McAfee Secure

Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 52

Question 510

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: An employee finishes BYOD registration but the new endpoint identity is absent from the expected RegisteredDevices group because the portal's endpoint group setting was changed. Which ongoing practice is most appropriate for this failure mode?

  1. Maintain OS-specific BYOD enrollment tests as mobile versions change.
  2. Track portal and EAP server certificates separately and verify both renewal paths.
  3. Test both unregistered and enrolled device states before enabling single-SSID BYOD.
  4. Review portal-to-endpoint-group mapping whenever device portals are cloned.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Review portal-to-endpoint-group mapping whenever device portals are cloned. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: The BYOD portal assigns registration and identity attributes used by downstream ISE authorization decisions. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A newly registered personal device appears in the designated group and its authorization matches that status.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Review portal-to-endpoint-group mapping whenever device portals are cloned. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Maintain OS-specific BYOD enrollment tests as mobile versions change. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Review portal-to-endpoint-group mapping whenever device portals are cloned. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Review portal-to-endpoint-group mapping whenever device portals are cloned. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: a new laptop completes enrollment and reconnects securely on the intended single SSID. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 511

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: An ISE BYOD deployment uses an internal CA but an administrator exports the private signing key to every access switch, assuming they must all issue client certificates. Which response most directly corrects the described failure?

  1. Correct the switch's supported redirection attributes, DNS access, and portal identity for the current ISE BYOD PSNs.
  2. Keep CA signing keys in the supported trusted service and distribute only the necessary trust certificates or chain to relying systems.
  3. Assign an appropriate native supplicant provisioning profile and supported onboarding instructions by operating system.
  4. Reconcile its residual endpoint record and remove or reclassify it through authorized endpoint administration if permanent cleanup is required.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Keep CA signing keys in the supported trusted service and distribute only the necessary trust certificates or chain to relying systems. This is appropriate because a certificate authority signs credentials centrally; access switches validate EAP/RADIUS outcomes and do not require possession of the CA private key. It should be verified by this evidence: A test certificate is issued by the approved CA and the switching infrastructure contains no CA signing private key.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Test certificate issuance and policy mapping separately from initial portal login. In the case being tested, Review portal-to-endpoint-group mapping whenever device portals are cloned. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Keep CA signing keys in the supported trusted service and distribute only the necessary trust certificates or chain to relying systems.

C:

Run onboarding with the actual limited-access ACL and DNS view used by new devices. In the case being tested, Review portal-to-endpoint-group mapping whenever device portals are cloned. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Keep CA signing keys in the supported trusted service and distribute only the necessary trust certificates or chain to relying systems.

D:

Reconcile its residual endpoint record and remove or reclassify it through authorized endpoint administration if permanent cleanup is required. In the case being tested, Review portal-to-endpoint-group mapping whenever device portals are cloned. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Keep CA signing keys in the supported trusted service and distribute only the necessary trust certificates or chain to relying systems.

Question 512

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: An ISE BYOD deployment uses an internal CA but an administrator exports the private signing key to every access switch, assuming they must all issue client certificates. What is the strongest evidence that this requirement is met?

  1. A managed Windows test and a supported iOS test each receive the appropriate platform configuration and authenticate.
  2. A newly registered personal device appears in the designated group and its authorization matches that status.
  3. Two differently owned pilot devices map to their respective employee records rather than one shared account.
  4. A test certificate is issued by the approved CA and the switching infrastructure contains no CA signing private key.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A test certificate is issued by the approved CA and the switching infrastructure contains no CA signing private key. The required remediation is: Keep CA signing keys in the supported trusted service and distribute only the necessary trust certificates or chain to relying systems. It works because a certificate authority signs credentials centrally; access switches validate EAP/RADIUS outcomes and do not require possession of the CA private key.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Maintain OS-specific BYOD enrollment tests as mobile versions change. The repeat risk here is different: Review portal-to-endpoint-group mapping whenever device portals are cloned. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test certificate is issued by the approved CA and the switching infrastructure contains no CA signing private key.

B:

The offered option specifies “A newly registered personal device appears in the designated group and its authorization matches that status”. The question requires “A test certificate is issued by the approved CA and the switching infrastructure contains no CA signing private key”: Review portal-to-endpoint-group mapping whenever device portals are cloned. These are not equivalent responses to the stated requirement.

C:

Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The repeat risk here is different: Review portal-to-endpoint-group mapping whenever device portals are cloned. A directly relevant preventive control is: A test certificate is issued by the approved CA and the switching infrastructure contains no CA signing private key.

Question 513

A campus and branch network operator reports: An ISE BYOD deployment uses an internal CA but an administrator exports the private signing key to every access switch, assuming they must all issue client certificates. Which recurring operational control would reduce this risk?

  1. Prohibit export of internal CA private material to network access devices.
  2. Track portal and EAP server certificates separately and verify both renewal paths.
  3. Test registered-state policy-set selection after every SSID configuration change.
  4. Maintain distinct inventories for portal, EAP service, and BYOD client certificate lifecycles.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Prohibit export of internal CA private material to network access devices. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: A certificate authority signs credentials centrally; access switches validate EAP/RADIUS outcomes and do not require possession of the CA private key. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A test certificate is issued by the approved CA and the switching infrastructure contains no CA signing private key.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN. The needed response is: Prohibit export of internal CA private material to network access devices.

C:

Test registered-state policy-set selection after every SSID configuration change. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN. The needed response is: Prohibit export of internal CA private material to network access devices.

D:

Mark the device appropriately as lost or stolen and apply the supported blocked-device policy and response or certificate revocation requirements. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN. The needed response is: Prohibit export of internal CA private material to network access devices.

Question 514

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: A BYOD registration portal uses a different HTTPS certificate than the name displayed in redirect URLs, causing mobile operating systems to reject enrollment. What is the most suitable solution within these constraints?

  1. Allow only the approved BYOD portal, certificate provisioning, and bootstrap endpoints during the constrained onboarding phase.
  2. Match the secure SSID to the EAP-TLS policy and the registered-device state instead of reusing the onboarding result.
  3. Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates.
  4. Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN. This is appropriate because the browser's trust decision is based on TLS certificate identity and chain, independently of subsequent EAP-TLS enrollment. It should be verified by this evidence: The mobile onboarding portal opens without certificate warning and certificate provisioning completes.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Verify effective network restrictions for every personal-device authorization profile. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Revalidate wired redirect paths when ISE portal hostnames change. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 515

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: A BYOD registration portal uses a different HTTPS certificate than the name displayed in redirect URLs, causing mobile operating systems to reject enrollment. Which platform distinction is decisive in this scenario?

  1. Wired BYOD relies on NAD-mediated redirect and restricted bootstrap connectivity just as wireless onboarding does.
  2. The BYOD portal assigns registration and identity attributes used by downstream ISE authorization decisions.
  3. The browser's trust decision is based on TLS certificate identity and chain, independently of subsequent EAP-TLS enrollment.
  4. A certificate may remain correctly signed after revocation; authorization should consider its current validity status when policy requires it.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The browser's trust decision is based on TLS certificate identity and chain, independently of subsequent EAP-TLS enrollment. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN. The acceptance result is: The mobile onboarding portal opens without certificate warning and certificate provisioning completes.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Test certificate issuance and policy mapping separately from initial portal login. In the case being tested, Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The browser's trust decision is based on TLS certificate identity and chain, independently of subsequent EAP-TLS enrollment.

B:

Test registered-state policy-set selection after every SSID configuration change. In the case being tested, Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The browser's trust decision is based on TLS certificate identity and chain, independently of subsequent EAP-TLS enrollment.

D:

Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. In the case being tested, Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The browser's trust decision is based on TLS certificate identity and chain, independently of subsequent EAP-TLS enrollment.

Question 516

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: A BYOD registration portal uses a different HTTPS certificate than the name displayed in redirect URLs, causing mobile operating systems to reject enrollment. Which acceptance test would directly establish the desired state?

  1. The laptop receives a certificate with the intended identity and completes a successful EAP-TLS connection.
  2. The pilot device completes native supplicant setup while unauthorized internal applications remain blocked during enrollment.
  3. A new laptop completes enrollment and reconnects securely on the intended single SSID.
  4. The mobile onboarding portal opens without certificate warning and certificate provisioning completes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The mobile onboarding portal opens without certificate warning and certificate provisioning completes. The required remediation is: Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN. It works because the browser's trust decision is based on TLS certificate identity and chain, independently of subsequent EAP-TLS enrollment.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Test certificate issuance and policy mapping separately from initial portal login. The repeat risk here is different: Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN. A directly relevant preventive control is: The mobile onboarding portal opens without certificate warning and certificate provisioning completes.

B:

Run onboarding with the actual limited-access ACL and DNS view used by new devices. The repeat risk here is different: Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN. A directly relevant preventive control is: The mobile onboarding portal opens without certificate warning and certificate provisioning completes.

C:

A new laptop completes enrollment and reconnects securely on the intended single SSID. The repeat risk here is different: Configure a portal certificate chain and hostname that match the published onboarding FQDN. A directly relevant preventive control is: The mobile onboarding portal opens without certificate warning and certificate provisioning completes.

Question 517

An enterprise access-control incident describes: A BYOD registration portal uses a different HTTPS certificate than the name displayed in redirect URLs, causing mobile operating systems to reject enrollment. Which governance step most directly targets the root cause?

  1. Review portal-to-endpoint-group mapping whenever device portals are cloned.
  2. Exercise portal availability separately from administrative configuration failover.
  3. Track portal and EAP server certificates separately and verify both renewal paths.
  4. Verify effective network restrictions for every personal-device authorization profile.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Track portal and EAP server certificates separately and verify both renewal paths. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: The browser's trust decision is based on TLS certificate identity and chain, independently of subsequent EAP-TLS enrollment. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The mobile onboarding portal opens without certificate warning and certificate provisioning completes.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Review portal-to-endpoint-group mapping whenever device portals are cloned. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. The needed response is: Track portal and EAP server certificates separately and verify both renewal paths.

B:

Exercise portal availability separately from administrative configuration failover. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. The needed response is: Track portal and EAP server certificates separately and verify both renewal paths.

D:

Verify effective network restrictions for every personal-device authorization profile. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. The needed response is: Track portal and EAP server certificates separately and verify both renewal paths.

Question 518

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: A BYOD EAP-TLS certificate expires while the device's ISE registration record remains active, leading to authentication failure on the secure SSID. Which change is justified by the observed evidence?

  1. Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy.
  2. Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs.
  3. Reconcile its residual endpoint record and remove or reclassify it through authorized endpoint administration if permanent cleanup is required.
  4. Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. This is appropriate because registration state and X.509 certificate validity are independent checks; a registered device cannot use an expired EAP credential. It should be verified by this evidence: The device presents a current certificate and receives its intended BYOD authorization while expired certificates are rejected.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Reconcile its residual endpoint record and remove or reclassify it through authorized endpoint administration if permanent cleanup is required. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 519

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: A BYOD EAP-TLS certificate expires while the device's ISE registration record remains active, leading to authentication failure on the secure SSID. What mechanism governs this authentication or management outcome?

  1. EAP-TLS requires issuer trust and a valid certification path; new certificates from an untrusted issuer fail even with matching usernames.
  2. Registration state and X.509 certificate validity are independent checks; a registered device cannot use an expired EAP credential.
  3. A trusted signature does not guarantee proper identity binding; authorization needs a reliable mapping from certificate fields to the owner.
  4. A device's registration category is descriptive unless an actual authorization result constrains the reachable resources.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Registration state and X.509 certificate validity are independent checks; a registered device cannot use an expired EAP credential. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. The acceptance result is: The device presents a current certificate and receives its intended BYOD authorization while expired certificates are rejected.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. In the case being tested, Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Registration state and X.509 certificate validity are independent checks; a registered device cannot use an expired EAP credential.

C:

Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. In the case being tested, Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Registration state and X.509 certificate validity are independent checks; a registered device cannot use an expired EAP credential.

D:

Test every BYOD state transition with the actual wireless or wired access device. In the case being tested, Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. The necessary acceptance evidence is: Registration state and X.509 certificate validity are independent checks; a registered device cannot use an expired EAP credential.

Question 520

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: A BYOD EAP-TLS certificate expires while the device's ISE registration record remains active, leading to authentication failure on the secure SSID. What is the strongest evidence that this requirement is met?

  1. The device presents a current certificate and receives its intended BYOD authorization while expired certificates are rejected.
  2. A newly issued certificate shows the required purpose and the supported client completes EAP-TLS.
  3. A newly provisioned device authenticates through either intended PSN and an unknown CA is rejected.
  4. The personal laptop provisions on the enrollment SSID and then authenticates to the secure SSID with the approved certificate.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The device presents a current certificate and receives its intended BYOD authorization while expired certificates are rejected. The required remediation is: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. It works because registration state and X.509 certificate validity are independent checks; a registered device cannot use an expired EAP credential.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The repeat risk here is different: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. A directly relevant preventive control is: The device presents a current certificate and receives its intended BYOD authorization while expired certificates are rejected.

C:

Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. The repeat risk here is different: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. A directly relevant preventive control is: The device presents a current certificate and receives its intended BYOD authorization while expired certificates are rejected.

D:

The personal laptop provisions on the enrollment SSID and then authenticates to the secure SSID with the approved certificate. The repeat risk here is different: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. A directly relevant preventive control is: The device presents a current certificate and receives its intended BYOD authorization while expired certificates are rejected.