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Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 26

Question 250

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: A wired guest port has no supplicant and Central WebAuth never starts because the switch waits only for EAPOL frames and sends no RADIUS request. Which administrative action BEST addresses this specific situation?

  1. Return a supported Central WebAuth authorization profile with the required redirect URL and redirect ACL, then verify WLC feature compatibility.
  2. Enable and validate the supported RADIUS CoA or reauthentication process that replaces the temporary redirect result.
  3. Configure the intended MAB-initiated guest Central WebAuth workflow with a restricted redirect authorization result.
  4. Check the guest-account notification method, contact address, and message delivery configuration after validating account creation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Configure the intended MAB-initiated guest Central WebAuth workflow with a restricted redirect authorization result. This is appropriate because a non-802.1X guest can start the web-authentication sequence from MAB and then transition to credentialed portal authentication. It should be verified by this evidence: A test guest without a supplicant receives a limited web redirect and completes the supported guest authentication.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Configure the intended MAB-initiated guest Central WebAuth workflow with a restricted redirect authorization result. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Return a supported Central WebAuth authorization profile with the required redirect URL and redirect ACL, then verify WLC feature compatibility. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Configure the intended MAB-initiated guest Central WebAuth workflow with a restricted redirect authorization result. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Successful portal credential validation does not itself change an already authorized NAD session without the required update mechanism. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Configure the intended MAB-initiated guest Central WebAuth workflow with a restricted redirect authorization result. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Test accounts receive their respective allowed durations and access restrictions, with no accidental conference-account extension. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 251

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: A wired guest port has no supplicant and Central WebAuth never starts because the switch waits only for EAPOL frames and sends no RADIUS request. Which architectural fact determines the appropriate fix?

  1. A hotspot flow can grant defined guest access on acknowledgement, whereas credentialed guest portals require account authentication.
  2. Local WebAuth presents authentication handling through the NAD, whereas Central WebAuth uses an ISE-hosted portal with RADIUS redirection.
  3. Sponsor portal authorization limits which guest identities a sponsor can create, manage, and view; login success alone does not establish least privilege.
  4. A non-802.1X guest can start the web-authentication sequence from MAB and then transition to credentialed portal authentication.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A non-802.1X guest can start the web-authentication sequence from MAB and then transition to credentialed portal authentication. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Configure the intended MAB-initiated guest Central WebAuth workflow with a restricted redirect authorization result. The acceptance result is: A test guest without a supplicant receives a limited web redirect and completes the supported guest authentication.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A hotspot flow can grant defined guest access on acknowledgement, whereas credentialed guest portals require account authentication. In the case being tested, Configure the intended MAB-initiated guest Central WebAuth workflow with a restricted redirect authorization result. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A non-802.1X guest can start the web-authentication sequence from MAB and then transition to credentialed portal authentication.

B:

Local WebAuth presents authentication handling through the NAD, whereas Central WebAuth uses an ISE-hosted portal with RADIUS redirection. In the case being tested, Configure the intended MAB-initiated guest Central WebAuth workflow with a restricted redirect authorization result. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A non-802.1X guest can start the web-authentication sequence from MAB and then transition to credentialed portal authentication.

C:

A departmental sponsor manages permitted visitors but cannot browse unrelated guests. In the case being tested, Configure the intended MAB-initiated guest Central WebAuth workflow with a restricted redirect authorization result. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A non-802.1X guest can start the web-authentication sequence from MAB and then transition to credentialed portal authentication.

Question 252

An access-security change request states: A wired guest port has no supplicant and Central WebAuth never starts because the switch waits only for EAPOL frames and sends no RADIUS request. Which postchange outcome demonstrates correct implementation?

  1. A new guest is redirected to the intended ISE portal and receives permitted internet access only after completing the guest flow.
  2. A test guest without a supplicant receives a limited web redirect and completes the supported guest authentication.
  3. A test visitor accepts the AUP and receives the limited guest role without being asked for a personal password.
  4. A pilot device sees the approved brand and terms, and its acknowledgement is recorded when required.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A test guest without a supplicant receives a limited web redirect and completes the supported guest authentication. The required remediation is: Configure the intended MAB-initiated guest Central WebAuth workflow with a restricted redirect authorization result. It works because a non-802.1X guest can start the web-authentication sequence from MAB and then transition to credentialed portal authentication.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Return a supported Central WebAuth authorization profile with the required redirect URL and redirect ACL, then verify WLC feature compatibility. The repeat risk here is different: Configure the intended MAB-initiated guest Central WebAuth workflow with a restricted redirect authorization result. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test guest without a supplicant receives a limited web redirect and completes the supported guest authentication.

C:

A hotspot flow can grant defined guest access on acknowledgement, whereas credentialed guest portals require account authentication. The repeat risk here is different: Configure the intended MAB-initiated guest Central WebAuth workflow with a restricted redirect authorization result. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test guest without a supplicant receives a limited web redirect and completes the supported guest authentication.

D:

A pilot device sees the approved brand and terms, and its acknowledgement is recorded when required. The repeat risk here is different: Configure the intended MAB-initiated guest Central WebAuth workflow with a restricted redirect authorization result. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test guest without a supplicant receives a limited web redirect and completes the supported guest authentication.

Question 253

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: A wired guest port has no supplicant and Central WebAuth never starts because the switch waits only for EAPOL frames and sends no RADIUS request. What should be added to the maintenance or security review?

  1. Document access methods and initial authentication triggers for each guest connection type.
  2. Test portal reachability from the guest's restricted preauthentication network.
  3. Choose guest portal type according to explicit identification and compliance requirements.
  4. Audit guest type-to-portal and guest type-to-authorization mappings at event boundaries.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Document access methods and initial authentication triggers for each guest connection type. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: A non-802.1X guest can start the web-authentication sequence from MAB and then transition to credentialed portal authentication. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A test guest without a supplicant receives a limited web redirect and completes the supported guest authentication.

Incorrect Answers

B:

The offered option specifies “Test portal reachability from the guest's restricted preauthentication network”. The question requires “Document access methods and initial authentication triggers for each guest connection type”: Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. These are not equivalent responses to the stated requirement.

C:

A hotspot flow can grant defined guest access on acknowledgement, whereas credentialed guest portals require account authentication. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. The needed response is: Document access methods and initial authentication triggers for each guest connection type.

D:

Test accounts receive their respective allowed durations and access restrictions, with no accidental conference-account extension. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. The needed response is: Document access methods and initial authentication triggers for each guest connection type.

Question 254

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: Guest users get a redirect URL but their browsers cannot open the ISE portal because the preauthentication ACL blocks the portal's HTTPS address and required DNS. What is the most appropriate next configuration or repair?

  1. Use the intended portal FQDN, valid HTTPS certificate, and DNS record reachable by the guest clients.
  2. Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL.
  3. Enable and validate the supported RADIUS CoA or reauthentication process that replaces the temporary redirect result.
  4. Restrict sponsor group mappings to the guest types and access policies that the contractor's role may administer.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. This is appropriate because a captive portal cannot load when preauthentication policy blocks the resources needed to resolve or reach it. It should be verified by this evidence: Unauthenticated guests reach the portal but remain unable to access internal applications before authorization.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Successful portal credential validation does not itself change an already authorized NAD session without the required update mechanism. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Trace each guest portal selection through policy and NAD session updates before release. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 255

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: Guest users get a redirect URL but their browsers cannot open the ISE portal because the preauthentication ACL blocks the portal's HTTPS address and required DNS. What is the key technical principle in this situation?

  1. A captive portal cannot load when preauthentication policy blocks the resources needed to resolve or reach it.
  2. Web authentication verifies a guest principal; a separately evaluated authorization rule determines the access scope returned to the NAD.
  3. Central Web Authentication relies on ISE-selected RADIUS redirect attributes and a NAD that can redirect unauthenticated web traffic.
  4. Guest identity repositories and account validity limits support time-bound visitor access distinct from durable employee identities.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A captive portal cannot load when preauthentication policy blocks the resources needed to resolve or reach it. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. The acceptance result is: Unauthenticated guests reach the portal but remain unable to access internal applications before authorization.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Web authentication verifies a guest principal; a separately evaluated authorization rule determines the access scope returned to the NAD. In the case being tested, Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A captive portal cannot load when preauthentication policy blocks the resources needed to resolve or reach it.

C:

Return a supported Central WebAuth authorization profile with the required redirect URL and redirect ACL, then verify WLC feature compatibility. In the case being tested, Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A captive portal cannot load when preauthentication policy blocks the resources needed to resolve or reach it.

D:

Guest identity repositories and account validity limits support time-bound visitor access distinct from durable employee identities. In the case being tested, Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A captive portal cannot load when preauthentication policy blocks the resources needed to resolve or reach it.

Question 256

A campus and branch network operator reports: Guest users get a redirect URL but their browsers cannot open the ISE portal because the preauthentication ACL blocks the portal's HTTPS address and required DNS. What result should be documented before closing the issue?

  1. A pilot guest loads the portal without a TLS name mismatch and cannot be redirected to an untrusted duplicate endpoint.
  2. Unauthenticated guests reach the portal but remain unable to access internal applications before authorization.
  3. The test browser reaches the intended portal host and its credentials are evaluated by the defined authentication component.
  4. A test request stays pending until the sponsor approves it, after which limited visitor access becomes available.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Unauthenticated guests reach the portal but remain unable to access internal applications before authorization. The required remediation is: Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. It works because a captive portal cannot load when preauthentication policy blocks the resources needed to resolve or reach it.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. The repeat risk here is different: Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. A directly relevant preventive control is: Unauthenticated guests reach the portal but remain unable to access internal applications before authorization.

C:

Local WebAuth presents authentication handling through the NAD, whereas Central WebAuth uses an ISE-hosted portal with RADIUS redirection. The repeat risk here is different: Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. A directly relevant preventive control is: Unauthenticated guests reach the portal but remain unable to access internal applications before authorization.

D:

The offered option specifies “A test request stays pending until the sponsor approves it, after which limited visitor access becomes available”. The question requires “Unauthenticated guests reach the portal but remain unable to access internal applications before authorization”: Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. These are not equivalent responses to the stated requirement.

Question 257

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: A captive portal advertises an IP address that does not match its public certificate, and mobile clients display a certificate identity warning before login. Which implementation decision directly satisfies the stated requirement?

  1. Use the intended portal FQDN, valid HTTPS certificate, and DNS record reachable by the guest clients.
  2. Select an explicit guest authorization profile restricted by authenticated guest identity, network access type, and permitted destinations.
  3. Configure the intended MAB-initiated guest Central WebAuth workflow with a restricted redirect authorization result.
  4. Permit the specific guest-facing portal IP/FQDN and TLS ports through the approved segmentation path while retaining management isolation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Use the intended portal FQDN, valid HTTPS certificate, and DNS record reachable by the guest clients. This is appropriate because portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. It should be verified by this evidence: A pilot guest loads the portal without a TLS name mismatch and cannot be redirected to an untrusted duplicate endpoint.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Web authentication verifies a guest principal; a separately evaluated authorization rule determines the access scope returned to the NAD. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. The needed response is: Use the intended portal FQDN, valid HTTPS certificate, and DNS record reachable by the guest clients.

C:

Configure the intended MAB-initiated guest Central WebAuth workflow with a restricted redirect authorization result. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. The needed response is: Use the intended portal FQDN, valid HTTPS certificate, and DNS record reachable by the guest clients.

D:

A pilot device sees the approved brand and terms, and its acknowledgement is recorded when required. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. The needed response is: Use the intended portal FQDN, valid HTTPS certificate, and DNS record reachable by the guest clients.

Question 258

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: A captive portal advertises an IP address that does not match its public certificate, and mobile clients display a certificate identity warning before login. Which technical behavior is MOST relevant to this design?

  1. A hotspot flow can grant defined guest access on acknowledgement, whereas credentialed guest portals require account authentication.
  2. Local WebAuth presents authentication handling through the NAD, whereas Central WebAuth uses an ISE-hosted portal with RADIUS redirection.
  3. Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted.
  4. Sponsor portal authorization limits which guest identities a sponsor can create, manage, and view; login success alone does not establish least privilege.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Use the intended portal FQDN, valid HTTPS certificate, and DNS record reachable by the guest clients. The acceptance result is: A pilot guest loads the portal without a TLS name mismatch and cannot be redirected to an untrusted duplicate endpoint.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: a hotspot flow can grant defined guest access on acknowledgement, whereas credentialed guest portals require account authentication. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Local WebAuth presents authentication handling through the NAD, whereas Central WebAuth uses an ISE-hosted portal with RADIUS redirection. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: a departmental sponsor manages permitted visitors but cannot browse unrelated guests. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 259

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: A captive portal advertises an IP address that does not match its public certificate, and mobile clients display a certificate identity warning before login. Which readback demonstrates that the actual problem was solved?

  1. A pilot guest loads the portal without a TLS name mismatch and cannot be redirected to an untrusted duplicate endpoint.
  2. A new guest is redirected to the intended ISE portal and receives permitted internet access only after completing the guest flow.
  3. The guest receives the intended post-authentication internet-only role after login, with the redirect ACL removed.
  4. A test request stays pending until the sponsor approves it, after which limited visitor access becomes available.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

A pilot guest loads the portal without a TLS name mismatch and cannot be redirected to an untrusted duplicate endpoint. The required remediation is: Use the intended portal FQDN, valid HTTPS certificate, and DNS record reachable by the guest clients. It works because portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Return a supported Central WebAuth authorization profile with the required redirect URL and redirect ACL, then verify WLC feature compatibility. In the case being tested, Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A pilot guest loads the portal without a TLS name mismatch and cannot be redirected to an untrusted duplicate endpoint.

C:

Successful portal credential validation does not itself change an already authorized NAD session without the required update mechanism. In the case being tested, Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A pilot guest loads the portal without a TLS name mismatch and cannot be redirected to an untrusted duplicate endpoint.

D:

The offered option specifies “A test request stays pending until the sponsor approves it, after which limited visitor access becomes available”. The question requires “A pilot guest loads the portal without a TLS name mismatch and cannot be redirected to an untrusted duplicate endpoint”: Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. These are not equivalent responses to the stated requirement.

Question 260

An enterprise access-control incident describes: A captive portal advertises an IP address that does not match its public certificate, and mobile clients display a certificate identity warning before login. What validation should be repeated before subsequent rollouts?

  1. Track portal certificate expiration and FQDN changes in guest-service maintenance.
  2. Test CWA login-to-authorization transition separately from portal form submission.
  3. Document access methods and initial authentication triggers for each guest connection type.
  4. Require sponsor attestation and expiration for visits to controlled facilities.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Track portal certificate expiration and FQDN changes in guest-service maintenance. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A pilot guest loads the portal without a TLS name mismatch and cannot be redirected to an untrusted duplicate endpoint.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Successful portal credential validation does not itself change an already authorized NAD session without the required update mechanism. The repeat risk here is different: Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. A directly relevant preventive control is: Track portal certificate expiration and FQDN changes in guest-service maintenance.

C:

Allow only the portal's approved HTTPS destination and essential DNS or DHCP bootstrap traffic in the limited-access redirect ACL. The repeat risk here is different: Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. A directly relevant preventive control is: Track portal certificate expiration and FQDN changes in guest-service maintenance.

D:

A hotspot's acceptance step does not prove a sponsor approved a named visitor or checked their eligibility. The repeat risk here is different: Portal trust depends on certificate hostname and chain validation; successful RADIUS redirection alone does not make the HTTPS identity trusted. A directly relevant preventive control is: Track portal certificate expiration and FQDN changes in guest-service maintenance.