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Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE) (300-715) Practice Tests

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 9

Question 80

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: An LDAP-connected subsidiary directory has moved its user objects into a new organizational unit, and all LDAP lookups now return no results despite healthy TLS connectivity. What mechanism governs this authentication or management outcome?

  1. An AD account authentication does not automatically cause every directory group to become available in ISE authorization rules.
  2. Kerberos and certificate-related authentication paths depend on appropriate time consistency; network reachability alone does not eliminate clock-related failures.
  3. Identifying a group is not equivalent to instructing the NAD to apply its authorized VLAN or role; that policy result must be represented in RADIUS attributes.
  4. LDAP search scope and attribute mappings determine whether an otherwise reachable directory returns eligible user records.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

LDAP search scope and attribute mappings determine whether an otherwise reachable directory returns eligible user records. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Update the ISE LDAP identity source search base and matching user object attributes to reflect the directory hierarchy. The acceptance result is: A known user is found under the new search base and an invalid identity is rejected.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Include DNS locator and domain connectivity checks in ISE node renumbering. The repeat risk here is different: Review ISE AD group mappings whenever directory groups are renamed or reorganized. A directly relevant preventive control is: LDAP search scope and attribute mappings determine whether an otherwise reachable directory returns eligible user records.

B:

Run cross-domain sign-in regression tests when adding or replacing PSNs. The repeat risk here is different: Review ISE AD group mappings whenever directory groups are renamed or reorganized. A directly relevant preventive control is: LDAP search scope and attribute mappings determine whether an otherwise reachable directory returns eligible user records.

C:

Return the supported VLAN or role authorization attributes through an appropriate ISE profile selected for contractors. The repeat risk here is different: Review ISE AD group mappings whenever directory groups are renamed or reorganized. A directly relevant preventive control is: LDAP search scope and attribute mappings determine whether an otherwise reachable directory returns eligible user records.

Question 81

A campus and branch network operator reports: An LDAP-connected subsidiary directory has moved its user objects into a new organizational unit, and all LDAP lookups now return no results despite healthy TLS connectivity. What is the strongest evidence that this requirement is met?

  1. A known user is found under the new search base and an invalid identity is rejected.
  2. A test staff user matches the intended group condition while a nonmember receives the lower-privilege policy.
  3. The affected PSN's clock offset falls within policy and the same test user authenticates reliably.
  4. The updated rule blocks the forbidden test flow consistently at two different enforcement points.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A known user is found under the new search base and an invalid identity is rejected. The required remediation is: Update the ISE LDAP identity source search base and matching user object attributes to reflect the directory hierarchy. It works because lDAP search scope and attribute mappings determine whether an otherwise reachable directory returns eligible user records.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Review ISE AD group mappings whenever directory groups are renamed or reorganized. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. The needed response is: A known user is found under the new search base and an invalid identity is rejected.

C:

Alert on ISE node time drift and authoritative NTP reachability. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. The needed response is: A known user is found under the new search base and an invalid identity is rejected.

D:

Use approved TrustSec policy distribution and verify that devices receive and enforce the current SGACL definition and matrix updates. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. The needed response is: A known user is found under the new search base and an invalid identity is rejected.

Question 82

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: An LDAP-connected subsidiary directory has moved its user objects into a new organizational unit, and all LDAP lookups now return no results despite healthy TLS connectivity. Which recurring operational control would reduce this risk?

  1. Alert on ISE node time drift and authoritative NTP reachability.
  2. Run cross-domain sign-in regression tests when adding or replacing PSNs.
  3. Test essential control-plane exceptions before enforcing closed mode at scale.
  4. Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: LDAP search scope and attribute mappings determine whether an otherwise reachable directory returns eligible user records. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A known user is found under the new search base and an invalid identity is rejected.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Alert on ISE node time drift and authoritative NTP reachability. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Run cross-domain sign-in regression tests when adding or replacing PSNs. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Select a supported 802.1X host mode such as multi-domain when one voice endpoint and one data endpoint must authenticate separately. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 83

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: A new LDAP source uses simple bind over an unencrypted connection through a shared WAN, contrary to the organization's password-transport policy. Which administrative action BEST addresses this specific situation?

  1. Update the ISE LDAP identity source search base and matching user object attributes to reflect the directory hierarchy.
  2. Restore AD-aware DNS resolution and reachable domain-controller discovery from the PSN, then retry the supported domain join.
  3. Configure supported LDAP over TLS with a trusted server certificate and the correct bind identity and search configuration.
  4. Select a supported 802.1X host mode such as multi-domain when one voice endpoint and one data endpoint must authenticate separately.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Configure supported LDAP over TLS with a trusted server certificate and the correct bind identity and search configuration. This is appropriate because lDAP authentication can expose credentials when confidentiality is absent; a protected bind path requires TLS trust as well as directory access. It should be verified by this evidence: The PSN binds successfully with certificate validation, and an untrusted server certificate is rejected.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Review ISE AD group mappings whenever directory groups are renamed or reorganized. In the case being tested, Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Configure supported LDAP over TLS with a trusted server certificate and the correct bind identity and search configuration.

B:

Separate initial-node bootstrap rights from production policy-administration privileges. In the case being tested, Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Configure supported LDAP over TLS with a trusted server certificate and the correct bind identity and search configuration.

D:

Select a supported 802.1X host mode such as multi-domain when one voice endpoint and one data endpoint must authenticate separately. In the case being tested, Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Configure supported LDAP over TLS with a trusted server certificate and the correct bind identity and search configuration.

Question 84

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: A new LDAP source uses simple bind over an unencrypted connection through a shared WAN, contrary to the organization's password-transport policy. Which architectural fact determines the appropriate fix?

  1. A distributed policy configuration does not guarantee that every PSN has functioning connectivity and identity-source state for all target domains.
  2. LDAP authentication can expose credentials when confidentiality is absent; a protected bind path requires TLS trust as well as directory access.
  3. LDAP search scope and attribute mappings determine whether an otherwise reachable directory returns eligible user records.
  4. RADIUS session authorization can remain cached on the network access device after ISE's endpoint classification changes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

LDAP authentication can expose credentials when confidentiality is absent; a protected bind path requires TLS trust as well as directory access. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Configure supported LDAP over TLS with a trusted server certificate and the correct bind identity and search configuration. The acceptance result is: The PSN binds successfully with certificate validation, and an untrusted server certificate is rejected.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions. The repeat risk here is different: Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. A directly relevant preventive control is: LDAP authentication can expose credentials when confidentiality is absent; a protected bind path requires TLS trust as well as directory access.

C:

Review ISE AD group mappings whenever directory groups are renamed or reorganized. The repeat risk here is different: Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. A directly relevant preventive control is: LDAP authentication can expose credentials when confidentiality is absent; a protected bind path requires TLS trust as well as directory access.

D:

Use a supported session reauthentication or RADIUS CoA after the endpoint identity and profile classification change. The repeat risk here is different: Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. A directly relevant preventive control is: LDAP authentication can expose credentials when confidentiality is absent; a protected bind path requires TLS trust as well as directory access.

Question 85

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: A new LDAP source uses simple bind over an unencrypted connection through a shared WAN, contrary to the organization's password-transport policy. Which postchange outcome demonstrates correct implementation?

  1. The PSN joins the intended domain and a known AD test account authenticates through the correct identity source.
  2. The PSN binds successfully with certificate validation, and an untrusted server certificate is rejected.
  3. The affected PSN's clock offset falls within policy and the same test user authenticates reliably.
  4. A pilot identity is resolved by the intended external or internal source with a traceable authentication result.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The PSN binds successfully with certificate validation, and an untrusted server certificate is rejected. The required remediation is: Configure supported LDAP over TLS with a trusted server certificate and the correct bind identity and search configuration. It works because lDAP authentication can expose credentials when confidentiality is absent; a protected bind path requires TLS trust as well as directory access.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Include DNS locator and domain connectivity checks in ISE node renumbering. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions. The needed response is: The PSN binds successfully with certificate validation, and an untrusted server certificate is rejected.

C:

Alert on ISE node time drift and authoritative NTP reachability. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions. The needed response is: The PSN binds successfully with certificate validation, and an untrusted server certificate is rejected.

D:

Audit overlapping account namespaces before modifying identity-source sequences. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions. The needed response is: The PSN binds successfully with certificate validation, and an untrusted server certificate is rejected.

Question 86

An enterprise access-control incident describes: A new LDAP source uses simple bind over an unencrypted connection through a shared WAN, contrary to the organization's password-transport policy. What should be added to the maintenance or security review?

  1. Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions.
  2. Include DNS locator and domain connectivity checks in ISE node renumbering.
  3. Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover.
  4. Review host-mode risk before permitting attached mini-switches.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: LDAP authentication can expose credentials when confidentiality is absent; a protected bind path requires TLS trust as well as directory access. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The PSN binds successfully with certificate validation, and an untrusted server certificate is rejected.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Include DNS locator and domain connectivity checks in ISE node renumbering. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Add an explicitly authorized MAB method and appropriate event-driven policy handling for devices that cannot perform 802.1X. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 87

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: Two ISE PSNs authenticate to different AD domains after an acquisition, but one PSN has not joined the trusted domain and users at that site fail randomly. What is the most appropriate next configuration or repair?

  1. Correct the PSN's NTP configuration and verify time synchronization with identity infrastructure before resetting user credentials.
  2. Restore AD-aware DNS resolution and reachable domain-controller discovery from the PSN, then retry the supported domain join.
  3. Replace the catch-all fallback with an explicit supported identity-store and failure policy that denies unauthorized identities.
  4. Reconcile native AD join points and access to required trusted domains across participating PSNs, then test each authentication path.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Reconcile native AD join points and access to required trusted domains across participating PSNs, then test each authentication path. This is appropriate because a distributed policy configuration does not guarantee that every PSN has functioning connectivity and identity-source state for all target domains. It should be verified by this evidence: The same authorized acquired-company account authenticates through each intended PSN and maps to its correct authorization group.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Run cross-domain sign-in regression tests when adding or replacing PSNs. In the case being tested, Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Reconcile native AD join points and access to required trusted domains across participating PSNs, then test each authentication path.

B:

Separate initial-node bootstrap rights from production policy-administration privileges. In the case being tested, Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Reconcile native AD join points and access to required trusted domains across participating PSNs, then test each authentication path.

C:

Document and test certificate naming conventions during enrollment-template changes. In the case being tested, Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Reconcile native AD join points and access to required trusted domains across participating PSNs, then test each authentication path.

Question 88

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: Two ISE PSNs authenticate to different AD domains after an acquisition, but one PSN has not joined the trusted domain and users at that site fail randomly. What is the key technical principle in this situation?

  1. LDAP authentication can expose credentials when confidentiality is absent; a protected bind path requires TLS trust as well as directory access.
  2. A distributed policy configuration does not guarantee that every PSN has functioning connectivity and identity-source state for all target domains.
  3. ISE's native AD integration depends on DNS discovery and communication with eligible domain services, not just a username and password.
  4. Static IP-to-SGT assignment supplies classification for eligible assets that cannot dynamically obtain an SGT via network access authentication.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A distributed policy configuration does not guarantee that every PSN has functioning connectivity and identity-source state for all target domains. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Reconcile native AD join points and access to required trusted domains across participating PSNs, then test each authentication path. The acceptance result is: The same authorized acquired-company account authenticates through each intended PSN and maps to its correct authorization group.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. The repeat risk here is different: Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions. A directly relevant preventive control is: A distributed policy configuration does not guarantee that every PSN has functioning connectivity and identity-source state for all target domains.

C:

Separate initial-node bootstrap rights from production policy-administration privileges. The repeat risk here is different: Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions. A directly relevant preventive control is: A distributed policy configuration does not guarantee that every PSN has functioning connectivity and identity-source state for all target domains.

D:

Create a controlled static IP-to-SGT mapping for the approved server and distribute it through the supported method. The repeat risk here is different: Monitor LDAP certificate renewal and prohibit cleartext bind exceptions. A directly relevant preventive control is: A distributed policy configuration does not guarantee that every PSN has functioning connectivity and identity-source state for all target domains.

Question 89

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: Two ISE PSNs authenticate to different AD domains after an acquisition, but one PSN has not joined the trusted domain and users at that site fail randomly. What result should be documented before closing the issue?

  1. A test staff user matches the intended group condition while a nonmember receives the lower-privilege policy.
  2. A known user is found under the new search base and an invalid identity is rejected.
  3. The same authorized acquired-company account authenticates through each intended PSN and maps to its correct authorization group.
  4. The WLC's pilot association creates an ISE live-log entry under its intended NAD object and receives a valid Access-Accept or Reject.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The same authorized acquired-company account authenticates through each intended PSN and maps to its correct authorization group. The required remediation is: Reconcile native AD join points and access to required trusted domains across participating PSNs, then test each authentication path. It works because a distributed policy configuration does not guarantee that every PSN has functioning connectivity and identity-source state for all target domains.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Review ISE AD group mappings whenever directory groups are renamed or reorganized. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Run cross-domain sign-in regression tests when adding or replacing PSNs. The needed response is: The same authorized acquired-company account authenticates through each intended PSN and maps to its correct authorization group.

B:

Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Run cross-domain sign-in regression tests when adding or replacing PSNs. The needed response is: The same authorized acquired-company account authenticates through each intended PSN and maps to its correct authorization group.

D:

Verify RADIUS source interfaces after controller failover, redundancy, or interface changes. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Run cross-domain sign-in regression tests when adding or replacing PSNs. The needed response is: The same authorized acquired-company account authenticates through each intended PSN and maps to its correct authorization group.

Question 90

An access-security change request states: Two ISE PSNs authenticate to different AD domains after an acquisition, but one PSN has not joined the trusted domain and users at that site fail randomly. Which durable safeguard best prevents a recurrence?

  1. Run cross-domain sign-in regression tests when adding or replacing PSNs.
  2. Review ISE AD group mappings whenever directory groups are renamed or reorganized.
  3. Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover.
  4. Measure actual method fallback time when onboarding new non-supplicant device types.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Run cross-domain sign-in regression tests when adding or replacing PSNs. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: A distributed policy configuration does not guarantee that every PSN has functioning connectivity and identity-source state for all target domains. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The same authorized acquired-company account authenticates through each intended PSN and maps to its correct authorization group.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Run cross-domain sign-in regression tests when adding or replacing PSNs. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Review ISE AD group mappings whenever directory groups are renamed or reorganized. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Run cross-domain sign-in regression tests when adding or replacing PSNs. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Validate directory organizational-unit moves against ISE LDAP search filters before cutover. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Run cross-domain sign-in regression tests when adding or replacing PSNs. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Register the printer's endpoint MAC as an authorized internal endpoint and configure a tightly scoped MAB authorization profile. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.