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Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE) (300-715) Practice Tests

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 53

Question 520

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: A BYOD EAP-TLS certificate expires while the device's ISE registration record remains active, leading to authentication failure on the secure SSID. What is the strongest evidence that this requirement is met?

  1. The device presents a current certificate and receives its intended BYOD authorization while expired certificates are rejected.
  2. A newly issued certificate shows the required purpose and the supported client completes EAP-TLS.
  3. A newly provisioned device authenticates through either intended PSN and an unknown CA is rejected.
  4. The personal laptop provisions on the enrollment SSID and then authenticates to the secure SSID with the approved certificate.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The device presents a current certificate and receives its intended BYOD authorization while expired certificates are rejected. The required remediation is: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. It works because registration state and X.509 certificate validity are independent checks; a registered device cannot use an expired EAP credential.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The repeat risk here is different: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. A directly relevant preventive control is: The device presents a current certificate and receives its intended BYOD authorization while expired certificates are rejected.

C:

Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. The repeat risk here is different: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. A directly relevant preventive control is: The device presents a current certificate and receives its intended BYOD authorization while expired certificates are rejected.

D:

The personal laptop provisions on the enrollment SSID and then authenticates to the secure SSID with the approved certificate. The repeat risk here is different: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. A directly relevant preventive control is: The device presents a current certificate and receives its intended BYOD authorization while expired certificates are rejected.

Question 521

An access-security change request states: A BYOD EAP-TLS certificate expires while the device's ISE registration record remains active, leading to authentication failure on the secure SSID. Which recurring operational control would reduce this risk?

  1. Alert on approaching BYOD certificate expiry and provide an authorized renewal process.
  2. Monitor certificate revocation service reachability before granting secure BYOD access.
  3. Test certificate principal uniqueness before rolling out new BYOD templates.
  4. Include BYOD ownership transfer in employee departure and asset handoff checklists.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Alert on approaching BYOD certificate expiry and provide an authorized renewal process. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: Registration state and X.509 certificate validity are independent checks; a registered device cannot use an expired EAP credential. The ongoing acceptance check remains: The device presents a current certificate and receives its intended BYOD authorization while expired certificates are rejected.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. The needed response is: Alert on approaching BYOD certificate expiry and provide an authorized renewal process.

C:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. The needed response is: Alert on approaching BYOD certificate expiry and provide an authorized renewal process.

D:

Resolve and verify the prior ownership and registration state through authorized endpoint management before allowing a new user to register it. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. The needed response is: Alert on approaching BYOD certificate expiry and provide an authorized renewal process.

Question 522

An enterprise access-control incident describes: ISE rejects all newly issued personal-device certificates after an internal CA renewal because the PSNs do not trust the new issuing chain. Which administrative action BEST addresses this specific situation?

  1. Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints.
  2. Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device.
  3. Enable and validate the intended ISE internal CA certificate issuance and native supplicant provisioning flow for that BYOD policy.
  4. Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. This is appropriate because eAP-TLS requires issuer trust and a valid certification path; new certificates from an untrusted issuer fail even with matching usernames. It should be verified by this evidence: A newly provisioned device authenticates through either intended PSN and an unknown CA is rejected.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

B:

Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Maintain OS-specific BYOD enrollment tests as mobile versions change. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 523

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: ISE rejects all newly issued personal-device certificates after an internal CA renewal because the PSNs do not trust the new issuing chain. Which architectural fact determines the appropriate fix?

  1. EAP-TLS requires issuer trust and a valid certification path; new certificates from an untrusted issuer fail even with matching usernames.
  2. A trusted signature does not guarantee proper identity binding; authorization needs a reliable mapping from certificate fields to the owner.
  3. A certificate may remain correctly signed after revocation; authorization should consider its current validity status when policy requires it.
  4. BYOD authorization evaluates the person and registered device state; employee identity alone does not imply a personal tablet meets corporate laptop trust requirements.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

EAP-TLS requires issuer trust and a valid certification path; new certificates from an untrusted issuer fail even with matching usernames. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. The acceptance result is: A newly provisioned device authenticates through either intended PSN and an unknown CA is rejected.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. In the case being tested, Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. The necessary acceptance evidence is: EAP-TLS requires issuer trust and a valid certification path; new certificates from an untrusted issuer fail even with matching usernames.

C:

Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. In the case being tested, Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. The necessary acceptance evidence is: EAP-TLS requires issuer trust and a valid certification path; new certificates from an untrusted issuer fail even with matching usernames.

D:

A registered tablet receives the BYOD role, while a managed laptop obtains its distinct corporate authorization. In the case being tested, Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. The necessary acceptance evidence is: EAP-TLS requires issuer trust and a valid certification path; new certificates from an untrusted issuer fail even with matching usernames.

Question 524

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: ISE rejects all newly issued personal-device certificates after an internal CA renewal because the PSNs do not trust the new issuing chain. Which postchange outcome demonstrates correct implementation?

  1. Two differently owned pilot devices map to their respective employee records rather than one shared account.
  2. The device presents a current certificate and receives its intended BYOD authorization while expired certificates are rejected.
  3. A newly provisioned device authenticates through either intended PSN and an unknown CA is rejected.
  4. The verified owner completes any required re-registration and the phone regains only its proper BYOD policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A newly provisioned device authenticates through either intended PSN and an unknown CA is rejected. The required remediation is: Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. It works because eAP-TLS requires issuer trust and a valid certification path; new certificates from an untrusted issuer fail even with matching usernames.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The repeat risk here is different: Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. A directly relevant preventive control is: A newly provisioned device authenticates through either intended PSN and an unknown CA is rejected.

B:

Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. The repeat risk here is different: Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. A directly relevant preventive control is: A newly provisioned device authenticates through either intended PSN and an unknown CA is rejected.

D:

Recovering physical possession does not automatically restore every BYOD registration and certificate state altered by the loss response. The repeat risk here is different: Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. A directly relevant preventive control is: A newly provisioned device authenticates through either intended PSN and an unknown CA is rejected.

Question 525

A campus and branch network operator reports: ISE rejects all newly issued personal-device certificates after an internal CA renewal because the PSNs do not trust the new issuing chain. What should be added to the maintenance or security review?

  1. Test certificate principal uniqueness before rolling out new BYOD templates.
  2. Coordinate CA rollover, PSN trust deployment, and overlap periods.
  3. Maintain distinct inventories for portal, EAP service, and BYOD client certificate lifecycles.
  4. Test registered-state policy-set selection after every SSID configuration change.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Coordinate CA rollover, PSN trust deployment, and overlap periods. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: EAP-TLS requires issuer trust and a valid certification path; new certificates from an untrusted issuer fail even with matching usernames. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A newly provisioned device authenticates through either intended PSN and an unknown CA is rejected.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The needed response is: Coordinate CA rollover, PSN trust deployment, and overlap periods.

C:

Mark the device appropriately as lost or stolen and apply the supported blocked-device policy and response or certificate revocation requirements. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The needed response is: Coordinate CA rollover, PSN trust deployment, and overlap periods.

D:

Test registered-state policy-set selection after every SSID configuration change. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The needed response is: Coordinate CA rollover, PSN trust deployment, and overlap periods.

Question 526

An access-security change request states: A personal-device certificate is valid but maps to the wrong employee because its certificate profile extracts a shared device name instead of a unique principal field. What is the most appropriate next configuration or repair?

  1. Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy.
  2. Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier.
  3. Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints.
  4. Set the intended device portal endpoint identity group and validate the authorized registration workflow.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. This is appropriate because a trusted signature does not guarantee proper identity binding; authorization needs a reliable mapping from certificate fields to the owner. It should be verified by this evidence: Two differently owned pilot devices map to their respective employee records rather than one shared account.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Test registered-state policy-set selection after every SSID configuration change. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 527

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: A personal-device certificate is valid but maps to the wrong employee because its certificate profile extracts a shared device name instead of a unique principal field. What is the key technical principle in this situation?

  1. Registration state and X.509 certificate validity are independent checks; a registered device cannot use an expired EAP credential.
  2. A trusted signature does not guarantee proper identity binding; authorization needs a reliable mapping from certificate fields to the owner.
  3. EAP-TLS requires issuer trust and a valid certification path; new certificates from an untrusted issuer fail even with matching usernames.
  4. The bootstrap credential authorizes enrollment; subsequent EAP-TLS access requires an issued device or user certificate and configured supplicant.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A trusted signature does not guarantee proper identity binding; authorization needs a reliable mapping from certificate fields to the owner. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The acceptance result is: Two differently owned pilot devices map to their respective employee records rather than one shared account.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. In the case being tested, Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A trusted signature does not guarantee proper identity binding; authorization needs a reliable mapping from certificate fields to the owner.

C:

Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. In the case being tested, Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A trusted signature does not guarantee proper identity binding; authorization needs a reliable mapping from certificate fields to the owner.

D:

Maintain OS-specific BYOD enrollment tests as mobile versions change. In the case being tested, Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A trusted signature does not guarantee proper identity binding; authorization needs a reliable mapping from certificate fields to the owner.

Question 528

A security policy owner must resolve this specific case: A personal-device certificate is valid but maps to the wrong employee because its certificate profile extracts a shared device name instead of a unique principal field. What result should be documented before closing the issue?

  1. A revoked test credential fails and an otherwise valid unrevoked credential succeeds through the same EAP policy.
  2. A newly issued certificate shows the required purpose and the supported client completes EAP-TLS.
  3. Two differently owned pilot devices map to their respective employee records rather than one shared account.
  4. The phone completes guided enrollment and uses the required EAP-TLS connection without relying on an employee-wide MAC whitelist.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Two differently owned pilot devices map to their respective employee records rather than one shared account. The required remediation is: Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. It works because a trusted signature does not guarantee proper identity binding; authorization needs a reliable mapping from certificate fields to the owner.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. The repeat risk here is different: Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. A directly relevant preventive control is: Two differently owned pilot devices map to their respective employee records rather than one shared account.

B:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The repeat risk here is different: Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. A directly relevant preventive control is: Two differently owned pilot devices map to their respective employee records rather than one shared account.

D:

The phone completes guided enrollment and uses the required EAP-TLS connection without relying on an employee-wide MAC whitelist. The repeat risk here is different: Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. A directly relevant preventive control is: Two differently owned pilot devices map to their respective employee records rather than one shared account.

Question 529

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: A personal-device certificate is valid but maps to the wrong employee because its certificate profile extracts a shared device name instead of a unique principal field. Which durable safeguard best prevents a recurrence?

  1. Monitor certificate revocation service reachability before granting secure BYOD access.
  2. Coordinate CA rollover, PSN trust deployment, and overlap periods.
  3. Verify effective network restrictions for every personal-device authorization profile.
  4. Test certificate principal uniqueness before rolling out new BYOD templates.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Test certificate principal uniqueness before rolling out new BYOD templates. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: A trusted signature does not guarantee proper identity binding; authorization needs a reliable mapping from certificate fields to the owner. The ongoing acceptance check remains: Two differently owned pilot devices map to their respective employee records rather than one shared account.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The needed response is: Test certificate principal uniqueness before rolling out new BYOD templates.

B:

Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The needed response is: Test certificate principal uniqueness before rolling out new BYOD templates.

C:

Verify effective network restrictions for every personal-device authorization profile. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The needed response is: Test certificate principal uniqueness before rolling out new BYOD templates.

Question 530

A campus and branch network operator reports: A mobile operating system requires an appropriate key usage and extended key usage on its BYOD certificate, but the enrollment template omits the client-authentication purpose. Which implementation decision directly satisfies the stated requirement?

  1. Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier.
  2. Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints.
  3. Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device.
  4. Mark the device appropriately as lost or stolen and apply the supported blocked-device policy and response or certificate revocation requirements.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. This is appropriate because eAP clients and servers may validate certificate purpose in addition to chain and expiry; incompatible usages can invalidate an otherwise trusted certificate. It should be verified by this evidence: A newly issued certificate shows the required purpose and the supported client completes EAP-TLS.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Mark the device appropriately as lost or stolen and apply the supported blocked-device policy and response or certificate revocation requirements. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.