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Cisco 300-715 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-715

Exam Name Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Security

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Implementing and Configuring Cisco Identity Services Engine (300-715 SISE) (300-715) Practice Tests

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Cisco 300-715 Practice Test 54

Question 530

A campus and branch network operator reports: A mobile operating system requires an appropriate key usage and extended key usage on its BYOD certificate, but the enrollment template omits the client-authentication purpose. Which implementation decision directly satisfies the stated requirement?

  1. Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier.
  2. Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints.
  3. Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device.
  4. Mark the device appropriately as lost or stolen and apply the supported blocked-device policy and response or certificate revocation requirements.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. This is appropriate because eAP clients and servers may validate certificate purpose in addition to chain and expiry; incompatible usages can invalidate an otherwise trusted certificate. It should be verified by this evidence: A newly issued certificate shows the required purpose and the supported client completes EAP-TLS.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Mark the device appropriately as lost or stolen and apply the supported blocked-device policy and response or certificate revocation requirements. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 531

A Cisco ISE operations team investigates this site issue: A mobile operating system requires an appropriate key usage and extended key usage on its BYOD certificate, but the enrollment template omits the client-authentication purpose. Which technical behavior is MOST relevant to this design?

  1. A certificate may remain correctly signed after revocation; authorization should consider its current validity status when policy requires it.
  2. A trusted signature does not guarantee proper identity binding; authorization needs a reliable mapping from certificate fields to the owner.
  3. Recovering physical possession does not automatically restore every BYOD registration and certificate state altered by the loss response.
  4. EAP clients and servers may validate certificate purpose in addition to chain and expiry; incompatible usages can invalidate an otherwise trusted certificate.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

EAP clients and servers may validate certificate purpose in addition to chain and expiry; incompatible usages can invalidate an otherwise trusted certificate. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The acceptance result is: A newly issued certificate shows the required purpose and the supported client completes EAP-TLS.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. In the case being tested, Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The necessary acceptance evidence is: EAP clients and servers may validate certificate purpose in addition to chain and expiry; incompatible usages can invalidate an otherwise trusted certificate.

B:

Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. In the case being tested, Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The necessary acceptance evidence is: EAP clients and servers may validate certificate purpose in addition to chain and expiry; incompatible usages can invalidate an otherwise trusted certificate.

C:

Recovering physical possession does not automatically restore every BYOD registration and certificate state altered by the loss response. In the case being tested, Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The necessary acceptance evidence is: EAP clients and servers may validate certificate purpose in addition to chain and expiry; incompatible usages can invalidate an otherwise trusted certificate.

Question 532

At a distributed Cisco ISE deployment, a security review finds: A mobile operating system requires an appropriate key usage and extended key usage on its BYOD certificate, but the enrollment template omits the client-authentication purpose. Which readback demonstrates that the actual problem was solved?

  1. Two differently owned pilot devices map to their respective employee records rather than one shared account.
  2. A newly issued certificate shows the required purpose and the supported client completes EAP-TLS.
  3. A newly provisioned device authenticates through either intended PSN and an unknown CA is rejected.
  4. The smart display appears under the employee's registered devices and receives only its permitted limited network authorization.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A newly issued certificate shows the required purpose and the supported client completes EAP-TLS. The required remediation is: Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. It works because eAP clients and servers may validate certificate purpose in addition to chain and expiry; incompatible usages can invalidate an otherwise trusted certificate.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The repeat risk here is different: Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. A directly relevant preventive control is: A newly issued certificate shows the required purpose and the supported client completes EAP-TLS.

C:

Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. The repeat risk here is different: Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. A directly relevant preventive control is: A newly issued certificate shows the required purpose and the supported client completes EAP-TLS.

D:

The smart display appears under the employee's registered devices and receives only its permitted limited network authorization. The repeat risk here is different: Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. A directly relevant preventive control is: A newly issued certificate shows the required purpose and the supported client completes EAP-TLS.

Question 533

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: A mobile operating system requires an appropriate key usage and extended key usage on its BYOD certificate, but the enrollment template omits the client-authentication purpose. What validation should be repeated before subsequent rollouts?

  1. Check platform certificate requirements when changing BYOD CA templates.
  2. Monitor certificate revocation service reachability before granting secure BYOD access.
  3. Alert on approaching BYOD certificate expiry and provide an authorized renewal process.
  4. Exercise portal availability separately from administrative configuration failover.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Check platform certificate requirements when changing BYOD CA templates. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: EAP clients and servers may validate certificate purpose in addition to chain and expiry; incompatible usages can invalidate an otherwise trusted certificate. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A newly issued certificate shows the required purpose and the supported client completes EAP-TLS.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. The needed response is: Check platform certificate requirements when changing BYOD CA templates.

C:

Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. The needed response is: Check platform certificate requirements when changing BYOD CA templates.

D:

Exercise portal availability separately from administrative configuration failover. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. The needed response is: Check platform certificate requirements when changing BYOD CA templates.

Question 534

A network identity engineer receives the following requirement: The employee BYOD WLAN accepts a revoked certificate because certificate status checking is disabled in the configured EAP-TLS trust workflow. What should the team change before declaring this work complete?

  1. Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates.
  2. Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy.
  3. Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints.
  4. Review the approved global employee device-registration limit and retire or remove obsolete registrations before selectively changing policy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. This is appropriate because a certificate may remain correctly signed after revocation; authorization should consider its current validity status when policy requires it. It should be verified by this evidence: A revoked test credential fails and an otherwise valid unrevoked credential succeeds through the same EAP policy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: the My Devices registration quota limits how many personal devices an employee may enroll; this is independent of general wireless capacity. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 535

An enterprise access-control incident describes: The employee BYOD WLAN accepts a revoked certificate because certificate status checking is disabled in the configured EAP-TLS trust workflow. What underlying Cisco ISE dependency explains this result?

  1. Registration state and X.509 certificate validity are independent checks; a registered device cannot use an expired EAP credential.
  2. EAP clients and servers may validate certificate purpose in addition to chain and expiry; incompatible usages can invalidate an otherwise trusted certificate.
  3. BYOD native supplicant provisioning is not supported on all device types, while My Devices can register otherwise eligible non-supplicant endpoints.
  4. A certificate may remain correctly signed after revocation; authorization should consider its current validity status when policy requires it.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

A certificate may remain correctly signed after revocation; authorization should consider its current validity status when policy requires it. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. The acceptance result is: A revoked test credential fails and an otherwise valid unrevoked credential succeeds through the same EAP policy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. In the case being tested, Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A certificate may remain correctly signed after revocation; authorization should consider its current validity status when policy requires it.

B:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. In the case being tested, Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A certificate may remain correctly signed after revocation; authorization should consider its current validity status when policy requires it.

C:

The smart display appears under the employee's registered devices and receives only its permitted limited network authorization. In the case being tested, Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. The necessary acceptance evidence is: A certificate may remain correctly signed after revocation; authorization should consider its current validity status when policy requires it.

Question 536

In a staged Cisco ISE network access rollout, the team observes: The employee BYOD WLAN accepts a revoked certificate because certificate status checking is disabled in the configured EAP-TLS trust workflow. Which measurable outcome proves the intended behavior?

  1. Two differently owned pilot devices map to their respective employee records rather than one shared account.
  2. A newly issued certificate shows the required purpose and the supported client completes EAP-TLS.
  3. A revoked test credential fails and an otherwise valid unrevoked credential succeeds through the same EAP policy.
  4. The legitimate new owner registers the console only after prior association is properly resolved.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

A revoked test credential fails and an otherwise valid unrevoked credential succeeds through the same EAP policy. The required remediation is: Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. It works because a certificate may remain correctly signed after revocation; authorization should consider its current validity status when policy requires it.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The repeat risk here is different: Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. A directly relevant preventive control is: A revoked test credential fails and an otherwise valid unrevoked credential succeeds through the same EAP policy.

B:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The repeat risk here is different: Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. A directly relevant preventive control is: A revoked test credential fails and an otherwise valid unrevoked credential succeeds through the same EAP policy.

D:

The offered option specifies “The legitimate new owner registers the console only after prior association is properly resolved”. The question requires “A revoked test credential fails and an otherwise valid unrevoked credential succeeds through the same EAP policy”: Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. These are not equivalent responses to the stated requirement.

Question 537

An identity and device-administration engineer evaluates: The employee BYOD WLAN accepts a revoked certificate because certificate status checking is disabled in the configured EAP-TLS trust workflow. Which ongoing practice is most appropriate for this failure mode?

  1. Alert on approaching BYOD certificate expiry and provide an authorized renewal process.
  2. Coordinate CA rollover, PSN trust deployment, and overlap periods.
  3. Maintain OS-specific BYOD enrollment tests as mobile versions change.
  4. Monitor certificate revocation service reachability before granting secure BYOD access.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Monitor certificate revocation service reachability before granting secure BYOD access. This control addresses recurrence of the observed failure. The governing behavior is: A certificate may remain correctly signed after revocation; authorization should consider its current validity status when policy requires it. The ongoing acceptance check remains: A revoked test credential fails and an otherwise valid unrevoked credential succeeds through the same EAP policy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. The needed response is: Monitor certificate revocation service reachability before granting secure BYOD access.

B:

Correct the certificate identity extraction rules and issuer template to use an approved unique employee or device identifier. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. The needed response is: Monitor certificate revocation service reachability before granting secure BYOD access.

C:

Maintain OS-specific BYOD enrollment tests as mobile versions change. The actual fault is governed by a different mechanism: Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. The needed response is: Monitor certificate revocation service reachability before granting secure BYOD access.

Question 538

An ISE administrator troubleshoots the following: An administrator selects the HTTPS portal certificate as the only identity trusted for BYOD client EAP, confusing server authentication and personal device enrollment. Which response most directly corrects the described failure?

  1. Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates.
  2. Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs.
  3. Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device.
  4. Set the intended device portal endpoint identity group and validate the authorized registration workflow.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. This is appropriate because the certificate protecting a portal web session serves a different role from the client certificate used as an EAP-TLS identity. It should be verified by this evidence: A browser trusts the portal hostname and the same device separately authenticates with its valid enrolled client credential.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Install and validate the authorized CA chain and appropriate certificate authentication profile across participating PSNs. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

C:

Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

D:

Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. The offered choice instead concerns a different principle: Test registered-state policy-set selection after every SSID configuration change. Those technical conditions are not interchangeable.

Question 539

An access-security change request states: An administrator selects the HTTPS portal certificate as the only identity trusted for BYOD client EAP, confusing server authentication and personal device enrollment. Which statement best explains why the correct response works?

  1. A certificate may remain correctly signed after revocation; authorization should consider its current validity status when policy requires it.
  2. The certificate protecting a portal web session serves a different role from the client certificate used as an EAP-TLS identity.
  3. Registration state and X.509 certificate validity are independent checks; a registered device cannot use an expired EAP credential.
  4. ISE BYOD enrollment branches by endpoint platform; a configuration package valid for one OS need not install on another.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The certificate protecting a portal web session serves a different role from the client certificate used as an EAP-TLS identity. This behavior directly governs the stated requirement. The recommended action is: Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. The acceptance result is: A browser trusts the portal hostname and the same device separately authenticates with its valid enrolled client credential.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Configure supported revocation validation and reachable CRL or OCSP services according to policy. In the case being tested, Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The certificate protecting a portal web session serves a different role from the client certificate used as an EAP-TLS identity.

C:

Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. In the case being tested, Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The certificate protecting a portal web session serves a different role from the client certificate used as an EAP-TLS identity.

D:

Run onboarding with the actual limited-access ACL and DNS view used by new devices. In the case being tested, Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. The necessary acceptance evidence is: The certificate protecting a portal web session serves a different role from the client certificate used as an EAP-TLS identity.

Question 540

During a Cisco ISE postchange review, the following is observed: An administrator selects the HTTPS portal certificate as the only identity trusted for BYOD client EAP, confusing server authentication and personal device enrollment. Which observation would BEST verify successful remediation?

  1. The device presents a current certificate and receives its intended BYOD authorization while expired certificates are rejected.
  2. A browser trusts the portal hostname and the same device separately authenticates with its valid enrolled client credential.
  3. A newly issued certificate shows the required purpose and the supported client completes EAP-TLS.
  4. The personal laptop provisions on the enrollment SSID and then authenticates to the secure SSID with the approved certificate.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

A browser trusts the portal hostname and the same device separately authenticates with its valid enrolled client credential. The required remediation is: Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. It works because the certificate protecting a portal web session serves a different role from the client certificate used as an EAP-TLS identity.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Renew or reprovision a valid approved certificate and verify the permitted trust chain and identity mapping before reauthorizing the device. The repeat risk here is different: Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. A directly relevant preventive control is: A browser trusts the portal hostname and the same device separately authenticates with its valid enrolled client credential.

C:

Adjust the supported CA certificate template and issuance policy to include required client-authentication usages and compatible key constraints. The repeat risk here is different: Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. A directly relevant preventive control is: A browser trusts the portal hostname and the same device separately authenticates with its valid enrolled client credential.

D:

The personal laptop provisions on the enrollment SSID and then authenticates to the secure SSID with the approved certificate. The repeat risk here is different: Configure the proper separate trust relationships for portal HTTPS identity, EAP server identity, and issued client certificates. A directly relevant preventive control is: A browser trusts the portal hostname and the same device separately authenticates with its valid enrolled client credential.