISE node time drift and authoritative NTP reachability. The repeat risk here is different: Audit overlapping account namespaces before modifying identity-source sequences. A directly relevant preventive control is: Certificate-based authentication validates X.509 trust, identity extraction, and permitted EAP methods rather than a password lookup alone.

B:

Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls. The repeat risk here is different: Audit overlapping account namespaces before modifying identity-source sequences. A directly relevant preventive control is: Certificate-based authentication validates X.509 trust, identity extraction, and permitted EAP methods rather than a password lookup alone.

C:

Normalize and validate the NAD's MAC calling-station identifier format against ISE's accepted endpoint identity handling. The repeat risk here is different: Audit overlapping account namespaces before modifying identity-source sequences. A directly relevant preventive control is: Certificate-based authentication validates X.509 trust, identity extraction, and permitted EAP methods rather than a password lookup alone.

Question 101

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: A wired EAP-TLS client presents a certificate from an untrusted private CA, and an engineer edits the AD password policy instead of the certificate trust path. Which observation would BEST verify successful remediation?

  1. A pilot certificate maps to the intended user and produces the correct restricted or permitted authorization result.
  2. A pilot identity is resolved by the intended external or internal source with a traceable authentication result.
  3. The PSN joins the intended domain and a known AD test account authenticates through the correct identity source.
  4. The approved client certificate passes validation while a certificate from an unknown CA fails.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The approved client certificate passes validation while a certificate from an unknown CA fails. The required remediation is: Install and trust the approved issuing CA chain in ISE and configure an appropriate certificate authentication profile and EAP-TLS policy. It works because certificate-based authentication validates X.509 trust, identity extraction, and permitted EAP methods rather than a password lookup alone.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Document and test certificate naming conventions during enrollment-template changes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls. The needed response is: The approved client certificate passes validation while a certificate from an unknown CA fails.

B:

Audit overlapping account namespaces before modifying identity-source sequences. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls. The needed response is: The approved client certificate passes validation while a certificate from an unknown CA fails.

C:

Include DNS locator and domain connectivity checks in ISE node renumbering. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls. The needed response is: The approved client certificate passes validation while a certificate from an unknown CA fails.

Question 102

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: A wired EAP-TLS client presents a certificate from an untrusted private CA, and an engineer edits the AD password policy instead of the certificate trust path. What should be incorporated into the change checklist?

  1. Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls.
  2. Test external MFA service failures and document secure fail-closed or permitted exception behavior.
  3. Document and test certificate naming conventions during enrollment-template changes.
  4. Reconcile static SGT mappings with server IPAM changes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: Certificate-based authentication validates X.509 trust, identity extraction, and permitted EAP methods rather than a password lookup alone. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The approved client certificate passes validation while a certificate from an unknown CA fails.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Test external MFA service failures and document secure fail-closed or permitted exception behavior. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Document and test certificate naming conventions during enrollment-template changes. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Use approved TrustSec policy distribution and verify that devices receive and enforce the current SGACL definition and matrix updates. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 103

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: An emergency field technician needs a temporary ISE-local test identity for an isolated laboratory where neither AD nor LDAP is reachable. What is the most suitable solution within these constraints?

  1. Create a narrowly scoped ISE internal user and a lab-only authentication policy referencing that local identity store.
  2. Replace the catch-all fallback with an explicit supported identity-store and failure policy that denies unauthorized identities.
  3. Integrate a supported MFA identity provider or method for the specific authentication flow and validate factor challenge and fallback behavior.
  4. Apply an appropriate closed-mode wired 802.1X configuration with necessary tightly controlled exceptions.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Create a narrowly scoped ISE internal user and a lab-only authentication policy referencing that local identity store. This is appropriate because the ISE internal identity store can validate accounts without relying on an external AD or LDAP directory for the intended test. It should be verified by this evidence: The named lab user authenticates in the lab policy while production policy does not accept that account.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Document and test certificate naming conventions during enrollment-template changes. In the case being tested, Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Create a narrowly scoped ISE internal user and a lab-only authentication policy referencing that local identity store.

C:

Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. In the case being tested, Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Create a narrowly scoped ISE internal user and a lab-only authentication policy referencing that local identity store.

D:

Apply an appropriate closed-mode wired 802.1X configuration with necessary tightly controlled exceptions. In the case being tested, Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Create a narrowly scoped ISE internal user and a lab-only authentication policy referencing that local identity store.

Question 104

An enterprise access-control incident describes: An emergency field technician needs a temporary ISE-local test identity for an isolated laboratory where neither AD nor LDAP is reachable. Which platform distinction is decisive in this scenario?

  1. The ISE internal identity store can validate accounts without relying on an external AD or LDAP directory for the intended test.
  2. LDAP and AD identity repositories can expose different account attributes; lookup success depends on the configured schema mapping.
  3. Identity-store ordering and duplicate account representations can change or block authentication when a username exists in multiple databases.
  4. ISE can return an authorization profile with a named downloadable ACL; the NAD enforces what it actually downloads.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The ISE internal identity store can validate accounts without relying on an external AD or LDAP directory for the intended test. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Create a narrowly scoped ISE internal user and a lab-only authentication policy referencing that local identity store. The acceptance result is: The named lab user authenticates in the lab policy while production policy does not accept that account.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Test external MFA service failures and document secure fail-closed or permitted exception behavior. The repeat risk here is different: Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls. A directly relevant preventive control is: The ISE internal identity store can validate accounts without relying on an external AD or LDAP directory for the intended test.

C:

Alert on ISE node time drift and authoritative NTP reachability. The repeat risk here is different: Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls. A directly relevant preventive control is: The ISE internal identity store can validate accounts without relying on an external AD or LDAP directory for the intended test.

D:

Associate the appropriate dACL result with the employee authorization profile and confirm the switch supports its application. The repeat risk here is different: Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls. A directly relevant preventive control is: The ISE internal identity store can validate accounts without relying on an external AD or LDAP directory for the intended test.

Question 105

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: An emergency field technician needs a temporary ISE-local test identity for an isolated laboratory where neither AD nor LDAP is reachable. Which acceptance test would directly establish the desired state?

  1. A pilot certificate maps to the intended user and produces the correct restricted or permitted authorization result.
  2. The known `uid` resolves to its proper directory entry while an unknown account does not authenticate.
  3. A forged address lacks access to sensitive destinations even when it can mimic the printer's MAC identity.
  4. The named lab user authenticates in the lab policy while production policy does not accept that account.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The named lab user authenticates in the lab policy while production policy does not accept that account. The required remediation is: Create a narrowly scoped ISE internal user and a lab-only authentication policy referencing that local identity store. It works because the ISE internal identity store can validate accounts without relying on an external AD or LDAP directory for the intended test.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Document and test certificate naming conventions during enrollment-template changes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. The needed response is: The named lab user authenticates in the lab policy while production policy does not accept that account.

B:

Maintain per-directory schema mapping tests before identity store migrations. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. The needed response is: The named lab user authenticates in the lab policy while production policy does not accept that account.

C:

Reduce the MAB role to least privilege and supplement admission with profiling, port context, or stronger supported controls where feasible. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. The needed response is: The named lab user authenticates in the lab policy while production policy does not accept that account.

Question 106

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: An emergency field technician needs a temporary ISE-local test identity for an isolated laboratory where neither AD nor LDAP is reachable. Which governance step most directly targets the root cause?

  1. Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests.
  2. Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls.
  3. Maintain per-directory schema mapping tests before identity store migrations.
  4. Maintain explicit exit criteria and a dated transition from monitor to enforced modes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: The ISE internal identity store can validate accounts without relying on an external AD or LDAP directory for the intended test. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The named lab user authenticates in the lab policy while production policy does not accept that account.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Track EAP certificate chain, identity mapping, and renewal as distinct controls. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Maintain per-directory schema mapping tests before identity store migrations. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Use a carefully scoped low-impact 802.1X design with a preauthentication ACL limited to required bootstrap services. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 107

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: Remote administrators need a second factor during a supported network access workflow, but policy is configured to validate only a directory password. Which change is justified by the observed evidence?

  1. Install and trust the approved issuing CA chain in ISE and configure an appropriate certificate authentication profile and EAP-TLS policy.
  2. Define a deterministic identity-source sequence or an unambiguous policy to select the intended source, and check for duplicate principal collisions.
  3. Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile.
  4. Integrate a supported MFA identity provider or method for the specific authentication flow and validate factor challenge and fallback behavior.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Integrate a supported MFA identity provider or method for the specific authentication flow and validate factor challenge and fallback behavior. This is appropriate because multifactor authentication adds proof beyond a single password; placing a password-only AD store in a sequence does not create a second factor. It should be verified by this evidence: A pilot access attempt requires and validates the approved second factor, with failed challenges denied.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Audit overlapping account namespaces before modifying identity-source sequences. In the case being tested, Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Integrate a supported MFA identity provider or method for the specific authentication flow and validate factor challenge and fallback behavior.

B:

Alert on ISE node time drift and authoritative NTP reachability. In the case being tested, Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Integrate a supported MFA identity provider or method for the specific authentication flow and validate factor challenge and fallback behavior.

C:

Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. In the case being tested, Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Integrate a supported MFA identity provider or method for the specific authentication flow and validate factor challenge and fallback behavior.

Question 108

An access-security change request states: Remote administrators need a second factor during a supported network access workflow, but policy is configured to validate only a directory password. What mechanism governs this authentication or management outcome?

  1. Certificate-based authentication validates X.509 trust, identity extraction, and permitted EAP methods rather than a password lookup alone.
  2. Multifactor authentication adds proof beyond a single password; placing a password-only AD store in a sequence does not create a second factor.
  3. Identity-store ordering and duplicate account representations can change or block authentication when a username exists in multiple databases.
  4. MAB is a weaker identity signal than cryptographic EAP; permissive default rules let unrecognized devices receive unwarranted access.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Multifactor authentication adds proof beyond a single password; placing a password-only AD store in a sequence does not create a second factor. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Integrate a supported MFA identity provider or method for the specific authentication flow and validate factor challenge and fallback behavior. The acceptance result is: A pilot access attempt requires and validates the approved second factor, with failed challenges denied.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Audit overlapping account namespaces before modifying identity-source sequences. The repeat risk here is different: Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. A directly relevant preventive control is: Multifactor authentication adds proof beyond a single password; placing a password-only AD store in a sequence does not create a second factor.

C:

Alert on ISE node time drift and authoritative NTP reachability. The repeat risk here is different: Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. A directly relevant preventive control is: Multifactor authentication adds proof beyond a single password; placing a password-only AD store in a sequence does not create a second factor.

D:

Replace the catch-all MAB authorization with an explicit known-endpoint group and a deny or isolation result for unknown MACs. The repeat risk here is different: Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. A directly relevant preventive control is: Multifactor authentication adds proof beyond a single password; placing a password-only AD store in a sequence does not create a second factor.

Question 109

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: Remote administrators need a second factor during a supported network access workflow, but policy is configured to validate only a directory password. What is the strongest evidence that this requirement is met?

  1. A pilot certificate maps to the intended user and produces the correct restricted or permitted authorization result.
  2. The named lab user authenticates in the lab policy while production policy does not accept that account.
  3. A test wireless session generates a matching accounting start and stop tied to its authenticated identity.
  4. A pilot access attempt requires and validates the approved second factor, with failed challenges denied.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A pilot access attempt requires and validates the approved second factor, with failed challenges denied. The required remediation is: Integrate a supported MFA identity provider or method for the specific authentication flow and validate factor challenge and fallback behavior. It works because multifactor authentication adds proof beyond a single password; placing a password-only AD store in a sequence does not create a second factor.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Document and test certificate naming conventions during enrollment-template changes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Test external MFA service failures and document secure fail-closed or permitted exception behavior. The needed response is: A pilot access attempt requires and validates the approved second factor, with failed challenges denied.

B:

Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Test external MFA service failures and document secure fail-closed or permitted exception behavior. The needed response is: A pilot access attempt requires and validates the approved second factor, with failed challenges denied.

C:

Monitor accounting packet delivery separately from successful authentication counts. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Test external MFA service failures and document secure fail-closed or permitted exception behavior. The needed response is: A pilot access attempt requires and validates the approved second factor, with failed challenges denied.

Question 110

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: Remote administrators need a second factor during a supported network access workflow, but policy is configured to validate only a directory password. Which recurring operational control would reduce this risk?

  1. Audit overlapping account namespaces before modifying identity-source sequences.
  2. Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests.
  3. Test SSID and network-device-group conditions in each wireless authorization policy set.
  4. Test external MFA service failures and document secure fail-closed or permitted exception behavior.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Test external MFA service failures and document secure fail-closed or permitted exception behavior. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: Multifactor authentication adds proof beyond a single password; placing a password-only AD store in a sequence does not create a second factor. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A pilot access attempt requires and validates the approved second factor, with failed challenges denied.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Test external MFA service failures and document secure fail-closed or permitted exception behavior. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Audit overlapping account namespaces before modifying identity-source sequences. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Test external MFA service failures and document secure fail-closed or permitted exception behavior. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Expire temporary local users and prevent test identity stores from matching production requests. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Test external MFA service failures and document secure fail-closed or permitted exception behavior. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Test SSID and network-device-group conditions in each wireless authorization policy set. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.